Determinants of futures-oriented environmental policies: A multi-country analysis

This research explores the validity of several hypotheses concerning the future-orientedness of countries. Nine hypotheses that relate futures-orientedness to characteristics of countries are presented. Several of these hypotheses represent ‘conventional wisdom’ about the differences between developed and developing countries and their respective values and political systems. As an example, it can be argued that conventional wisdom holds that more democratic countries will be more futures-oriented. The number of international environmental agreements signed by a country and the number of provisions related to AGENDA21 being implemented by a country were used as proxies for measures of futures-orientedness. Almost 30 independent variables drawn from a variety of secondary sources were used in two multiple regression models to investigate the hypotheses. The results do not support several pieces of conventional wisdom. Specifically, the results suggest that there is: a negative relationship between democracy and futures-orientedness; no relationship between the level of development and futures-orientedness; and a negative relationship exists between wealth and life expectancy and futures-orientedness. These results call into question a view that more democratic, developed, and rich countries are more concerned about the future than their ‘less developed’ counterparts. The results did indicate that countries with more environmental problems tend to be more futures-oriented as are countries that may be experiencing population pressures. Countries with more land tend to be less futures-oriented. More work is needed to better understand the relationships between culture and governmental decision-making structures on futures-orientedness. Future research should also focus on constructing better measures of futures-orientedness.     

Toward the year 2000

If the world population continues to grow at its present rate, in only about 35 more years there will be an additional 3.5 billion people. Although it is likely that the growth rate will slow down in the future, there will be an increase of between 2.3-3.5 billion people by the year 2000. At that time the Asian, African, and Latin American regions of the world will account for between 81-84% of world population, regardless of whether there is a fertility decline. Simultaneously, the populations of Europe and North America will decrease from 26 to between 16-19%. The People's Republic of China is now working to contain population increase, but despite the efforts for every 10 Chinese alive in 1970 there will be 15 in the year 2000. For the other 9 most populous less developed countries, there will be nearly 20 persons for every 10. As this figure is 12 in the year 2000 for every 10 Russians or Americans in 1970, a significant reduction in the growth rate of population in the 10 largest less developed countries would do much to reduce the world's population problems. The number of children born between now and the year 2000 depends on the fertility of all women in the childbearing ages during that period. Finally, as the population of the world continues to increase, there will be a marked concentration of the world's children in the poorer nations, and this will be a major problem in these developing countries.     

Anticipating the future: ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ as unrealized promise?

This article analyses visions of the future articulated by proponents of ‘biotechnology for the poor’, those who claim that an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture is critical to alleviating poverty in developing countries. Specifically, we analyse how such ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents represent a future with or without transgenic crops. Such representations include visions of a beckoning (promising) future, where much is to be gained from an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture, and an onrushing (threatening) future, where much will be lost if the technology is not embraced. The article shows that claims about a beckoning or onrushing future by ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents are based upon unexamined or problematic assumptions about the poor and poverty. As such, poverty becomes merely a moral backdrop against which visions of a future are articulated. Furthermore, ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings do not engage in dialogue with alternative voices in articulating their perspectives on the future, losing a key opportunity to democratize debate about this crucial issue. We conclude by considering the policy consequences (in regulatory and institutional terms) of ‘biotechnology for the poor’ depictions of the future, particularly for the global South where such consequences will be felt.     

Is there a postnormal time? From the illusion of normality to the design for a new normality

Ziauddin Sardar's characterization of ‘postnormal times’ elegantly captures the mood of despair, uncertainty and insecurity in the West due to the multiple shocks of terrorism, economic recession and climate change. However, the prevailing mood in India, most of Asia and developing countries in general is confidence and optimism for the future. The label ‘postnormal times’ is inappropriate for resurgent Asia and other ‘emerging markets’. Similarly, these countries - as illustrated by examples from India - need more modernization and efficiency to save and improve the lives of their citizens. This paper argues that the seeming normality of twentieth century in the West was an illusion arising out of the ignorance and neglect of environmental and health consequences of unbridled industrial growth. The distorted assumptions of neoclassical economics are largely to blame for this. It is now time to pay back for those excesses. A new normality will emerge only by addressing these distortions and by creating democratic global institutions that can reflect the changed global balance of power of the 21st century. The intellectuals, opinion-makers and leaders of the world have to exercise their ethical responsibility and creative imagination to enable this new normality to emerge.     

