Appraisal Quality and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from Alaska

We empirically examine the effect of appraisal quality on subsequent mortgage loan performance using data from the high volatility housing market of Alaska in the 1980s. We develop measures of appraisal quality by computing the residual between a hedonic estimate of house value using available information from other appraisals compared to actual ex ante appraised value. We then estimate proportional hazard models of mortgage default and find that several measures of appraisal quality, particularly appraised value in excess of hedonic estimates, are significantly related to default risk. Using valuations subsequent to loan default, we are also able to evaluate how well house price indices perform in terms of estimating current loan-to-value and offer some additional evidence on the controversy over the role of net equity versus trigger events as determinants of mortgage default. We also show that defaults are related to ex ante measures of housing market conditions, with additional implications for underwriting policies and the current industry trend away from traditional appraisal and toward automated valuation.     

The determinants of bank loan recovery rates

Using Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database, we estimate a model for bank loan recoveries using variables reflecting loan and borrower characteristics, industry and macroeconomic conditions, and several recovery process variables. We find that loan characteristics are more significant determinants of recovery rates than are borrower characteristics prior to default. Industry and macroeconomic conditions are relevant, as are prepackaged bankruptcy arrangements. We examine whether a commonly used proxy for recovery rates, the 30-day post-default trading price of the loan, represents an efficient estimate of actual recoveries and find that such a proxy is biased and inefficient.     

The impact of technical defaults on dividend policy

This paper examines how loan covenant violations impact firm dividend policy. Using contract-level loan data for nonfinancial firms in the US, this study provides evidence that the occurrence of a covenant violation significantly increases the likelihood of a dividend reduction in the subsequent quarter. Moreover, we show that the degree of creditor–shareholder conflict and firm financial constraints are important determinants of dividend cuts upon technical default. Additionally, this paper finds the tendency of dividend cuts upon technical default weakened after the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act. These findings suggest that loan covenants serve a critical role in mitigating creditor–shareholder conflicts.     

Repayment behavior in peer‐to‐peer microfinancing: Empirical evidence from Kiva

Based on a sample of microloans (to individuals and to groups) that were refinanced through the peer-to-peer microfinancing platform Kiva, we study the determinants of the repayment behavior of micro-entrepreneurs whose loans are available to international charitable lenders. We perform binary regressions and account for influential factors such as the time required for funding or the type of entrepreneurial activity. The screening and monitoring quality of the microfinance institution which selects the borrowers is a main driver of credit default. We find evidence that the loan size, the loan term and the length of a possible grace period influence the probability of default. Moreover, women demonstrate better repayment behavior which is, however, not the case for groups of women.     

Loan Portfolio Swaps and Optimal Lending

Theories on loan portfolio swap hedging are based on a portfolio-choice approach. This paper presents an alternative: a firm-theoretic model for bank behavior with loan portfolio swaps. Our paper derives the optimal loan rate and rate-taking loan amount of the banks portfolio, and relates them to the market loan rate, counterparty loan rate, swap default risk, capital-to-deposits ratio, and deposit insurance. We find that in the bilateral default risk approach, the comparative static results are generated by four factors: the banks risk magnitude about the equity market value, loan composition in the swap contract, the substitution effect in the loan portfolio, and the income effect from the swap transaction. The results imply that changes in the payoff asymmetry in the event of swap default and the banks regulatory parameters have a direct effect on the banks loan portfolio for lending and swap transactions.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and advice.     

A Note on Selecting a Response Measure for Financial Distress

Since 1966, researchers have examined financial distress prediction models to determine the usefulness of accounting information to lenders. These researchers primarily used legal bankruptcy as the response variable for economic financial distress, or included legal bankruptcy with other events in dichotomous prediction models. However, theoretical models of financial distress normally define financial distress as an economic event, the inability to pay debts when due (insolvency). This study uses a loan default/accommodation response variable as a proxy for the inability to pay debts when due. The purpose of this note is to empirically test whether or not using the inability of a firm to pay debts when due, loan default/accommodation, as a response measure produces different results than using legal bankruptcy as the response measure. The study's empirical results show that legal bankruptcy and loan default/accommodation financial distress prediction models produce different statistical results, thus suggesting that the responses measure different constructs. A loan default/accommodation model also fits the data better than a bankrupt model. Our results suggest that a loan default/accommodation response may be a more appropriate measure to determine which accounting information is most useful to lenders in evaluating a firm's credit risk.     

