社会地位、在职消费与激励绩效

对企业高管进行有效激励，降低企业的激励成本，有利于企业的平稳运行和经济的繁荣发展。文章以2003-2014年所有A股上市公司为样本，对在职消费通过彰显"地位"、"威望"等而对企业高管产生的激励作用进行检验。研究发现，"地位"、"威望"等精神层面的非物质因素对企业高管具有激励作用，并在激励效果上对货币薪酬具有替代作用：国有企业中，在职消费更可能作为货币薪酬的替代性补偿而产生激励作用；民营企业中，在职消费更可能发挥精神层面的激励替代作用。而在货币薪酬等物质激励得到相对满足的情况下，考虑了"地位"、"威望"等精神因素的激励契约具有更高的激励相容性，能够有效地为企业节约激励成本，提高内部资源配置效率，进而提升股东价值。     

国有企业员工组织政治知觉与自愿离职——工作价值观的调节作用

文章分析了转型期员工组织政治知觉对自愿离职的影响机理,并通过对416位国有企业员工的问卷调查,采用层级回归方法检验了员工个体的工作价值观在自愿离职决定中的调节作用.主要结论包括:第一,组织政治知觉对自愿离职具有显著的解释能力;第二,员工的社会型工作价值观对组织政治知觉与自愿离职之间的关系具有显著的调节效应,当社会型工作价值观处于高位时,组织政治知觉对自愿离职的影响显著减弱.研究对国有企业遏制政治行为,弘扬社会型工作价值观和减少员工自愿离职提出了建议.     

企业产权、社会责任与权益资本成本

企业社会责任是否是企业为社会利益而牺牲自身利润的行为一直是学术界争论的焦点,文章尝试从资本市场参与者的角度出发,通过考察我国上市公司的社会责任履行情况对权益资本成本的影响来回答这个问题。研究发现：（1）良好的社会责任表现确实能显著降低企业的权益资本成本,其中改善企业对投资者的责任起到的作用最为突出;（2）与非国有企业相比,目前国有企业的社会责任履行情况更好且权益资本成本更低,但是积极的社会责任行为在非国有样本中更能发挥降低权益资本成本的作用。     

Agency cost and the crisis of China's SOEs: A comment and further observations

This paper compares and contrasts our earlier principal–agent analysis of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with that of Zhou and Wang [China Econ. Rev. 11 (2000) 297.]. We argue that the focal principal–agent relationship in these SOEs consists of the manager as the principal and the workers as the agents. In addition, the paper addresses the appropriate representation of the state as principal and the manager as agent when the two top levels of SOEs are the focus. The modeling of collusion in a multilevel organization is also discussed. Other aspects in representing these SOEs are presented.     

What effect does the size of the state-owned sector have on regional growth in China?

This paper examines the effects state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have on China's economic growth. We present a simple and intuitive model of the political process, which predicts a larger state-owned sector will lead to lower growth rates. We then estimate regressions with various measures of and proxies for real output growth using a variety of other factors, including measures of the size of the state-owned sector, as regressors.We find a robust negative relation between the size of state-owned enterprises and the provincial growth rate. The estimates indicate that a decrease in the SOE share of industrial production by 10 percentage points increases real GDP growth the following year by between 0.7% and 1.2%. The average impact of a reduction in the SOE share in employment by 10 percentage points is between 1.6% and 2.3%.     

中国国有企业员工关系的困境

文章站在人力资源管理的高度 ,从员工关系的角度出发 ,对我国国有企业员工关系现状及其成因进行了理性的分析研究。文章认为中国国有企业员工关系面临的问题主要有三个方面 :一是员工受聘稳定程度较高 ,而参与企业管理程度较低 ;二是人员结构比例失衡 ,上下级沟通交流不足 ;三     

略论新世纪的产业结构

国有企业在股份制改造中存在两个突出问题 :在微观层面上 ,目前的股份制改造没有彻底解决建立现代企业制度的问题 ;在宏观层面上 ,股份制改造未能很好适应国有经济布局战略调整的要求。     

Energy prices and investment in energy efficiency: evidence from Chinese industry 1997–2004

The paper develops and implements a methodology for assessing the role of energy prices and new investment in reducing energy intensity in Chinese industry. Analysing a unique panel data set which reports firm-level energy consumption and price from 1997 to 2004, the paper finds: the energy prices, not only the current but also the past energy prices, are key factors that driving down firms' energy intensity for all three types of firms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), domestic non-SOEs (NSOEs) and foreign-funded firms (FFEs); furthermore, SOEs exhibit a robust price-investment channel: responding to rising energy prices, SOEs tend to invest in new energy-efficient capital, through which SOEs reduce energy intensity; the same price-investment channels are less robust for non-SOEs or foreign-funded firms.     

Do Political Connections Promote Innovation in Environmentally Polluting Enterprises?