A multinomial logit approach to exchange rate policy classification with an application to growth

We model a country's de jure exchange rate policy as the choice from a multinomial logit response conditioned on the volatility of its bilateral exchange rate, the volatility of its international reserves, and the volatility of its effective exchange rate. The category with the highest predictive probability implied by the logit regressions serves as our de facto exchange rate policy. An empirical investigation into the relationship between the de facto classifications and GDP growth finds that growth is higher under stable currency-value policies. For non-industrialized countries, a more nuanced characterization of exchange rate policy finds that those who exhibit ‘fear of floating’ experience significantly higher growth.     

A productivity analysis of Central and Eastern European banking taking into account risk decomposition and environmental variables

This paper develops a Luenberger productivity index that is applied to a technology where desirable and undesirable outputs are jointly produced and are possibly negative. The components of this Luenberger productivity index - the efficiency change and the components of the technological shift - are then decomposed into factors determined by the technology, adjusted and then for ‘risk and environment’, ‘risk management’ and ‘environmental effects’. The method is applied to Central and Eastern European banks operating during 1998-2003 utilising three alternative input/output methodologies (intermediation, production and profit/revenue). Additionally, the comparative analysis of the sensitivity of the productivity indices in the choice of the methodologies is undertaken using statistical and kernel density tests. It is found that the main driver of productivity change in Central and Eastern European banks is technological improvement. That is, in the beginning of the analysed period, the results hinged on the banks ability to capitalise on advanced technology and successfully take into account ‘risk and environmental’ factors. Whereas, in later periods, one of the most important factors of technological improvement/decline was ‘risk management’. Finally, the tests employed confirm previous findings, such as Pasiouras (2008)in this journal, that different input/output methodologies produce statistically different productivity results. Finally, we find that external factors, such as ‘risk in the economy’ and banking production, and a ‘corruption perception’ affect the productivity of banks.     

Oppression and resistance: the powerless and the future

Relations between rich and poor (across and within countries) appeared in some questions in Images; there were clear differences between what the powerful and the powerless hoped and expected from the future. This is compared with what actually happened and a deeper analysis is made of ‘power’ as an organizing concept. It turned out that the pessimism associated with powerlessness tended to make better predictions.     

Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community?

This article analyses the concept of epistemic community focusing the attention on two aspects, which contribute to define this ‘actor’: knowledge and capacity of acting under the conditions of uncertainty. The link between these two issues and the ‘nature of future studies’ is considered and the possibility of considering some organisations and institutions as future epistemic communities is explored. The case of the World Futures Studies Federation is examined in detail.In 1992, Peter Haas defined an ‘epistemic community’ as follows: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; shared notions of validity—that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and a common policy enterprise—that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” [1].In ancient Greek, the term ‘episteme’ has a meaning which belongs to the philosophical sphere; ‘community’ is a concept which comes from the religious tradition and, more recently, has been the objective of sociological studies. Epistemic community links the two terms to indicate a ‘new’ and in some aspects, atypical political actor. At etymological level we already have a first sort of indication with respect to what is meant: politics as a synthesis of religion (faith), sociology (the decisions taken by policy makers have consequences on the whole society) and philosophy (intended as Weltanschaung). The German term Weltanschaung means the idea, concept or the ‘vision’ of the world and life. It is the way in which an individual or a social group considers the position of the human being in the world and the attitudes and actions they develop on the basis of a particular vision of the cosmos.In addition to this formal definition, Haas identifies other characteristics: “members of an epistemic community share inter-subjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge” [1].This definition could be analysed in several ways with particular attention to one or more of the indicated criteria. We could assume that the expression ‘possible policy actions and desired outcomes’ is to be understood as the ‘long term implications, expected, possible, probable and desired’ of a decision taken or that which will be taken, and this would already represent a linkage between the policy, the futures studies and an epistemic community; moreover, usually ‘the policy choices concern consequences, which can only be partially anticipated’ [2]. This gives rise ‘to the desire for information, which is not so much based on purely technical knowledge but rather information, which is the product of human interpretation’ [1]. Epistemic communities, national or trans-national, are one possible provider of such information.At this stage, and considering only this aspect of the whole definition, we could argue that a network of experts active in the field of future studies would represent the perfect portrait of what we are looking for: a multi-person actor able to ‘anticipate’, using knowledge, various backgrounds and expertise. To anticipate, in this context, might be specified as to understand or comprehend global and local changes. In general, futurists work within the framework of complexity and uncertainty, try to re-define problems in broader context and attempt to comprehend ‘change’ using knowledge.An example could be helpful: the change we are experiencing in Eastern European countries appears as multi-dimensional: in less than 15 years those countries have moved from a

