Revenue-Constrained Combination of an Optimal Tariff and Duty Drawback

A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.     

出口导向贸易政策与发展中国家间FDI竞争——基于寡占竞争模型的理论分析

文章建立了一个两国竞争模型,重点分析了进口关税与出口补贴等战略贸易政策对发展中国家吸引FDI竞争的影响。研究发现:(1)当两国都采取出口补贴的外资激励政策时,工资水平和进口关税对发展中国家间FDI竞争并没有直接影响;(2)对全要素生产率较高的国家来说,当两国的关税水平都较高时,出口补贴政策增加流向本国的FDI,而当两国关税水平大幅下降后,出口补贴政策反而不利于本国FDI竞争。文章的结论对当前我国战略引资和出口退税等政策的调整具有重大的指导意义。     

Trade Liberalization in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Credits: Estimates for Costa Rica

The paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model to quantify the welfare impact of trade liberalization—and compute the optimal tariff structure—for Costa Rica when trade-policy-induced foreign direct investment and international capital taxation with credits are present. It shows that complete trade liberalization reduces Costa Rica's welfare, as it leads to an outflow of capital and loss of tax revenue which more than offset the efficiency gains from an enhanced resource allocation. The optimal tariff structure for the Costa Rican economy turns out to be a mixture of relatively small import tariffs and subsidies.     

The Effects of Tariffs and Export Subsidies on Entry Barriers and Investment

This paper explains the effects of unilateral tariffs and export subsidies on entry decisions in an imperfectly competitive industry, and suggests that carefully targeted trade policies play a strategic role in shifting the industry structure and the terms of subsequent competition. The model provides a new justification for tariffs which is different from the traditional infant industry argument; the tariff affects foreign firms' reactions as well as those of the domestic firms. [410]     

Measuring China’s trade liberalization: A generalized measure of trade restrictiveness index

Neither simple average nor import-weighted average tariff indexes are ideal measures of tariff barriers. In this paper, we propose a generalized trade restrictiveness index (GTRI) that extends Feenstra’s (1995) tariff restrictiveness index (TRI) by relaxing the crucial assumption of a small open economy. We show that the GTRI can be measured using import tariffs, import shares, and the corresponding import and foreign export elasticities. We then apply the GTRI to examine how trade restrictiveness has evolved in China from 1997 to 2008, the period in which China entered the WTO. The GTRI indicates a higher level of protection than simple and import-weighted averages, but lower than the TRI. We further show a negative correlation between tariffs and product export supply elasticity, indicating that strategic trade policy was being pursued prior to China’s WTO accession. Finally, we calculate the welfare loss and terms-of-trade gain due to tariff protection. The overall tariff pass-through increases from around 28% to almost 47% because of the WTO.     

Optimal Countervailing Intervention

This paper examines the optimal countervailing measures in response to foreign subsidy. Two alternative objectives are considered: (1) to maintain the domestic producer price, or (2) to maintain the initial import level. Three different instruments are discussed: a tariff, a production subsidy, and a consumption tax. Their rankings in terms of welfare costs are established. One important finding is that, contrary to present convention, the optimal countervailing rate may have to exceed the foreign subsidy rate. [411]     

ALTERNATIVE OPTIMAL TRADE POLICIES IN THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN INPUT MONOPOLY

Abstract.  This paper develops a generalized three-country model with downstream and upstream industries to analyze optimal import and export trade policies in the presence of monopoly distortion in a foreign intermediate input market. It shows that the import tariff and export tax are linearly dependent. Thus, the optimal choice of the tariff gives rise to the same results as the optimal choice of the export tax, which implies that the domestic government, to avoid tariff retaliation, can use export tax as a substitute for the import tariff.     

Heterogeneous impacts of the Section 301 tariffs: Evidence from the revision of product lists

In each of the three waves of the Section 301 tariffs on Chinese imports, the US government exempted some products on the originally proposed list from additional duties. Using these exempted products as the counterfactual, we identify modest but heterogeneous impacts of the tariffs on the value of US imports from China. We find a complete pass-through for the first and second waves of tariffs. However, unlike in previous studies, we estimate a very limited tariff pass-through of the third wave of tariffs. Finally, we find little import diversion for the US and significant export diversion for China.     

