Baltic stock markets and the financial crisis of 2008–2009

This study presents new evidence on stock market integration by investigating the linkages between developed European stock markets and emerging stock markets. We focus on three countries in the Baltic region, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with particular attention to the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009. The study is motivated by traditional stock market studies of integration, which show that developed stock markets are highly integrated, while emerging markets may be segmented. How integrated these emerging stock markets are in a crisis period with respect to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index is an empirical question investigated in this study. While the results of this study demonstrate that the Baltic stock markets were apparently segmented before the crisis, they were highly integrated during the crisis. The results of the variance decomposition analysis show that a large proportion of the forecast variance of the Baltic stock markets can be explained by the EUROSTOXX50 during the crisis. The results from the quantile regressions demonstrate that during the crisis the returns of the lowest quantile were most sensitive to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index. All these results imply less diversification benefits during crises when investors would need them the most.     

Baltic stock markets and the financial crisis of 2008–2009

This study presents new evidence on stock market integration by investigating the linkages between developed European stock markets and emerging stock markets. We focus on three countries in the Baltic region, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with particular attention to the recent financial crisis of 2008–2009. The study is motivated by traditional stock market studies of integration, which show that developed stock markets are highly integrated, while emerging markets may be segmented. How integrated these emerging stock markets are in a crisis period with respect to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index is an empirical question investigated in this study. While the results of this study demonstrate that the Baltic stock markets were apparently segmented before the crisis, they were highly integrated during the crisis. The results of the variance decomposition analysis show that a large proportion of the forecast variance of the Baltic stock markets can be explained by the EUROSTOXX50 during the crisis. The results from the quantile regressions demonstrate that during the crisis the returns of the lowest quantile were most sensitive to the EUROSTOXX50 stock index. All these results imply less diversification benefits during crises when investors would need them the most.     

International income risk-sharing and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the degree of international income and consumption risk-sharing among industrial economies using returns on cross-border portfolio holdings (e.g., debt, equity, FDI). We split the returns from the net foreign holdings as receipts (inflows) and payments (outflows) to investigate which of the two sides exhibited the greater resilience for income risk-sharing during the recent crisis. First, we find that debt delivered better risk-sharing than equity, mainly reflecting the deficit deterioration in EMU countries during the post-crisis period. FDI, by contrast, did not correspond to noticeable risk diversification. Second, separating output shocks into positive and negative components reveals that debt holding receipts (equity liability payments) performed better under negative (positive) realizations of the shock variable. Third, the unwinding of capital flows resulted in a sharp fall in income dis-smoothing via the debt liability channel in the new EU countries.     

The impact of the global financial crisis on the cross-currency linkage of LIBOR–OIS spreads

This article examines the impact of global financial crisis on cross-currency linkage of the LIBOR–OIS spread, a financial stress measure in interbank markets. The impulse response analysis is conducted in a multivariate setting, adopting the bias-corrected bootstrap as a means of statistical inference. The overall evidence suggests that the crisis has substantially changed the nature of the cross-currency interactions in liquidity stress. Also global money markets have failed to contain stress in US dollar funding and the role of the Japanese yen as a liquidity source appears to be significant, while these two currencies drive the cross-currency system of liquidity stress.     

Impact of the 2008–2009 financial crisis on the external and internal linkages of European frontier stock markets

This study investigates the impact of the 2008–2009 financial crisis on (i) external linkages of European frontier stock markets (Croatia, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) with the developed equity markets (the US, the UK, and Germany) and (ii) internal linkages within the frontier markets. The results demonstrate that both long- and short-run external linkages were strengthened during the crisis. The analysis of internal linkages reveals strong relationship only between the Croatian and Slovenian markets. However, the other frontier markets in the group were weakly linked, implying that European frontier stock markets may constitute a good alternative source of diversification benefits during crises periods.     

Spillover effects of the 2008 global financial crisis on the volatility of the Indian equity markets: Coupling or uncoupling? A study on sector-based data

This paper focuses on the following question: has the global financial stress in the US markets during the subprime crisis induced a persistent volatility of Indian equity stocks? We answer this question using sector-based data and we propose a simple stochastic volatility model augmented with exogenous inputs (financial stress indicators in the US market). We derive analytically the autocorrelation of the squared returns using cross-moments and estimate the impact of several variables such as the CDS spreads, the ABCP spreads, market liquidity, the volatility of the S&P 500 using a Kalman filter approach with the impact captured through Almon polynomials. We find a strong evidence of persistent volatility irrespective of the sector and interpret this finding as the result of two factors: the lower liquidity of the Indian equity markets during the subprime crisis and a wake-up call effect.     

