纵向一体化、排他性销售与寡头竞争中的非对称均衡

跨国公司往往通过使用排他性销售渠道（ED）或者纵向一体化（VI）进入东道国并进行竞争。这两种竞争策略的相似性和不完全替代性，使之成为本文的分析对象。在同一个东道国进行竞争的两个生产相似产品的寡头，当一方欲领先一步,应选择何种竞争策略来先动；当竞争对手先动选择一个竞争策略时，己方采取何种策略才能减少甚至摆脱后发劣势。本文通过建立两寡头Stackelberg数量竞争模型分析表明，跨国公司现实竞争中对于VI或者ED的偏好决不是偶然。而是经过理性博弈后的一种均衡。     

Vertical Integration in International Telecommunication System

The process of liberalization and privatization is drastically altering the links among international telecommunications carriers. The model presented in this paper analyses the international telecommunications market illustrating the effects of vertical mergers, under symbiotic production conditions, when vertically integrated and unintegrated carriers coexist. The effect of competition is analysed both in the final market and in the intermediate one where carriers compete over tariffs to get an appropriate distribution of profits. In particular, the results show the relations between final market prices, intermediate tariffs and market dimensions and their implications on profits.     

Vertical Enclosure: Vertical Integration and the Reluctance to Purchase from a Competitor

Vertical integration can reduce integrating firms' trading opportunities and, contrary to predictions of two-firm models, this loss of trade can make integration unprofitable. If downstream units must commit to suppliers before contracting on the final terms of trade, then suppliers will have ex-post monopoly power. This monopoly power reduces the quality that an integrated supplier will provide to its competitors. Expectations of this quality reduction can prevent firms from purchasing from an integrated supplier even though the supplier would be better off if it could commit to provide its downstream competitors with sufficient quality to retain their business.     

论垂直价格挤压下的接入定价规制

在自然垄断产业引入竞争的过程中,独占传输网络的纵向一体化垄断厂商可能对下游市场新进入者实施接入价格挤压。接入价格挤压从属于价格歧视。尽管一定条件下的接入价格挤压具有正向的竞争效应,但垄断厂商将具有同等效率或更高效率的独立厂商驱逐出市场则应该受到规制。接入价格规制包括政府直接规制定价和反垄断法间接规制定价。直接规制定价中整体价格上限较为可取,而反垄断法间接规制需要采用基于福利后果分析的合理推定原则,但从短期来看采用直接规制更有效率。最后提出了完善我国自然垄断产业接入定价规制的相关政策建议。     

Digging Deep to Compete: Vertical Integration,Product Market Competition and Prices

This article establishes a causal effect of product market competition on vertical integration. I exploit a hitherto unexplored natural experiment in the U.S. coal mining industry and a unique mine‐level organizational data set. Following an exogenous increase in product market competition, the incidence of vertical integration fell by 33% within the treatment group relative to the counterfactual. I find novel evidence that transition to the lower degree of vertical integration is driven by competition's reducing market prices by 32% which decreased the incentive to conduct vertical mergers. I discuss several possible interpretations of these changes.     

Vertical Integration and Internet Strategies in the Apparel Industry

We explore the relationship between vertical scope and the ability to respond to a significant economic shock by studying how firms in the apparel industry have adapted to the Internet. We find that vertically integrated specialty retailers, e.g., The Gap, tended to start on-line sales sooner than non-integrated vendors, e.g., Nautica, and department stores. We also find that the products of vertically integrated retailers are more available on-line than those of non-integrated vendors. These results are consistent with greater contractual barriers, coordination costs and incentive problems that non-integrated brands face relative to integrated companies in responding to the e-commerce opportunity.     

Geographical Agglomeration as an Alternative to Vertical Integration

This paper provides empirical evidence of the relationship between agglomeration and vertical integration decisions. It contributes to the existing literature by first developing a conceptual framework that focuses on both opportunism risk and communication problems to explain how physical proximity among firms can be an alternative to internal organization. Second, this study tests this relationship through the use of firm-level data from 10,955 establishments in the Spanish meat industry. Results confirm that establishments located in agglomerated areas internally undertake fewer stages of the value chain. We also find that this relationship is weaker than expected and fades at distances greater than 2.5 km, which may be explained by the particular characteristics of this industry.     

Horizontal Concentration and Vertical Integration in the Cable Television Industry

In the recent past, the cable industry has exhibited a pronounced tendency toward increased vertical integration and concentration of cable system ownership. As a result, the 1992 Cable Act proposed and the Federal Communications Commission implemented restrictions on such activity. Two antitrust concerns include the size of programming discounts offered to large multiple-system operators and price and carriage discrimination by vertically integrated programming networks. The empirical model in this paper attempts to systematically measure the effect of ownership concentration and vertical integration on the programming cost and price of cable operators. We find that concentration and integration lower the programming cost to cable systems affiliated with larger multiple-system operators. These discounts are partially passed along to consumers in the form of lower prices.     

