How R&;D investments influence TFP growth: Evidence from China’s large and medium-sized industrial enterprises

This paper investigates the potential channels through which R&D may influence TFP growth using industry-level panel data of China’s large and medium-sized industrial enterprises over the period of 2000–2007. Comparing with existing literature, we provide a closer look of the relationship between R&D and TFP growth by decomposing TFP growth into efficiency change and technical change components using Malmquist productivity index and distinguishing between upstream R&D spillovers and downstream R&D spillovers. We find TFP grow slightly during 2000–2007, and R&D investment indeed serves as an engine of productivity growth just as endogenous growth theories argued, which is largely because R&D accelerates technical progress even it also results in enlarging technical inefficiency. However, we find a robust negative effect of downstream R&D spillovers on TFP growth, the effects of upstream is positive but not statistically significant. In addition, we do not find the positive effects of human capital on TFP as endogenous growth theories indicated, but find human capital severs as “assimilation device” for R&D spillovers both in promoting TFP growth and increasing technical efficiency even the effects on technical progress is adverse.     

Be productive or face decline. On the sources and determinants of output growth in Italian manufacturing firms

This article investigates the sources and determinants of output growth of Italian manufacturing firms. Applying stochastic frontier techniques, we decompose output growth into factor accumulation and TFP growth for the period 1998–2003. TFP growth is further decomposed into technological change, efficiency change and scale effects. Two key results emerge from the analysis. After confirming that both input accumulation and TFP growth are important in explaining output growth, we show that efficiency change (technological catch-up) is the most significant component of TFP growth in explaining output growth distribution. Furthermore, using a specific model of the asymmetric error component, we find that R&D spillovers, banking efficiency and public infrastructures have statistically significant and economically relevant effects on technological catch-up.     

Economic reforms,efficiency and productivity in Chinese banking

This paper analyzes the impact of banking reforms on efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) change in Chinese banking industry. Using an input distance function, we find that joint-equity banks are more efficient than wholly state-owned banks (WSOBs). Furthermore, both WSOBs and joint-equity banks are found to be operating slightly below their optimal size, suggesting potential advantages in expansion of their businesses. Overall, TFP growth was 4.4% per annum for the sample period 1993–2002. Joint-equity banks experienced much higher growth in TFP (5.5% per annum) compared to the WSOBs (1.4% per annum).      

The Japanese saving rate between 1960 and 2000: productivity,policy changes,and demographics

In this paper, we use an overlapping generations model to study the factors generating the saving rate in Japan between 1960–2000. The model economy allows for observed aging of the population, total factor productivity (TFP), and fiscal policy to affect the national saving rate. Our calibrated general equilibrium setup generates saving rates that are reasonably similar to the data during this period. Our counterfactual experiments indicate that observed TFP growth rates are the main reason for both the secular decline and the two humps in the saving rate during 1960–2000.      

Economic impact of ocean fish populations in the global fishery

Our goal in this paper is to estimate the total output in an economy that is currently dependent (at least partially) on current fisheries output. We therefore applied the Leontief technological coefficients at current production and then estimate total output supported throughout the economy at the current level of production. Estimates of gross revenue from capture fisheries suggest that the direct value of output for this sector is US $80–85 billion annually (Sumaila et al., Journal of Bioeconomics 9(1):39–51, 2007; Willmann et al., The Sunken Billions, World Bank, FAO, Washington DC, Rome, 2009). However, as a primary or a potential economic base industry, there are a vast number of secondary economic activities—from boat building to international transport—that are supported by world fisheries, yet these related activities are rarely considered when evaluating the economic impact of fisheries. This study applies an input–output methodology to estimate the total direct, indirect, and induced impact of marine capture fisheries on the world economy. While results suggest that there is a great deal of variation in fishing output multipliers between regions and countries, when we apply the output multipliers to the capture fisheries sector at the global level, we find that significant indirect and induced effects place the impact of this sector to world output nearly three times larger than the value of landings at first sale, at between US $80–85 billion annually (Sumaila et al., Journal of Bioeconomics 9(1):39–51, 2007; Willmann et al., The Sunken Billions, World Bank, FAO, Washington DC, Rome, 2009). However, as a primary or a potential economic base industry, there are a vast number of secondary economic activities—from boat building to international transport—that are supported by world fisheries, yet these related activities are rarely considered when evaluating the economic impact of fisheries. This study applies an input–output methodology to estimate the total direct, indirect, and induced impact of marine capture fisheries on the world economy. While results suggest that there is a great deal of variation in fishing output multipliers between regions and countries, when we apply the output multipliers to the capture fisheries sector at the global level, we find that significant indirect and induced effects place the impact of this sector to world output nearly three times larger than the value of landings at first sale, at between US 225 and 240 billion per year.     

