Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilizations: What are the Gains from Cooperation?

In this paper we extend the open-economy stochastic framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff (Q J Econ. 117:503–36, 2002) to include distortionary taxation, when prices are flexible but wages are sticky. We use the model to analyze the optimal design of tax rules that respond to productivity shocks, under non-cooperation and cooperation between the fiscal authorities, and evaluate the gains from coordination. We show that, although monetary policy would be preferred to fiscal policy as a stabilization tool both under competition (Nash) and under cooperation, there is a role for procyclical fiscal stabilization in a monetary union where the monetary authority cannot respond to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we show that in the Nash game there will be an incentive for the fiscal authorities to try to manipulate the terms-of-trade in their favor, and we estimate the potential gains from fiscal policy coordination. The size of the gains depends crucially on the value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For lower values of the Frisch elasticity (more in line with microeconometric estimates) the gains are relatively small, but for more elastic labor supplies (more in agreement with the business cycle literature) the gains can be very large.

Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks

In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the “symbiosis” result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.

The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle: The IS-LM model with optimal policy

The high correlations between saving and investment, which suggest a small variability of the current account, is explored within an IS-LM framework. While Feldstein and Horioka interpret this evidence to imply a low degree of capital mobility, the pattern of shocks to the model is also important. If the monetary authorities are pegging domestic rates to foreign returns, then we would expect the Feldstein-Horioka evidence even under high mobility. We explore whether such a rule is optimal when policymakers wish to avoid income variability where fiscal and monetary policy are coordinated and where monetary policy must act alone. We suggest that the Voicker Federal Reserve switched to the latter stance and created a dramatic exception to the Feldstein-Horioka paradox.     

CAN TUNISIA MOVE TO INFLATION TARGETING?

Inflation targeting has become an alternative monetary strategy that has been followed by many industrial and emerging countries. This study considers whether the adoption of inflation targeting would be relevant for Tunisia. More specifically, this paper aims at checking whether the necessary conditions for the successful implementation of such a strategy are fulfilled or not. It is found that fiscal dominance does not constitute the main hindrance to the adoption of inflation targeting. Other impediments have been identified, especially a weak financial system in general, the unsound and fragile banking system in particular, and the glaring lack of knowledge about the monetary transmission mechanism. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that if Tunisian monetary authorities continue to carry out the present exchange rate regime, namely, the constant real exchange rate rule, an inflation targeting regime will not be sufficient to properly contain the inflation pressures caused by demand shocks.     

Structural Asymmetries and the Optimal Monetary Policy Instrument of the European Central Bank

Although the existence of differences in economic structure across European countries is well known, their implications for the conduct of the single monetary policy in Stage Three of EMU have not yet been analyzed. This paper explores the issue on the basis of a two-country, rational-expectations, stochastic model characterized by asymmetric structural equations and a general formulation for monetary policy. Only if financial shocks are the main source of instability can heterogeneity in structures be neglected. When real shocks to aggregate demand prevail, their geographical distribution and the difference in the elasticity of aggregate supply are the key factors governing the response to structural differences. When supply shocks predominate, irrespective of their geographical distribution monetary policy should lean against the wind with more determination than if countries were identical. Differences in the transmission lag of monetary policy or some concern for growth when pursuing price stabilization reduce the size of the correction in monetary policy called for by structural asymmetries.     

Policy Shocks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in a Two‐country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model: Evidence from China*

In this paper, we construct a two‐country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to investigate the sources of business cycles in China and the contributions of policy shocks in economic fluctuations. The empirical results from Bayesian estimation show that, apart from the traditional supply and demand shocks, monetary and fiscal policy shocks also play important roles in determining China's economic fluctuations. In addition, we find significant feedback effects between monetary and fiscal policies in China, indicating that policy coordination is an important feature of China's monetary and fiscal policies. Overall, these results not only shed new light on the policy factors behind China's economic fluctuations, but also provide new evidence that is helpful for understanding the policy transmission mechanisms in China.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in China

Using the structural vector autoregression model, we estimate the current responses of monetary policy to contemporaneous shocks from macroeconomic variables. Our findings indicate that the People's Bank of China responded to inflation and output changes, but did not react to asset price fluctuations during the period from January 1997 to March 2010. The optimal monetary responses to exogenous shocks are also examined. It is revealed that using asset prices to formulate monetary policy would not help to improve monetary authorities' performance in lowering the volatilities of output growth and inflation while keeping output growth and inflation in their safety zones. The effectiveness of monetary policy and fiscal policy in reacting to external shocks is also discussed.     

