住房抵押贷款理性违约的决策分析

住房抵押贷款中的违约是指借款人不再继续履行贷款合同,停止偿还贷款,造成贷款拖欠给贷款机构带来贷款风险的行为。违约发生的原因有:一是被动违约,指借款人因生病、失业等原因造成收入下降或开支增加,无能力继续履行贷款合同而引起的违约行为;二是理性违约,指借款人发现中止贷款合同,选择违约在经济上更有利的一种主动违约行为。     

住房抵押贷款信用风险形成的经济学分析

1．银行理性假设下的抵押贷款信用风险分析 住房抵押贷款信用风险是指由于借款人的违约而导致抵押贷款银行损失的可能性。从信息经济学的角度看，如果银行和借款人完全理性，则银行与借款人之间的行为是一种非对称信息的博弈，自然会产生所谓的逆向选择和道德风险问题，信用风险由此而产生。梅耶森(Myerson)认为：“由参与人选择错误信息引     

住房抵押贷款定价模型与数值分析

期权的价值取决于借款人的违约行为和提前偿还行为，而借款人的违约行为和提前偿还行为又取决于当前的利率水平和房屋价格。CTR模型表明，住房抵押贷款合同的价值满足一个偏微分方程。运用交替方向隐性有限差分法对住房抵押贷款合同的价值进行数值分析的结果表明，由于提前偿还期权和违约期权的存在，贷款合同的价值远远小于贷款总额。房屋价格的波动幅度与抵押贷款合同的价值负相关，而利率波动幅度与抵押贷款合同的价值正相关。为减少商业银行面临的提前偿还风险和违约风险，住房抵押贷款合同需要使用浮动利率贷款，同时还应加快发展我国住房抵押贷款保险市场。     

国外住房抵押贷款风险防范研究及实践

近几年来我国个人住房抵押贷款业务呈快速上升态势，随着贷款规模的不断扩大，个人住房抵押贷款的违约风险正在不断增大，违约风险的防范已被提到议事日程。本文较系统地介绍了国外对借款者违约行为的研究成果以及风险防范措施，以期对我国个人住房抵押贷款的风险防范和该业务的发展有所借鉴。     

我国目前实施个人住宅抵押贷款证券化的障碍及对策

个人住宅抵押贷款证券化是指银行等金融机构发放个人住宅抵押贷款后，把所持有的个人住宅抵押贷款债权出售给SPV(特殊目的载体)，该机构在资本市场上发行以其收购的个人住宅抵押贷款为基础的证券MBS(住宅抵押贷款支持证券)的过程。通过个人住宅抵押贷款证券化的实施，既可以解决商业银行“短存长     

证券化资产的定价分析

本文主要分析住房抵押贷款支持证券的定价问题,因为住房抵押贷款合同允许借款人提前支付和违约,从而造成抵押贷款支持证券未来现金流量的不确定。不过我国的住房抵押贷款的违约率很低,所以本文采用约化方法分析提前支付行为对抵押贷款支持证券定价的影响,通过计算一些因素对证券价格影响的数值结果,分析证券的收益和风险。这些结论不仅有利于我国证券化市场的培育,同时也有利于金融结构或投资者管理抵押贷款资产。     

证券化资产的定价分析

本文主要分析住房抵押贷款支持证券的定价问题,因为住房抵押贷款合同允许借款人提前支付和违约,从而造成抵押贷款支持证券未来现金流量的不确定.不过我国的停房抵押贷款的违约率很低,所以本文采用约化方法分析提前支付行为对抵押贷款支持证券定价的影响,通过计算一些因素对证券价格影响的数值结果,分析证券的收益和风险.这些结论不仅有利于我国证券化市场的培育,同时也有利于金融结构或投资者管理抵押贷款资产.     

个人住房抵押贷款违约相关变量选择

文章主要从三个维度对个人住房抵押贷款违约相关变量选择进行了论述。在微观层面梳理个人住房抵押贷款违约特征变量是建立评分模型的重要步骤。文章基于借款人特征、贷款特性、房产特征三个维度构建了个人住房抵押贷款违约相关变量选择的分析框架。     

美国次级住房抵押贷款市场的危机及启示

一、美国的次级住房抵押贷款市场危机回顾从2000年到2005年,经过5年房地产火热牛市,美国家庭自有住宅比例达到历史最高纪录。2005年下半年开始．房地产市场开始缩水,房价迅速下跌。2006年三季度起,逾期超过30目没有偿还贷款的比例达到4．6％,次级抵押贷款的违约率则高达12．6％,违约率在过去12个月里增加了25％,美国抵押银行家协会追踪的全美抵押贷款超过4600万件。2007年2月．二十多家发放次级抵堋件敦的公司呆丌棚桕官布神产.[第一段]     

