Should all Choices Count? Using the Cut-Offs Approach to Edit Responses in a Choice Experiment

Should we give equal weight to all responses in a choice experiment? Previous Choice Modelling papers have considered the issue of the internal consistency of choices—such as the extent to which strictly-dominated options are chosen. In this paper, a different focus is employed, namely the extent to which people choose options which violate their stated upper or lower limits for the acceptable levels for individual attributes. Since hypothetical over-statement of WTP has been a focus in stated preference studies, we concentrate on violations of stated upper limits of WTP, and explore the effects of “editing” such choices using a variable censoring rule and alternative approaches to re-classifying choices. The empirical case study is a choice experiment on eco-tourists in Rwanda. Our main conclusion is that the suggested approach offers a useful way of imposing consistency on choices, and that editing choices in this manner has an appreciable impact on estimated willingness to pay. However, issues remain with regard to explaining why people apparently violate their stated maximum willingness to pay.     

Using an integrated choice and latent variable model to understand the impact of “professional” respondents in a stated preference survey

Internet panels are increasingly used for stated preference research. Because members of such panels receive compensation for each completed survey, one concern is that over time this creates professional respondents who answer surveys solely for the monetary compensation. We identify professional respondents using data on panel tenure, survey response frequency, completion rate and total number of completed surveys. We find evidence of two types of professional respondents: “hyperactives” who answer surveys frequently and “experienced” who have long panel tenure and a large number of completed surveys. Using an integrated choice and latent variable model on stated preference survey data, we find that “hyperactive” respondents are less likely to choose the 'status quo’ and have a more stochastic choice process as seen from the econometrician's point of view, whereas “experienced” respondents have a relatively more deterministic choice process. Our results show that “hyperactive” respondents significantly impact estimated values.     

Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property

A social choice function satisfies the tops‐only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most‐preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy‐proofness implies the tops‐only property provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this paper, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy‐proof social choice function satisfies the tops‐only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences.     

Dealing with preference uncertainty in contingent willingness to pay for a nature protection program: A new approach

In this paper, we propose an alternative preference uncertainty measurement approach where respondents have the option to indicate their willingness to pay (WTP) for a nature protection program either as exact values or intervals from a payment card, depending on whether they are uncertain about their valuation. On the basis of their responses, we then estimate their degree of uncertainty. New within this study is that the respondent's degree of uncertainty is “revealed”, while it is “stated” in those using existing measurement methods. Three statistical models are used to explore the sources of respondent uncertainty. We also present a simple way of calculating the uncertainty adjusted mean WTP, and compare this to the one obtained from an interval regression. Our findings in terms of determinants of preference uncertainty are broadly consistent with a priori expectations. In addition, the uncertainty adjusted mean WTP is quite similar to the one derived from an interval regression. We conclude that our method is promising in accounting for preference uncertainty in WTP answers at little cost to interviewees in terms of time and cognitive effort, on the one hand, and without researcher assumptions regarding the interpretation of degrees of uncertainty reported by respondents, on the other.     

Learning in society

In an individual experimentation problem a decision maker learns only from his own experience. It is well known that an optimal experimentation strategy for such problems sometimes results in the best alternative being dropped altogether, which is the so-called “Rothschild effect.” Many experimentation problems of interest, however, involve learning from both individual experience and the experience of others. This paper shows that learning in society can overcome the Rothschild effect. We consider an economy with a continuum of infinitely lived players in which each player faces a multi-armed bandit and in each period a player observes the action choice of another randomly chosen player. We show that social conformity always happens in the long run, and we use this fact to derive a condition on the distribution of prior beliefs that implies that the fraction of players who choose the best alternative always converges to one in the long run.     

Choice and individual welfare

We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a “rational” ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. Our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective, and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis. We provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose. Namely, we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model). We require that for any two alternatives x and y, if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions, then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions. Together with some mild technical requirements, such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set. It therefore requires us to have a “prior view” about how important or representative a choice of x at a given situation is.     

Starting point bias and respondent uncertainty in dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys

In this article, we develop a dichotomous choice model with follow-up questions that describes the willingness to pay being uncertain in an interval. The initial response is subject to starting point bias. Our model provides an alternative interpretation of the starting point bias in the dichotomous choice valuation surveys. Using the Exxon Valdez survey, we show that, when uncertain, individuals tend to answer “yes”.     