Ambiguity shifts and the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Faced with doubts about the quality of information and the quality of modeling techniques, ambiguity-averse agents assign higher probabilities to lower utility states, leading to higher CDS premia and lower equity prices. Using data on financial institutions, I find that the sudden increases in credit spreads during the recent crisis can be explained by changes in the amount of ambiguity faced by market participants and changes in how the total amount of ambiguity was distributed between ambiguity about information quality and ambiguity about model quality.     

Market reactions to policy deliberations on fair value accounting and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008–2009

Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We investigate investor and creditor reactions to policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals that relax FVA rules and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we investigate cross-sectional stock price reactions to bank-specific factors that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we examine whether banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Finally, we investigate credit market reactions to these policy deliberations, recommendations and decisions by examining changes in credit default swap spreads for a subset of banks in our sample.     

Pricing of commercial real estate securities during the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We study the relative and absolute pricing of CMBX contracts (commercial real estate derivatives) during the recent financial crisis. Using a structural CMBX pricing model, we find little systematic mispricing relative to REIT equity and options. We do find short-term deviations from this relative pricing relationship that are statistically and economically significant. In particular, the CMBX market temporarily overreacts to news announcements. We provide evidence that this temporary mispricing is caused by price pressure due to hedging activities. Finally, an absolute pricing analysis provides no substantial evidence that CMBX contracts traded at fire sale levels during the crisis.     

Stock market correlations during the financial crisis of 2008–2009: Evidence from 50 equity markets

Using data from 50 equity markets we examine conditional and unconditional correlations around two major banking events during the financial crisis of 2008–09. To measure the value of covariance information on the augmented DCC model used in the study, a portfolio in-sample estimation is performed. We show that by taking into account the change in the level of variance in high volatility periods, the estimates of the conditional covariance are more efficient in capturing the dynamics of the stock markets variance. Furthermore, in a two-asset allocation framework, the model consistently generates relatively low portfolio variances, implying substantial benefits in portfolio diversification.     

The effects of news events on market contagion: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

In this paper, we use the quantile regression technique along with coexceedance, a contagion measure, to assess the extent to which news events contribute to contagion in the stock markets during the crisis period between 2007 and 2009. Studies have shown that, not only the subprime crisis leads to a global recession, but the effects on the global stock markets have also been significant. We track the news events, both in the UK and the US, using the global recession timeline. We observe that the news events related to ad hoc bailouts of individual banks from the UK have a contagion effect throughout the period for most of the countries under investigation. This, however, is not found to be the case for the news events originating from the US. Our findings regarding the evidence of contagion effects in the UK reinforce the argument that spreads and contagion—an outcome of the risk perception of financial markets—are solely a result of the behaviour of investors or other financial market participants.     

Is the diversification discount caused by the book value bias of debt?

We analyze whether the diversification discount is driven by the book value bias of corporate debt. Book values of debt may be a more downward biased proxy of the market value of debt for diversified firms, relative to undiversified firms, as diversification leads to lower firm risk. Thus, measures of firm value based on book values of debt undervalue diversified firms relative to focused firms. Our paper complements recent literature which uses market values to test the risk reduction hypothesis for a subsample of firms for which debt is traded. Alternatively, we employ market value of debt estimates for the whole firm universe. Consistent with the above hypothesis, we show that the use of book values of debt underestimates the value of diversified firms. There is no discount for mainly equity financed firms and lower distress risk and equity volatility for diversified firms. More concentrated ownership increases firm valuation.     

Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns

Using data on job approval ratings of governors, U.S. senators, and the president, we find that firms located in states with high approval ratings outperform firms located in states with low approval ratings by .64% per month. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when investors are actively involved in politics, when local politicians are closer to the center of political power, for small firms that have a larger proportion of local investors, and for financially strong areas where investors are ready to execute investments in local stocks. Overall, our study shows that investors’ political sentiment is important in determining stock returns.     

Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide

This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 crisis.     