住宅抵押贷款证券化亟待解决的问题

住宅抵押贷款证券化 (Ｍｏｒｔｇａｇｅ ＢａｃｋｅｄＳｅｃｕｒｉ ｔｉｅｓ)起源于美国 ,是房地产证券化的一种特殊形式。它是指抵押权人将原始的住宅抵押款汇集重组成新的抵押品组合 (ＭｏｒｔｇａｇｅＰｏｏｌ) ,经信用担保机构信用增强后 ,由特设机构 (ＳｐｅｃｉａｌＰｕｒｐｏｓｅＶｅｈｉｃｌｅ)在资本市场上发行和销售这类证券的过程。住宅抵押贷款证券化能够实现间接融资和直接融资的有机结合 ,提高住宅抵押贷款的流动性、安全性和盈利性 ,对房地产业的发展有着深远影响。正是有这些优点 ,住宅抵押贷款证券化被许多国家采用。目前 …     

Analyzing yield, duration and convexity of mortgage loans under prepayment and default risks

In this article, we construct a general model, which considers the borrower’s financial and non-financial termination behavior, to derive the closed-form formula of the mortgage value for analyzing the yield, duration and convexity of the risky mortgage. Since the risks of prepayment and default are reasonably expounded in our model, our formulae are more appropriate than traditional mortgage formulae. We also analyze the effects of the prepayment penalty and partial prepayment on the yield, duration and convexity of a mortgage, and provide lenders with an upper-bound for the mortgage default insurance rate. Our model provides portfolio managers a useful framework to more appropriately appraise the mortgage and more effectively hedge their mortgage holdings. From the results of sensitivity analyses, we find that higher interest-rate, prepayment and default risks will increase the mortgage yield and reduce the duration and convexity of the mortgage.     

An analysis of default risk in the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program

While reverse mortgages are intended as a tool to enable financial security for older homeowners, in 2014, nearly 12 percent of reverse mortgage borrowers in the federally insured Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program were in default on their property taxes or homeowners insurance. Unlike the traditional mortgage market, there were no risk-based underwriting guidelines for HECMs through 2014. In response to the relatively high default rate, a variety of policy responses were implemented, including establishing underwriting guidelines. However, there is a lack of data and analysis to inform such criteria. Our analysis follows 30,000 seniors counseled for reverse mortgages between 2006 and 2011. The data includes comprehensive financial and credit report attributes, not typically available in analyses of reverse mortgage borrowers. Using a bivariate probit model that accounts for selection, we estimate the likelihood of tax and insurance default. Financial characteristics that increase default risk include the percentage of funds withdrawn in the first month of the loan, a lower credit score, higher property tax to income ratio, low or no unused revolving credit, and a history of being past due on mortgage payments or having a tax lien on the property. Our estimate of the elasticity of default with respect to credit scores is similar to that for closed-end home equity loans, but higher than that for HELOCs. We simulate the effects of alternative underwriting criteria and policy changes on the probability of take-up and default. Reductions in the default rate with a minimal effect on participation can be achieved by requiring that participants with low credit scores set aside some of their HECM funds for future property tax and insurance payments, a form of escrowing.     

住房抵押贷款借款人违约风险影响因素及应对措施研究

随着房地产业的快速发展,个人住房抵押贷款已经成为商业银行的重要业务.然而,面对日趋复杂多变的市场环境,违约风险的隐患也日益显现.本文就国内外有关违约风险影响因素的研究进行了综述,指出以往研究的局限性,并结合我国实际提出了控制违约风险的建议和对策.     

Credit rationing, race, and the mortgage market

This study applies microdata from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances to evaluate the effects of borrower race and default risk in mortgage lending. The empirical analysis is based on a probit model of whether borrowers obtain FHA or conventional mortgages; the former are fully insured and are characterized by easier downpayment constraints, but are typically more expensive. Hence, households borrowing through the FHA will tend to be credit constrained in the conventional market. Results of the analysis indicate that variables which proxy lender concerns about default risk and cost have an important effect on the type of loan borrowers obtain. Empirical estimates also suggest that minority households are significantly less likely to obtain conventional financing than whites, even after controlling for various proxies of default risk. These results suggest that race effects in mortgage lending may persist for reasons unrelated to borrower default risk.     

