Regional debt in monetary unions: Is it inflationary?

This paper studies the inflationary implications of interest bearing regional debt in a monetary union. Is this debt simply backed by future taxation with no inflationary consequences? Or will the circulation of region debt induce monetization by a central bank?We argue here that both outcomes can arise in equilibrium. In the model economy, there are multiple equilibria which reflect the perceptions of agents regarding the manner in which the debt obligations will be met. In one equilibrium, termed Ricardian, the future obligations are met with taxation by a regional government while in the other, termed Monetization, the central bank is induced to print money to finance the region's obligations. The multiplicity of equilibria reflects a commitment problem of the central bank. A key indicator of the selected equilibrium is the distribution of regional debt holdings. We show that regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits. We use the model to assess the impact of some policy measures within a monetary union as well as dollarization.     

The ‘compensation’ thesis,as exemplified by the case of the Chinese central bank

This paper extends the theory of demand-led money supply endogeneity to the case of an open economy with a fixed exchange rate. This theory is contrasted to the standard Mundell-Fleming view. In the compensation approach advocated here, central banks are able to set interest rates, even in a fixed exchange rate regime, either because there are automatic market mechanisms that will induce the private sector to act in such a way that changes in foreign reserves will be compensated by opposite changes in central bank claims over the domestic economy, or because the central bank will engage in endogenous sterilization operations in its efforts to enforce its benchmark interest rate. Analyzing the balance sheet of the Chinese central bank, we find that the large rise in foreign reserves on the asset side is compensated by large positive changes in items of the liability side, mainly bonds issued by the central bank. Foreign reserves are not cointegrated with the monetary base, meaning that there is no long-run relationship between foreign exchange reserves and the supply of base money. We also find no long-run relation between foreign exchange reserves and the consumer price index.     

中国经济增长与碳排放之间的长期均衡关系及其短期非线性调整

运用Hansen和Seo的两区制阈值协整理论,研究了1953—2010年中国经济增长与碳排放之间的关系及其关系的短期非线性调整。结果表明:经济增长与碳排放之间存在非线性协整关系;当两者的长期均衡关系出现短期偏离时,在正常区制中,主要依靠碳排放的调整使两者间关系恢复到长期均衡状态,在极端区制中,碳排放和经济增长都会向均衡状态做出调整,且碳排放的调整速度更快。     

Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default

This paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt. We apply a cash-in-advance model where the government does not have access to non-distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate. Solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt. If the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way, the equilibrium allocation cannot be determined. If, instead, money supply is controlled, the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined.     

MULTIVARIATE COINTEGRATION APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF RESERVES AND BANK CREDIT: A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY*

The paper estimates both long-run reserves and long-run money demand equations using the multivariate cointegration approach. An economic model is constructed, based on the monetary approach to balance of payments in which the monetary authorities can control money supply through changes in bank credit. The vector auto-regressive methodology is used to derive latent equilibrium relationships, and the short-run error correction equations are estimated for both nominal money stock and reserves. A response function for the short-run changes in bank credit is developed. Given the institutional system and slow adjustments, a response function of changes in bank credit to lagged changes in reserves performs well for the period 1960–88.     

Unilateral capital transfers, public investment, and economic growth

We contrast the effects of a transfer tied to investment in public infrastructure from a traditional pure transfer. The latter has no growth or dynamic consequences; it is always welfare improving, the gains increasing with the stock of government debt and the benefits of debt reduction. A tied transfer generates dynamic adjustments, as public capital is accumulated in the recipient economy. Its long-run growth and welfare effects depend upon the initial stock of infrastructure, as well as co-financing arrangements. These contrasts also apply to temporary transfers, particularly the transitional dynamics. A temporary pure transfer has only modest short-run growth effects and leads to a permanent deterioration of the current account, while a productive transfer has significant impacts on short-run growth, leading to permanent improvements in key economic variables including the current account.     

Public debt in a basic endogenous growth model

We work out the mechanism that makes public debt affect the allocation of resources in the long-run. To do so we analyze an AK growth model with elastic labor supply and a government sector. The government levies a distortionary income tax and issues bonds to finance lump-sum transfers and non-distortionary public spending. We show that the long-run growth rate is the smaller the higher the debt ratio if the government adjusts public spending to fulfill its inter-temporal budget constraint. If the government adjusts lump-sum transfers the public debt ratio does not affect the balanced growth rate.     

Policy volatility and growth

The paper aims to examine how fiscal and monetary volatility might affect the balanced economic growth rate using a standard monetary growth model characterized by nominal wage rigidity and productive public spending. The model shows that any type of shock — monetary or fiscal — can generate either a negative or positive relationship between short-run volatility and long-run growth, critically depending on the size of government and the elasticity of output with respect to labor/capital. In particular, given the labor income share, it shows that excessive government spending may cause the impact of fiscal volatility on long-run growth to turn from positive to negative. In addition, a rise in the volatility of the monetary shock is capable of generating either an increase or decrease in the mean of growth. With the range of the labor share values in reality, the model produces results consistent with the fact that the relationship between volatility and growth is generally found empirically to be more negative in developing than in developed countries. The model can be seen as a further explanation for the ambiguous empirical evidence in the existing literature.     

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.     

Budget deficits,money growth and inflation: the Turkish evidence

The paper investigates the long-run relationships between budget deficits, inflation and monetary growth in Turkey considering two alternative trivariate systems corresponding to the narrowest and the broadest monetary aggregates. While the joint endogeneity of money and inflation rejects the validity of the monetarist view, lack of a direct relationship between inflation and budget deficits makes the pure fiscal theory explanations illegitimate for the Turkish case. Consistent with the policy regime of financing domestic debt through the commercial banking system, budget deficits lead to a growth not of currency seigniorage but of broad money in Turkey. This mode of deficit financing, leading to the creation of near money and restricting the scope for an effective monetary policy, may not be sustainable, as the government securities/broad money ratio cannot grow without limit.     

