How to win a decision in a confederation

This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff: competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous states.     

Campaigning and election outcomes in a presidential primary election

This article presents new evidence from the US presidential primary setting on the role campaigning plays in determining election outcomes. Using candidate visits as a measure of campaign intensity, I estimate a discrete choice model of voting using a differentiated products framework where I allow for abstention and create instruments for campaigning based on Democratic Party rules for delegate allocation. On average, a visit by a candidate increases the vote share of this candidate by about 2.4 percentage points and decreases the abstaining share by 0.7 percentage points.     

Majority rule when voters like to win

I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate and to vote for the winner. When voters care only about the winning candidate (the standard formulation) a unique responsive equilibrium exists. The addition of a desire to win creates multiple equilibria, some with unusual properties. In most of these equilibria information is not aggregated effectively, and I uncover the novel possibility of negative information aggregation in which information aggregated in equilibrium is used to select the worse rather than the better candidate.I then characterize the efficiency of optimal equilibria as the population becomes large and show that a discontinuity arises in the information aggregation capabilities of the majority rule voting mechanism: in elections without a dominant front-running candidate the better candidate is almost surely elected, whereas in races with a front-runner information cannot be effectively aggregated in equilibrium.     

Majority rule when voters like to win

I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate and to vote for the winner. When voters care only about the winning candidate (the standard formulation) a unique responsive equilibrium exists. The addition of a desire to win creates multiple equilibria, some with unusual properties. In most of these equilibria information is not aggregated effectively, and I uncover the novel possibility of negative information aggregation in which information aggregated in equilibrium is used to select the worse rather than the better candidate.I then characterize the efficiency of optimal equilibria as the population becomes large and show that a discontinuity arises in the information aggregation capabilities of the majority rule voting mechanism: in elections without a dominant front-running candidate the better candidate is almost surely elected, whereas in races with a front-runner information cannot be effectively aggregated in equilibrium.     

The effect of remittances prior to an election

The objective of the article is to assess whether remittances have an influence on political manipulation, which may occur prior to an election, through an increase in the government consumption-to-GDP ratio. We combine data from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy data set compiled and discussed in Hyde and Marinov (2012) and the World Development Indicators data set. We focus on 70 developing countries over the period 1990–2010. It appears that the political budget cycle is reduced up to the point where it is fully cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10.7% of GDP. Those findings are robust to different robustness checks.     

How to suppress a lead

According to the findings of Schöler (1994)¹ the “Business Climate” developed by the ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, cannot be used as a leading indicator for business cycle forecast. This paper shows that this result is due to Schöler's choice of statistical methods applied: apart from generating stationary time series, Schöler's filter systematically suppresses the business cycle components and amplifies the irregular components. It impairs the basis for the causality test.     

Predicting presidential election results

The 2004 US presidential election proved again how difficult it is to predict vote shares on the basis of polls. Midday media exit polls suggested that Senator Kerry would become the 44th President. Political scientists and econometricians, led by Ray Fair, have promulgated theoretical arguments and empirical results to predict US presidential elections, using macro-economic data and political factors. Respecifying Fair's war variable to include Korea and Vietnam and removing serial correlation improves his election forecasting without public opinion poll variables. This generalized Fair model predicts President Bush's two-party vote share would be 52.3 percent, well below predictions by Fair and prestigious political scientists.     

Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition

We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in equilibrium, few are predicted to misreport. It is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest. We test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it. This finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations.     

解析商务谈判之"双赢"途径

"双赢"谈判理念是把谈判当作一个合作的过程,视谈判对手如伙伴,与对方共同寻找满足双方利益的方案,真正实现共好双赢.从发展趋势来看,"双赢"谈判无疑有巨大的发展空间.但是,在实际工作中,尤其在处理商务谈判中的利益关系时,却存在着过分重视立场,时关系、利益重视不够、对潜在利益挖掘不充分等诸多问题.文章就商务谈判在把握利益时容易处理失当的几种关系进行了论述,从中探讨出实现"双赢"的谈判思路.