Environmental Regulation Induced Foreign Direct Investment

The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the relationship between environmental regulations and international capital flows. However, empirical studies have so far failed to find conclusive evidence for this so-called pollution haven or race to the bottom effect where foreign direct investment (FDI) is assumed to be attracted to low regulation countries, regions or states. In this paper we present a simple theoretical framework to demonstrate that greater stringency in environmental standards can lead to a strategic increase in capital inflows which we refer to as environmental regulation induced FDI. Our result reveals a possible explanation for the mixed results in the empirical literature and provides an illustration of the conditions under which environmental regulations in the host country can affect the location decision of foreign firms.     

Skill Upgrading and Production Transfer within Swedish Multinationals

This paper studies the link between production transfer within Swedish‐headquartered multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the manufacturing industry and skill upgrading in their parent companies in the 1990s. The analysis distinguishes between horizontal and vertical foreign direct investment (FDI). The increased employment share in the affiliates in non‐OECD countries (vertical FDI) has a non‐trivial, significantly positive effect on the share of skilled labor in the Swedish parents. On the other hand, the parents’ skill upgrading is unrelated to employment changes in their affiliates in other OECD countries (horizontal FDI). This is consistent with implications of the newly developed horizontal MNE models.     

The (Im)possibility of Distinguishing Horizontal and Vertical Motivations for FDI

Skill differences between parent and host countries are considered a key variable for distinguishing horizontal and vertical motivations within aggregate foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper tests the robustness of the skill difference term in the knowledge‐capital model for FDI in a sample of Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries. The evidence in this paper indicates that skill differences per se do not properly explain FDI: the skill level of the host country is also important. This paper argues that both horizontal and vertical FDI may increase in the skill level of the host. It follows that the distinction between vertical and horizontal motivations for FDI with respect to skills is less straightforward than generally assumed in the literature.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

When is FDI a capital flow?

In this paper we analyze the conditions under which a foreign direct investment (FDI) involves a net capital flow across countries. For this purpose, we investigate how multinational firms finance their foreign affiliates, globally or locally. We develop a contract theoretical model in which the financing structure is used to govern the incentives of managers. We find that the investment tends to be financed locally if managerial incentive problems are large. Thus, microeconomic governance problems may have macroeconomic implications for the net capital flow to host countries. Our results are consistent with survey data on German and Austrian investment flows of firms to Eastern Europe.     

Shouldn't Physical Capital Also Matter for Multinational Enterprise Activity?

The foreign direct investment (FDI) literature has generally failed to find strong systematic evidence of “vertical” motivations in bilateral aggregate FDI and foreign affiliate sales (FAS) data, despite recent evidence of vertical FDI in firm‐level data. Moreover, a Bayesian analysis of the empirical determinants of FDI (and FAS) flows reveals that the parent country's physical capital per worker has a strong positive effect on FDI alongside typical gravity‐equation variables; however, this variable is ignored in the knowledge‐capital (KC) model and most empirical work. We address these two puzzles by introducing relative factor endowment differences into the three‐factor, three‐country knowledge and physical capital extension of the 2 × 2 × 2 KC model. Using a numerical version of our model, we show that horizontal and vertical multinational enterprises' (MNEs') headquarters surface in different parts of the Edgeworth box relating the parent country's skilled labor share relative to its physical capital share (of the parent's and host's endowments). The key economic insight is that horizontal MNE headquarters will be relatively more abundant than vertical MNE headquarters in countries that are abundant in physical capital relative to skilled labor, because of the multi‐plant (single‐plant) structure of horizontal (vertical) MNEs—assuming plants (headquarters) use physical capital (skilled labor) relatively intensively in their setups. The theoretical relationships suggest augmenting empirical FAS gravity equations with (polynomials of) the parent's skilled labor share alongside the parent's physical capital share to explain in aggregate bilateral data the coexistence of horizontal and vertical FAS. The theoretical and empirical results shed light on the positive effect of parent's physical capital share on FAS flows, but also suggest that MNE headquarters may be prominent in parent countries with relatively high and low skilled labor shares—once physical capital is accounted for—a result not suggested by the two‐factor KC model.     

