Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry

This article proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain. In this framework, under general conditions, the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante. Asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the problem. The implications of these general results are examined in a series of examples that represent important markets in the computer industry. The first is a model that shows how an operating system monopolist, by its mere presence, can deter the invention of complements, to its own detriment as well as that of society. The implications of policies such as patent protection, price regulation, and mandatory divestiture are considered. Three additional examples consider the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated product, a pair of horizontally differentiated firms that can add a new feature to their products, and a platform leader that can be challenged in its base market by the supplier of a complementary product.     

Proximity,networking and knowledge production in Europe: What lessons for innovation policy?

This paper aims at investigating the role of different types of proximity on the technological activity of a region within the context of a knowledge production function, where R&D expenditure and human capital are the main internal inputs. We thus assess to what extent the creation of new ideas in a certain region is enhanced by knowledge flows coming from proximate regions. In particular, we examine in detail different kinds of proximity by combining the usual geographical dimension with the institutional, technological, social and organizational proximity. The analysis is implemented for an ample dataset referring to 276 regions in 29 European countries (EU27 plus Norway, Switzerland) over the last decade. Results show that human capital and R&D are clearly essential for innovative activity with the former being much more effective in driving the production of knowledge. As for the proximity and network effects, we find that technological proximity outperforms the geographic one, whilst a limited role is played by social and organizational networks. As a result, the first policy message is that European regions still need to focus on policies aimed at increasing the endowments of well-educated labour force and therefore their knowledge base. Furthermore, we need innovation policies based on each region's specific innovation potential, due to the existing differences in geographical, cognitive, institutional, social and organizational structures and networks.     

Subjective welfare,isolation, and relative consumption

The recent literature has shown that subjective welfare depends on relative income. Much of the existing evidence comes from developed economies. What remains unclear is whether this is a universal human trait or an artifact of a prosperous, market-oriented lifestyle. Using data from Nepal, a mountainous country where many households still live in relative isolation, we test whether poorer and more isolated households care less about relative consumption. We find that they do not. We investigate possible reasons for this. We reject that it is due to parental concerns regarding the marriage prospects of their children. But we find evidence in support of the reference point hypothesis put forth by psychologists: household heads having migrated out of their birth district still judge the adequacy of their consumption in comparison with households in their district of origin.     

Markov-perfect industrial dynamics with technological path dependence

A game-theoretic intertemporal model of industrial competition is proposed where firms choose their optimal technological strategies as part of some (Markov Perfect) equilibrium with potential entry and exit. The main novel feature of the approach is that technological change is modelled along a directed graph of technologies, which permits a rigorous consideration of key issues such as technological gaps, switching costs and gradual innovation. The paper provides some sufficient conditions for existence and ergodicity of the equilibrium, partially studies the induced population dynamics, and explores a number of other issues by means of numerical simulations.     

Innovation and evolution as a dynamic game with rational behaviour

In the recent literature about the explanation of the behaviour of innovating firms there coexist two basically different approaches. To so calledneoclassical approach assumes maximising behaviour relating to an exogenously given innovation technology and theevolutionary approach postulates time constant routine decisions. Both explanations are supported by well known arguments. Nevertheless they seem to be completely separated in the literature. The evolutionary approach even defines itself by the separation of the neo-classical approach. In this paper the two methods or philosophies are linked in a simple duopolistic model. It will be shown, that the strategic maximising behaviour of innovating firms leads in a dynamic model to routine decisions as equilibrium strategies.     

The better you are the stronger it makes you: Evidence on the asymmetric impact of liberalization

This paper shows how trade liberalization can have an asymmetric effect on heterogeneous firms. It develops a neo-Schumpeterian growth model predicting that the impact of liberalization on economic performance is positive “on average”, but more advanced firms benefit more. These predictions are tested using Mexican plant-level data confirming that, under NAFTA, the liberalization spurred productivity growth on average. However, the empirical analysis goes beyond estimating the average effect of liberalization and shows that more advanced firms benefited disproportionately more from the liberalization. Focusing on the mechanisms explaining these results, the paper shows that the results are not just driven by an increase in input usage and investments, but rather by innovative and managerial efforts as they are significantly stronger in those sectors where the scope for innovative activities is larger.     