Mortgage Loan Securitization and Relative Loan Performance

We compare the ex ante observable risk characteristics, the default performance, and the pricing of securitized mortgage loans to mortgage loans retained by the original lender. In our sample of loans originated between 2000 and 2007, we find that privately securitized fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages were riskier ex ante than lender-retained loans or loans securitized through the government sponsored agencies. We do not find any evidence of differential loan performance for privately securitized fixed-rate mortgages. We find evidence that privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages performed worse than retained mortgages, although other observable factors appear to be more economically important determinants of mortgage default. We do not find any evidence of a compensating premium in the loan rates for privately securitized adjustable-rate mortgages.     

An Analysis of SBA Loan Defaults by Maturity Structure

The financial intermediation literature on small business lending focuses on the determinants and costs to credit access. There is, however, little research examining the repayment behavior of small firms that actually receive loans. In this paper, we address this shortcoming in the literature by examining the default behavior of a sample of Small Business Administration 7(a) guaranteed loans with three distinct maturity structures. We employ a discrete-time hazard approach and show that SBA defaults are time-dependent and that the factors impacting default behavior, as well as its timing, are maturity specific. Specifically, we show the importance of loan maturity, seasoning, economic conditions, and other firm-specific factors in predicting the likelihood of SBA loan defaults. JEL classification: G21     

信贷损失准备计提的理论分析

本文在预期损失与损失准备概念的基础上,通过对贷款价值、预期损失与违约升水之间关系的分析提出了信贷损失准备计提的理论与方法,指出基于未来现金流量折现法的信贷准备计提方法更能反映贷款的真实价值。最后结合银行信贷损失准备计提的实践,对理论方法与实践中的作法进行了简要的评析。     

Cost stickiness and bank loan contracting

This study examines whether and, if so, how borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., cost stickiness) is factored into the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. We provide strong and reliable evidence that ex-ante, the loan spread increases with cost stickiness after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Moreover, we find that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers with higher default risk and higher information risk. This is consistent with borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior increasing lenders' uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, and hence, lenders need to be compensated ex-ante. Additionally, we conjecture that higher cost stickiness may increase the need for ex-post monitoring. Consistent with this conjecture, we find some evidence that lenders impose tighter non-price terms on firms with stickier costs. This study integrates cost stickiness research with the banking literature by showing that banks incorporate borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior into loan contracting terms.     

Firm Size Dependence in the Determinants of Bank Term Loan Maturity

Abstract:   We examine the hypothesis that firm size affects the sensitivity of bank term loan maturity to its underlying determinants. As borrower size increases, negotiating power with the lender and information transparency increase, while the lender is able to spread the fixed costs of loan production across a larger dollar value of the loan. We find strong evidence of firm size dependency in the determinants of bank term loan maturity and show that this is unrelated to syndication. Only large borrowers can manipulate bank loan contract terms so as to increase firm value.     

Bank Debt versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices

This paper uses a new data set of daily secondary market prices of loans to analyze the specialness of banks as monitors. Consistent with a monitoring advantage of loans over bonds, we find the secondary loan market to be informationally more efficient than the secondary bond market prior to a loan default. Specifically, we find that secondary market loan returns Granger cause secondary market bond returns prior to a loan default. In contrast, secondary market bond returns do not Granger cause secondary market loan returns prior to a loan default.     

Relative default rates on corporate loans and bonds

We use two alternative matched-set methodologies to examine for differences in loan and bond default rates among US non-financial corporate issuers. Under both methodologies, the data indicate that loan default rates are roughly 20% lower than the bond default rates due to issuers that default on their bonds but avoid bankruptcy and avoid defaulting on their loans. For a small number of European issuers, the data suggest a similar reduction in loan default rates relative to bond default rates. However, the European results differ qualitatively from the US results, due likely to differences in US and European bankruptcy regimes, as well as the larger role of bank debt on most European issuers’ balance sheets. These results have important implications for investors, bank supervisors, and rating agencies that assess the relative expected credit losses on loans versus bonds.     

