价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

Bounding consumer surplus by monopoly profits

Regulatory agencies and other public authorities in the United States frequently require private firms seeking regulatory approvals to enter geographic markets, or offer products, that they would not otherwise provide. Examples include “build-out” rules for cable television franchisees, and universal service or “common carrier” obligations. The social welfare consequences of such policies are often difficult to evaluate because, among other things, consumer surpluses generated by entry must be assessed. This article shows that the level of (variable) monopoly profits in the markets of interest can be used to place an upper bound on the associated consumer surplus whenever demand vanishes at a sufficiently high price. This result, which is new, can then be used to evaluate the social consequences of forced entry. Our methods can also be used to provide a bound on the change in consumer surplus resulting from the imposition of regulated prices on an existing monopoly.      

Unemployment equilibrium and economic policy in mixed markets

This paper features a simple static Cournot-Nash model of an exchange economy with two productive sectors at flexible prices and wages. The traders in the atomless sector are price-takers, while the atoms behave strategically. We focus on the consequences of strategic interactions on the market outcome. Firstly, strategic interactions create underemployment on the labor market. Secondly, when the number of atoms increases without limit, the CWE coincides with the competitive equilibrium. Thirdly, we compare the welfare reached by traders at both equilibria. Fourthly, we consider the implementation of a tax levied on strategic supplies. Finally, we compare the approach retained with the monopolistic competition framework.     

Competition and monopoly of Chinese rural groundwater market：structure and determinants

China is facing severe problem of water scarcity.Agricultural sector,the main consumer of water resource,has remarkably changed its institutions on water resource deployment,due to heavy environmental pressure.As a new and spontaneous institution,groundwater market has developed rapidly in northern China,and has impacts on waterusing behaviors and benefits of farmers.Using household survey data from Hebei and Henan in 2007,this paper attempts to pin down the development and operating of groundwater market in rural China.We focus on the monopoly and competition in the market.Empirical analysis reveals that Chinese farmers are trying to make rational decision when they compete with others in groundwater market.In general,monopoly is not fierce in Chinese rural groundwater market,with great variations among different villages and even different tubewells within one village.Tubewell costs,regulation and the density of tubewells are the main determinants that affect monopoly level of groundwater market.To make water market benefit more and more farmers of low income,corresponding policies are needed to modify its development in the future.     

Taxing a monopolist

We consider a simple, self-financing and informationally undemanding scheme to reduce the deadweight loss due to a monopolist's market power. Essentially, we propose taxing the monopolist and applying the tax revenue to generate a public demand for his output. It turns out that a favorable scenario for such a reform to generate an ‘efficiency increase’ (i.e. to increase total output) is an elasticity of market demand with an absolute value of less than 3 (a seemingly ‘realistic’ condition). We also consider the case for the implementation of the first best, and compare specific and ad-valorem taxes as a way to finance the public demand.     

中国式分权下地方政府FDI税收竞争的策略性及其经济增长效应

中国式分权机制下,政治和经济双重激励使地方政府竞相降低税率吸引FDI流入,本文考察了这种税收竞争的策略性及其对FDI经济增长效应的影响。模型表明地区间策略性税收竞争将通过降低外资质量影响FDI经济增长效应。使用1999-2006年省级面板数据进行实证分析,回归结果表明,经济发展水平相近的地区间外资企业实际所得税率具有显著的空间正相关性;税收优惠对FDI经济增长效应具有明显的阻碍作用;并且税收优惠幅度越大,阻碍作用越强。因此,我国需要加大对地方政府招商引资行为的监督和约束,以使地方政府放弃对FDI的盲目追捧,转而注重FDI质量,提高FDI对国民福利的促进作用。     

垄断行业工资改革的可行性研究——基于国际垄断行业视角

在垄断行业中,员工的工资一般高于其他行业,表现出收入分配的不平等.引起垄断行业工资问题的原因很多,垄断行业工资问题也对社会经济各方面产生着重要影响,导致公共福利受损,减少了劳动者的流动及其对人力资本的投入,加剧了社会收入的不公平.对于垄断行业工资所引发的种种问题已经受到社会各界的重视,各国政府已开始采取措施解决这些问题,把竞争机制等改革引入垄断行业.     

