Angels and non-angels: Are there differences?

The market for informal venture capital is an elusive and nearly invisible source of financing for entrepreneurial ventures. This market consists of a diverse set of high net worth individuals (business angels) who invest a portion of their assets in high-risk, high-return entrepreneurial ventures. The emerging consensus of the characteristics of the individual investor is that of a well-educated,middle-aged individual with considerable business experience and a substantial net worth. These informal investors appear to prefer investing in the early start-up stage of the venture and, if given a choice, prefer that their investments be located close to home. One consequence of this consensus is the tendency to assume that the traits of these business angels are as tightly clustered around the norm as are the traits of venture capital funds. They are not. In terms of their competence in the many areas of venture investing, these Individual investors range from the successful, cashed-out entrepreneur on the one hand to individuals with little or no experience with venture investing on the other. At the same time, little is known about the characteristics of high net worth individuals who never ventured where angels dare to tread, or about these non-angels' propensity to join the fold. Thus, this study seeks to fill the void by examining the characteristics of high net worth individuals regardless of their investment history or their interest in venture investing.An analysis of the data reveals three groups of high net worth Individuals: business angels with experience investing in entrepreneurial ventures, interested potential investors with no venture investment history but who express a desire to enter the venture investment market, and uninterested potential investors who under no circumstances would consider investing in entrepreneurial ventures as part of their investment strategy. Business angels and potential investors (both the interested and non-interested segment) share similar views about the economic significance of the entrepreneur and the difficulty in securing the equity capital for development of the venture. As the issues move from the general to the specific, divergence in investment attitudes takes place among the two groups, but this divergence is in terms of magnitude or intensity, rather than in contrasting or opposing views of the process. The potential investor tends to view investing in entrepreneurial ventures on a smaller scale than the active investor, especially in terms of the dollar amount committed to any one investment. While the business angel is more interested than the potential investor across all stages of financing, the interest for both groups increases as the type of financing progresses from the seed stage to expansion financing. In contrast, the potential investor is more likely to seek diversification as a motivation for venture investing than their angel counterparts.The potential investor pool is segmented into those potential investors who appear willing to take on the role of business angels and those individuals who have no desire to participate in the venture market. For the interested group to increase their interest in providing venture capital, these potential investors want assistance in monitoring the performance of the venture investment, followed by assistance in pricing and structuring. Both of these resources relate more to the technical aspects of venture investing and Indicate that these are the areas where the potential investor is least likely to have expertise. Other resources, such as finding and evaluating the investment opportunity, appear to represent less of a stimulus for the potential investor. In many respects, interested potential investors act like business angels across several dimensions. Both consider the later stages of the development of the venture as the preferred stage to invest. The business angel and interested potential investor prefer investments to be located relatively close to their primary residence and share similar views on the amount of the investment portfolio to allocate to venture investing. Where the interested potential investor and business angel clearly differ is on the scale of the commitment and the motivation for investing. The potential investor will commit a smaller dollar amount to any one venture, is more inclined to participate with other investors, and is more apt to see venture investing as a diversification strategy than is the seasoned business angel.     

对中小企业技术创新项目风险投资的博弈分析

在中小企业对技术创新项目进行融资的过程中,风险投资是其融资的一个重要途径,而风险投资人与风险企业之间会因利益的分配展开博弈。通过建立风险投资人与风险企业之间的博弈模型,可以看出风险企业对利润率高的技术创新项目进行风险融资的可行性并不高,所以风险投资人应谨慎选择风险企业进行投资,以降低资金风险。     