On relaxing the maximization postulate

We have agreed in behalf of the desirability of having a decision theory that includes nonoptimal decisions. Nonopti mal decisions are a basic cause of X-inefficiency in the production processes of firms, as well as in the economy as a whole. Therefore it is important to have a theory that allows us to examine the nature of, and use the possibility of suboptimal decision making.We suggested and examined briefly various decision procedures and behaviors which can yield suboptimal outcomes. These include faulty calculating procedures, which leave out steps from more careful calculating procedures; noncalculating responses, such as habits, conventions, rules of thumb, etc., non-responses as well as satisficing, and sacrificing types of behavior. The Yerkes-Dodson Law enables us to relate the likelihood that decisions will be optimal or suboptimal to the pressures felt by the decision maker. Up to a certain point pressure will increase the probability of optimal decisions, then will reduce it.Within the firm, in particular, there are certain behaviors which are likely to be suboptimal which are of special inter est. These are conventions, and other types of behaviors, that are constrained by peers or superiors. Conventions, in particular, are likely to prevent latent PD outcomes from occurring even though they are themselves suboptimal but Pareto superior to the PD outcome.Even though the idea of suboptimal decisions is not well accepted in economics, it is linguistically and logically consistent with the concept of maximizing behavior, and hence it is correct to allow for them in a more complete behavior postulate. The essential meanings of the words, “maximize,” “optimize,” and “choice” imqly that dissimilar options are available to the person doing the choosing. Furthermore “choice” implies that any options, optimal or suboptimal, are possible choices. Therefore, we argued that the logically correct interpretation of the maximization postulate must allow for the possibility of suboptimal choices along with optimal ones. We emphasize that we are not arguing against the possibil,ity of optimal choices being made. On the contrary, it seems likely that most decision sets will tend to be some mixture of optimal and suboptimal procedures.A major purpose of this paper has been to argue against the ideas that nonoptimal choices are unthinkable, misconceived or an unnecessary part of any decision postulate. To this end we attempted to identify several modes of argumentation in which the essential comparative meanings of “maximize,” and “choice” are commonly nullified. Such postulates were identified as, “whatever is chosen is optimal;” “preference is revealed by the choices made;” and “people maximize a function which can include the disutility of maximization.” Among the types of reasoning looked at critically were, that an apparent nonoptimal choice is really a misspecification of the objective function; and that a nonoptimal choice can be translated into an optimal one by adding another variable, or generalizing the time unit of utility. These circular reasonings amount to a denial of the comparative meaning of optimality when they are carried to the point where every assertion of nonoptimality is countered by arguments of this type. In general, we have argued that the possibility of nonoptimal choices and nonoptimal decision procedures cannot be denied.     

What kind of preference maximization does the weak axiom of revealed preference characterize?

A (multivalued) choice is justified if no two chosen alternatives are preferred to each other, and if all chosen alternatives are preferred to all rejected alternatives. This concept permits a connection between the behavioral property expressed by WARP and a weak form of preference maximization. I am grateful to Michele Lombardi, Michael Mandler, Paola Manzini and an anonymous referee for useful discussions and comments.     

Testing the Influence of Substitute Sites in Nature Valuation by Using Spatial Discounting Factors

This paper investigates the effect of nearby nature substitute sites on preferences for nature restoration. Contrary to prior studies, we use a respondent-centric approach to control for substitute sites. We assess each respondent-specific spatial context by computing densities of nature substitute sites within various ranges from each respondent’s home. This approach considers the use and non-use values of nature together. Data from three similar discrete choice experiments carried out in Flanders (Belgium) are compared. Different spatial discounting factors are tested to explore how the substitution effect behaves with regard to distance. Latent class analyses are performed to account for preference heterogeneity among respondents. We observe divergent behaviours across groups of respondents. The “distance-to-substitutes” affects how respondents gauge substitute sites. We find a significant influence of the squared average buffer distance but this effect varies in sign across case studies and classes of respondents. Our results demonstrate that individual-specific GIS data can significantly improve the representation of the spatial context and the transferability of value functions. However, the roles played by preference heterogeneity and nature perception on respondents’ capacity to value nature still deserves further attention in future research.     

The Adding-Up Test in an Incentivized Value Elicitation Mechanism: The Role of the Income Effect

In the context of testing the construct validity of stated preference studies, some researchers advocate the use of an “adding-up test” designed to gauge whether elicited values are sufficiently sensitive to a change in the scope (i.e. size) of a good. Crucial to the applicability of this test in practice, which relies on endowing a subsample of respondents with a good free of charge, is that the income effects due to endowment are negligible. In this study, we apply the adding-up test in an experimental value elicitation format to examine the potential effect of endowment as part of the test design on the adding-up property of elicited values. The results show that the adding-up property can be affected by free provision of part of the bundle.     

Teaching Ecological and Feminist Economics in the Principles Course

It can be difficult to incorporate ecological and feminist concerns into introductory courses, when one is also obliged to teach neoclassical analysis. In this essay we briefly describe how one might extend existing “multi-paradigmatic” approaches to feminist and ecological concerns, and then present an new alternative approach that may be more suitable for some students. This “broader questions and bigger toolbox” approach can be applied in both microeconomics and macroeconomics introductory classrooms.     

