Media Effects on the Formation of Negotiator Satisfaction: The Example of Face-to-Face and Text Based Electronically Mediated Negotiations

Recently, scholars have highlighted the importance of subjective negotiation outcomes such as negotiator satisfaction for future negotiations and the relationship between negotiators. This study considers the major antecedents of satisfaction formation in negotiation and analyses how the communication medium, i.e. the face-to-face (FTF) and the text based electronically mediated (TBEM) mode, influence satisfaction formation. Drawing on grounding in communication (Clark and Brennan in Perspectives on socially shared cognition. American Psychological Asociation, Washington DC, pp 127–149, 1991), hypotheses are developed and tested in an experimental gaming simulation in which graduate students negotiated in n = 52 dyads. The empirical analysis supports the notion that the communication medium has a mediated and a moderating effect on negotiator satisfaction. Aspirations, individual profit and positive relational messages mediate the medium’s effect on satisfaction. Furthermore, the impact of contentious behaviour and positive relational messages on negotiator satisfaction is stronger in TBEM than in FTF negotiations. This study also contributes to the wider negotiation literature by employing a context-rich gaming simulation for experimental purposes.     

Resolving Impasses in e-Negotiation: Does e-Mediation Work?

In this article we evaluate the performance of an e-mediation system, referred to as VienNA, in an e-negotiation environment. A set of hypotheses drawn from the mediation and e-mediation literatures are explored. Bargaining processes, outcomes, and perceptions are compared for bargainers that have access to the VienNA system with those that do not have access during negotiation. Supporting several of the hypotheses, bargainers with access to the system were more flexible during the process, showed more concession reciprocation, sent more messages dealing with relationships and related sources of conflict, and were more satisfied with both the process and outcome. Early use of the system produced more flexible bargaining and better outcomes than later use, a finding that supports research on mediation in international conflicts. More balanced agreements occurred when bargainers consulted a form of advice known as fairness norms. Implications of these results for theory and practice are discussed along with suggestions for further research.     

The Effects of Personalised Negotiation Training on Learning and Performance in Electronic Negotiations

Individuals have different learning styles and thus require different methods for knowledge acquisition. Whereas learning theories have long acknowledged this fact, personalised negotiation trainings especially for electronic negotiations have rarely been developed. This paper integrates learning styles and negotiation styles and reports on an implementation of this integration. We will discuss personalised negotiation trainings, namely an enactive training and a vicarious training, that we developed to match the learners’ learning styles. Such a matching is proposed to be beneficial regarding learning outcomes. Furthermore, positive effects on the dyadic negotiation outcomes are assumed. To this end, an experiment with participants from different European countries was conducted. The results show tendencies that personalised negotiation trainings lead to better skill acquisition during the training and also to fairer negotiation outcomes. Overall, this paper contributes an integration of the theories on individual differences from the domains of negotiation and learning as well as valuable insights for further experiments on individual differences in negotiations.     

The effects of Hispanic bilinguals language use and stereotype activation on negotiations outcomes

Service encounters often become negotiations between the customer and the service provider. For speakers of multiple languages, the language used in a negotiation can be a critical factor in the success of that encounter. By investigating how U.S. bilinguals negotiate in either English or Spanish, this research examines the effect that the activation of the stereotype related to the minority language-speakers has on negotiation outcomes. The results of two experiments support the general notion that, among U.S. Hispanic bilinguals, the majority language (English) yields more favorable outcomes compared to the minority language (Spanish); a third study with a comparison group of bilinguals in Mexico, where no language-related stereotype exists, shows no effect of the negotiation language on the outcome. The paper discusses theoretical and practical implications of the findings and areas for future research.     

Culture's Influence on Business Negotiations in Four Countries

The usefulness of a theoretical model of the determinants of business negotiation outcomes is tested in a simulation with business people from four countries (the United States, Japan, Brazil and Spain). The article is an extension of Graham, Mintu, and Rodgers (1994), and also directly tests Hofstede's and Hall's theories of culture. A problem-solving approach results in higher negotiation outcomes for Americans when their partners reciprocate. Role (buyer or seller) is the key determinant of profits for Japanese negotiations; that is, buyers do better than sellers. For the Spanish negotiators, a problem-solving approach actually yielded lower profits. For the Brazilians, interpersonal attractiveness lead to higher partner satisfaction.     