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socialist economy (closed and planned), to a

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‘Western economy’ (the so-called market economy), to a

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technological one as a consequence of globalisation and, lastly,

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to the learning economy.

The first step (socialist economy), recalls other sectors in which the ‘ideas’ were closed and planned. The society was divided into classes and the dominant concept was ‘war’. In this context, every single action was intended as a possibility to demonstrate the points of strength of a system: sports, culture and economy were part of the battle and the vision of the future was mostly influenced by the possibility to destroy or to be destroyed. Examples of these considerations could be seen in the choice made by the USA government in its participation at Olympic Games in Moscow (1980), the USSR’s answer in 1984 (Los Angeles Olympic Games) and the proliferation of nuclear holocaust movies such as The Day After. These ideas were strongly present amongst the people of the Eastern countries, but after 1989, things changed and ‘gradually’ the new paradigms based on ‘Western values’ and, for a few, Western lifestyles, emerged. Probably these changes caused shocks in the local societies, shocks that have had consequences also in the way these societies now see their futures. The third step, the shift to a technological economy, has been faster and wider, thanks largely to the new communication technologies and the Internet. In understanding and developing alternative futures for Eastern Europe, futurists have to take account of the fact that all the three economies exist side by side—Eastern Europe does not represent one or the other economies, it is a complex mix of all the three economies. This complexity is further augmented by the fact that Eastern European societies have not had enough time to understand their present in order to be able to desire possible, alternative futures. Further, economic competitiveness is now based more and more on the capacity to develop and apply knowledge [3]. Thus, futures of Eastern Europe are a function of its capacity to develop relevant new forms of knowledge. Futurists cannot afford to ignore this connection between the knowledge and alternative futures.Thus, the concept of epistemic community and the theory of ‘knowledge economy’ have a great deal in common. If we consider that the so-called ‘decision-makers’ are (in democratic countries) elected by the people, we can argue that that section of the people able to disseminate consciousness of problems, possible solutions and long term implications, posses a form of power. Without engaging with this power, we cannot shape viable and meaningful futures.Are there any trans-national networks of expert where it is possible to identify these characteristics of an ‘embryonic’ epistemic community? In some respect this could be the case of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), or of the Washington-based World Future Society (WFS) or, at regional level, of the Namur-based euroProspective or the Finland Futures Research Centre, where we have structured networks of the experts coming with different experiences, from different backgrounds, a common interest (to analyse the society from different perspective, but all future oriented), a shared task (to disseminate the use of futures studies not only as a tool but also as a way of thinking) and diversity in knowledge, which is what keeps them together. Moreover, for most of the members, the idea of knowledge economy is already their reality and the capacity to understand trends, possible (or even better) probable futures is the aim of their professional activities.If we briefly consider those organisations, we could assume that they already posses some aspects related to the concept of epistemic community: the WFS for example “strives to serve as a neutral clearinghouse for ideas about the future, membership is open and the Society includes 30,000 people in more than 80 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Members