Games of Status

A status game is a cooperative game in which the outcomes are rank orderings of the players. They are a good model for certain situations in which players care about how their "status" compares with that of other players.
We present several formal models within this class. Included are authoritarian status games (where coalitions may assign positions in the rank ordering to nonmembers) and oligarchic status games (where they are unableto do so). We consider the issues of a value concept for authoritarian games and that of core existence for oligarchic games. We then add a transferable resource to the models, obtaining "games of wealth and status."
Finally, we consider an interesting variant, called a "secession game," where coalitions have the right to secede from the grand coalition and form their own smaller "subsocieties," each with its own hierarchy.     

Value,sign, and social structure: the ‘game’ metaphor and modern social science

This exploratory paper, part of continued work on the history of game theory, seeks to illustrate certain links between von Neumann's theory of games and contemporaneous ideas in other fields. In particular, we claim that the emergence of the analytical metaphor of the ‘game’ in economics can be viewed as part of a general reconceptualization of theory in a range of disciplines. That methodological reconstitution may be described as the emergence of a Structuralist view, an approach to theorizing which treated its object – be that a text, a kinship arrangement, or an economy – as a self-contained system, with its own internal logic, subject to its own ‘laws’. In particular, individual texts, or observed social and economic arrangements, are now viewed as variations on an underlying logical theme, on a structural invariant. The latter is to be uncovered, in the case of linguistics, through the analysis of phonemes; in kinship analysis, through the rules governing the exchange of women because of the incest taboo; in von Neumann and Morgensterns game theory, through the possibilities for equilibrium coalition formation, based on the stable set. There thus emerged a tendency, across the intellectual spectrum, towards seeing things in combinatorialterms. Theoretical coherence was to be found in examining how objects ‘held together’ rather than analysing where they ‘came from’: nineteenth-century concerns with history, evolution and individual psychology give way to a distinctly modern emphasis on synchronic, formal structure, on analogical reasoning. Atomism gave way to holism, and formal elegance superceded immediate empirical content. Recourse to the metaphor of the ‘game’ was constitutive of this shift, which we examine by referring to Saussures General Course in Linguistics, to Formalism in mathematics and literary analysis, to Lévi-Strauss's analysis of kinship and myth, and to von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.     

The Explanatory Power of Game Theory in International Politics: Syrian–Israeli Crisis Interactions, 1951–87

The present paper assesses the usefulness of game theory in explaining crisis interactions between Israel and Syria. We begin with the simplest game-theoretic tool for analyzing strategic situations: the one-shot 2×2 game. By analyzing the various episodes of the protracted Syrian--Israeli conflict as one-shot 2×2 games, we avoid the multiplicity of equilibria of the infinitely repeated game and the difficulty of specifying an endpoint of a finitely repeated game. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of these one-shot games are treated as theoretical predictions and are compared with the observed outcomes.     

File sharing as conditional cooperation: evidence from a framed field experiment

In this project, we investigate downloading and sharing behaviour in a novel ‘piracy game’ modelled after standard public good games. We find that willingness to share correlates positively with the sharing by others. By contrast, actual behaviour in the ‘piracy game’ is not correlated with self-reported behaviour.     

An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amount c has to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.     

Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study

We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in one game depends on the other game that the subject plays, and that play is altered in predictable directions. We develop a measure of behavioral variation in a normal form game, outcome entropy, and find that prevalent strategies in games with low outcome entropy are more likely to be used in the games with high outcome entropy, but not vice versa. Taken together, these findings suggest that people do not treat strategic situations in isolation, but may instead develop heuristics that they apply across games.     

Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects

We study proliferation of an action in binary action network coordination games that are generalized to include global effects. This captures important aspects of proliferation of a particular action or narrative in online social networks, providing a basis to understand their impact on societal outcomes. Our model naturally captures complementarities among starting sets, network resilience, and global effects, and highlights interdependence in channels through which contagion spreads. We present new, natural, computationally tractable, and efficient algorithms to define and compute equilibrium objects that facilitate the general study of contagion in networks and prove their theoretical properties. Our algorithms are easy to implement and help to quantify relationships previously inaccessible due to computational intractability. Using these algorithms, we study the spread of contagion in scale-free networks with 1000 players using millions of Monte Carlo simulations. Our analysis provides quantitative and qualitative insight into the design of policies to control or spread contagion in networks. The scope of application is enlarged given the many other situations across different fields that may be modeled using this framework.     

Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers

A monotone game comprises the infinitely repeated play of an n-person stage game, subject to the constraint that players' actions be monotonically nondecreasing over time. These games represent a variety of strategic situations in which players are able to make (partial) commitments. If the stage games have positive spillovers and satisfy certain other conditions, then the limit points of the subgame perfect equilibria are precisely the approachable action profiles. This characterization is applied to voluntary contribution games, market games, and coordination games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.     

Play online,work better? Examining the spillover of active learning and transformational leadership

In this 1-month, longitudinal study we examined how participating in massively multiplayer online role-playing games affects users’ real-life employment. For 79 employees, we tested spillover effects from gaming to work in relation to active learning and transformational leadership. Furthermore, we investigated the moderating role of game performance in these spillover effects. Results of hierarchical regression analyses showed that active learning spills over from game to work only under conditions of enhanced game performance, while bad performance reduces this effect. Furthermore, results supported the direct spillover of transformational leadership, as well as the boosting effect of high game performance in this spillover effect. These results provide further insights with regard to spillover processes, and suggest that virtual games may be of relevance for the development of new organizational training techniques.     