What do equity issuances signal? A study of equity issuances in the UK before and during the financial crisis

The financial crisis provides an ideal setting to study how quality signalling by firms, and information asymmetries, might explain the stock price reactions around seasoned equity offerings. The heightened information asymmetry levels during the GFC should have increased the importance of issuance quality and information asymmetries in explaining announcement returns. However, we document new and, in some cases, surprising findings, using a sample of 700 UK seasoned equity offerings between 2003 and 2012: (1) Contrary to expectations, announcement returns during the crisis were driven less by signalling and asymmetric information effects and more by macroeconomic conditions and general uncertainty. (2) In constrained capital markets, firms that were able to move more quickly to raise significant amounts of capital, made the capital-raising environment more challenging for firms that followed, such that the latter had to incur additional costs. (3) Contrary to the traditional view that the low book-to-market ratios may proxy for overvaluation and thus lower announcement returns, we found a negative relationship during the crisis period. The latter is consistent with the view that book-to-market ratios may also proxy for a distressed firm effect which may have dominated the conventional ‘market timing’ effect during the GFC. (4) Announcement returns were strongly positive for many firms at the peak of the crisis, possibly because the market was relieved to see that equity issues might potentially save firms from insolvency; an equity issuance could, in such circumstances, be a positive signal, even though equity issues are conventionally seen as negative signals. Overall, our paper documents fresh and surprising results about equity capital-raising during the GFC, and also offers insights for corporate finance that are of interest beyond the current crisis.     

Euro money market spreads during the 2007–? financial crisis

In the paper we investigate the empirical features of euro area money market turbulence during the recent financial crisis. By means of a novel Fractionally Integrated Heteroskedastic Factor Vector Autoregressive model, we find evidence of a deterministic level factor in the EURIBOR-OIS (OIS) spreads term structure, associated with the two waves of stress in the interbank market, following the BNP Paribas (9 August 2007) and Lehman Brothers (16 September 2008) “shocks”, and two additional factors, of the long memory type, bearing the interpretation of curvature and slope factors, respectively. The unfolding of the crisis yields a significant increase in their persistence and volatility. We also find evidence of a declining trend in the level and volatility of OIS spreads since December 2008, associated with ECB liquidity policies.     

Causes of the great recession of 2007–2009: The financial crisis was the symptom not the disease!

Globalization has increasingly made it possible for labor in developing countries to augment labor in the developed world, without having to relocate, in ways not thought possible only a few decades ago. We argue that this large increase in the developed world’s effective labor supply, triggered by geo-political events and technological innovations, coupled with the inability of existing institutions in the US and developing nations themselves to cope with this shock, set the stage for the great recession. The financial crisis in the US was but the first acute symptom.     

The microstructure of fear,the Fama–French factors and the global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008

We analyze minute by minute equity price data from 1 August 2005 to 31 October 2008 to study the relationship between the three sources of systematic risk in Fama and French's (1993) model and the market's expectation of total risk as represented by the VIX (the “fear factor”). Our findings confirm the predicted relationship between the equity risk-premium and risk (Merton, 1980). We find that the size-premium is driven by investors who are flying-to-quality (Abel, 1988; Barsky, 1989). We also find that investors became increasingly sensitive to changes in the VIX during the global financial crisis.     

Firms as liquidity providers: Evidence from the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Using a supplier–client matched sample, we study the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on between-firm liquidity provision. Consistent with a causal effect of a negative shock to bank credit, we find that firms with high precrisis liquidity levels increased the trade credit extended to other corporations and subsequently experienced better performance as compared with ex ante cash-poor firms. Trade credit taken by constrained firms increased during this period. These findings are consistent with firms providing liquidity insurance to their clients when bank credit is scarce and offer an important precautionary savings motive for accumulating cash reserves.     

Trading by bank insiders before and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

This paper sheds new light on the role bank executives played in the financial crisis. It examines whether they foresaw the poor performance of their own bank by analyzing their insider trading patterns. Insider trading during 2006 predicts stock returns during the crisis: a portfolio strategy based on insider trading information earns a risk-adjusted return of over 40% during the crisis. Further, banks with a high exposure to the housing market and banks with a low exposure exhibit different insider trading patterns starting in mid-2006, when US housing prices first decline: insiders of high-exposure banks are 20% more likely to sell stock than insiders of low-exposure banks. This pattern is more pronounced for CEOs than other insiders. However, insider trading patterns of high- and low-exposure banks do not differ before 2006. Replacing high-exposure banks by too-big-too-fail banks yields similar results. This evidence indicates that insiders of high-exposure and too-big-too-fail banks revised their assessment of their banks’ investments following the reversal in the housing market.