The determinants and effects of CEO–employee pay ratios

We study the determinants and effects of the relative compensation of top executives and lower-level employees. First, we show that CEO–employee pay ratios depend on the balance of power between the CEO (relative to the board) and ordinary employees (relative to management). Second, our results suggest that employees do not perceive higher pay ratios as an inequitable outcome to be redressed via costly behaviors that lower productivity. We do not find a negative relation between relative pay and employee productivity, either in our full sample or in subsamples where employees are well-informed about executive pay and are protected against career retributions. Rather, we find that productivity increases with relative pay when the firm has fewer employees who are well-informed, and when promotion decisions are predominantly merit-based. We also find that firm value and operating performance both increase with relative pay. We conclude that ordinary employees appear to perceive an opportunity in higher pay ratios but the extent to which such perception incentivizes them depends on the likelihood of success in a series of sequential promotion tournaments.     

Who should rescue subsidiaries of multinational banks?

This paper asks whether a single resolution authority for multinational banks is desirable. Such an authority was recently established within the European Monetary Union, where the resolution power for large banks was transferred to a Single Resolution Board. To address this issue, we consider the risk incentives of a multinational bank in the presence of different resolution frameworks and determine the welfare-efficient structure which prevents banks from excessive risk-taking. We argue that a single resolution authority is not always welfare-efficient, because it is the heterogeneity of bank resolution power which induces multinational banks to behave prudently. In severe solvency crises, the multinational authority should have the resolution power, whereas in less severe crises national resolution authorities are more efficient in avoiding excessive risk-taking on the part of multinational banks.     

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.     

Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction

Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predictions using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs’ personal over-investment in their company and their press portrayal. We find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. The market reaction at merger announcement (-90$-90$ basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (-12$-12$ basis points). We consider alternative interpretations including inside information, signaling, and risk tolerance.     

Who times the foreign exchange market? Corporate speculation and CEO characteristics

This paper shows that managers' personal beliefs and individual characteristics explain a large share of the substantial time-variation of derivative use beyond firm, industry, and market fundamentals. We construct a panel data set of foreign currency derivative holdings and currency exposures for U.S. non-financial firms. We use a novel approach to build a firm-specific foreign exchange return. We find that managers adjust derivatives notional amounts in response to past foreign exchange returns, as if they were forming views on future currency prices. We then construct an empirical measure of speculative behavior for each firm to investigate the profile of the speculator. Firms where the CEO holds an MBA degree, is younger, and has less previous working experience speculate more. These results are consistent with overconfident managers taking more risk.     

Who buys Bitcoin? The cultural determinants of Bitcoin activity

We examine the relationship between national culture and a country's Bitcoin activity. Given that Bitcoin is a high-risk currency/investment that is frequently used for illegal purposes and whose market is relatively opaque, we focus on the cultural dimension of individualism, which has been related to financial market participation, risk-taking behavior, and overconfidence. Using unique data that includes the originating country for Bitcoin transactions, we examine the relationship between individualism and a country's Bitcoin activity for a sample of 80 countries between 2009 and 2020. We find a significant and positive relationship between a country's individualism and its use of Bitcoin consistent with cultural values affecting the demand for such high-risk currency/investments.     

Pay now or pay later? The economics within the private equity partnership

The economics of partnerships have been of enduring interest to economists, yet it is not clear what profit sharing within a private partnership should look like. We examine over 700 private equity partnerships and show that the allocation of fund economics to individual partners varies drastically, even among the most senior partners, and appears divorced from past success as an investor, being instead related to status as a founder. A smaller share of carried interest and ownership—and inequality in fund economics more generally—is associated with departures of senior partners which, in turn is negatively related to the funds’ ability to raise additional capital.     

The monitoring role of independent directors in CEO pay–performance relationship: the case of Malaysian government linked companies

This study looks into the pay-performance and monitoring issues in Malaysian government linked companies (GLCs). Our study utilizes 21 Malaysian public listed GLCs data from financial year 2001 until 2006. We adopt panel regression to study pay–performance relationship while the internal monitoring mechanism is measured by board independence. In our analysis, chief executive officer (CEO pay is regressed to individual performance as well as benchmarked against industry average. Generally, we document that the pay–performance relationship in Malaysian GLCs is sporadically significant, implying that CEO pay is not properly aligned to performance. However, pay-earning-sensitivity (EPS) is high and statistically significant when individual performances are benchmarked against industry average in GLCs with more than 50% independent directors (majority board). This implies that for Malaysian GLCs, a majority independent board is required to ensure effective monitoring on CEOs' performance.     

Who wins in the money game? The case of KOSPI 200 futures

This study investigates the information advantage of each investor category (i.e., foreigners, individuals, institutions, and the others) in the Korean stock index (i.e., KOSPI 200) futures market. To evaluate the information advantage of each investor category, we calculate futures trading and position gains; review and criticize the Value Weighted Average Price (VWAP) measure; and develop adjusted VWAP measures that are consistent with trading gains. Our main inferences are made based on adjusted VWAP measures. This study analyzes the transaction data of the nine years from January 1998 through 2006. From the perspectives of the adjusted VWAP measures, our findings support the information advantage of foreign investors over domestic (particularly, domestic individual) investors in the KOSPI 200 futures market.     