Asymmetry, stability and growth in a step-by-step R&D-race

We define a notion of stability of equilibrium in an infinitely repeated step-by-step R&D race. The unique symmetric equilibrium is shown to be unstable, and stable asymmetric equilibria arise, if product market competition is intense, firms are patient, imitation is difficult and innovations are large. Some predictions based on symmetric equilibria, e.g. that less patient firms always invest less in research, or that more intensive competition leads to higher economic growth, are reversed for “realistic” values of the underlying parameters.     

Learning-by-doing,technology-adoption costs and wage inequality

In the dominant literature, the technological-knowledge bias that drives wage inequality is determined by the market-size channel. We develop an endogenous growth model with two technologies in which: a specific quality of labour, low or high-skilled, is combined with a specific set of quality-adjusted intermediate goods; the market-size channel is practically removed; adoption costs and learning-by-doing are linked with labour endowments. By solving transitional dynamics numerically, we show that changes in the supply of labour affect learning-by-doing and technology-adoption costs, which, in turn, influence the technological-knowledge bias and thus wage inequality. The proposed mechanisms can accommodate facts not explained by the previous literature.     

Complementarities in innovation policy

This paper develops a framework for testing discrete complementarities in innovation policy using European data on obstacles to innovation. We propose a discrete test of supermodularity in innovation policy leading to a number of inequality constraints. We apply our test to two types of innovation decisions: to innovate or not, and if so, by how much. We find that the evidence regarding the existence of complementarity in innovation policies depends on the phase of innovation that is targeted (getting firms innovative or increasing their innovation intensity) as well as on the particular pair of policies that is being considered. The two phases of the innovation process, i.e. the probability of becoming an innovator and the intensity of innovation, are subject to different constraints. Interestingly, there seems to be a need to adopt a package of policies to make firms innovate, while a more targeted choice among policies is necessary to make them more innovative.     

Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.     

Spillovers and the competitive pressure for long-run innovation

This paper discusses the impact of oligopolistic product markets for innovation and growth, highlighting a novel, fundamental role of spillovers. We develop a model of endogenous growth with non-tournament R&D, where spillovers raise the relative R&D efficiency of laggards. A key feature is that the rate of innovation and the market configuration (i.e. the distribution of market shares) are jointly determined. Our results emphasize the role of spillovers in sustaining the competitive pressure that is fundamental for long-run innovation and economic growth.     

Horizontal innovation-based growth and product market competition

The influence of the intensity of competition in the product market on economic growth is analyzed by developing an endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation. Product market competition is measured by (1 − Lerner index) and depends on both the share of factor inputs in total income and the degree of substitutability across goods. We find that the shape of the relationship between competition and growth can change dramatically according to which proxy of competition is used. We explain our results in terms of the interplay between the resource allocation and the profit incentive effects.     

Endogenous protection of R&D investments

Abstract .  We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. We show that, contrary to findings in most of the literature, the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Consequently, as long as the R&D spillovers are not too strong, firms decide to let their R&D knowledge flow. Since, as we show, welfare is higher when R&D spillovers are present, it follows that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge could be welfare-enhancing.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.     

Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral

We construct a dynamic model of self-enforcing insurance provision and lending to a community of borrowers who are connected by risk-sharing arrangements that are themselves subject to enforcement problems, as in Kocherlakota (1996). We show that an outside lender offering constant-consumption contracts can earn a higher profit if he conditions his repeated interactions with each borrower on the history of his interactions with all the group members (a joint liability contract), rather than on his history with that borrower only (individual liability contracts). This result holds even in the absence of informational asymmetries. The observation driving it is that with individual liability contracts, a joint welfare-maximizing group may prefer to have one or more group members default on their contracts, so that the group can consume a mix of outside funds and the defaulters' stochastic income. One contribution of our work is to give precise economic content to the concept of “social collateral” as the per-agent surplus from group risk-sharing over autarky. The group can deter its members from defaulting on their contracts with the principal by threatening to reduce that surplus.     

THE INF‐T TEST FOR A UNIT ROOT AGAINST ASYMMETRIC EXPONENTIAL SMOOTH TRANSITION AUTOREGRESSIVE MODELS

This paper proposes a new test for a unit root against an alternative of asymmetric exponential smooth transition autoregressive models, by extending the infimum test developed by Park and Shintani. Simulation results suggest that the test performs reasonably well in finite samples. The proposed test is also applied to real exchange rates to examine their asymmetric and nonlinear mean‐reverting properties.