产品分成合同模式和回购合同模式比较分析

在国际油气勘探开发合作项目中，资源国与承包商之间的合作方式主要有租让制和合同制，合同制包括产品分成合同（PSC）、服务合同（Service)和回购合同（Buy Back)等几种，其中油气产品分成合同模式较为普遍，新兴的回购合同模式在中东一些国家得到应用。产品分成合同与回购合同在核心内容、追求目标和风险方面存在不同，资源国政府与承包商选择合同模式的着眼点不同，构成了对合同模式的主要争议。油气田勘探开发项目，涉及长期、大宗的投资，分析回购合同模式和产品分成合同模式的适用性和各自的特点，对于从事国际油气合作项目，追求投资回报的最大化，具有一定的指导意义。     

Actual and Preferred Working Hours

We use British panel data to investigate whether or not subjective data on desired labour supply provide information on future labour market behaviour. We find that, although men and women are able to adjust their work hours in line with preferences, this is greatly facilitated through within‐ and between‐employer job changes. We also find that hours constraints are significant determinants of leaving the labour market and within‐ and between‐employer mobility. We conclude that rigidities in the labour market exist and that these rigidities impair the welfare of employees.     

Workers,Workplaces and Working Hours

This article uses the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 dataset to evaluate the importance of firm‐level factors in determining weekly hours of work in Britain, to analyse the amount of variation of hours within firms, and to assess whether workers are sorted into firms on the basis of hours. Nearly a third of the explained variation in weekly hours of work can be ascribed to firm‐level differences, which are unrelated to any observed worker characteristics. Firm‐level ‘policies’ are especially important in the private‐services sector. A further 40 per cent of variance can be attributed to the effect within firms of different occupation, skills and family characteristics. Finally, about a quarter of the explained variation in working hours is due to a sorting process of workers to firms, especially on the basis of skill and occupation.     

Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*

We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two-part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.     

Auctions for Split-Award Contracts

The buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. He uses a sequential second-price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole-source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. When entry is endogenous, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price.     

Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating

This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure contracts and supporting institutions. We focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government purchasers of infrastructure services by the supplying companies and by the governments themselves. In particular, we allow for trust updating and trust misalignments, which may give rise to ‘undertrusting’ and ‘overtrusting’. The core of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts with dynamic adjustment of trust perceptions, which we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic efficiency (measured by expected welfare) and on investment levels. We explore flexible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do not allow for post-investment renegotiation), and hybrid contracts. We then compare the efficiency of the flexible contracts to that of hybrid contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare implications of each contract. The model is used to shed light on current issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts in developed and in developing countries, including the role of regulatory institutions.     

Upstream Competition with Complex and Unobservable Contracts

Review of Industrial Organization - This paper examines situations where two vertically integrated firms consider supplying an input to an independent downstream competitor via privately observed...     

Innovation in Labor Contracts: On the Adoption of Profit Sharing inCanadian Labor Contracts

I present a model in which I show that labor contracts with wages indexed to prices have longer optimal contract lengths and therefore are more likely to adopt performance-related pay. There is empirical support for these predictions in Canadian collective-bargaining agreements. Contract durations are longer in indexed contracts. Performance-related pay is more than twice as likely to be adopted and present in indexed contracts and more likely to be adopted in contracts with longer durations.     

Labor Supply,Flexible Hours and Real Estate Agents

Real estate agents have flexibility in choosing hours and employers. These responses are tested with a five‐equation recursive model. Agents choose between full‐ and part‐time work. The conditional wage measures productivity adjusted for self‐selection to each status. Hours worked in each status depend on the fitted after‐tax wage and household income, yielding flexible supply elasticities. Using a 2005 survey of 8,450 U.S. real estate agents, a year of experience raises the full‐time hourly wage by 2.5%. Conditional hours worked decline by 0.6%, implying an earnings return of 1.9% per year of experience. The labor supply elasticity for full‐time agents is 0.21; it is almost zero for part timers.     

Vertical Contracts That Reference Rivals

Review of Industrial Organization - We study two types of vertical contracts that reference rivals: the “vertical price constraint” (VPC) requires retail prices for a...     

Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts

We analyze licensing contracts specifying an exclusive territory clause and a fixed fee as a form of payment. While commonly observed, the effects of such licensing contracts have not been investigated in the licensing literature. We find that they can generate revenues for an innovator equal to those that would be obtained by a monopolist using the cost-reducing innovation that is being licensed. This result, however, depends on three factors: The size of the market relative to the pre-innovation marginal cost, the quality of the innovation, and the degree of substitutability between the goods being produced in the market.      

The Structure of Licensing Contracts

Industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing, but empirical analyses are extremely rare. We amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts, and use it to present some simple 'facts' concerning licensing behavior. Our analysis reveals robust cross-industries differences in several contractual features, such as exclusivity, cross-licensing, ex-ante versus ex-post technology transfers, and licensing to related versus unrelated parties. We offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross-industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights.     

伊朗回购合同的执行与油气服务市场

伊朗回购合同在规范油气勘探、开发、生产、投资、产能建设和成本回收方面,与其他油气合作合同有所不同,由此产生合同执行过程及管理理念的较大差异.对于回购合同的执行,成本控制和时间是至关重要的.回购合同的作业者以伊朗国家石油公司(NIOC)的名义并代表伊朗国家石油公司进行作业,但并非石油作业的最终决策者.回购合同项目的联合管理委员会、伊方技术代表和协调程序,要求作业者具备扎实的专业知识和现场作业经验,拥有较高的商务操作和处理能力.伊朗石油服务市场呈现作业量有限、市场资源匮乏、市场准入门槛高的特点,作业者必须考虑在伊作业的工程风险.在伊执行回购合同时,应注意合同执行总体计划、选择承包商、工程技术设计方案、作业管理以及项目回收等环节的重点工作.     

隐性契约、专用性投资与资本结构

隐性契约以商品所有权分割为存在前提。专用性投资是企业传递履约动机与履约能力信息的重要通道，受资产专用性与隐性负债导致较高债务融资成本的双重约束，专用性投资应主要依靠权益融资。实证研究表明，专用性投资强度与资本结构呈负相关，隐性契约对资本结构产生影响。本文研究结论为企业融资政策选择提供了新依据。     

Exclusivity Contracts,Insurance and Financial Market Foreclosure

We study the trade‐off between the positive effects (risk‐sharing) and negative effects (exclusion) of exclusivity contracts. We revisit the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton [ 1987 ] under risk‐aversion and show that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk‐sharing, they can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival into the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral instruments, such as forward contracts, achieve optimal risk‐sharing without distorting product market outcomes. Thus, risk‐sharing alone cannot be invoked to defend exclusivity contracts.