Individual valuation,market valuation,and the preference reversal phenomenon

This article reports experiments dealing with individual subject valuation and preference over prospect pairs that are known to generate systematic intransitivities in choice behavior termed “preference reversals”. The authors examine whether alternative procedures to those previously employed for eliciting individual limit selling prices over prospects alters the incidence or dollar magnitude of preference reversals. It is found that when individual limit selling prices over prospects are elicited in a repetitive, second-price sealed Vickrey (1961) auction market framework, rather than under the traditional single response Becker, DeGroot, and Marshak (1964) procedure, that the dollar magnitude of preference reversals declines significantly. Initially, when opening Vickrey auction limit selling prices are combined with individual subject choices over prospects, previous results like those of Grether and Plott (1979) are obtained. When ending Vickrey auction limit selling prices are combined with individual subject choices over prospects, the dollar magnitude of reversals declines significantly. These results imply that markets can be efficient and yield market clearing prices under a given arrangement of property rights even if the behavior of some individuals is inconsistent with expected utility theory.     

Manipulation and the Pareto rule

This paper examines rules that map preference profiles into choice sets. There are no agendas other than the entire set of alternatives. A rule is said to be “manipulable” if there is a person i, and a preference profile, such that i prefers the choice set obtained when he is dishonest to the one obtained when he is honest. It is “nonmanipulable” if this can never happen. The paper indicates how preferences over choice sets might be sensibly derived from preferences over alternatives, and discusses seven different notions of manipulability associated with seven different assumptions about preferences over sets of alternatives. The paper has two sections of results. In the first I show that the Pareto rule, that is, the rule that maps preference profiles into corresponding sets of Pareto optima, is nonmanipulable in four of the seven senses of manipulability, and manipulable in three of them. In the second section, I examine this conjecture: If an arbitrary rule is nonmanipulable and nonimposed, and if indifference is disallowed, then every choice set must be contained in the set of Pareto optima. The conjecture is true under the strongest definition of nonmanipulability.     

Distributional preference in Japan

Using experiments developed by Engelmann and Strobel ( 2004 ), this study investigates distributional preference in Japan. We find that just over half the people in the study have a maximin preference, approximately 7 to 19% have an efficiency preference, approximately 8% have a self‐interest preference, and approximately 18% chose the allocation that would reduce the payoff to the rich and the poor, given that her/his payoff would remain constant. The last preference could be interpreted as what is referred to as “malice”, “deep envy” or a “feeling of vulnerability” in behavioural economics and cross‐cultural psychology.     

Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence

This paper studies a situation wherein a set of voters choose between two alternatives in the presence of a payoff externality. Specifically, regardless of her intrinsic preference, a voter’s payoff is maximized should she vote for the alternative that garners a majority of the votes cast. Are votes coordinated on a single alternative? Using laboratory experiments, we examine voting patterns in sequential voting and simultaneous voting elections. Across both election types, we also vary the amount of information that an individual voter has regarding the intrinsic preferences of the other voters. Our main findings are as follows. In the “low” information treatment, sequential voting elections facilitate coordinated voting. However, in the “high” information treatment, voting patterns are not dependent on how the election is structured.     

The most ordinally egalitarian of random voting rules

Aziz and Stursberg propose an “Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation” rule (ESR), a generalization of Serial rule, one of the most discussed mechanisms in the random assignment problem, to the more general random social choice domain. This article provides an alternative definition, or characterization, of ESR as the unique most ordinally egalitarian one. Specifically, given a lottery p over alternatives, for each agent i the author considers the total probability share in p of objects from her first k indifference classes. ESR is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares (calculated for all i, k). Serial rule is known to be characterized by the same property. Thus, the author provides an alternative way to show that ESR, indeed, coincides with Serial rule on the assignment domain. Moreover, since both rules are defined as the unique most ordinally egalitarian ones, the result shows that ESR is “the right way” to think about generalizing Serial rule.     

The lifeboat problem

We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes (“lifeboat seats”). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes (“lifeboats”). Players play a two-stage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition (“a lifeboat”). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen (“a seat”). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. The partitioning of prizes can lead to coordination failure when players employ nondegenerate mixed strategies. In these equilibria some rents are sheltered and rent dissipation is reduced.     

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem

Recent literature has made significant progress in characterizing those social choice functions that can arise, or be “implemented,” as the equilibria of an underlying noncooperative game. This paper studies the implementability of social choice functions via cooperative games. Specifically, we show that if a social choice function arises, in each environment, as a Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of an underlying cooperative game, whose dominance structure is monotonic and neutral, then the social choice function is essentially oligarchic, in exactly the same sense that “core” selecting choice functions are oligarchic.     

Risk aversion,impatience, and optimal timing decisions

In this paper, a theory measuring a decision maker's aversion to temporal risks is developed in the context of a simple choice framework that admits the interpretation “time varying utility of wealth.” A relation “more temporally risk averse” is defined and characterized in terms of instantaneous risk aversion (the usual single variable case) and impatience. A further characterization of this relation is obtained in the context of a class of action timing problems known as optimal stopping problems and is applied to preference based investigations of information production, incentives to innovate, and job search.