The effects of public deficits on money growth in the European Union

The impact of government debt on the money supply has been studied for different countries, with an emphasis on developing countries and the U.S. This topic becomes especially interesting in European Union countries that have high public deficits and low inflation rates. It is also very relevant in the monetary union, with a European central bank controlling monetary policy and introducing monetary measures for all the member countries. The main goal of this paper is to analyze if there is any relationship between public deficits and monetary growth in the European Union. The conclusions presented in the previous literature are ambiguous. Some studies concluded that there is little evidence that government debt influences money in some of the member countries.     

Stock prices and long-run demand for money: evidence from Malaysia

This paper investigates the money demand function for Malaysia in the 1971-1996 period using the multivariate cointegration and error correction model methodology. The results suggest that a stable long-run relationship exist between real M2, the interest rate differential, income and stock prices. Stock prices have a significant negative substitute effect on long-run as well as short-run broad-money demand (M2) and its omission can lead to serious misspecification in the money demand function. The analysis from the vector error correction model (VECM) and the Toda & Yamamoto (1995) causality tests find that money is endogenous and that there is at least a unidirectional relationship between stock prices and real M2. Stock prices Granger cause real M2 indirectly through income between interest rates and stock prices and stock prices and money stock. This paper comes to the conclusion that due to the endogeneity of money, M2 cannot be completely controlled by Malaysia's central bank. Therefore, in formulating future monetary policy, the response of money demand to stock prices should be considered.     

Central Bank's interventions and the Fisher hypothesis: a threshold cointegration investigation

The long-run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation is examined, allowing for structural breaks and asymmetric mean reversion. From a Threshold AutoRegressive (TAR) test applied to the residuals of the cointegration relationship (while allowing for both a break in the mean of the long-run equation and a smooth regime-transition), there is strong evidence for non-linear mean reversion properties for the real interest rates of the US Treasury Bill market. This suggests asymmetric changes to inflation shocks in the Central Bank's reaction function. The existence of different regimes is consistent with some interpretations of the monetary policies run by the Fed, such as credibility and opportunism.     

Fiscal leadership and central bank design

Abstract.  This article investigates the impact, on economic performance, of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies.     

An investigation into the dynamic relationship between international and China’s crude oil prices

This article studies the dynamic relationship between international (WTI, Brent and Dubai) and domestic (Da Qing) crude oil prices in China using threshold cointegration method. We find evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between each pair of international and Da Qing oil prices, favouring the market integration hypothesis. We also estimate asymmetric adjustments under the momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) specification in a TVECM, and the results show that adjustments to eliminate disequilibrium happen faster when oil price spread increases than when it decreases. The long-run and short-run Granger causality tests support the notion that China has influence on the international oil markets. The results imply that China should open up its domestic and imported oil markets, and also establish a well-functioning crude oil futures market, as they are essential for arbitrage and hedging strategies.     

Understanding policy in the great recession: Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic

I use the valuation equation of government debt to understand fiscal and monetary policy in and following the great recession of 2008–2009. I also examine policy alternatives to avoid deflation, and how fiscal pressures might lead to inflation. I conclude that the central bank may be almost powerless to avoid deflation or inflation; that an eventual fiscal inflation can come well before large deficits or monetization are realized, and that it is likely to come with stagnation rather than a boom.     

POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE

The theory of opportunistic political business cycles predicts incumbent politicians will alter their economic policies to spur short-run growth to attract additional votes for the upcoming election. There has not been much emphasis on the possibility of historical political business cycles prior to the Keynesian Revolution. No study has yet undertaken a systematic approach to testing for policy cycles during this period. Our study will bridge this gap by considering cycles in monetary policy for the periods of 1879–1914 until the start of Fed operations, and 1914–1932 until abandonment of the gold standard. To properly test for political cycles, it is necessary to develop reaction functions for the Treasury and compare against the reaction function later held by the Fed. This also reveals that creation of an independent monetary authority to be insulated from political pressures changed the manner in which policy was directed, aside from political issues. The evidence is not consistent, however, with monetary cycles closely tied to electoral concerns.     

量化宽松、财政赤字与美元资产安全

次贷危机爆发以来,美国采取了一系列货币和财政政策以拯救深陷泥潭的本国经济。美联储运用非常规政策工具向金融体系注入大量流动性资产,美联邦政府也大幅度提高了财政支出,使得财政赤字愈加恶化。在此背景下,美元资产的安全性成为投资者关注的焦点。本文分别从货币政策效果、财政赤字的可持续性以及投资主体等方面考察了美元资产的安全性,分析了美国宏观经济政策的实际作用,并从投资主体结构探讨了美国联邦政府的经济取向,最后以所涉及资产的市场表现回应美元资产安全问题。笔者认为,与其它货币资产相比,持有美元资产并不会承担额外的币种风险。     

Social status, human capital formation and super-neutrality in a two-sector monetary economy

In this paper, we study how social status affects the impact of monetary policy on the long-run growth rate in a two-sector monetary economy with human capital accumulation, and find that the super-neutrality of money, with regard to the growth rate of the economy depends on the formation of human capital. In an economy with Lucas-type human capital formation, money is super-neutral; however, for an economy in which both physical and human capital are used as inputs for human capital accumulation, the money growth rate will have a positive effect on the long-run economic growth rate. The existence, uniqueness and saddle-path stability of balanced-growth equilibrium are also examined.