国外对企业兼并的动机研究综述

企业兼并主要有3种类型:①横向兼并,指生产同一产品的企业之间或其产品具有密切替代关系的企业之间的兼并。②纵向兼并,指处在同一产品生产(或同一生产过程)不同阶段的企业之间的兼并。发生纵向兼并的企业,其产品具有密切的投入产出关系。③混合兼并,指生产不同产品的企业间的兼并。     

九十年代发达国家企业兼并浪潮的深层分析

进入九十年代以来，发达国家掀起了一场全球性的企业兼并浪潮，形成了世界经济的一个热点。这次兼并浪潮规模之大，范围之广，是以往任何一次都无法比拟的。如此大规模的企业兼并运动，其背景是深刻而又极其复杂的。它是世界经济发展过程中出现的新特点、新情况的反映，它本身对世界经济未来的发展构成了重要影响。就发达国家内部而言，这样大规模的兼并运动对其产业结构、国家分工格局和生产关系等都必将产生深远的影响。我国企业界近年也在推行集团化战略，企业间的兼并从无到有，从小到大，逐渐形成了相当的规模。研究发达国家企业兼并的…     

基于PCAIDS模型的单边价格效应模拟——以国际铁矿石巨头力拓与必和必拓拟议的兼并为例

本文基于爱泼斯坦和鲁宾菲尔德提出的PCAIDS 模型,模拟了国际铁矿石生产和出口巨头力拓与必和必拓之间2007 年10 月提出的兼并的单边效应.研究发现,该兼并对世界铁矿石市场价格将产生重要影响,特别是兼并后形成的新企业将大幅度提高其产品的价格.兼并也会引起印度、巴西和南非铁矿石提价,尽管幅度要比"两拓"要小一些.中国的进口铁矿石主要来自于两拓、巴西、印度和南非,因此,如果"两拓"兼并将极大地提高我国进口铁矿石的成本.     

网络效应下优势厂商的兼并行为选择

基于Salop模型,分析了存在网络效应的市场中具有成本优势的厂商如何进行兼并,兼并后是否保留被兼并品牌,以及兼并行为对社会福利的影响。结果表明,在网络效应较弱并且优势厂商的成本优势也不明显时,厂商倾向于放弃被兼并品牌的兼并,优势很大时则会选择不兼并。网络效应的增强会使得优势厂商更倾向于兼并且保留被兼并品牌,并且不论网络效应的大小,保留被兼并品牌的兼并会增加社会福利,放弃被兼并品牌的兼并会减少社会福利。     

复杂网络理论在企业营销中的应用研究

文章借鉴复杂性科学中复杂系统的结构将决定系统的功能与行为的观点,运用复杂网络的研究思路,将企业产品的销售概括为企业产品在销售网络中的扩散行为,并对企业产品在销售网络中的扩散行为进行了描述;在此基础上,提出了复杂网络理论时企业营销方法选择的指导意叉以及运用营销理论对企业销售网络扩散阀值进行改进的方法.     

企业兼并中的政府行为选择

企业兼并中的政府行为选择王钦１９９７年甘肃企业兼并工作取得了一定的成绩，全省优势企业兼并劣势企业，被兼并企业共７７户，其中中央企业１户，省属企业２７户，地市企业４９户。“省级队”企业集团实施兼并联合重组资产２７．７亿元，使现有的存量资产得到了调整，改...     

企业兼并的程序及政策规定

一、兼并的一般常识 兼并是指一家企业购买其他企业的产权,使其他企业失去法人资格或改变法人实体的一种行为。它是优势企业实现低成本扩张快速发展的重要手段。 企业兼并可以分成三种基本类型,即横向兼并、纵向兼并和混合兼并。所谓横向兼并,是指同一产业部门生产或经营同一产品的企业间的兼并。兼并的目的是为了迅速扩大生产规模,提高规模效益和市场占有率。横     

要素价格最佳规模与横向兼并

兼并作为一种企业行为被人们研究已有一定时间了,但对其发生的原因至今仍未形成（恐怕一时也难以形成）一种统一的解释。目前存在的解释主要有：Nelson等的获得垄断力量假说和规模经济假说,Gort等的预期和市场价值假说,Nelson的商业周期假说,Markham的股票市场发起人利益假说,Penrose的成长最大化假说以及Newbould等的环境、不确定性和竞争防御假说等。”’其中,规模经济假说是在利润最大化的古典理论框架下被提出来的,这一假说得到了一些人的赞同（当然,也有人持批评意见）。这一假说认为,兼并（以下所提兼并均指横向兼并）只…     

企业兼并中的制度效应

尽管兼并者的动机受企业内外多方面因素的影响而千差万别,但企业兼并所带来的兼并效应,如经营协同效应、财务协同效应、市场份额效应等等,却是企业兼并者所共同追求的.自上个世纪以来,世界范围的兼并案例不计其数,成功失败兼而有之,其中兼并中的制度效应是影响兼并成功和失败的最主要因素.     