Creative accounting or creative destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing

We present the first comprehensive set of firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) estimates for China's manufacturing sector that spans China's entry into the WTO. For our preferred estimate, which adjusts for a number of potential sources of measurement error and bias, the weighted average annual productivity growth for incumbents is 2.85% for a gross output production function and 7.96% for a value added production function over the period 1998-2007. This is among the highest compared to other countries. Productivity growth at the industry level is even higher, reflecting the dynamic force of creative destruction. Over the entire period, net entry accounts for over two thirds of total TFP growth. In contrast to earlier studies looking at total non-agriculture including services, we find that TFP growth dominates input accumulation as a source of output growth.     

The Green Solow model

We argue that a key empirical finding in environmental economics—the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)—and the core model of modern macroeconomics—the Solow model—are intimately related. Once we amend the Solow model to incorporate technological progress in abatement, the EKC is a necessary by product of convergence to a sustainable growth path. We explain why current methods for estimating an EKC are likely to fail; provide an alternative empirical method directly tied to our theory; and estimate our model on carbon emissions from 173 countries over the 1960–1998 period.     

Estimating the natural rates in a simple New Keynesian framework

The time-varying natural rate of interest and output and the implied medium-term inflation target for the US economy are estimated over the period 1983–2005. The estimation is conducted within the New Keynesian framework using Bayesian and Kalman-filter estimation techniques. With the model-consistent estimate of the output gap, we get a small weight on the backward-looking component of the New Keynesian Phillips curve—similar to what is obtained in studies which use labor share of income as a driver for inflation (e.g., Galí, Eur Econ Rev 45(7):1237–1270, 2001; Eur Econ Rev 47(4):759–760, 2003). The turning points of the business cycle are nevertheless broadly consistent with those of CBO/NBER. We find considerable variation in the natural rate of interest while the inflation target has been close to 2% over the last decade.     

The Great Depression in Canada and the United States: A Neoclassical Perspective

Canada suffered a major depression from 1929 to 1939. In terms of output it was similar to the Great Depression in the United States. However, total factor productivity (TFP) in Canada did not recover relative to trend, while in the United States TFP had recovered by 1937. We find that the neoclassical growth model, with TFP treated as exogenous, can account for over half of the decline in output relative to trend in Canada. In contrast, we find that conventional explanations for the Great Depression—monetary shocks, terms of trade shocks, and labor market and competition policies—do not work for Canada. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E30, N12, N42.     

我国玉米全要素生产率增长及其对产出的贡献

运用T orngv ist-T he il指数法和增长账户法测算了1985~2003年期间我国TFP的变动及其对玉米产出增长的贡献。结果表明,1985~2003年我国玉米TFP的年均增长率为2.23%,对产出增长的贡献为66.13%。从总体上看,这一时期我国玉米TFP增长还呈现出明显的波动性特征,粮食生产和流通制度的变革,技术创新和新技术的推广使用,以及玉米市场价格变动可能是产生玉米TFP生产率波动的主要原因。     

ChinHow R&D Investments Influence TFP Growth: Evidence from China’s Large and Medium- Sized Industrial Enterprises

This paper investigates the potential channels through which R&D may influence TFP growth using industry-level panel data of China’s large and medium-sized industrial enterprises over the period of 2000–2007. Comparing with existing literature, we provide a closer look of the relationship between R&D and TFP growth by decomposing TFP growth into efficiency change and technical change components using Malmquist productivity index and distinguishing between upstream R&D spillovers and downstream R&D spillovers. We find TFP grow slightly during 2000–2007, and R&D investment indeed serves as an engine of productivity growth just as endogenous growth theories argued, which is largely because R&D accelerates technical progress even it also results in enlarging technical inefficiency. However, we find a robust negative effect of downstream R&D spillovers on TFP growth, the effects of upstream is positive but not statistically significant. In addition, we do not find the positive effects of human capital on TFP as endogenous growth theories indicated, but find human capital severs as “assimilation device” for R&D spillovers both in promoting TFP growth and increasing technical efficiency even the effects on technical progress is adverse.     