Strategies and language trends in learning success and failure of negotiation

In negotiation by electronic means, language is an important deal-making tool which helps realize negotiation strategies. Negotiators may use language to request information, exchange offers, persuade, threaten, as well as reach a compromise or find prospective partners. All this is recorded in texts exchanged by negotiators. We explore the language signals of strategies—argumentation, persuasion, negation, proposition. Leech and Svartvik’s approach to language in communication gives our study the necessary systematic background. It combines pragmatics, the communicative grammar and the meaning of English verbs. Language signals become features in the task of classifying those texts. We employ Statistical Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning techniques to find general trends that negotiation texts exhibit. Our hypothesis is that language signals help predict negotiation outcomes. We run experiments on the Inspire data. The electronic negotiation support system Inspire was gathering data for several years. The data include text messages which negotiators may exchange while trading offers. We conduct a series of Machine Learning experiments to predict the negotiation outcome from the texts associated with first halves of negotiations. We compare the results with the classification of complete negotiations. We conclude the paper with an analysis of the results and a list of suggestions for future work.     

Simulated Negotiations in the Hiring of a Salesforce Manager: Tests of Two-Person Bargaining Solutions

This paper examines the ability to predict bargaining outcomes consistent with Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Gupta-Livne bargaining models as well as two heuristic solutions based on interpersonal (cardinal) comparisons of utility. Equal earning and equal loss solutions are developed from bargainers' multi-attribute utility functions. An experimental test of these bargaining solutions is conducted for simulated negotiations between a representative of sales force management and a representative of sales force employees over the hire of a regional sales manager. Results show that proportional (Kalai-Smorodinsky) solutions are generally more likely when bargaining is conducted in attribute space, and equal loss solutions are more likely in utility space.     

Modeling the Caspian Sea Negotiations

The objective of this study is to identify techniques for predicting the outcome of a negotiation and then apply them to the current negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which has been in dispute since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The five coastal states—Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan—entered negotiations in 1993, but have not yet agreed on who owns the waters or the oil and natural gas beneath them. We identify the five well-defined options for resolving the dispute and then discuss the states’ preferences regarding these options. We apply some well-known social choice rules to find the “socially optimal” resolution. Then we review several versions of Fallback Bargaining, which aims to minimize the maximum dissatisfaction of the bargainers, and apply them to the dispute. Finally, we represent the dispute in financial terms and apply several well-known bankruptcy procedures, which are fair division methods for settling monetary claims. We end with some suggestions on how the value of the Caspian seabed resources could be allocated among the five Caspian states.     

The Relationship of Cognitive Effort,Information Acquisition Preferences and Risk to Simulated Auditor–Client Negotiation Outcomes

The auditor–client relationship is a legally-mandated relationship in which one party, the auditor, is hired and paid by the auditee (client) to inform third party stakeholders as to whether the client firm’s financial statements are presented in conformity with national financial accounting standards. When these statements do not meet the criteria for acceptable financial statements, a negotiation situation may arise in which the auditor is presumed to act in the best interests of shareholders and creditors who have no independent knowledge of the auditor’s findings. The client management may then feel forced to defend its numbers. The result is a negotiation between the auditor and client (e.g., Salterio in Account Financ 52:233–286, 2012; Brown and Wright in Account Horiz 22(1):91–109, 2008). This study examines cognitive factors and risk preference factors that may impact the negotiation both in the setting of each side’s negotiation position and on the outcomes of that negotiation using simulated auditor–client negotiations. Questionnaire and simulated auditor–client negotiations were used to generate the data, with MBA and MS in Accounting students playing the role of client CEOs and auditor partners. We further explore the use of a tool, Structural Equation Modeling, to test the data, in the process highlighting its usefulness in auditor–client negotiation research. We find that the cognitive characteristic of need for cognition is significantly and positively related to achievement of the negotiator’s desired income objectives and reported willingness to argue strongly for his/her position. Actively open-minded thinking, a second cognitive variable studied, was not significantly related to success in the negotiations, nor to a reported willingness to argue strongly for his/her position. Finally, we find that perceived aggressive tactics by the other party to the negotiation had a negative impact on the counterpart negotiator’s success in the negotiation, and satisfaction with it. As expected, risk assessment-related variables were not related to outcomes of interest.     