Research and development and trade policies for product innovation in the presence of foreign competition

This paper examines two policy instruments — a matching grant and import tariffs — for encouraging research and development (R&D) in product innovation by a domestic firm when it faces foreign competition. We do so by developing a theoretical model of product innovation where R&D effort is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. We examine the effects of a reduction in import tariffs on private expenditure on R&D, on public support for such R&D, and on total R&D expenditure. We find that in response to a reduction in import tariffs, the domestic firm always reduces its private R&D investments, but the total level of R&D expenditure (i.e., including public support) might go up depending on the level of tariffs. In particular, we find that it will go up if the initial level of tariff is higher than a critical level. When tariff is endogenous, we find that the socially optimal level of tariffs is positive. One finding that is of particular interest is that supporting private attempts to product innovate in the form of a matching grant program leads to a socially optimal level of product R&D.     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18     

不完全信息、反倾销威胁与最优出口贸易政策

通过扩展Brander和Spencer(1985)的基本模型,本文首先证明了,在反倾销威胁下,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策要求出口国政府给予低成本企业更高的出口补贴或更低的出口征税,在无效激励机制下必然导致出口企业隐匿自己的真实成本类型,基于完全信息假设的最优出口贸易政策失效。在此基础上,本文进一步论证了不完全信息和反倾销威胁下激励相容的最优出口贸易政策,该政策要求出口国政府依据进口国国内要求保护压力的大小,采用不同的出口征税和一次性转移支付政策组合,激励出口企业如实报告成本类型,并使国家整体福利最大化。     

VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.     

Illegal Immigration and Second-best Import Tariffs

A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows.     

A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Trade with Decreasing Transport Costs

Decreasing transport costs are incorporated in the standard partial equilibrium analysis of trade by allowing the divergence—introduced by transport costs—between export and import price to decrease with the volume of trade. When the excess demand (supply) curve is steeper than the long run average cost curve for imports (exports), we observe that an import (export) tariff raises (lowers) the domestic price by an amount exceeding the tariff. Further, when the excess demand (Supply) curve is less steep than the long run average cost curve for imports (exports), the possibility exists that an import (export) tariff may lower (raise) the domestic price. These results lead to the important conclusion that tariffs cannot be used as measures of nominal protection across industries. [F10]     

Trade taxes and the current account

We show that, under some conditions, a temporary import tariff improves the current account, whereas a temporary export tax deteriorates it. Permanent import tariffs and export taxes have an identical, although ambiguous, effect on the current account.     

TARIFFS AND IMPORTS MISINVOICING UNDER OLIGOPOLY

Mismatch of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial misinvoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). In this paper, we focus on import underinvoicing due to high tariff barriers in a market where domestic producers compete with importers. Specifically, we examine how tariff levels, market structure and government intervention (in the form of intensity of monitoring and severity of penalties) affect the levels of underinvoicing. We also look at the optimal levels of import tariff and instruments of government intervention in these circumstances.     

A Supply and Demand Exposition of a Constitutional Tax Loophole: The Case of Tariff Symmetry

The U.S. Constitution permits import tariffs but bans export duties. Yet import taxes are de facto export taxes, just as export taxes are de facto import taxes. Access to this symmetry proposition has been limited by its illustration being in daunting analytics largely restricted to international economics. This is unfortunate. Tariff symmetry exposes a tax loophole of constitutional proportions, a case where economics trumps the intentions of America's Founding Fathers. Moreover, tariff revenue was the U.S. government's pivotal revenue source from 1789 until the 1913 constitutional sanctioning of the income tax. Because U.S. exports were heavily agricultural, tariff symmetry implies that federal taxation had an export dimension with disparate economic and regional consequences. By making tariff symmetry more accessible, this paper lowers the cost of examining important issues.     

Employment Risk and Optimal Trade Policies

This paper considers trade policies and welfare in a Harris–Todaro model with risk-averse workers. Workers are assumed to have identical and homothetic preferences, but their incomes differ, depending on whether and where they are employed. When workers are equally valued, maximizing social utility is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a rural worker. An optimal policy consists of a production subsidy on the exportable and an import tariff. This model explains the widespread use of import tariffs on manufactured goods along with production subsidies on the export sectors in many LDCs.
JEL Classification Numbers: F13, D8.     

Trade imbalance and the endogenous optimal tariff

Endogenous tariff literatures reveal empirically that trade imbalance is negatively related with import tariff, this article gives a theoretical evidence and explanation to support this finding with the methodology of multi-country numerical general equilibrium modelling and simulation. We explore how optimal tariff changes after trade imbalance is introduced, and find that optimal tariffs decrease substantially, either for surplus or deficit countries, when imbalance is considered. Specifically, when the imbalance is modelled in endogenous monetary and inside-money structures, the optimal tariffs decrease by 26% globally on average. Our results suggest that the deepening trade imbalance is beneficial to the global trade liberalization due to its driving tariffs down.     

On the Equivalence of Ad Valorem Tariffs and Specific Tariffs under Duopoly*

Using a quantity conjectural variation model, this paper examines whether an ad valorem tariff and a specific tariff are equivalent under duopoly. We show that if the average per‐unit import tax is the same for the two tariffs, domestic output will be smaller while foreign output will be larger under an ad valorem tariff. We further show that for any value of a specific tariff, there is a Pareto‐superior ad valorem tariff for all values of conjectural variation except in the case of perfect competition where the two tariffs are equivalent.