Foreign direct investment and vertical integration of production by Japanese multinationals in Thailand

We test the vertical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) empirically using firm level information on Japanese multinational activity in Thailand. These data allow us to investigate the effects of both home country (Japan) and host country (Thailand) characteristics on the inter-industry pattern of FDI. For 85 manufacturing industries over the period from 1985 to 1995, we find a positive influence of industry variation in skill intensity and market size in the host country and a negative effect of transport costs on the amount of FDI. These results provide strong direct econometric evidence of vertical integration of production across the countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (4) (2004) 805–821.     

Fragmentation, Efficiency-Seeking FDI, and Employment

The paper examines the impact of efficiency-seeking FDI on factor prices, employment, and output. The analysis shows that when transportation costs fall, companies start relocating labor-intensive production processes to low-wage countries. But this does not necessarily hurt workers in the high-wage country. The paper demonstrates an employment-depressing "relocation effect" and an employment-enhancing "efficiency effect." Employment is more likely to rise if the internationality of production is high and if the supply of capital is elastic. Furthermore, the model is capable of explaining intra industry cross-hauling.     

Vertical foreign direct investment: Make,buy, and sell

According to conventional wisdom, multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake vertical FDI to take advantage of cross‐border factor cost differences and source inputs from abroad at better terms. However, recent empirical studies document many instances in which intrafirm trade between parent firms and their vertically related foreign affiliates is absent. We provide theoretical support for these findings, demonstrating that a firm can engage in vertical FDI to exploit its intangible assets in another country and improve its input sourcing terms domestically by enhancing its cross‐threat. Furthermore, we show that the welfare implications of vertical FDI on the home and host country are neither always positive nor aligned.     

Hunting High and Low for Vertical FDI

Recently the horizontal and vertical models of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been synthesized into the knowledge‐capital (KK) model. Empirical tests, however, find that the horizontal model cannot be rejected in favor of the KK model. I suggest this is because the empirical specifications are too restrictive for vertical FDI to manifest itself. Using an alternative specification, I find evidence of vertical FDI. In particular, when I use the stock of FDI I can reject the horizontal model in favor of the knowledge‐capital model and identify countries for which FDI is dominated by vertical investment.     

Corporate transparency, cream-skimming and FDI

We develop a simple information-based model of Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. On the one hand, the relative abundance of “intangible” capital in specialized industries in the source countries, which presumably generates expertise in screening investment projects in the host countries, enhances FDI flows. On the other hand, host-country relative corporate-transparency diminishes the value of this expertise, thereby reducing the flow of FDI. The model also demonstrates that the gains for the host country from FDI [over foreign portfolio investment (FPI)] are reflected in a more efficient size of the stock of domestic capital and its allocation across firms. These gains are shown to depend crucially (and positively) on the degree of competition among FDI investors. We provide also some evidence on the effects of corporate transparency indicators, such as accounting standards, on bilateral FDI flows from a panel of 24 OECD countries over the period of 1981-1998.     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

Foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes

Governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors, though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes. This paper examines the impact of indirect (non-income) taxes on FDI by American multinational firms, using affiliate-level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries. Indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of American companies. Estimates imply that 10% higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7.1% lower affiliate assets, which is similar to the effect of 10% higher income tax rates. Affiliate output falls by 2.9% as indirect taxes rise by 10%, while higher income taxes have more modest output effects. High corporate income tax rates depress capital/labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates, whereas high indirect tax rates do not. These patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect FDI.     

