On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm

This study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem. We assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly, and analyze the strategic behavior of students. We demonstrate the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game through a simple algorithm that finds it. Specifically, (i) the equilibrium outcome from our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm and (ii) in a one-to-one matching market, it coincides with the student-optimal von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable matching. We also show that (i) when a strict core allocation in a housing market derived from a college admission market exists, it can be supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium, and (ii) there exists a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the college-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the student-optimal stable matching is Pareto-efficient for students.     

Housing choices,sorting, and the distribution of educational benefits under deferred acceptance

I study the welfare and distributional consequences of introducing the student‐proposing deferred acceptance in a model where schools have exogenous qualities and the benefit from attending a school is supermodular in school quality and student type. Unlike neighborhood assignment, deferred acceptance induces nonpositive assortative matching where higher type students do not necessarily choose neighborhoods with better schools. Student types are more heterogeneous within neighborhoods under deferred acceptance. Assuming an elastic housing supply, deferred acceptance benefits residents in lower quality neighborhoods with more access to higher quality schools. Moreover, more parents will “vote with their feet” for deferred acceptance, other things equal, than for neighborhood assignment.     

全流通环境下投资者利益保护研究——控股股东、中小股东和经理人三方博弈分析

随着上市公司控制权的转移,投资者保护在全流通环境下有了新的内涵。文章从公司的委托代理问题出发,构建了控股股东、中小股东和经理人的三方博弈模型。各方决策的混合策略纳什均衡结果显示,股权的集中在一定程度上可以抑制公司的内部人控制;为保护投资者利益,应对控股股东和经理人的违规操作进行严厉惩罚,降低投资者的监督稽查成本,健全上市公司的治理机制。