The Tax Exemption to Subchapter S Banks: Who Gets the Benefit?

The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 allows U.S. banks to adopt the Subchapter S status. We investigate if the Subchapter S banks use tax benefits for the intended purposes of “protecting jobs,” “creating opportunities” and “increasing take home pay of workers.” We find that the tax benefits: (a) are not used in expenses related to protection of jobs, (b) do not lead to greater employment opportunities within the Subchapter S banks, and (c) do not benefit the employees in the form of increased salaries and benefits. Our results indicate that bank owners are sole beneficiaries of the tax exemption benefits.     

What should we know about momentum investing? The case of the Australian Security Exchange

This paper investigates Australian momentum strategies and their performance stability separately employing two samples a) the S&P/ASX 200 constituents and b) all market securities; for different time periods and market states. To avoid transaction intensive strategies, non-overlapping portfolios are employed. Results show that momentum performance is not sample specific and is positive in all cases, yet at varying magnitudes for different states and years. The profits are robust to univariate and multivariate risk considerations, seasonality (which is however present), and to different starting months.     

How does the executive pay gap influence audit fees? The roles of R&D investment and institutional ownership

Using a sample of US firms from 2003–2014, this study examines how the executive pay gap affects audit fees for firms with different levels of R&D investment and institutional ownership. Consistent with managerial power theory, we find that the executive pay gap is positively associated with audit fees, and that the positive association is attenuated by intense R&D investment and higher institutional ownership. We also find that the executive pay gap more strongly affects audit fees after the passage of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and the PCAOB's 2012 call to identify the audit risk related to executive incentive compensation. Additional analyses show that the moderating effects of R&D investment and institutional ownership on the pay gap–audit fees association are not conditional on auditor tenure, but the moderating effect of institutional ownership is stronger for firms hiring specialist auditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors consider the business context, such as innovation initiative and external monitoring, when assessing audit risk related to the executive pay gap.     

The death of the deal: Are withdrawn acquisition deals informative of CEO quality?

To examine the market response to positive revelations of chief executive officer (CEO) quality, this study focuses on CEOs who withdraw acquisition bids when the price becomes increasingly expensive. Firms that withdrawal for price-related reasons earn higher withdrawal returns than firms that withdraw for other reasons. This relation is stronger when CEO uncertainty and discretion is high. CEOs unwilling to increase the offer price are less likely to be replaced and more likely to advance to a larger firm than a control group of CEOs. The finding that the market attaches value to CEO-specific information suggests that unobservable manager characteristics can meaningfully impact firm outcomes.     

Who should teach what? Australian perceptions of the roles of universities and practice in the education of professional accountants

This paper addresses the respective roles and responsibilities of universities and practitioners in educating professional accountants. The issues are explored by a review of the literature in accounting and other professions regarding the respective roles of universities and employers in the development of both technical and non-technical knowledge and skills of professionals, particularly accounting practitioners. The literature review suggests that critics of university-based education fail to recognise (a) the changes that have occurred in the roles and responsibilities of accounting practitioners, and (b) the opportunity costs necessarily associated with providing generalist accounting degrees. Universities and employers have comparative advantages for the development of different types of professional skills and knowledge. These insights are extended by way of a series of interviews with Australian accounting practitioners, representatives from professional accounting bodies, recent accounting graduates, and accounting students about their perceptions of the respective responsibilities and roles of universities and employers. Although some interviewees recognised that universities cannot be ‘all things to all people’, there was a tendency to expect universities to have the major responsibility for the development in accounting graduates of both technical and non-technical knowledge and skills. Such perceptions tended to understate the responsibilities and comparative advantage of employers and result in unrealistic expectations about the outcomes of a university education. Employers need to be made more aware of the resource and other limitations associated with university programs and should develop meaningful opportunities for learning and reflection within workplace contexts.     

Who works for startups? The relation between firm age,employee age,and growth

Young firms disproportionately employ and hire young workers. On average, young employees in young firms earn higher wages than young employees in older firms. Young employees disproportionately join young firms with greater innovation potential and that exhibit higher growth, conditional on survival. We argue that the skills, risk tolerance, and joint dynamics of young workers contribute to their disproportionate share of employment in young firms. Moreover, an increase in the supply of young workers is positively related to new firm creation in high-tech industries, supporting a causal link between the supply of young workers and new firm creation.     

Who is afraid of the Ebola outbreak? The influence of discrete emotions on risk perception

The appraisal tendency framework (ATF) suggests that discrete emotions mediate the relationship between cognitive appraisals and behaviors. Based on the ATF, this study analyzed and found that fear, anger, anxiety, disgust, and sadness were positively related to the US public’s risk perception about the Ebola outbreak. Fear was also found to inhibit the degree to which systematic processing of the relevant risk information influenced participants’ support for institutional mitigation measures such as sending more health professionals to help countries in West Africa deal with the Ebola outbreak. The result partially confirms the ATF and offers important practical implications in regard to the communication of emergent public health crises.