Growth patterns of the European venture capital industry

Although the European venture capital industry has become nearly as important as its American counterpart, little research has been done to describe its nature and importance. This study gives in the first place an overview of the importance of the venture capital industry in the major European countries. Thereafter, we look for funding and investment patterns in the different European countries. We hypothesize that there is a difference between countries in which the venture capital industry is just emerging, and those where the venture capital industry is since long established.The data are mainly, but not solely, taken from the yearly statistics of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and cover the period 1984–1989. The characteristics we look at are: (1) the sources of the funds flowing into the industry, broken down with respect to investor type and geographical location of the investor; and (2) the investments, broken down with respect to investment stage (using the EVCA definitions of the different stages), geographical location, degree of syndication, and industrial sector of the investee companies. In Europe as a whole, the most important group of investors are the banks (28%), the pension funds (17%), and the insurance companies (12%). Banks dominate the Swiss industry (48%); corporate investors dominate the German, Swedish, and Portuguese industries, whereas these are nearly completely absent in Denmark (2%), Ireland (4%), and the United Kingdom (5%). Eighty percent of all venture capital funds are raised domestically, 7% in another European country, and the remaining 13% in a non-European country.Almost half of the European investments (44%) are made in the expansion stage; management buy-outs (MBOs) account for another 36%. Only 14% is invested in seed or start-up companies, much less than the 30% in the U.S. Half of the venture capital investments in the United Kingdom are buy-outs. The highest start-up investment activity takes place in Austria and Spain. On average, more than half (54%) of the invested amount in Europe is syndicated, but only 6% internationally, while 10% is invested internationally.We also search for similarities and dissimilarities in the characteristics of the sources of funds and of the investments. The hypothesis is that a growth pattern can be distinguished, determining the maturity of the venture capital industry in a particular country. The characteristics that we think would discriminate most among the different industry stages are the importance of government agencies, pension funds, and insurance companies (sources of funds); of start-up, later stages, or MBO investments; and the percentage of international and syndicated investments. Cluster analyses show that there is a growth pattern, but it is less clear than expected. Characteristics of mature industries are a bigger size, relative to the gross national product of the country, the presence of pension funds and insurance companies as investors in the industry, the syndication of the deals, and the absence of the government as an investor, in the 1980s, investments in management buy-outs are mainly done by the mature industries. No pattern can be distinguished for the investments in early or later stages.The major implication from this study is the fact that the European venture capital industry cannot be approached as a single, undifferentiated industry. Each country has its own structures, institutions, and policies, which make the venture capital industries in the different countries have unique characteristics. Moreover, the European venture capital industry has different characteristics than the American industry; this has to be taken into account when comparing both industries.     

The Deal Structuring Stage of the Venture Capitalist Decision‐Making Process: Exploring Confidence and Control*

This exploratory study examines the deal structuring stage of the venture capitalist decision‐making process. Here, the primary issues of concern are investor confidence and potential control of a venture in relation to the level of financing the investor provides and the structure with which the funding is delivered. Confidence comes in support of the entrepreneur, the venture itself, or a combination of the two, prior to capital transfer, but after the initial “invest or not invest” decision has already occurred. Findings support a multicriteria perspective of the pre‐investment decision‐making process and a distinct difference between entrepreneur confidence and venture confidence in the deal structuring stage.     

Is it worth it? The rates of return from informal venture capital investments

Despite growing interest in venture capital, there is a paucity of information on the rate of return to these investments and the limited research that is available refers almost entirely to portfolio returns for venture capital funds. The investment returns to business angels have been virtually ignored. This paper provides the first attempt to analyse the returns to informal venture capital investment using data on 128 exited investments from a survey of 127 business angel investors in the UK. The paper finds that the distribution of returns is highly skewed, with 34% of exits at a total loss, 13% at a partial loss or break-even, but with 23% showing an IRR of 50% or above. Trade sales are the main way in which business angels harvest their investments. The median time to exit for successful investments was 4 years. Large investments, large deal sizes involving multiple coinvestors, and management buyouts (MBOs) were most likely to be high-performing investments.     

Legality and venture capital governance around the world

We analyze governance with a new dataset on investments of venture capitalists in 3848 portfolio firms in 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia spanning 1971–2003. We provide evidence that cross-country differences in legality, including legal origin and accounting standards, have a significant impact on the governance structure of investments in the VC industry: better laws facilitate faster deal screening and deal origination, a higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-investment, and facilitate investor board representation of the investor. We also show that country-specific differences exist apart from legal and economic development.     

After the cash arrives: A comparative study of venture capital and private investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms

Equity investments in entrepreneurial firms continue to grow in number and dollar amount from both venture capital and private investment sources. Increasingly, these two sources of capital play an important role in the development of new and existing entrepreneurial ventures. Due to the sometimes hurried attempt to turn their dream into reality, entrepreneurs may fail to consider similarities and differences in the value-added benefits supplied by venture capital firms (VCs) and private investors (PIs).Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to determine how initial relationships are established and maintained between entrepreneurs and their primary investors. Specifically, we asked entrepreneurs to assess characteristics of the relationship with their primary investor. We then contrasted the results between entrepreneurial firms that had received venture capital funding versus private investor funding. Differences were examined along the following lines:

• 1.• Levels of investor involvement in entrepreneurial firms
• 2.• Reporting and operational controls placed on the firm
• 3.• Types of expertise sought by the entrepreneur

     

基于期权定价理论的风险投资决策

项目评价的传统方法———净现值(NPV)法在应用于风险投资项目时,由于低估了投资价值,往往会使得投资者失去一些有价值的投资机会。结合风险投资的特性,将期权定价理论应用于风险投资决策中,并建立连续及离散两种状态下的决策模型     

Determinants of the Incidence and Scale of Seed Capital Investments by Venture Capital Firms

Employing both behavioral decision making and agency theories, our study seeks to identify those factors that influence a venture capital (VC) firm’s decision to undertake seed capital investments and, subsequently, the scale of such activity. Using data on the investments made by 2949 VC funds raised worldwide between 1962 and 2002, we find investor age, timing of investment, and fund location to be of importance. In addition, the size of the fund and the existing number of portfolio firms exert opposite influences on the level of seed capital activity of the VC firm. These results suggest that seed activity is a valuable source of market intelligence for leading VC firms seeking proactively to identify and invest in novel technologies.      