come from all walks of life, they include sociologists, scientists, and educators” [4]. If the WFS’s main strength is in trans-national partnership and different backgrounds of its members, the regional experience that euroProspective is carrying out is mostly based on the construction of a European network of experts. The inter-exchange of ideas and a common ‘mission’ are the two elements, which could let us consider this organisation as futures epistemic communities. Another example, at national/regional level, is the one provided by the Finland Futures Research Centre; the link with epistemic community is offered by the activity and the nature of some projects of this institution such as ‘sustainable energy development in developing countries’, ‘Russian energy and global climate’, ‘collisions of nature and culture in transport policy’, ‘professional delphiscan, an expert system’ [5]—all of these projects or tools (delphiscan is a software) are aimed at producing a relationship between political power and future and knowledge power.There are several reasons why we cannot consider the WFSF by itself as an epistemic community. Perhaps the most important is that it does not have a direct link with the political power; neither does the Federation seek any kind of influence on public authorities or on the decision-making process. But in as much as the Federation is concerned with managing change, it could be considered as an actor able to help people and the institutions understand the on-going processes of change. In the coming years, it will probably be forced to become an epistemic community as it will be necessary to ‘represent and clarify the relation between knowledge management, ICT usage and experts in futures studies as mediators between the complexity of political decision and the tendency of institutions to became advanced learning organisation’ [6] and [7].We also need to study the role the futures studies can play in clarifying those ‘shadow zones’ between the political power and the complexity of the decision-making processes. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the demand for the expert advice is a common phenomenon in policy-making processes, at local, national and international level. All this processes have a concrete objective, which would offer the possibility to exploit the added value of a ‘federation intended as a sort of epistemic community’: the credibility of the futures studies and, consequentially, the credibility of the experts active in this field, depends on this. The debate and the progress of these considerations should be developed in a multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary way with respect to several subjects and research areas, but this is only a logical consequence of the ‘nature and the different backgrounds’ already represented in the Federation.A theme (which emerged during the conference held in Brasov), which allows us to identify a relationship between an epistemic community and the social needs is globalisation. While globalisation is difficult to pin down, it is quite evident that we are living through a phase of transition. But as futurists and a potential epistemic community, our goal ought to be to develop an understanding of, and perspectives on, post-globalisation societies. This suggests that we need to identify the relationships between an epistemic community, the futures studies and the organisations active in this field such as WFSF and euroProspective.The analytical tools offered by the concept of epistemic community seem appropriate under the current prevailing conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. Understanding uncertainty and bringing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge to analyse difficult problems and propose future solutions are the two fundamental characteristics of futurists. The constitution of a network of experts coming from different backgrounds is already a reality inside the Federation but, at the moment, there is no linkage with the traditional and democratic forms of power. To become an active epistemic community, the WFSF has to realise its potential and develop these much needed linkages.     