Assessing the costs of European monetary union

Much has been made of the importance of asymmetric shocks in arguing against European Monetary Union (EMU). But such shocks are entirely consistent with better monetary policy under EMU. A single money represents the perfect answer to asymmetric shocks coming from currency substitution. In addition, many asymmetric shocks cannot properly be handled through monetary policy; others will not be so because of information problems; still others because of policy mistakes. Some strategic factors also favor EMU if shocks are symmetric. Finally, doubts about the effectiveness of monetary policy in Europe should be kept in mind. On these numerous grounds, little weight can be assigned to criticisms of EMU based on mere asymmetry in the shocks. Distinguished Address presented at the Forty-First International Atlantic Economic Conference, Paris, France, March 12–19, 1996.     

Rules,discretion, and international monetary and fiscal policy coordination

This paper considers the implications of international policy coordination when both monetary and fiscal policy choices are endogenous. We show that a movement from insular monetary commitment to international monetary policy coordination will, if fiscal policies are not coordinated, produce higher output and public expenditure levels at the expense of higher inflation rates. We also show that the concurrent coordination of monetary and fiscal policies raises output and inflation while lowering public expenditure relative to a regime of monetary coordination alone. We conclude that the arguments for concurrent monetary and fiscal policy coordination fail to have a clear-cut theoretical basis.     

Openness and the Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Shocks on Real Output in Nigeria (1960–2003)*

Abstract: This study investigates the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the real output growth in a small open economy. It is a country‐specific, time series study that verifies the implication of increasing economic openness on the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy. A modified GARCH model was used to estimate the anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Two measures of fiscal and monetary shocks were combined with openness and real oil price shocks in a VECM model to assess the effects of anticipated and unanticipated policy shocks on the output equations. The empirical results showed that anticipated and unanticipated fiscal and monetary shocks had no significant positive effects on real output. This suggests that the open macroeconomic version of the policy ineffectiveness proposition was valid for both monetary and fiscal policy shocks in Nigeria. This is in consonance with earlier works in this area. Furthermore, the degree of openness and oil price shocks had a negative implication on the efficacy of macroeconomic policy in Nigeria; also in agreement with the Dutch Disease Syndrome. Finally, the policy implication of this study therefore is that trade liberalization policy should be implemented cautiously. The Nigerian economy is weak to withstand the unwholesome consequences of full economic integration.     

Dynamics of Money Market Interest Rates in Ghana: Time-Frequency Analysis of Volatility Spillovers

As the second longest practicing inflation targeting economy in Africa, it is of interest to investigate the degree to which policy interest rate influences other money market rates so as to gauge the overall effectiveness of monetary policy transmission in Ghana. This study evaluates the degree of connectedness among money market rates and also determines the most dominant money market rate(s) in Ghana. The basic finding is that the monetary policy rate has a low-to-moderate influence on volatility dynamics of other money market rates in Ghana across historical time-interval and time-frequency domains. This is a reflection of a generally weak capability of policy interest rate to drive other market rates in Ghana. Both monetary policy rate and Treasury bill rate are net transmitters of shocks, while interbank, lending and saving rates are net receivers of shocks in the money market. However, the Treasury bill emerges as the largest shock transmitter in the money market, across all forecast horizons and analytical domains. The lending rate is the largest shock recipient in the money market, largely from the Treasury bill rate which suggests ample evidence of fiscal dominance in Ghana. The study accentuates the exigency for monetary and fiscal policies to expeditiously address the domestic structural bottlenecks, especially in the financial sector and the fragile fiscal profile, in order to strengthen policy transmission in Ghana.     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.     

What are the Trade Spill-Overs from Fiscal Shocks in Europe? An Empirical Analysis***

We use a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis to explore the (trade spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in Europe. To enhance comparability with the existing literature, we first analyse the effects of these shocks at the national level. Here, we employ identification based on Choleski decomposition and a structural VAR, both of which lead to the same results. Then, we turn to study the cross-border spill-overs of fiscal shocks via the trade channel. Fiscal expansions in Germany, France and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from a number of European countries. In order to mimic the case of monetary union, we also shut off the effects via the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and find a slight strengthening on average of the cross-country spill-overs from a fiscal expansion. These results suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the possibility of enhanced fiscal coordination.*** This research is part of the RTN project ‘Macroeconomic Policy Design for Monetary Unions’, funded by the European Commission (contract number HPRN-CT-2002-00237). We thank two anonymous referees, a referee for the ECB Working Paper series, Peter Claeys, David-Jan Jansen, Franc Klaassen, Roberto Perotti and audiences at the Dutch Central Bank and the CEPR/CREI Conference ‘Designing a Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Europe’ (Barcelona, 2004) for many helpful comments. A large part of this paper was written while Beetsma was visiting the Directorate-General for Research of the ECB. He thanks the ECB for the stimulating research environment. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit any of.cial institution. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Cross-category spillover effects of economic policy uncertainty between China and the US: Time and frequency evidence