How venture capital firms differ

Four potential sources of differences between venture capital (VC) firms were examined—venture stage of interest, amount of assistance provided by the VC, VC firm size, and geographic region where located. Through a questionnaire, 149 venture capitalists provided data about their firms, about what they look for in evaluating an investment, and about how they work with a portfolio company following an investment.Firms were divided into four groups based on venture stage of interest. The earlier the investment stage, the greater the interest in potential investments built upon proprietary products, product uniqueness, and high growth markets. Late-stage investors were more interested in demonstrated market acceptance.There were no differences by stage regarding the desired qualities of management. However, after the investment was made, earlier stage investors attached more importance to spending their time evaluating and recruiting managers. Earlier stage investors sought ventures with higher potential returns—a 42% hurdle rate of return for the earliest stage investor versus 33% for the late-stage investor.Late-stage investors spent more time evaluating a potential investment. However, after the investment was made, there was little difference in the amount of time spent assisting the portfolio company. There were, however, differences in the significance that VCs attached to particular post-investment activities. Firms were split into three groups based upon the amount of time the VC spent with a portfolio company after an investment was made as lead investor. The most active group averaged over 35 hours per month per investment, and the least active group averaged less than seven hours.The difference in assistance provided was not strongly tied to differences in investment stage of interest. There were major differences in the importance the VCs attached to their post-investment activities. Not surprisingly, high involvement VCs viewed their activities as more important.Based upon the amount of capital they managed, firms were also split into three groups. Average fund size varied from 278 to 12 million dollars. The larger firms had more professionals and managed more money per professional. The large firms provided the least, and the medium-sized firms the most, assistance to portfolio companies. Large firms also made larger individual investments. Even though they invested over half their funds in late-stage investments whereas smaller firms focused on the earlier stages, the large firms were still a major source of early stage financing.There were no differences between geographic regions in the proportion of investments where the venture capital firm served as lead investor. There were, however, major regional differences in investment stages of interest. Also differences were observed between regions that were not a result of differing size and investment stage.     

风险投资最优融资契约安排模型研究

风险投资中投资者与风险投资家之间的关系是一种委托与代理关系,投资者和风险投资家的目的都是实现收益最大化。融资契约收益的分配直接影响到风险投资家的努力水平,从而影响到最终的投资收益。因此,只有从投资者和风险投资家两个角度分析风险投资中的最优契约安排,才能给出最优契约安排的选择区间。     

Emerging strategies in the venture capital industry

This article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms. There are three main sets of results:First, the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different “strategic groups.” Members of these “groups” are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms: 1. Financial Resources—Equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources (five major sources) resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm. 2. Staff Resources—The way venture capital firms use staff resources, particularly regarding investee management assistance, is becoming increasingly varied across different groups. Some firms provide fewer than 2-days per year, while others provide up to 450 man-days per year per client. 3. Venture Stages—While the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1,2, and 3 investment, specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages. 4. Use of Financial Resources-Firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make ($100 M to $1000 M) and in their role as a direct investor versus a “broker” for institutional funds. Practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways. First, they may find it useful to compare their firm's orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm's that comprised this study. Second, they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine, clarify, and/or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm.A second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups. Annualized, after-tax return on investments of between 25% and 40% remain the most common objective across all firms. A 5-to-6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms.A third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater “certainty” about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm. The most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline.Practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry. Second, they should consider the finding that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry.It is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger, older funds. Some of these funds would be characterized as “industry leaders, pace-setters, and innovators.” The sample provides a solid representation of the “broad middle” of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry. While larger, older funds are under represented, their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about “future direction of the venture capital industry.“Finally, the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital. For investors, the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied. Basically, this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry/geographic considerations.For users of venture capital, the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs. Users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities, staff utilization orientations, sources and uses of financial resources. This should make for more informed “shopping” among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to “shop” for the most compatible firm.     

