论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应

文章以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易活动为基础,发展了一个有关本国企业的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的非合作性广义Coumot-Nash谈判模型,探讨是否应该建立中间品策略性采购联盟,以及如何运用其集体谈判力实现行业降低成本、保障供给等问题.文章证明本国与外国之间的中间品与最终产品贸易的互补性既增加了建立采购联盟进行集体谈判的迫切性,也复杂化了集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应:这些效应既依存于本国策略性采购联盟的偏好这种主观因素,也取决于最终产品需求由线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度等客观因素,其中,采购联盟的偏好因素具有重要的影响.     

产业结构对贸易政策的影响

有别于其他讨论上下游进出口策略性贸易的文献,我们将产业结构因素加入技术领先国(外国)与技术落后国(本国)之间的贸易问题,在中间产品市场和最终产品市场都是古诺竞争的假设下,利用两阶段博弈模型,考虑当技术先进国同时出口中间产品和最终产品到技术落后国时,技术落后国的策略性贸易政策问题.文中的研究结论,可以解释我国一些产业发展中的现象,同时也可以给我国在制定上下游企业的国际贸易政策时提供一定的理论依据和参考思路.     

策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析

文章把战略性贸易政策模型扩展到环境领域,策略性环境政策认为政府有动机通过降低环境标准补贴出口企业,以达到利润转移的目的.文章分析了策略性环境政策中比较受忽视的一部分--环境技术补贴,本国政府结合使用环境税和减排补贴,我们验证了政府使用策略性环境政策的动机,得到了最优的污染排放税率,认为虽然环境政策仍旧不能消除生产带来的环境损害,但是环境技术补贴提高了本国的环境标准,企业会更少地遇到绿色壁垒报复.     

竞争政策与跨国最优技术授权策略

本文探讨当前中国在知识产权领域实施(宽松)竞争政策的理论基础。基于本国国有企业和私营企业与具有成本优势的外国企业进行古诺竞争的寡头模型,分析生产型外国企业如何将降低成本的专利技术分别授权给本国的两家企业。我们的研究表明:当不能歧视性授权时,外国企业总是偏好特许权收费方式;当能够歧视性授权时,外国企业在技术创新程度较大时会偏好固定收费方式。由于在歧视性授权下,外国企业将更多的利润转移到母国,因此本国福利在不允许歧视性授权下更高,但全球福利却相反。因此,本国政府从本国福利极大化的角度往往会强化竞争政策,限制歧视性授权;尽管从全球角度看,不限制歧视性授权的宽松竞争政策能够提升全球福利。     

基于两个联盟转换的房地产市场管制与反管制博弈分析

目前中国房地产市场价格过高,中央政府的管制政策效果甚微.这一问题的关键原因在于地方政府与房地产商结成"反管制联盟"对抗中央政府的政策执行.文章通过建立重复博弈和联盟博弈模型,得出结论,中央政府应通过策略调整,瓦解"反管制联盟",并与地方政府结成"管制联盟",共同治理房地产市场.最后,提出具有建设性的政策建议.     

垂直贸易、财政政策与一篮子货币最优权重

笔者构建了一般均衡模型,将进口中间品和财政政策纳入分析框架,在保持贸易余额不变的目标下,计算一篮子货币最优权重。研究发现,即使第三国实际汇率不变,本国实际汇率仍需对政府购买支出的变动和中间品价格变动作出反应,最优货币权重会受到进口中间品产出弹性的影响。基于中国的实证研究基本验证了该结论。     

战略性贸易政策在出口管理中的运用

一、战略性贸易政策在出口管理实践中的运用 战略性贸易政策指一国能在实际或潜在的国际市场上影响企业战略决策结果的贸易政策,它的基本主张是在具有规模经济或垄断性的行业,当本国企业与国外厂商竞争时,政府应采取关税或补贴等措施,使垄断利润从外国垄断厂商转移到本国厂商,从而使本国企业获得"垄断租".     

战略性研发补贴政策稳健吗?-基于中间品贸易的视角

在Stackelberg竞争框架下,本文沿用Spencer and Brander(1983)第三国市场模型,考虑存在中间品贸易情形时,一国的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,在只有单个国家可以实施研发政策的情况下,若最终产品间的差异程度较大(小),那么该国的最优研发政策为征税(补贴);而当两国政府均可以干预各自国内企业研发时,一国最优的研发政策将随最终产品间的差异程度不同而选择征税、补贴或不干预,并且当最终产品间的差异程度位于一定范围之内时,一国的研发补贴政策并不会招致另一国的报复,因此,战略性研发补贴政策并不如Leahyand Neary(2001)分析的稳健。     

战略性研发补贴政策稳健吗?-基于中间品贸易的视角

在Stackelberg竞争框架下,本文沿用Spencer and Brander(1983)第三国市场模型,考虑存在中间品贸易情形时,一国的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,在只有单个国家可以实施研发政策的情况下,若最终产品间的差异程度较大(小),那么该国的最优研发政策为征税(补贴);而当两国政府均可以干预各自国内企业研发时,一国最优的研发政策将随最终产品间的差异程度不同而选择征税、补贴或不干预,并且当最终产品间的差异程度位于一定范围之内时,一国的研发补贴政策并不会招致另一国的报复,因此,战略性研发补贴政策并不如LeahyandNeary(2001)分析的稳健。     