熊彼特的竞争理论及其启示

熊彼特的竞争理论表明,短期限制竞争可以激励和保护创新,而完全竞争并不适合创新。熊彼特理论没有颠覆传统的反垄断范式,但调整了它的重心和内部结构,使得反垄断关注的重点从静态转向动态、从相关市场转向创新活动、从市场份额和集中度转向进入壁垒。     

Resource extraction by cartels facing constraints on cooperation

This paper considers a non-renewable resource cartel facing constraints on cooperation. Although different kinds of constraints are conceivable and some of them are also investigated, the analysis focuses on the case in which cooperation is restricted to sufficiently high quotas. This approach of imposing constraints on cartelization complements papers that assume exogenously when a monopoly ends (in particular Benchekroun, H., Gaudet, G., Van Long, N., 2006. Temporary natural resource cartels. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52, 663–674) in two aspects: an endogenous determination when the cartel breaks up and the consequence that it is impossible to shift resource sales between the two regimes.     

转轨经济中行业性行政垄断的制度根源——基于理性政府汲税约束视角

有关行业性行政垄断制度根源的研究大多局限于利益集团理论框架内,忽视了对政府本质和行为的深层次分析。本文提出理性政府假设,并基于理性政府的汲税约束视角,构建政府税收约束函数和政府效用函数的相应模型,对行政垄断的制度根源进行新的探讨。研究表明,理性政府为了维护自己的执政地位和国家的长治久安,对经济和行政两种汲税手段可相机抉择使用;政府税收的最优点会偏离经济效率的最优点,政府通过突破税收约束的途径来实现自身效用最大化会导致对经济的过度干预;在既定税收水平的条件下,通过改变制度组合,使政府税收最大化点向经济效率最大化点移动,是政府效用提高的另一途径,该途径的实现依赖于政府转型——建设强化市场型政府。     

财富、福利及生产力——略论自由贸易主义与保护贸易主义

文章在分析了人们对于福利的认识以及追求过程中表现出的差异基础上，归纳这种差异对发展中国家的影响后，分析了这种差异的原因。最后提出了发展中国家所应选择的途径。     

从自由竞争权到公平竞争权——市场主体竞争权的现代性话语

市场主体的竞争权经历了从自由竞争权到公平竞争权的发展历程。公平竞争权是指市场主体在经济竞争过程中所享有的开展自由、公平竞争的权利,它是竞争自由与竞争公平的统一体,是竞争法的基石范畴,是一项具有社会法性质的权利。由于我国现阶段市场主体公平竞争权缺失,为了实现竞争权的成功转型,需要由竞争法明确赋予市场主体以公平竞争权。     

增值税转型实施效果的经济法反思——以江苏地区为调研对象

在全国范围内实施的增值税转型影响了我国经济发展,小规模纳税人税负的调整促进了其与一般纳税人之间的税收公平,取消关于外商投资企业增值税优惠的政策促进了内外资企业的公平竞争与税收平等,固定资产的抵扣给不同行业带来不同程度的税收实惠,对矿产和再生资源政策的调整体现了经济法的平衡协调原则和可持续发展理念。但是,增值税转型也带来了一系列问题,如法律位阶较低,固定资产抵扣引起的就业问题等,还有待进一步研究。     

Countercyclical taxes in a monopolistically competitive environment

In the context of a neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition, this paper studies the stabilizing effects of countercyclical tax policy when the income tax rate has an additional role of financing government budget deficits. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, countercyclical taxes generally reduce aggregate volatility, unless the fiscal response to debt accumulation is weak. The presence of monopoly power enhances these effects. Even when automatic stabilizers successfully stabilize business cycle fluctuations, countercyclical taxes are welfare inferior, due to reduced precautionary saving motives. While, if the fiscal response to debt is weak and countercyclical tax policy destabilizing, the increased precautionary saving motive is not welfare enhancing as the asset accumulated is government debt rather than capital. These results are generally robust. Nominal inertia may, however, dominate the precautionary saving mechanism.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa

A century ago, Thorstein Veblen introduced socially contingent consumption into the economic literature. This paper complements the scarce empirical literature by testing his conjecture on South African household data and finds that Black and Coloured households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable White households. Following the approach of Charles et al. (2009), this paper explores whether the differences in visible expenditures can be explained with a signaling model of status seeking. Moreover, it is assessed to which extent positional concerns motivate conspicuous consumption. Although the socially contingent share in visible consumption increases with income, different incentives to consume conspicuously seem to explain that, at every level of income, Black households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable White households. In contrast to the findings of Charles et al. (2009) where differential spending on conspicuous consumption can be found also within each group separately, the model's core hypothesis fails to hold within the group of White South Africans.     

税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。