Risk-Shifting Incentives and Signalling Through Corporate Capital Structure

This paper examines optimal corporate financing arrangements under asymmetric information for different patterns of temporal resolution of uncertainty in the underlying technology. An agency problem, a signalling problem and an agency-signalling problem arise as special cases. The associated informational equilibria and the optimal financing arrangements are characterized and compared. In the agency-signalling equilibrium the private information of corporate insiders at the time of financing is signalled through capital structure choices which deviate optimally from agency-cost minimizing financing arrangements, which in turn induce risk-shifting incentives in the investment policy. In the pure signalling case the equilibrium is characterized by direct contractual precommitments to implement investment policies which are riskier than pareto-optimal levels. Empirical implications for debt covenants and the announcement effect of investment policies and leverage increasing transactions on existing stock and bond prices are explicitly derived.     

Market Timing and Capital Structure

It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.     

Market Structure, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking

This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks’ franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system efficiency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics.     

资产专用性、产品市场竞争和资本结构——基于我国上市公司的实证分析

本文研究资产专用性和产品市场竞争对公司资本结构的影响,发现我国上市公司资本结构与产品市场强度和资产专用性负相关。在高资产专用性行业,资产清算价值受到影响,产品市场竞争越激烈,发生清算的概率越大,公司负债率越低。我们运用沪深上市公司面板数据进行检验,实证分析支持我们的理论假设,并且三者之间的关系在不同行业表现出不同的特征,这主要是受不同的行业竞争结构和资产专用性的影响。理论和实证分析表明在我国某些竞争性行业存在＂过度监管＂现象,融资条件过于苛刻而不能得到有效的股权融资。     

Conglomerate Structure and Capital Market Timing

We examine the effects of keiretsu structure on capital market-timing. Keiretsu groups offer a hybrid structure between fully integrated conglomerates and stand-alone firms. We find that past market conditions affect the capital structure of keiretsu firms more than they affect the capital structure of unaffiliated firms. The decision to issue equity is more correlated with market conditions for keiretsu members than it is for unaffiliated firms. The stock returns of keiretsu firms following the issuance of equity decrease with the size of the issuance. These results suggest that keiretsu members time the issuance of equity more so than stand-alone firms.     

一切从"结构优化"出发

2004年新春伊始,当投资者还在为贬市的涨跌狐疑不定时,新华社2月1日正式刊发了《国务院关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定发展的若干意见》(简称《意见》)。该《意见》涵盖了我国资本市场发展的历史、指导思想和任务,并就目前中国资中市场备受关注的几个问题如资本市场体系建设问题、上市公司质量提升问题、股份全流通问题提出了具体意见。鉴于《意见》的本身对中国资本市场发展所具有的重要意义,本刊特别就该《意见》中提出的几个问题邀请相关人士加以分析,以飨读者。     

市场条件、竞争状况与资本结构的关联研究

使用沪、深A股制造业的样本数据,运用向量自回归模型（VAR）研究市场条件、竞争状况与资本结构的关联特征。实证结果表明,市场条件、竞争状况显著影响资产和负债的变动,但资本结构的调整没有表现出明显的融资优序。此外,市场条件、竞争状况对短期负债的影响较长期负债显著,表明企业长期负债的主要动机源于其长远战略规划,与市场条件和竞争状况关联较低。资本结构（包括债务期限）的变动对市场条件、竞争状况没有显著影响。     

资本结构理论与控制权市场行为的相关性浅析

资本结构理论与控制权市场理论是现代金融经济学的重要组成部分。它们之间的相互融合、渗透已经成为其不断发展和完善的必然过程。资本结构理论价值的进一步升华离不开对公司控制权市场理论若干要素的解释和证明；公司控制权市场理论也只有以传统的资本结构理论为根基才能不断发展和壮大。     

The Theory of Capital Structure

This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.     

Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe

We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank‐level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of “equity‐friendly” market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both “equity‐friendly” and “credit‐friendly” market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely.     

Capital Structure Equilibrium under Market Imperfections and Incompleteness

This paper generalizes Miller's supply-side equilibrium argument to other forms of capital market imperfections and incompleteness. If corporations possess a comparative advantage in dealing with these imperfections, they have an incentive to act as financial intermediaries. Corporations' attempts to profit from these intermediation activities dictate an optimal capital structure for the corporate sector as a whole, but in equilibrium the capital structure of any single firm is a matter of indifference. In addition, the positive role that corporate finance plays in completing the market restores standard perfect market results on asset pricing and the associated portfolio separation properties.     

资本市场会计理论研究综述

西方资本市场会计理论研究从方法论视角来看主要是实证研究.会计领域资本市场研究的主要需求在于:基础分析和评估、资本市场有效性检验、会计数据在合同和政治过程中的作用和披露监管.这些问题的研究对于资本市场投资决策、会计准则制订和公司财务披露决策方面有着重要作用.     

Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings

In this paper, we examine the stock price reactions to announcements of new security offerings by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs offer a unique setting in which to study these events because they do not pay taxes at the firm level. Theory suggests that the net tax gain to corporate borrowing is unambiguously negative for a REIT. Contrary to some recent studies, however, we find a positive stock price reaction to debt offerings, while the negative equity-issuance effect is preserved. Further empirical evidence lends support to signalling as the explanation for the positive significant debt-issuance effect.     

Capital Structure Theory and the Fisher Effect

This paper incorporates capital structure theory to model the response of nominal interest rates to expected inflation in a world with taxes. Within an otherwise common framework, the model includes Modigliani-Miller (MM) and Miller capital structure theory, as well as a variation of the Miller model with bankruptcy costs, developed by DeAngelo and Masulis. Within this framework, we derive an equation to predict the response of nominal interest rates under each capital structure hypothesis. With MM theory, our model predicts di_D/d_π value consistent with empirically observed ranges. With Miller theory, the predictions are inaccurate. With DeAngelo-Masulis, the predictions vary widely; the midpoint of the predicted range is less accurate than with Miller theory.     

Bond Market Access,Credit Quality,and Capital Structure: Canadian Evidence

We examine the impact of bond market access (measured by having a credit rating) on leverage for Canadian high credit quality (HQ) and low credit quality (LQ) firms, and find that the leverage impact is more pronounced for LQ firms. The results are similar for U.S. firms. Our results are confirmed when we control for the firm's credit quality, examine the change in leverage around rating initiation, and account for the issue size effect. A similar leverage impact for Canadian and U.S. LQ firms suggests that the Canada‐U.S. bond market integration has mitigated the financial constraints for Canadian LQ firms.     

Market Structure,Internal Capital Markets,and the Boundaries of the Firm

We study how the creation of an internal capital market (ICM) can invite strategic responses in product markets that, in turn, shape firm boundaries. ICMs provide ex post resource flexibility, but come with ex ante commitment costs. Alternatively, stand‐alones possess commitment ability but lack flexibility. By creating flexibility, integration can sometimes deter a rival's entry, but commitment problems can also invite predatory capital raising. These forces drive different organizational equilibria depending on the integrator's relation to the product market. Hybrid organizational forms like strategic alliances can sometimes dominate integration by offering some of its benefits with fewer strategic costs.