风险投资对创业企业作用的实证研究

文章从风险投资对创业企业作用的机理分析出发,实证研究风险投资对创业企业创生和企业成长的作用。对企业创生作用的研究表明风险投资活动的发展和增长有助于地区新企业的创生,一方面风险投资为那些无法从传统渠道融资的创业企业提供资金支持,另一方面也刺激地区创新,促使新经济部门、新技术、新产品的出现,为创业者创业活动提供更多机遇。有关风险投资对创业企业成长作用的研究采用倾向得分匹配法,该方法有效剔除了风险投资家“选择作用”对研究结果造成的偏差。研究结果表明风险投资不但有助于企业规模的不断扩大,同时也有助于企业研发创新等各项成长能力的提升,有效促进了企业竞争优势,帮助企业做大做强。     

Incremental impact of venture capital financing

This paper investigates the differences in the return generating process of venture capital (VC)-backed firms and their peers that operate without VC financing. Using a unique hand-picked database of 990 VC-backed Belgian firms and a complete population of Belgian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we focus on the extent to which the presence of a VC investor affects the sensitivity of a firm’s returns to the changes in the capital structure, in the operating cycle, and in the industry dynamics. The differences may stem from the (self-) selection of better companies into VC portfolios, from the venture capitalists’ (VCs) value-adding activities, and/or from both. We examine these factors in the context of a complex simulation procedure which allows separating selection from value-adding when traditional approaches are difficult to implement. Our results indicate that VC-backed firms are able to extract more rent from the changing industry conditions and from the optimizations in their capital structure. The presence of VCs in the firm’s equity seems to have only a marginal effect on the operating cycle efficiency. Overall, the results are suggestive of the value-adding being the main driver of the VC-backed firm’s performance.     

风险投资对企业并购决策的影响及作用机制

近年来,伴随着并购市场的快速发展及股权投资退出渠道的多元化,风险投资参与的并购决策事件大幅增多。本文以我国创业板上市企业完成的并购事件为研究样本,系统研究风险投资对企业并购频次、并购支付方式及多元化并购行为等方面的影响及其作用机制。结果发现,风险投资能够通过抑制管理层过度自信进而降低并购方的频繁并购行为;得益于风险投资对并购中信息不对称的缓解,目标方接受有风险投资背景的企业以非现金方式作为并购支付对价的概率更高;此外,风险投资通过提升企业内部控制有效性,使得有风险投资背景的企业更偏好于进行同行业并购,以优化企业并购目标选择及实现企业规模效应。     

黑龙江省风险投资政府支持存在问题及对策研究

现阶段,黑龙江省风险投资还是以政府直接投资为主。政府过度干预存在着资金来源单一、委托代理、效率低下等问题。黑龙江省在风险投资过程中,政府应找准定位,实现资金来源多元化,建立风险投资的综合评估筛选体制。同时,政府出台适合风险投资发展的政策及法规,营造良好的外部环境,促进黑龙江省风险投资的进一步发展。     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

Venture Capital Investment Duration

This paper examines cross‐country evidence on the duration of venture capital (VC) investment. We formulate a theory of VC investment duration based on the idea that venture capitalists exit when the expected marginal cost of maintaining the investment is greater than the expected marginal benefit, and thereby relate VC investment duration to entrepreneurial firm characteristics, investor characteristics, deal characteristics, and institutional and market conditions. VC investment duration data in Canada and the United States lend strong support to the theoretical predictions developed herein.     

Chinese venture investments in the United States, 2010–2017

This article contributes to the understanding of Chinese venture investors in the United States by comprehensively measuring the amount and type of venture investments coming to the United States from China. Venture activity is examined by focusing on the number of investments made by venture capital funds, both U.S.‐ and China‐based that include Chinese corporations undertaking corporate venture capital (CVC). Chinese participation in venture funding of United States emerging companies increased from 21 investments in 2010 to 407 in 2016 and 2017. Venture capital funds account for 78% of the investment activity, with Chinese CVC undertaking 22% of the investments. We contribute to the literature of CVC by providing definitions of three specific types of investing firms: corporate funds, strategic investors, and strategic partnerships. In addition, we provide data and examine the motivations of Chinese firms forming strategic partnerships with United States startups.     

风险投资国际化影响因素研究综述

风险投资长期以来被视为是一项高度本土化的行为,但是近年来越来越多的风投机构开始走出国门进行远距离的跨境投资。这一现象引起了学者们的极大兴趣,许多学者开始致力于考察跨境风险投资的动因,即为什么本土化特征如此明显的风险资本开始热衷于进行跨越国境的远距离投资。尽管相关研究近几年才刚刚开始,但已迅速成为学术研究的热点。文章从国家环境因素、社会网络和风投机构主体因素三个层次,对风险投资国际化影响因素的最新文献进行了梳理和评述,并在此基础上对未来研究进行了展望。