纵向一体化与联合所有权--通用-费希尔公司收购案例研究

纵向一体化可以很好地解决物质资本的专用性问题,然而对人力资本专用性造成的"套牢"无能为力.通过降低交易双方对一般性投资的激励,从而提高专用性投资的激励,联合所有权使得"套牢"的收益最小而成本最高.因此,联合所有权不仅可以解决物质资本专用性问题,也是解决人力资本套牢问题的有效途经.     

纵向一体化与联合所有权——通用一费希尔公司收购案例研究

纵向一体化可以很好地解决物质资本的专用性问题,然而对人力资本专用性造成的“套牢”无能为力。通过降低交易双方对一般性投资的激励,从而提高专用性投资的激励,联合所有权使得“套牢”的收益最小而成本最高。因此,联合所有权不仅可以解决物质资本专用性问题,也是解决人力资本套牢问题的有效途经。     

Vertical Integration and Costly Demand Information in Regulated Network Industries

We study how vertical integration affects the acquisition and transmission of demand information in regulated network industries. Demand information helps to set the access price, incentivize infrastructure investment, and foster competition in the unregulated downstream market. We show that when demand information is costly and private, the optimal access prices are independent of demand levels. Vertical integration then secures greater welfare in new markets where little demand information is available or where infrastructure cost is low, or when investing is highly risky. In the remaining cases, vertical separation is preferable.     

纵向一体化网络的接入定价研究

中国铁路、煤气、自来水、邮政等绝大多数网络型产业的结构改革将选择纵向一体化与自由接入作为突破口，研究纵向一体化网络的接入定价理论和政策已成为中国网络型产业规制政策研究的一个重要问题。本文首先依据资源最优配置、次优配置、生产效率等原则，研究了不同的接入定价理论，详细探讨了不同的接入定价方法，最后进一步分析了纵向一体化网络在不同政策目标下的接入定价政策选择。     

Vertical Integration and Efficiency: Ownership in the Swedish Sawmill Industry

This study investigates different types of vertically integrated ownership types inrelation to technical efficiency, in the Swedish sawmill industry. The theoreticalfindings connecting vertical integration and efficiency points in two directions:both in favour for non-integrated firms and in favour for fully integrated firms.In the study, significant differences between ownership types are not found. Onepossible interpretation of this result is that the integration advantages outweigh thepossible negative effects an integrated firms will have from maximising an integratedobjective function.     

基于集成的工程建设标准化监管研究

工程建设标准是经济建设和项目投资的重要制度和依据,而标准的实施效率取决于监管机制.文章剖析了我国工程建设标准化监管的现状,并指出存在的主要问题.在详细讨论政府监管机制、市场约束机制和自我监督机制后,提出了基于三者集成的工程建设标准化监管框架.分析了该框架有效运行的对策,为改善工程建设标准化监管绩效提供新的思路.     

基于产业链效率的煤电纵向规制模式研究

本文认为，我国煤电产业链受到内生的纵向外部性和外生的需求强波动性的影响．政府在对其制定规制政策时必须基于这两种特性。同时，在评价规制政策有效性时需要以产业链整体效率为基准。本文归纳了7种煤电纵向价格规制模式，并在此基础上提出了“基于产业链规制”的概念。我们认为，将对电价的规制延伸到对电煤价格的规制是现阶段我国煤电产业链价格规制的最优选择。这不仅可以解决煤炭纵向价格双轨制带来的矛盾，还有利于资源的有效利用。为确保规制延伸的有效性，本文还对相关辅助政策提出了建议。     

Vertical Integration in Cable Television. David Waterman and Andrew A. Weiss.

Review of Industrial Organization -     

产业链纵向关系与分工制度安排的选择及整合

产业发展过程中的产业链现象越来越受到关注。产业链中上下游企业之间存在着高度的分工,分工制度安排的优化与产业链稳定性有着密切的关系。产业链中分工制度安排包括:企业分工、准一体化契约分工和市场分工。成本与收益的比较是决定分工制度安排选择的主要因素,成本与收益的变化又决定了分工制度安排的进一步整合。通过实施不同的产业链纵向关系可以实现不同分工制度安排的选择与整合。     

移动互联网环境下通信产业链纵向整合模式研究

我国移动通信业新一轮重组完成后,国内主要电信运营商均着力于在移动互联网市场中谋求新的业务增长点,抢占竞争优势.而随着移动通信产业链专业化分工和复杂性的加剧,对产业链进行纵向整合成为推动产业发展的关键.本文研究移动通信产业链纵向整合模式,主要考虑产业链各参与者之间的组织模式与利益协调问题,运用非合作博弈和合作博弈的有关理论讨论不同产业链纵向组织模式下的均衡解和产业链整体缋效,并利用Slapley值法合理协调各参与者的收益分配.最后,通过计算和仿真模拟比较不同组织模式下参与者的个人效用和产业链整体绩效,讨论分析参与者的博弈选择和产业链的稳定性均衡.     

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.