We use an unbalanced panel data analysis to examine the effect of political connections (PCs) in state‐owned enterprises (SOE) and non‐SOEs on the innovation of Chinese environmentally polluting enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2016. Our sample consists of 792 firms and 4587 firm‐year observations. There are several interesting findings. First, SOEs that are politically linked to the central government promote more innovation in general and more environmental innovation than SOEs without these links. Second, privately‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs) with PCs promote less environmental innovation than non‐SOEs without PCs. Third, environmental regulation does not affect the environmental innovation of SOEs but it drives non‐SOEs with PCs to become more environmentally innovative. Our results enable us to better understand how PCs and regulations affect environmental innovation.     

Evaluating Chinese Industrial Reforms: SOEs between Output Growth and Profit Decline

This paper evaluates Chinese industrial reforms against a background of conflicting evidence for rapid output growth and declining profitability in China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using enterprise level data for various ownership forms from four coastal cities it is shown that the profitability decline in SOEs has little to do with allocative inefficiency such as excess wage payments. Rather, growing competitive pressures on the domestic market are responsible for the erosion of profit rates in Chinese industry. Industrial reforms that lead to an increase in managerial, autonomy and provide material incentives to workers can be shown to have a positive impact on enterprise profit rates. The overall favourable assessment of industrial reforms in China is qualified by substantial regional differences not covered by the sample data.     

The factor income distribution in China: 1978–2007

This paper investigates changes in aggregate labor share in China during 1978 and 2007 with a particular focus on the 1995–2007 period during which official statistics report a drop of 12.45 percentage points in labor's share of national income (labor share). Our main findings are: (1) The reported fall in aggregate labor share is overstated. According to the official statistics released by the NBS (2007a), the labor share fell 5.25 percentage points from 2003 to 2004. However this dramatic decline, 42.16% of the total reported decline of the labor share from 1995 to 2007, is completely due to the changes in the way NBS break down the operating surplus state-owned and collective-owned farms and the mixed income of the owners of individual economy; (2) For the last three decades, two main forces have been driving shifts in the aggregate labor share: (i) structural transformation between the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors and (ii) shifts in the labor share within the industry sector; (3) From 1995 to 2003, these two effects are both negative and together drive down aggregate labor share by 5.48 percentage points. The structural change explains 61.31% of the decline and the remaining 38.69% of the decline is due to the changes in the labor share within sectors, primarily in the industry sector; (4) Labor share in agriculture is lower than labor share in services. Therefore, when the service sector grows relative to the agriculture sector in the economy, the aggregate labor share of income declines; and (5) Restructuring of the SOEs and expanded monopoly power are the main reasons for the decline of labor share within industry after 1998. Relative price shifts, the factor input ratio, and biased technological progress are all insignificant forces for this decline because the substitution between factors in the industry sector is nearly unit elastic.     

控制权及投资者保护对掏空风险的影响——基于融资规模的经验证据

基于中国上市公司融资规模数据对上市公司的控制权与掏空风险的关系进行了实证分析,并探讨了投资者保护对掏空风险的抑制作用。研究发现:与国家终极控制的上市公司相比,私人终极控制的上市公司中掏空风险更高,因而融资规模显著高于前者;控股股东持股比例越高,掏空上市公司的动机越小,从而导致上市公司融资规模越低;其他大股东的制衡能力越强,控股股东掏空上市公司的可能性越小,因而上市公司融资规模越低;投资者保护水平越高,越能起到抑制掏空风险的作用。     

Long live China’s state-owned enterprises: deflating the myth of poor financial performance

China’s industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly perceived as performing poorly. This leads authors to conclude that SOE reform so far has been a failure, and to recommend all-out privatization. Industrial SOE profitability indeed declined drastically in the course of the reform period, and industrial SOEs are always less profitable than industrial non-SOEs. However, the gap between SOEs and non-SOEs can be explained by just two factors: SOEs face higher circulation tax rates than non-SOEs, and have a higher capital intensity. In as far as these are the result of government policies and historical factors discriminating against SOEs, privatization of SOEs may improve these enterprises’ profitability levels, but privatization is not a necessary condition. The decline in SOE profitability over time furthermore is well explained by economic transition factors; non-SOE profitability declined following a similar time pattern, and non-SOEs are no better suited to withstand shocks such as the 1989–1990 economic downturn.     

The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure

In December 2006, the SEC issued new rules requiring enhanced disclosure by public U.S. firms of perquisites granted to their executives. The rules applied to perquisites granted in fiscal year 2006 and thereafter. Because the rules were implemented quickly, the perks disclosed for 2006 reflect the arrangements firms made under prior disclosure rules: firms could not revise perks to reflect the new rules until 2007. For firms that disclose for the first time in 2006, we predict and find that perks decrease in 2007, reflecting both the costs of increased disclosure and enhanced monitoring. This decrease in perks is offset by higher levels of non‐perk compensation, however. We also predict and find that the effect of perk disclosure by formerly non‐disclosing firms in 2006 leads to higher perks in 2007 for firms that were disclosing perks prior to the rule change.     