企业风险异质性、贷款利率与信贷违约风险——基于银行信贷微观数据

通过某股份制商业银行2010-2015年贷款数据,讨论不同风险贷款企业、贷款利率与信贷违约之间的关系.结果表明:贷款利率与贷款违约之间呈现U型关系;高风险等级企业与贷款违约之间正相关且显著;无论是高风险等级企业还是低风险等级企业与银行贷款利率之间均呈现负相关且显著,说明贷款利率的抑制现象依然存在.从参数估计值来看,低风险等级企业贷款利率要低于高风险等级企业;高风险企业与贷款利率交叉项与违约之间呈现负相关且显著,说明高风险企业通过贷款利率渠道确实可以降低信贷违约概率.     

IRB法下公司敞口组合的风险驱动因子计量研究

巴塞尔银行监管委员会针对防范信贷组合信用风险所需要的资本制定的内部评级法,通过风险驱动因子的变化来反映组合回报的变化,并根据风险权重函数,通过风险加权资产转化为与每一项信用风险敞口更准确匹配的资本要求.本文对违约概率、违约损失率、违约敞口、期限因素以及违约相关性等信贷组合信用风险的风险驱动因子的度量进行了综合研究.     

Offering Rates on Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Loans

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic determinants of the spread between simultaneous fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage loan offering rates. Previously developed theoretical relationships are used to construct an econometric model that incorporates both general financial market and region-specific variables. Results indicate that changes in offering rate spreads are positively related to changes in the level and volatility of interest rates and negatively related to changes in variables that proxy for potential default risk.     

The good,the bad and the impaired: A credit risk model of the Irish mortgage market

Using a uniquely constructed loan-level dataset of the residential mortgage book of Irish financial institutions, this paper provides a framework for estimating default probabilities of individual mortgages. In contrast to the popular stock delinquency approach, this model provides estimates of default and cure flows: a requirement of the stress test approach adopted by the European Central Bank's comprehensive assessment. In addition, both default and cure transitions are modelled as functions of micro- and macro-covariates including loan characteristics and current macroeconomic conditions such as house prices and unemployment. When comparing the competing equity and affordability effects, labour market deterioration played a stronger role than house equity in the rise of Irish default rates. For cures, a scarring effect of default is identified and estimated with the probability of a loan returning to performing reducing by almost four per cent each month a loan remains delinquent.     

Subprime Transitions: Lingering or Malingering in Default?

When a mortgage borrower becomes seriously delinquent (i.e., defaults), the lender initiates a time consuming and complex recovery process that may or may not result in foreclosure and eventual disposition of the real estate collateral (REO). This research studies this transition process for a unique sample of subprime mortgages that were seriously delinquent on September 30, 2001. Eight months later, possible states for the delinquent loans, in order, are 1)to remain delinquent without deteriorating further, 2) foreclosure, 3) worsen, i.e., become more months delinquent, 4) bankruptcy and 5) cure. The data indicate that, relative to prime loans, when subprime loans become seriously delinquent (90 days or longer) they are about twice as likely to become REO but take about four times longer to get there. It is unusual for a subprime default to be cured suggesting considerable forbearance by subprime lenders. We explore determinants of the transition probabilities and find that the most economically important predictors of transition from default to any other state are the number of payments the borrower has made and the loan to value ratio.     

Regional redistribution through SBA guaranteed loan programs

We document and quantify a new implicit transfer mechanism in the SBA 7(a) loan program that redistributes funds between US states. We use SBA 7(a) loan data in conjunction with Dealscan private corporate loan data to show that SBA 7(a) loan interest rates are much less responsive to predicted local loan default risk compared to private corporate loans. This redistributes funds from states with low default risk to states with high default risk. These transfers are positively correlated with the severity of local economic shocks during the Great Recession and the COVID-19 Recession. Therefore, even though it was unintended, the interest rates on SBA 7(a) loans acted as an automatic stabilizer mitigating regional economic shocks.     

Strategic loan modification: An options-based response to strategic default

This paper presents a parsimonious barrier model for the optimal principal reset in a loan modification, thereby maximizing the loan value to the lender bank and minimizing the likelihood of strategic foreclosure by the homeowner. Writing down the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio will reduce the present value of future payments on the loan, but will also reduce the probability of default, thereby saving foreclosure losses. The optimal trade-off of these two countervailing effects will pinpoint the optimal LTV at which the loan must be reset. We present a simple barrier option decomposition of the loan value that makes the optimization of LTV easy to implement. An extension of the model is shown to account for varying growth rate assumptions about house prices. The model in this paper specifically accounts for the homeowner’s willingness to pay, and uses the framework to model shared-appreciation mortgages (SAMs).