The office: The weakness of numbers and the production of non-authority

It often seems to be taken for granted that numbers produce effects and that practices of accounting enhance authority. This also goes for accounting and the environment. This paper shares this belief and argues that practices of accounting have been a crucial technology for taking nature or ‘the environment’ into account in the post-war era. Nevertheless, the ‘constitutive turn’ in the studies of accounting should not tempt us to leave unexplored the limitation of accounting practices and the inabilities to govern by numbers. With a point of departure in a pollution control agency, the paper explores the making of a non-authoritative office. It points to the emergence of what is labelled ‘accounting intimacy’ rather than the exertion of government at a distance. The paper also points to the ways in which the agency, rather than building a separate and distinct authority, came to reproduce the actor subjected to being governed, i.e., the polluting factory, within its own office. The author argues that this can be related to the investment in a shared ‘technical interest’ and the belief that the right (emission) number in itself would be sufficient to move the factory. The paper then explores the conditions for which numbers nevertheless came to have effects. The argument is that this should be seen as inextricably linked to the emergence of an ‘interesting object’, i.e., ‘the environment’ and an environmental interest, within the office. Thus, we need to pay attention to the formation of interests, and as accounting scholars turn to ‘the environment’, the latter should not be taken for granted.     

The dystopia of technoscience: An ecofeminist critique of postmodern reason

This essay addresses postmodern feminist statements on ‘women’ and ‘nature’, as expressed in the influential work of US theorist Donna Haraway and some of her European followers like Braidotti, Bryld and Lykke. It makes a critical reading of epistemological postures adopted by these postmoderns, revealing a number of internal incoherencies. And it finds their substantive analyses as unhelpful to radical political action in the here and now, as it is to utopian prefiguration of a just and sustainable future. The author argues from the perspective of an ‘embodied materialist ecofeminism’ and makes two claims. First, the postmodern preoccupation with methodologies of discourse analysis becomes counterproductive by deflecting attention from activism. Secondly, Haraway's quasi-celebration of capitalist patriarchal technoscience with it iconic cyborg, presents a dystopia that confuses the political focus of feminists, just as an aggressive neoliberal form of globalisation colonises and consumes the support systems of all life on earth.     

Population growth. Its magnitude and implications for development

A summary of the 1984 World Development Report is provided. The 3 major points stressed in the report were: 1) rapid population growth adversely affects development, 2) governments must adopt policies to reduce fertility, and 3) policies adopted by many countries have effectively reduced fertility. World population growth began accelerating at 0.5%/year in the 18th century, and by 1950 the annual acceleration rate was 2%. Most of the increase in population size is occurring in less developed countries, and this increase is due in part to the recent decline in mortality experienced by these countries. Of the 80 million individuals who will be added to the world's population in 1984, 70 million will be in the developing countries. Since 1965 the population growth rate for developing countries as a group declined from 2.4% to 2%. However, because of the high proportion of younger aged individuals in developing countries, the decline in fertility is expected to level off. According to World Bank population projections, the world population will stabilize at around 11 billion in 2150. During the interium, the population of developing countries will increase from its present level of 3.6 billion to 8.4 billion, and the population of developed countries will increase from 1.2 billion to 1.4 billion. These projections are probably overly optimistic. The adverse impact on development of rapid population growth is due to several factors. 1st, resources which could be used for investment must instead be used to fulfill the consumption needs of an increased number of people. 2nd, increases in the labor force must be absorbed by the agricultural sector, and this reduces agricultural productivity. 3rd, rapid population growth increases management problems. The adaption of policies by governments to reduce fertility is a necessary step in halting population growth. For poor families, children provide economic security. Therefore, governments must act to improve the economic conditions for poor families if they hope to reduce population growth. Education and job opportunities must be expanded and social security provided for the elderly. In the past it was assumed that fertility would only decline when urbanization, industrialization, and income reached a certain level. It is now known that appropriate policies can effectively reduce fertility even in the absence of economic advancement. Fertility declines are more closely related to increases in literacy and life expectancy than to increases in the gross national product. Family planning programs in China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Korea, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia have reduced fertility far below the level normally associated with the income levels prevailing in those countries.     

The impact of firms' internationalization on financial statement presentation: Some French evidence

Historically, the format of financial statements has varied from one country to another. Recently, due to the attractiveness of their capital markets, the strength of their accounting professions and the influence of their institutional investors, Anglo-American countries have seen a steady increase in the impact of their accounting practices on other nations, even influencing the actual format of financial statements. Given that French accounting regulations allow a certain degree of choice in consolidated balance sheet format (‘by nature’ or ‘by term’) and income statement format (‘by nature’ or ‘by function’), this study examines a sample of 199 large French listed firms in an attempt to understand why some of these firms choose not to use the traditional French formats (‘by nature’ for the balance sheet and ‘by nature’ for the income statement), instead preferring Anglo-American practices that we call ‘alternative’ (‘by term’ format for the balance sheet and ‘by function’ format for the income statement). We first analyze the balance sheet and income statement formats separately using a logit model, then combine the two and enrich the research design with a generalized ordered logit model. Our results confirm that opting for one or two alternative formats is related to internationalization, influenced by several factors: size, international auditor, accounting standards, foreign listing and international sales. When distinguishing the decision to adopt at least one versus two alternative-format financial statements, our findings also provide evidence that not all variables play the same role: ‘Accounting standards’ and ‘Foreign listing’, which are important in explaining the use of at least one alternative format, are irrelevant in explaining the use of two alternative-format financial statements.     