Bargaining in distribution channels

This study empirically assesses the impact two fundamental dimensions of distribution channels have on channel member bargaining behavior, namely, (1) the expected duration of the channel bargaining relationship and (2) the channel member dependence on the bargaining. The following findings were observed from a laboratory study using 160 business students: low dependence produced fewer bargaining sessions ending in agreement compared to high dependence among buyer-seller dyads. Low dependence bargainers made more extreme initial offers, conceded less, and used the pronoun we less than did high dependence bargainers. The sellers emerged better off than the buyers from the negotiations. Sellers achieved this advantage by making more extreme initial offers than buyers, conceding more than buyers, but emerging with the better deal.     

What matters in a price negotiation: Evidence from the U.S. auto retailing industry

While there is a great deal of theoretical and experimental literature on what factors affect bargaining outcomes, there is little empirical work based on data from real markets. In this paper we analyze negotiations for new cars, a $340 billion industry in the United States in 2010. Our results suggest that search costs, incomplete information, and bargaining disutility have an economically significant effect in real-world negotiations: we estimate that relative to an uninformed consumer, a consumer with basic information about the seller’s reservation price and his own outside options captures 15% of the average dealer margin from selling an automobile. We also find that a buyer’s search cost and bargaining disutility have significant effects on bargaining outcomes. Finally, our results show that while search is common, there remains a substantial group of consumers who do not engage in any of the search behaviors we measure. We hypothesize that these buyers are not aware of how easy and effective certain activities in improving negotiation outcomes can be.     

The Effects of Multimedia Communication on Web-Based Negotiation

With the rapid growth of electronic commerce, there is growing demand forremote online negotiations. Although the Internet now enables audio and video communication, most Web-based negotiation systems are still text-based. There is, however, a lack of research on the effects of multimedia on remote negotiations. In this paper, we present a theoretical model to investigate the impacts of multimedia communication in an online negotiation setting. The constructs in our model include communication efficiency, communication effectiveness, and positive and negative social-emotional communication. Through a simulated house purchasing negotiation experiment, we study how different multimedia combinations (text only; text with audio; text with audio and video) affect our constructs and thus further influence negotiation results. Our results showed that both text with audio and text with audio and video communication were significantly preferred to text alone. However, the addition of video to text and audio communication in a negotiation environment was not found to be beneficial. It did not significantly improve communication efficiency, effectiveness or positive social-emotional communication, but distracted negotiators from focusing on the negotiation task. Our analysis also revealed that the communication efficiency construct did not correlate with the perceived success of the negotiation solution; however communication effectiveness and social-emotional communication did correlate with negotiation satisfaction.     

Dimensions of International Negotiation: A Test of Iklé's Typology

Results from statistical analyses of 30 cases of international negotiations supported Iklé's typology of negotiating objectives. The cases, sampled from the collection of Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, were distinguished in terms of five objectives: innovation, redistribution, extension, normalization, and side effects. In addition, a sixth objective was identified: negotiations concerning the creation of multilateral regimes. These cases focused on issues that surfaced on the international agenda during the 1980s. Each type had a relatively distinct profile based on such aspects of negotiation as the number of parties and issues, bargaining strategies, media exposure, stability of the process, and types of outcomes. The methodology contributes to the state-of-the art in comparative analysis and the results have implications for the development of middle-range theories of negotiation. They also contribute to practice, by enabling negotiators to evaluate future cases in terms of knowledge about past cases.     

Communication Quality in Business Negotiations

The quality of a business negotiation process is usually assessed by its economic outcome, e.g. in terms of Pareto efficiency or distance to Nash equilibrium. We argue that this assessment method is insufficient in that it fails to provide a comprehensive analysis of business negotiations. Negotiators engage in highly complex communication tasks, and these communication processes should be analysed along with the outcome in the overall evaluation of a business negotiation. To this end, we will introduce Communication Quality as a new construct for analyzing the negotiation process. Furthermore, it will be argued that Communication Quality itself can affect economic negotiation outcomes both short- and long-term. We will present relevant aspects of Communication Quality, outline a scheme for its operationalisation and measurement, and discuss its probable impacts on business negotiations.     