企业兼并名词解释

横向兼并横向兼并(Horizontal Merger)是指资本在同一生产领域或部门中集中,优势企业吞并劣势企业组成横向托拉斯,扩大生产规模以达到新技术条件下的最佳经济规模。横向兼并实质上是两个生产或销售相同、相似产品的企业之间的兼并,这种兼并的目的一般是消除竞争、扩大市场份额或增     

事务所合并对审计质量影响——基于中国第三次事务所合并浪潮的实证研究

中国第三次事务所合并的浪潮仍然继续,事务所合并是否影响其审计质量值得关注.文章采用2005—2008年合并事务所的样本,考察了合并事务所合并前后的审计质量差异,发现事务所合并影响合并事务所的审计质量,总体的研究结果表明事务所合并后审计质量没有提高.分组检验发现:规模小、以新设合并方式合并以及审计的上市公司盈余管理为正的合并事务所,合并后较合并前审计质量变低;规模大、以吸收合并方式合并以及审计的上市公司盈余管理为负的合并事务所,合并前后审计质量没有显著差异.     

Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition

This paper investigates the profitability and locational effects of mergers when Cournot firms compete in spatially differentiated markets. A two-firm merger is generally profitable because the merged partners can coordinate their location decisions. The merged firm locates its plants outside the market quartiles with distance from the market center being an increasing function of the number of nonmerged firms remaining at the market center. Profitable two-firm mergers reduce competitive pressure, leading to higher prices and reduced consumer surplus. The merger increases total surplus by increased locational efficiency and the increased profits of the merged and nonmerged firms.     

成本节约的不确定性、效率抗辩与并购评估审查

横向并购可能给参与并购的企业带来成本节约而产生效率效应,同时也可能产生反竞争效应。在横向并购反垄断审查的效率抗辩中,并购企业只要能够证实成本节约的效率效应能够抵消反竞争效应进而增进社会总福利水平,就可以获得反垄断当局的批准。然而,成本节约及其实现程度具有不确定性,成本节约的不确定性不仅会影响消费者剩余和社会总福利水平,而且将对效率抗辩和反垄断当局并购审查的判定规则产生影响。本文以Cournot模型为基础,系统分析了成本节约的不确定性对于横向并购反垄断评估审查中效率抗辩、判定规则和预期消费者福利的影响,为反垄断当局在并购评估审查中如何考虑效率因素提供决策参考。     

外资并购国有企业中的职工安置问题研究

长期以来,由于中国采取低工资、高就业的政策,再加上国有企业的高福利政策,更是使得职工不愿随意离去。这种情况,往往使企业在兼并的过程中,受到职工大力的反对而作罢。而政府也希望能够保障职工的权益,避免造成社会问题,于是颁布了一些关于职工安置的法规,并在确定资产转让价格时要考虑这一因素。但这成本的增加,却会使得兼并方却步,也不容易达成兼并的目标。该如何平衡这两者,最好的方式还是尽快建立社会保障制度,并且彻底的实施,才能达到双赢的局面。     

Mixed oligopoly,endogenous timing and mergers

The present paper discusses endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly model, comprising one public firm and two private firms, assuming both a merger between the two private firms and between one private and one public firm. The paper proves that although a merger between the two private firms does not change the timing of the game, a merger between the public firm and the private firm into a mixed firm could change the market structure from Stackelberg to Cournot competition.     

Consumer discrimination,duopoly, and black firm entry: The welfare effect of subsidies

Consumer discrimination, to the extent that it lowers expected profit for black owned firms, discourages the entry of new black firms. From a social welfare perspective, consumer discrimination may be welfare reducing, since market output is lower than otherwise. If so, a policy intervention that subsidizes new black firms may improve social welfare. This article presents a simple model of duopoly where consumer discrimination exists with uncertainty, and the only cost of production is a “loss of sales” cost. Given the Nash equilibrium, in which a black and white firm must select a price to charge, conditions are derived for which a profit subsidy to a new black firm increases, decreases, or has no effect on social welfare.     

Mixed duopoly,location choice,and shadow cost of public funds

We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.     

EQUIVALENCE OF COMPETITION MODE IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH DELEGATION

This paper aims to examine the equivalence of competition mode in a vertically differentiated product market with the relative performance delegation. It demonstrates the equivalence of product quality and social welfare in this delegation game, irrespective of modes of product competition. In addition, in a three‐stage game of quality‐delegation‐quantity (or price), it shows that the delegation coefficient is different between high‐quality and low‐quality firms in an asymmetric vertical differentiated model, and a high‐quality firm makes better use of the delegation than a low‐quality firm.     

Did the 1998 Merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand Increase Audit Quality?

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse (PW) and Coopers & Lybrand (CL) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW/CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.