Mortgage default in an estimated model of the U.S. housing market

This paper models the housing sector, mortgages and endogenous default in a DSGE setting with nominal and real rigidities. We use data for the period 1981–2006 to estimate our model using Bayesian techniques. We analyze how an increase in risk in the mortgage market raises the default rate and spreads to the rest of the economy, creating a recession. In our model two shocks are well suited to replicate the subprime crisis and the Great Recession: the mortgage risk shock and the housing demand shock. Next we use our estimated model to evaluate a policy that reduces the principal of underwater mortgages. This policy is successful in stabilizing the mortgage market and makes all agents better off.     

Subprime mortgage default

This paper constructs a reduced-form credit risk model of mortgage default. The data used is of privately-securitized subprime ARMs (adjustable rate mortgages), originated between 1997 and 2008, and observed between 2000 and 2009. The period studied thus encompasses the beginning of the subprime crisis. Given the estimated model, contractual properties of the loans are then used to infer the market price of default risk for the various quarters of origination. It is empirically determined that a change in the inherent nature of borrowers led to a deterioration in their default performance, a change which can be first detected in late 2004. On the other hand, the evidence also indicates that the secondary mortgage market became aware of this change at about this same time. The large rise in defaults in 2007 cannot, therefore, be attributed to any surprise other than the unexpectedly large fall in housing prices.     

Default risk of wage-indexed payment mortgage in Turkey

This paper analyses default risk of wage-indexed payment mortgage (WIPM) in Turkey in comparison with other standard mortgage contracts originated in high inflationary economies. Emlak Bank launched WIPM linked to Civil Service employees’ wage (CSW) index during high inflationary period of late 1990s. Concurrently, the government introduced a policy linking CSW index to semi-annual expected rate of inflation in an attempt to facilitate housing finance for the fastest growing sector of the population. We find that WIPM protects borrowers against risk of high payment shocks whereas nominal contracts such as ARM and DIM would have resulted in high mortgage defaults.     

Reconciling theory and empirics on the role of unemployment in mortgage default

Empirical models of mortgage default typically find that the influence of unemployment is negligible compared to other well known risk factors such as high borrower leverage or low borrower FICO scores. This is at odds with theory, which assigns a critical role to unemployment in the decision to stop payment on a mortgage. We help reconcile this divergence by employing a novel empirical strategy involving simulated unemployment histories to measure the severity of attenuation bias in loan-level estimations of default risk due to a borrower becoming unemployed. Attenuation bias results because individual data on unemployment status is unobserved, requiring that a market-wide unemployment rate be used as a proxy. Attenuation is extreme, with our results suggesting that the use of an aggregate unemployment rate in lieu of actual borrower unemployment status results in default risk from a borrower becoming unemployed being underestimated by a factor more than 100. In addition, our analysis indicates that adding the unemployment rate as a proxy for the missing borrower-specific unemployment indicator does not improve the accuracy of the estimated model over the specification without the proxy variable included. Hence, aggregate portfolio-level risk estimates for mortgage guarantors such as FHA also are not improved.These views represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. This is a revised version of a paper that previously circulated under the title “Unemployment and Unobserved Credit Risk in the FHA Single Family Mortgage Insurance Fund (NBER Working Paper No. 18880). John Grigsby provided excellent research assistance. We appreciate the helpful comments of Andrew Haughwout, Wilbert van der Klaauw, the editor (Stuart Rosenthal) and referees, but remain responsible for any errors.     

Availability of Mortgage Loans in Volatile Real Estate Markets

This paper presents a default model for mortgages on single-family houses implying a higher probability of negative equity and thus default in real estate markets with high price volatility. Mortgage lenders compensate for the increased default probability in volatile markets by demanding higher downpayments or increased creditworthiness of loan applicants, thus making mortgage loans more difficult to obtain. An empirical analysis finds greatly varying price volatility in single-family real estate markets in a sample of 42 cities. Consistent with the implications of the model, the empirical analysis finds that the fraction of low-downpayment loans declines in volatile markets.     

The role of neighborhood characteristics in mortgage default risk: Evidence from New York City

Using a rich database of non-prime mortgages from New York City, we find that census tract level neighborhood characteristics are important predictors of default behavior, even after controlling for an extensive set of controls for loan and borrower characteristics. First, default rates increase with the rate of foreclosure notices and the number of lender-owned properties (REOs) in the tract. Second, default rates on home purchase mortgages are higher in census tracts with larger shares of black residents, regardless of the borrower’s own race. We explore possible explanations for this second finding and conclude that it likely reflects differential treatment of black neighborhoods by the mortgage industry in ways that are unobserved in our data.