The future of India’s economic growth: the natural resources and energy dimension

The continuation of widespread poverty apart, the biggest danger that India faces is the wanton destruction and degradation of all the country’s natural resources and a growing, unsustainable, dependence on the use of hydrocarbon fuels. We are losing ten percent of our GDP as a result of the damage to and degradation of our natural resources. But environmental decision-making has not yet been merged with mainstream economic decision making. In the developed countries, environmental protection followed a path defined by the Environmental Kuznets curve, involving significant increases in income and pollution levels to a point where the trend changed. A developing country like India cannot pursue the same path, and would need to set up a governance structure and policy regime that allow the turning point to take place at substantially lower levels of income. The internalization of social and environmental externalities would ensure that resources are used in a sustainable and responsible manner. In the matter of energy use, for instance, proactive policies—such as stress on renewable sources and the rationalisation of subsidies—are needed to decrease the dependence on unsustainable imports and to create the conditions under which the dispossessed and poor sections of society are able to meet their basic energy needs. Blindly aping the consumerist approach of the developed world, and neglecting the ecological footprint of lifestyles, could prove disastrous for our populous country.     

Do managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts?: Evidence from Australia

This paper examines whether managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts in Australia. Previous Australian studies on benchmark-beating have focused on loss avoidance and small earnings increases as benchmarks [Coulton, J., Taylor, S., & Taylor, S. (2005). Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management? Accounting and Finance, 45, 553-576; Holland, D., & Ramsay, A. (2003). Do Australian companies manage earnings to meet simple earnings benchmarks? Accounting and Finance, 43, 41-62]. This paper extends this earlier research on benchmark-beating in Australia by incorporating analyst forecast as an important benchmark. Using three different models of unexpected accruals as proxies for earnings management, this study did not find any significant difference between the mean and median unexpected accruals of the “‘just meet or beat” group as against the “just miss” group. Furthermore, for a long period of time (1997-2002), the proportion of Australian firms ‘just meeting or beating’ analyst forecasts benchmark increased, although such increase was not statistically significant.     

Corporate valuation around the world: The effects of governance,growth, and openness

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of corporate valuation around the world. Specifically, we (i) document and compare corporate valuation around the world, and (ii) identify the key factors that drive cross-country differences in valuation. In doing so, we utilize the country-level Tobin’s q (CTQ), computed as the ratio of the aggregate market value to book value of all assets held by all public firms domiciled in a country, which amounts to the Tobin’s q for the ‘market portfolio’ of the country. The key findings of the paper are: First, CTQ varies greatly across countries, ranging from 0.73 for Venezuela to 2.11 for Finland, with the international mean of 1.30 during our sample period 1999–2004. Despite the steady integration of the world economy in recent years, corporate valuation remains starkly different across countries. Second, apart from the effect of corporate governance, cross-country differences in corporate valuation are significantly driven by the growth options of countries represented by the R&D intensities, capital expenditures, and GDP growth. In addition, the degree of capital market openness has a significant, independent effect on valuation. Third, our regression analyses show that CTQ varies directly with shareholder rights, enforcement of insider trading laws, GDP growth, R&D intensity, and the degree of capital market openness. The key findings remain robust to the inclusion of inflation and industry effects.     

Health transitions in a globalising world: towards more disease or sustained health?

In this paper, we argue that the concept of transitions is a useful way to address future changes in the health status of the world due to the processes of globalisation. To that end, we discuss the current forces affecting human health and the health transitions we have seen in the past. Next, we describe developments in the health status of populations according to three potential future ‘ages’: the age of emerging infectious diseases, the age of medical technology and the age of sustained health. Future health transitions are explored along the lines of four development paths (scenario groups), defined along two dimensions (global versus regional dynamics and emphasising economic objectives versus environmental and equity objectives). We conclude that managing the health transition effectively will require a micro- and macro-approach, taking into account the social, cultural and behavioural determinants of health.     