消费者谈判能力与厂商标价策略-模型及基于实验经济学的检验

本文建立的理论模型研究了消费者谈判能力、谈判成本和对商品的偏好程度等几方面对厂商最优标价决策的影响。当消费者谈判能力较弱时,厂商可能策略性地不对商品标价,以获取更大利润,利润大小与消费者的谈判能力呈倒U形关系;而当消费者谈判能力较强时,厂商会选择对商品进行标价以最大化利润;但若消费者谈判能力很弱,消费者很可能因无利可图而放弃购买,这时厂商就会选择标价销售。通过对模型进行模拟实验,模型的结果得到了进一步验证。本文同时证明,在一定条件下,厂商选择策略性不标价可能不是社会最优的,因此需要通过政府强制标价来实现市场有效性。     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Trade policy in the face of price and non-price strategies

When selling their products domestically or internationally, firms rely on more than just price as a strategic variable. They also rely on non-price instruments such as advertising and/or R&D investments. Any trade policy that affects or limits the use of one variable will likely have strategic consequences for the use of all the others. Using a Hotelling model with vertical differentiation we focus on how trade policy barriers alter price and non-price competition on the goods market. The main results are as follows: first, no matter whether the trade restriction (tariff) is placed on the non-price instrument or on the good itself, the foreign (domestic) firm prefers to increase (decrease) its use of its pricing tool and give up some of (increase) its use of the non-price instrument. Second, in the presence of a non-price instrument, tariffs do not always lead both firms to increase their price: it can lead the foreign firm to decrease its (final) price.     

ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY*

I characterize the optimal export promoting policy for international markets whose structure is endogenous. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for duopolies, it is always optimal to subsidize exports when entry is endogenous, under both quantity and price competition. With homogenous goods the optimal export subsidy is a fraction 1/ε of the price, where ε is the elasticity of demand (the exact opposite of the optimal export tax in the neoclassical trade theory). Analogously, I show the general optimality of R&D subsidies and of competitive devaluations to promote exports in foreign markets where entry is endogenous.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

Do Preferential Rules of Origin Reverse Trade Creation and Trade Diversion?

Restrictive preferential rules of origin (PROOs) moderate the ‘trade diversion and trade creation’ effects of free trade agreements (FTAs). Moderation effects occur because restrictive PROOs reverse the increase in the relative price of non-member country goods initially caused by FTAs. Such a reversal arises because high compliance costs associated with restrictive PROOs lead to a lower utilization of tariff preferences by member countries. With a lower utilization, the increase in the relative price of non-members country goods would be smaller than it could have been with a full utilization. Thus, restrictive PROOs will lead to less than full trade diversion from non-members to member countries, and less than complete trade creation to member countries. This paper infers the effect of restrictive PROOs on intra-regional trade from the estimated parameters of the revenue function, on the presumption that trade diversion refers to a decrease in the elasticity of substitution between import sources, and that trade creation refers to a difference between the change in import price elasticity and the trade diversion effect. Empirical results support the conjecture that restrictive PROOs move in the opposite direction of FTAs partly undoing the trade diversion and trade creation effects of FTAs.     

Domestic trade protection in vertically-related markets

We consider trade policy in a setting where home country firms are fully dependent on vertically-integrated foreign firms for supplies of a key input. We find that vertically-integrated firms' strategic considerations play an important role and that, in particular, a tariff on final goods may either increase or decrease the domestic price of final goods. The import of final goods is always taxed to extract and shift rents from foreign firms, while the import of intermediate goods can be either taxed or subsidized. The market structure is shown to be an important consideration when making trade policy.     

逆周期的贸易政策与福利分配

2008年金融危机以来,全球逆周期的贸易政策盛行。为了探究逆周期贸易政策对双方福利分配的影响,本文在巴格维尔和斯泰格解释发达经济体之间逆周期贸易政策最优选择模型的基础上,构建了一个2×2×2模型,假定两国商品的需求价格弹性不同,首次在理论上证明了发达国家(如美国)和发展中国家(如中国)之间的逆周期贸易政策取向和福利分配,并依据经验数据证实了自由贸易政策对中美双方来说都是帕累托改进,但中国的福利增进水平低于美国的福利增进水平;而在逆周期贸易政策下,美国和中国通过贸易获得的福利增进水平之差进一步扩大。     

战略性贸易政策应用于中国轿车业量化效果的再考察--政策工具与外国政府行为对政策实施的影响

经验分析表明,战略性贸易政策可以起到从国外企业转移利润、支持本国企业竞争和提高国民福利的作用.本文以中国轿车业为例,在以前对我国单边实施进口关税效果量化分析的基础上,进一步应用数量模型对战略性贸易政策实施过程中应注意的两个问题进行考察,一是实施战略性贸易政策应当注意与其他政策工具相配合,二是应用该政策应当注意技巧,尽量避免引发其他国家的报复,这样才能收到更好的政策效果.     

从出口优先与内需扩大走向中性贸易政策——出口导向与内需扩展政策的价格、销量与福利效应分析

文章以中国出口导向型经济为原型,建立出口—消费补贴局部均衡模型,并以自由贸易为参照,分别探讨了出口补贴、消费补贴以及二者组合政策的价格、数量和国民福利效应,由此证明了从中性贸易政策、消费补贴政策、出口补贴与消费补贴组合政策到出口补贴政策的最优政策排序。文章提出如下的政策转型建议:(1)以创造就业和加速增长为目标,将单一出口补贴政策转向出口补贴和消费补贴组合政策;(2)以降低贸易摩擦、扩大内需为目标,将内外双重补贴政策转向单一消费补贴政策;(3)以建立和谐市场经济为目标,将非中性贸易政策转向以自由贸易为基础的中性贸易政策。