This study investigates the connectedness among three types of economic policy uncertainties, namely monetary, fiscal, and trade uncertainties, between China and the US. We used the spillover index measurement and the frequency-domain decomposition approach to detect the spillover effects of these categorical uncertainties from both the time- and frequency-domain perspectives. The results suggest that the spillover effects have time-varying characteristics, and some major events could sharply increase the spillover indices. More spillovers are mainly observed in the short-term, whereas the impacts of the medium- and long-term are limited. Furthermore, the leader of the spillover is monetary policy in China, but fiscal policy in the US, the spillovers of all uncertainties mainly exist domestically, apart from the US trade policy uncertainty. These results provide crucial implications for policymakers and investors, who should pay more attention to short-term spillovers and monetary policy uncertainty, which can mitigate their vulnerability to policy uncertainty shocks.     

Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting

Several countries face the choice between targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. The present paper extends the theory of optimum currency areas to deal with this choice. In contrast to the conventional theory, countries might form more of an optimum currency area the more asymmetric supply shocks are.     

Co-ordinating fiscal authorities in the euro-zone: a key role for the ECB

This paper examines the conditions for fiscal restraint to emergeas Nash equilibrium in the game between fiscal authorities ina monetary union and discusses the implications for the ECB'smonetary strategy. We show that fiscal authorities fail to internalizethe adverse area-wide effects of their policies when the ECBtargets union-wide aggregates. To address this co-ordinationfailure, we propose that the ECB reacts to fiscal restraintby implementing a monetary reward. Applying the pareto- andrisk dominance criteria to the ensuing co-ordination game, weshow that the ECB can ensure convergence upon fiscal restraintby adopting a weakly countercyclical reaction function.     

Sustainability of the fiscal imbalance and public debt under fiscal policy asymmetries in Sri Lanka

This paper investigates the sustainability of Sri Lanka’s fiscal imbalance and public debt. To test for sustainability of the fiscal imbalance, the study applies a symmetric ARDL (autoregressive distributive lag) technique to estimate a government intertemporal budget constraint. And to test for sustainability of public debt, it applies an asymmetric ARDL technique to estimate a fiscal reaction function, which allows for differential responses in the primary budget balance depending on whether shocks to regressors are positive or negative. Annual data for the period 1961–2018 are used in the estimations. The results indicate that Sri Lanka’s fiscal management is inconsistent with strong form sustainability, which requires that expenditures not grow faster than revenues. However, estimation of the fiscal reaction function finds robust evidence for fiscal policy asymmetries. Evidence emerges that Sri Lanka’s fiscal policy stance is procyclical with strong stabilization tendencies in economic expansions that are not sustained in contractions. Against upsurges in the debt-to-GDP ratio, authorities are found to pursue fiscal consolidation, thus suggesting weak form sustainability.     

中国财政赤字的通货膨胀效应

文章主要以1996年第1季度至2015年第3季度的居民消费价格指数CPI、财政赤字、利率和货币供应量的季度同比增长率等数据为基础,通过构建时变参数向量自回归(TVP-VAR) 模型,对我国财政赤字的通货膨胀效应进行了检验,并探讨了货币当局和财政当局的主导权归属问题。主要得出了二方面结论：一方面是现阶段财政赤字在短期内具有“凯恩斯效应”,而从长期看,既遵循“李嘉图等价”原理,又具有微弱的“挤入效应”;另一方面是财政当局虽占优于货币当局,但财政赤字需要配合货币政策才能影响价格水平。据此,向政府提出了“新常态”时期的政策建议,即政府在短期内可以通过赤字财政的方式诱导适度通胀来实现去库存,从供给侧引导经济增长,同时也要保持货币政策偏紧,增强人民银行的独立性,进一步优化财政收支结构。     

Inflation Targeting as a Coordination Device

The paper analyses inflation targeting when two independent policy authorities (a central bank and a National Government) have divergent preferences for the optimal policy mix. We demonstrate that the main advantage of inflation targeting, as a policy regime, is that it represents a simple proxy for full coordination between policy authorities. Inflation targeting therefore helps because it reduces the conflicts between fiscal and monetary policy, expecially where there are strong spillovers between the two policies. These results are then tested, and largely validated, in a simulation framework using a small open economy calibrated model.