The happy story of small business financing

We examine two data sets, one from the UK (n = 15,750) and one from the US (n = 3239), to show that SME financial behaviour demonstrates substantial financial contentment, or ‘happiness’. We find fewer than 10% of the UK firms seek significant growth and only 1.32% of US firms list a shortage of capital other than working capital as a problem. Financial performance indicators (growth, return on assets, profit margin) were not found to be determinants of SME financing activities, as might be expected in a ‘rational’ risk–return environment. Younger and less educated SME owners more actively use external financing – even though more education reduces the fear of loan denial – while older and more educated (‘wiser’) SME owners are found to be being less likely to seek or use external financing. The contentment hypothesis for SME financing also extends to high-growth firms in that we show that they participate more in the loan markets than low-growth firms. By way of contrast to the finance gap hypothesis, the contentment hypothesis observes the importance of social networks (connections) [for finance] and confirms the ‘connections – happiness’ linkage in the literature on happiness while doubting the theoretical suitability of Jensen and Meckling [Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.] base-case analysis for SMEs.     

THE ECONOMICS OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE

This article examines the generation and management of municipalsolid waste through the lens of economics. The authors estimatethat the global burden of municipal solid waste amounted to1.3 billion metric tons in 1990, or two-thirds of a kilogramof waste per person per day. Industrial countries account fora disproportionately high share of the world's waste relativeto their share of world population, while developing countriesaccount for a disproportionately high share of the world's wasterelative to their share of world income. Analyses across countriesand over time reveal that the generation of municipal solidwaste is positively related to variations in per capita incomeand that the generation of municipal solid waste per capitadoes not vary with population size among countries with comparableper capita income. Practices for collecting, processing, and disposing of municipalsolid waste vary widely across countries, generally in accordwith the nature of the waste stream and key environmental andeconomic features. The least efficient practices tend to befound in developing countries, creating serious threats to localenvironmental quality and public health. Although considerableevidence indicates that the generation and management of wasteis sensitive to income and price variables, natural incentivesto overuse common property and the presence of inter- generationalexternalities both suggest that private economic behavior willnot yield socially optimal outcomes in this area. Communityintervention may be needed to promote the social good, withevidence accumulating in support of arrangements involving theparticipation of private firms. The authors' calculations alsosuggest that improvements made now in the handling of hazardouswaste will be far less expensive in discounted terms than undoingin the future the damage being caused by current practices.Addressing these issues from a rational societal perspectivewill become increasingly urgent in the future, especially inthe developing countries, where the authors project that municipalsolid waste will increase at an annual rate of 2.7 percent throughthe year 2010.      

Pirsig's ‘Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance’: Quality, reason and binary opposites

Robert Pirsig's celebrated novel has lost little of its impact after 30 plus years, and still speaks to us in the West and our highly technological society. None of the issues raised regarding our relation with technology have changed. As fits the schizophrenic pattern of the book, this article is arbitrarily divided into two disparate sections: the first covers some of the sources for the book and the range of critical views on the book. The second, a more speculative conclusion, drawing on a contradiction in Pirsig's text, looks forward to the books continuing relevance as we see the promise of a new dawn for computers: quantum computing. I am unsure of how to equate the forceful rhetoric against dualism, with the facile mystical acceptance of the Buddha residing in the circuits of a digital computer. This fracture in Pirsig's work becomes more visible when he talks of the Japanese term ‘mu’, meaning ‘no thing’. Binary computation is challenged by alternative logics to binary logic. I examine these issues along with the current definitions of Pirsig's quality. A future ‘definition’ of Pirsig's Quality could be the undecided state of a quantum computer (or quantum processes in the mind).     

The hegemony of the physical sciences: an exploration in complexity thinking

Traditionally the natural sciences, particularly physics, have been regarded as the Gatekeepers of Truth. As such the legitimacy of others forms of knowledge have been called into question, particularly those methods that characterise the ‘softer’ sciences, and even the arts. This paper begins with an extended discussion concerning the main features of a complex system, and the nature of the boundaries that emerge within such systems. Subsequent to this discussion, and by assuming that the Universe at some level can be well-described as a complex system, the paper explores the notion of ontology, or existence, from a complex systems perspective. It is argued that none of the traditional objects of science, or any objects from any discipline, formal or not, can be said to be real in any absolute sense although a substantial realism may be temporarily associated with them. The limitations of the natural sciences is discussed as well as the deep connection between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ sciences. As a result of this complex systems analysis, an evolutionary philosophy referred to as quasi-‘critical pluralism’ is outlined, which is more sensitive to the demands of complexity than contemporary reductionistic approaches.