Two-Party Negotiation Modeling: An Integrated Fuzzy Logic Approach

Game theoretic models attempted to predict unique equilibrium outcomes of negotiations with limited success. The imprecise character of negotiation is often altered to fit the game theorist's exacting approach. Alternative models deviated from the formal game theoretic approach and attempted to accommodate concepts such as negotiator power and time pressure. In this paper, we introduce a model which uses a fuzzy logic approach to deal with the imprecision in the negotiation process and to integrate several negotiation theories. The new model is used to simulate multiple-issue, two-party negotiations and results are consistent with established negotiation theories.     

Negotiators' Communication, Perception of Their Counterparts, and Performance in Dyadic E-negotiations

The aim of this study was to improve our understanding of negotiation strategies, behaviors, and outcomes, and the relationships between these factors based on data collected from questionnaires, actual behavior during the negotiation process implemented using e-negotiation system, and the negotiation outcomes. This study clustered the negotiators based on either the negotiators' own strategies or their thoughts about those of their partners. This resulted in a division into cooperative and noncooperative clusters. We found that the negotiators whose own strategies are less cooperative tend to submit more offers but fewer messages. However, these people consIDer that they have less control over the negotiation process compared with those who adopt a more cooperative strategy, who make fewer offers but send more messages. Those in the cooperative cluster consistently feel friendlier about the negotiation and more satisfied with the outcome and their performance. Further, there is a correlation not only between self-strategies and the thoughts about partners' strategies, but also between strategies and final agreements. Finally, the proportion of negotiations reaching agreement is larger for the cooperative cluster than for the noncooperative cluster.     

The process of assisted negotiations: A network analysis

This article introduces network analysis as a supplement to current research on the process of negotiations. We briefly review the literature on negotiations involving third parties, and argue that to understand fully the dynamics of dispute resolution, it is important to examine processes in addition to outcomes. We propose social network methods as a way to examine systematically the step-by-step process through which self-interested third parties influence negotiated outcomes. To illustrate, we analyze process data from triads in an agent-assisted negotiation. We describe three classes of results. First, we describe the basic properties of the third-party-assisted negotiation process (e.g., we found agents to be the most active players in the negotiation process—they initiate interactions significantly more frequently than buyers or sellers). Second, we study the changes in the process characteristics due to experimental conditions (i.e., we found the interactive patterns to vary depending on the information made available to the third party). Finally, we examine the relationships between the systematic process measures and standard outcome measures. We argue that these measures are complementary, and that the process should be informative with respect to interpreting, predicting, and managing outcomes.This research was supported in part by a grant from the Dispute Resolution Research Center.     

Fallback Bargaining

Under fallback bargaining, bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over alternatives. They then fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives – starting with first choices, then adding second choices, and so on – until an alternative is found on which all bargainers agree. This common agreement, which becomes the outcome of the procedure, may be different if a decision rule other than unanimity is used. The outcome is always Pareto-optimal but need not be unique; if unanimity is used, it is at least middling in everybody's ranking. Fallback bargaining may not select a Condorcet alternative, or even the first choice of a majority of bargainers. However, it does maximize bargainers' minimum satisfaction. When bargainers are allowed to indicate impasse in their rankings – below which they would not descend because they prefer no agreement to any lower-level alternative – then impasse itself may become the outcome, foreclosing any agreement. The vulnerability of fallback bargaining to manipulation is analyzed in terms of both best responses and Nash equilibria. Although a bargainer can sometimes achieve a preferred outcome through an untruthful announcement, the risk of a mutually worst outcome in a Chicken-type game may well deter the bargainers from attempting to be exploitative, especially when information is incomplete. Fallback bargaining seems useful as a practicable procedure if a set of reasonable alternatives can be generated. It leapfrogs the give-and-take of conventional bargaining, which often bogs down in details, by finding a suitable settlement through the simultaneous consideration of all alternatives.