Remote markets as shelters for local distortions: Evidence from China

We study how the presence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) distorts private firms' decision on interprovincial sales in China. Using data from World Bank Investment Climate Survey and Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms in China, we find evidence that the prevalence of SOEs in a city-industry where private firms reside will affect these firms' decision on the allocation of sales between interprovincial markets versus adjacent market. The direction of the effect on private firms, however, depends crucially on the private firms' access to credit. Specifically, the prevalence of SOEs leads to a higher propensity to sell to remote markets for firms with adequate financial access, whereas the opposite is true for firms who are credit constrained. We build a parsimonious model which links political/market distortion, market access, and credit constraint to explain these patterns, and argue that remote markets can serve as shelters for local distortions resulted from SOEs presence for some private firms.     

我国上市公司高管在职消费:有效激励还是隐性腐败——基于市场化改革进程视角的理论分析框架

文章在梳理现有文献的基础上,从外部制度环境动态变化的角度考察高管在职消费隐性薪酬契约的激励有效性,对高管在职消费的现状、成因及经济后果进行理论分析,并提出治理高管过度在职消费的相关措施。从而为深入研究在我国市场化改革进程中,企业高管在职消费薪酬契约的激励效果提供理论分析框架,为解决高管过度在职消费问题提供理论支持和措施建议。     

Quality of Corporate Governance on Dividend Payouts: The Case of Nigeria

Corporate governance (CG) safeguards shareholders’ portfolios and ensures optimal returns in terms of dividend payouts (DPs) on investment. The association between CG and DPs could be significant in relation to risk exposure, operational and financing activities across firms and sectors. The relationship between CG and DPs has been well documented, however; the role of industry classification on the relationship has not been given adequate consideration in the literature. This study, therefore, examines the moderating effects of sector classification of CG on DPs in Nigeria. Agency theory underpins the model which captures the effects of CG on DPs. Governance indicators and dividend per share of 97 non‐financial listed companies in Nigeria from 1995–2012 are utilized. The system generalized method of moments estimation technique is employed in the analysis. The empirical findings indicate a positive association between CG and DP. Additionally, the analysis underlines the importance of the mode of operations (sector classification) in the relationship between CG practices and DPs in Nigeria. Based on the results of the study, it is suggested that more independent directors should be on the boards of corporate firms and the proportion of institutional shareholding also be increased to improve monitoring.     

社会主义市场经济要求政府体制改革什么

“十一五”规划强调行政管理体制改革要以继续推进“政企分开,政经分开,政事分开”为主要内容。政府兼有作为“政治实体”和“经济实体”两重身份和两种职能,乃是“政企不分”、“政经不分”的体制根源。这种体制是建国初期从前苏联学来的,长期成为计划经济的源头,现在成为建立社会市场经济的严重障碍。为此,必须让政府从两重身份和两重职能中脱身,仅只具有“政治实体”身份和“公共服务”职能,统辖提供公共产品和公共服务的国企;另在政府之外设置一个作为经济实体的国家载体(如“人大”),统辖经营性竞争性国企。首先分清和分开两类职能不同的国企,即财政账户项目类国企和资本账户项目类国企,应该退出经营性竞争性行业和领域的是政府而不是国企。再循此理顺中央与地方的关系,应是产权明晰,分级所有,可相互参股或控股。政府行政管理体制改革最需要体制创新。     

Gender and labor retrenchment in Chinese state owned enterprises: Investigation using firm-level panel data

In the late 1990s, China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) underwent dramatic labor retrenchment, drawing considerable attention to how women fared relative to men during the retrenchment process. However, almost all the existing studies on the subject rely on individual-level data. In this paper, we study the gender patterns of SOE labor retrenchment using a unique enterprise-level dataset for the period from 1995 to 2001. We find that disproportionately large share of discharge was borne by female workers and that female discharge rates were more sensitive to output growth than male discharge rates. Further, estimating dynamic labor demand equations by gender, we find that female employment was more sensitive to negative output shocks experienced by enterprises than male employment but less sensitive to positive output shocks. Further, we find that sensitivity of female employment to output was greater for reformed than non-reformed enterprises and for male-intensive than female-intensive sectors. These results provide new insights into the gender patterns of employment adjustment of Chinese SOEs to output shocks during the retrenchment period.     

Education and welfare program compliance: Firm-level evidence from a pension reform in China

This study examines how firms with heterogeneous human capital quality respond differently to a welfare policy shock. In 2002, China expanded pension mandates from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private enterprises. Based on data covering all median and large manufacturers in China (around 250,000 firms), we find that their compliance rates varied widely across firms and increased in the average education level of employees. Utilizing these heterogeneous responses at the firm level, we estimate that the pension reform might have increased the return to education of employees by 8.75%. To address endogeneity in firms' human capital levels, we exploit the historical scale of local university as an instrumental variable. Moreover, we use SOEs as a control group, which was not directly affected by the policy shock. We find our empirical estimates robust to both measures.