Postwar slowdowns and long-run growth: a Bayesian analysis of structural break models

Using Bayesian methods, we re-examine the empirical evidence from Ben-David, Lumsdaine, and Papell (Empir Econ 28:303–319, 2003) regarding structural breaks in the long-run growth path of real output series for a number of OECD countries. Our Bayesian framework allows the number and pattern of structural changes in trend and variance to be endogenously determined. We find little evidence of postwar growth slowdowns across countries, and smaller output volatility for most of the developed countries after the end of World War II. Our empirical findings are consistent with neoclassical growth models, which predict increasing growth over the long run. The majority of the countries we analyze have grown faster in the postwar era as opposed to the period before the first break.     

Capital growth in a global warming model: will China and India sign a climate treaty?

Global warming is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. One of the key challenges in mounting a global response to it is the seeming unwillingness of the fastest growing economies such as China and India to sign a treaty that limits their emissions. The aim of this paper is to examine the differential incentives of countries on different trajectories of capital growth. A benchmark dynamic game to study global warming, introduced in Dutta and Radner (J Econ Behav Organ, 2009), is generalized to allow for exogenous capital accumulation. It is shown that the presence of capital exacerbates the “tragedy of the common”. Furthermore, even with high discount factors, the threat of reverting to the inefficient “tragedy” equilibrium is not sufficient to deter the emissions growth of the fastest growing economies—in contrast to standard folk theorem like results. However, foreign aid can help. If the slower growth economies—like the United States and Western Europe—are willing to make transfers to China and India, then the latter can be incentivized to cut emissions. Such an outcome is Pareto improving for both slower and faster growth economies.     

Finance and sources of growth: evidence from the U.S. states

How does financial development affect economic growth: through its impact on accumulation of physical and human capital or by boosting total factor productivity (TFP) growth? We use a new data set on output, inputs, and total factor productivity for the US states to study this question. Unlike previous cross-country research that tries to disentangle the channels through which financial development impacts growth, we use a plausibly exogenous measure of financial development: the timing of banking deregulation across states during the period 1970–2000. At the same time our new data set allows us to go beyond what was previously done in the state banking deregulation literature and identify whether finance impacts states’ input accumulation or TFP growth. We find, in line with existing cross-country studies, that deregulation boosts growth by accelerating both TFP growth and the accumulation of physical capital without having any impact on human capital. In contrast to the cross-country studies, we also find that the effects of deregulation are largely independent of states’ initial level of development; both rich and poor states grow faster after deregulation. Additionally, since our data set breaks down aggregate output into three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and the remaining industries, we are able to show that deregulation accelerates the growth of productivity in manufacturing. This last finding answers an important critique of the banking deregulation studies which asserts that observed growth effects may be coming from the growth of financial industry itself and not from the beneficial effect of finance on other industries, such as manufacturing.     

The Bank Lending Channel and Monetary Policy Rules: Evidence from European Banks

There exist two main channels of the monetary transmission mechanism: the interest rate and the bank lending channel. This paper focuses on the latter, which is based on the central bank’s actions that affect loan supply and real spending. The supply of loans depends on the monetary policy indicator, which, in most studies, is the real short-term interest rate. The question investigated in this paper is how the operation of the bank lending channel changes when this short-term indicator is allowed to be endogenously determined by the target rate the central bank sets through a monetary rule. We examine the effect that a rule has on the bank lending channel in European banking institutions spanning the period 1999–2009. The expectations concerning inflation and output affect the decision of the central bank for the target rate, which, in turn, affect private sector’s expectations —commercial banks— by altering their loan supply.     

ICT AND EUROPE's PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE: INDUSTRY-LEVEL GROWTH ACCOUNT COMPARISONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

In this paper we present a new industry-level database to analyze sources of growth in four major European countries: France, Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (EU-4), in comparison with the United States for the period 1979–2000. Aggregate labor productivity growth is decomposed into industry-level contributions of labor quality, ICT and non-ICT capital deepening and TFP. A small set of service industries is mainly responsible for the acceleration in ICT capital deepening in both regions, but their contribution to growth is lower in the EU-4 than in the U.S. TFP in these ICT-intensive services accelerated in the U.S. in the 1990s, but not in Europe. In addition, widespread deceleration in non-ICT capital deepening in the EU-4 has led to a European labor productivity slowdown.     