Melioration learning in games with constant and frequency-dependent pay-offs

The paper explores the implications of melioration learning—an empirically significant variant of reinforcement learning—for game theory. We show that in games with invariable pay-offs melioration learning converges to Nash equilibria in a way similar to the replicator dynamics. Since melioration learning is known to deviate from optimizing behavior when an action’s rewards decrease with increasing relative frequency of that action, we also investigate an example of a game with frequency-dependent pay-offs. Interactive melioration learning is then still appropriately described by the replicator dynamics, but it indeed deviates from rational choice behavior in such a game.     

Region,Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a New Synthesis

Latin American regional governance today represents a conglomerate of commercial, political and trans-societal welfarist integration projects. In this overlapping and sometimes conflicting scenario what Latin Americanness should mean, and how integration projects should respond to current challenges of global political economy are being redefined. The focus of the paper is twofold: to better understand current regional transformations and to discuss what new developments mean for how we theorise non-European regionalism. Looking at the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas and the Union of South American Nations we ask: How are we to understand regional agreements that are grounded in different systems of rules, alternative ideas and motivations that contest ‘open regionalism’? We argue that Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) represent different pathways to regional building, creating foundations for post-hegemonic and post-trade regional governance. We thus challenge New Regionalist approaches that assume regionalism as taking place within and modelled by neoliberal economics, establishing the debate around ‘old’ vs. ‘new’ regionalism. As these categories are limited in grasping the full meaning and implications of post-hegemonic regional orders, we discuss UNASUR and ALBA as ‘arenas for action’ to understand divergent practices, outcomes and types of regionness emerging in alternative regional spaces in South America.     

Social dilemmas,time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problem

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’ resource game may induce several ‘subjective’ games in the class of social dilemmas. Which unique ‘subjective’ game is actually played depends crucially on how the agents discount their future payoffs. We examine equilibrium behavior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool resource system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. A sufficient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the degree of patience between agents is sufficiently dissimilar, the more patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium. We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the enormous complexity surrounding the general cases.     

Non-Laplacian beliefs in a global game with noisy signaling

In standard global games, individual behavior is optimal if it constitutes a best response to agnostic—Laplacian—beliefs about the aggregate behavior of other agents. This paper considers a standard binary action global game augmented with noisy signaling by an informed policy-maker and shows that in this game, equilibrium beliefs depart in quite stark ways from the Laplacian benchmark. In the limit as signals become arbitrarily precise, so that all fundamental uncertainty is removed (leaving only strategic uncertainty), the equilibrium beliefs of the marginal individual concerning the aggregate action collapse to a discrete Bernoulli distribution, giving probability mass only to the polar extreme outcomes. By contrast in the underlying standard global game the marginal individual believes the aggregate action has a continuous uniform distribution, giving equal likelihood to all possible outcomes.     

Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?

This paper studies the links between public spending, governance, and outcomes. We examine the role of governance–measured by the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy–in determining the efficacy of public spending in improving human development outcomes. Our analysis contributes to our understanding of the relationship between public spending, governance and outcomes, and helps explain the surprising result that public spending often does not yield the expected improvement in outcomes. We show empirically that the differences in the efficacy of public spending can be largely explained by the quality of governance. Public health spending lowers child mortality rates more in countries with good governance. Similarly, public spending on primary education becomes more effective in increasing primary education attainment in countries with good governance. More generally, public spending has virtually no impact on health and education outcomes in poorly governed countries. These findings have important implications for enhancing the development effectiveness of public spending. The lessons are particularly relevant for developing countries, where public spending on education and health is relatively low, and the state of governance is often poor.     

Two universal,probabilistic measures of competitive imbalance

I propose two universal measures of competitive imbalance. The first is, like those in the existing literature, based on team season win–loss records. The second is based solely on the outcomes of the various series of individual matchups during a season. Both measures will on average equal (2p ? 1)², where p is the ‘typical’ probability that the stronger team will win any particular game. Both measures will average zero when a league is competitively balanced and will converge to 1 as the league approaches perfect imbalance. In addition, both measures are universal, in that they are on average independent of the number of teams in the league and the number of games played during the season.     

On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games

There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players. With such endogenous interaction patterns we see multiple stochastically stable states of play, including some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk-dominant. Thus the endogenous network structure not only has implications for the interaction pattern that emerges, but it also has a significant impact on the play in the coordination game relative to what would arise if the same interaction network were exogenous.     

Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data

A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes, the theory lacks predictive power. To produce stronger predictions, one can restrict attention to the set of sequential equilibria, or Markov equilibria, or symmetric equilibria, or pure-strategy equilibria. This paper explores the relationship between equilibrium behavior in a class of monotone games, namely voluntary contribution games, and the behavior of human subjects in an experimental setting. Several key features of the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (SMPE) are consistent with the data. To judge how well the SMPE fits the data, we estimate a model of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) [R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for normal form games, Games Econ. Behav. 10 (1995) 6-38; R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games, Exp. Econ. 1 (1998) 9-41] and find that the decision rules of the QRE model are qualitatively very similar to the empirical choice probabilities.     

Party Politics and the Political Economy of Ghana’s Oil

Ghana’s status as a new oil producer raises questions about the developmental effects of resources, and the role of political institutions in these processes. The conundrum this paper addresses is the rather limited impact of oil exploitation in Ghana despite the country’s strong democratic record and internationally acclaimed oil governance legislation. The reasons for this lie in the nature of elite-based political coalitions and we root our analysis of Ghana’s hydrocarbons in the political settlements literature, which moves us beyond the ‘good governance’ approaches so often linked to ‘resource curse’ thinking. We also move beyond the instrumentalism of political settlements theory to examine the role political ideas play in shaping resource governance. We argue that inter-coalitional rivalry has generally undermined the benefits of Ghana’s oil but that a crude interests-based interpretation is insufficient to explain differences between these coalitions.     

A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.