Democracy in the neighborhood and foreign direct investment

The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been extensively studied. Even though there is extensive research in the area, most of it is based on analyzing the effects of host country characteristics on FDI flows, and yet there is little research on how neighboring country characteristics play a role in facilitating FDI flows to host countries. This paper analyzes the association between the democracy level in neighboring countries and FDI flows to host countries. Using bilateral FDI flows from the OECD countries, with a large host country sample, we find that countries surrounded by democratic countries attract higher FDI flows. Furthermore, we find evidence that countries that are surrounded by neighboring countries with good institutions tend themselves to have better institutions, experience lower civil conflict, and have higher political stability and hence indirectly attract higher FDI flows. Our findings suggest that if neighboring countries act in such way as to become more democratic, FDI flows to these countries would be higher since not only does improving the quality of democracy attract more FDI inflows, but also being surrounded by neighboring advanced democratic countries will also lead to higher FDI flows to them.     

Agglomeration Effects in Foreign Direct Investment and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis

Does environmental regulation impair international competitiveness of pollution-intensive industries to the extent that they relocate to countries with less stringent regulation, turning those countries into “pollution havens”? We test this hypothesis using panel data on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows of various industries in the German manufacturing sector and account for several econometric issues that have been ignored in previous studies. Most importantly, we demonstrate that externalities associated with FDI agglomeration can bias estimates away from finding a pollution haven effect if omitted from the analysis. We include the stock of inward FDI as a proxy for agglomeration and employ a GMM estimator to control for endogenous time-varying determinants of FDI flows. Furthermore, we propose a difference estimator based on the least polluting industry to break the possible correlation between environmental regulatory stringency and unobservable attributes of FDI recipients in the cross-section. When accounting for these issues we find robust evidence of a pollution haven effect for the chemical industry.     

The Interaction Between FDI and Infrastructure Capital in The Development Process

This paper focuses on the possible interaction between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the host country’s infrastructure base. Its central hypothesis is that the effect of FDI on per capita real income depends, at least in part, on the size of the recipient country’s infrastructure. This hypothesis is tested in a panel of 46 countries and 5-year averages over the 1980–2000 period using the size of three types of infrastructure capital: telecommunication, power generation, and network of roads or highways. The results indicate that the size of the host country’s infrastructure base helps to improve the marginal effect of FDI on real income.     

Competing to Outsource in the South

This paper analyzes foreign direct investment (FDI) competition in a three‐country framework: two Northern countries and one Southern country. We have in mind the competition of Airbus and Boeing in a developing country. The host‐country government endogenizes tariffs, while Airbus and Boeing choose domestic output and FDI. Wages and employment in the home countries are negotiated. We find that in the unique equilibrium, both Airbus and Boeing compete to undertake FDI in the developing country. This arises because the host country can play off the multinationals, which in turn stems from three factors: (a) oligopolistic rivalry; (b) quid pro quo FDI; (c) strategic outsourcing—FDI drives down the union wages at home if the host‐country wage is sufficiently low. However, if the host‐country wage is sufficiently high, the union wage increases under FDI. In such cases, FDI competition benefits the multinationals, the labor unions, as well as the host country.     

The substitutability between parent company and foreign affiliate employment in Europe

This paper examines the substitution pattern between parent company and foreign affiliate employment of European multinationals. The data is drawn from the AMADEUS and BANKSCOPE firm-level databases and covers parent companies in 14 high-wage European countries (EUR14) and their affiliated companies in the wider Europe including locations in the low-wage Central and East European countries (CEEC) for the period 2000–2004. We find that the substitution elasticity between employment of the EUR14 parent companies and employment in their foreign affiliates in the CEEC is quite low. Furthermore, the substitution possibilities are higher between parent company and affiliate employment in other West European countries than those between parent company and affiliate employment in the CEEC. Finally, we find that the output change of the parent company and to a lesser extent that of the foreign affiliates is more important than changes in relative wages in determining the relative labour demand.     

The effects of foreign direct investment on private domestic investment: evidence from developing countries

The main objective of this study is to make a contribution to the empirical literature of investment by examining the effects of FDI inflows on private investment in developing host countries. We employ panel data for 91 developing host countries over the period 1970–2000 and estimate our model by a means of system generalized method of moments. The results show that FDI stimulates private domestic investment which supports the “crowd-in-hypothesis”. Moreover, after grouping countries based on their level of income, we find that the positive effects of FDI on private investment in low-income countries depend on the availability of human capital.