Technological progress and scientific indicators: a panel data analysis

Total factor productivity (TFP) is generally interpreted to be a proxy for technological advancement. In this paper, we use stochastic frontier analysis to decompose the growth in TFP into three components: technological progress, scale effect and change in technical efficiency. Then, we conduct a comprehensive panel data analysis using the technological progress component of the TFP growth and several scientific and technological indicators using data from 160 countries over the period from 1960 to 2009. Our results generally show that the technological progress component of the TFP growth properly reflects certain dimensions of actual scientific and technological progress. However, we also find that this result is somewhat sensitive to different econometric specifications and assumptions.     

中国地区工业生产绩效:结构差异、制度冲击及动态表现

This paper is dedicated to probing into the dynamic performances of industrial productivity across regions of transitional China, using the panel data of provincial level. Based on the approach by Kumbhakar (2000), TFP (total factor productivity) growth is decomposed into four components. The main results are as follows. First, since 1988, the industrial TFP growth has been commonly accelerated across regions, with a rising technical change rate as the principal impetus. Second, meanwhile, technical efficiency and factors’ allocative efficiency are deteriorated with scale efficiency switching from being retrogressive to being progressive. Third, although the SOE (state-owned enterprise) reform in the late 1990s has constituted a common shock to the industrial productivity, the eastern area with relatively few SOEs suffers the least from this policy enforcement. Fourth, by exploring the sources of productivity differences, we further confirm that the institutional shock launched by SOE reform in the late 1990s is crucial for the enhancement of scale effects as well as the temporarily rapid decline of factors’ allocative efficiency; in addition, the educational level of the labor-force and the share of non-SOEs in the industrial output contribute positively to the acceleration of technical change and the improvement of allocative efficiency. The economic transition, accompanied by gradual institutional reforms, is reshaping the map of regional industrialization through various channels. Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2006, (11): 48–59     

Sources of efficiency,productivity and output growth in Botswana agriculture

The purpose of this study is to explore reasons for the decline in agricultural performance in Botswana that has occurred during the implementation of a variety of policy measures, as well as the introduction of new technologies, and to identify ways in which it might be reversed. Panel data from six regions in Botswana (period 1979–2012) is analyzed with a stochastic output distance function and inefficiency effects model. We decompose agricultural output growth into; total factor productivity (TFP ) and changes in input use (factors of production). TFP is further decomposed into scale effects, technical efficiency and technological change. The results show that over the study period agricultural output grew at a very low rate of 0.072 percent per year, which is largely due to a growth in factors of production at 0.071 percent per year rather than TFP growth (which declined at 0.003 percent per year). We found that the decline in productivity has been due to technological regress and low growth in technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Policy options aimed at improving agricultural productivity and output growth will require the strengthening of extension services; improving the agronomic and husbandry management skills of farmers through training; and by encouraging farmers to adopt and utilize technologies that have been provided under existing policy programs.     

Consumption,wealth and business cycles in Germany

This paper studies the long-run relationship between consumption, asset wealth and income—the consumption–wealth ratio—based on German data from 1980 to 2003. We find that departures from this long-run relationship mainly predict adjustments in income. The German consumption–wealth ratio also contains considerable forecasting power for a range of business cycle indicators, including the unemployment rate. This finding is in contrast to earlier studies for some of the Anglo-Saxon economies that have shown that the consumption–wealth ratio reverts to its long-run mean mainly through subsequent adjustments in asset prices. While the German consumption wealth ratio contains little information about future changes in German asset prices, we report that the U.S. consumption–wealth ratio has considerable forecasting power for the German stock market. One explanation of these findings is that in Germany—due to structural differences in the financial and pension systems—the share of publicly traded equity in aggregate household wealth is much smaller than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. We discuss the implications of our results for the measurement of a potential wealth effect on consumption. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee as well as from Heinz Herrmann, Helmut Lütkepohl, the editor, Baldev Raj, Burkhard Raunig, Monika Schnitzer, Harald Uhlig and Christian Upper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants at the ECB, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the CESifo Macro, Money and International Finance Area Conference 2005, the EEA 2005 annual congress and at the 2005 IAEA Meetings. Last but not least, we would like to thank Mark Weth for very useful information concerning the construction of the financial wealth data. Hoffmann’s work on this paper is also part of the project The International Allocation of Risk funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in the framework of SFB 475. Responsibility for any remaining errors and shortcomings is entirely our own.