Reduced game and converse consistency

The initiating points of the current paper are the axiomatic characterizations, in terms of consistency, of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost value (by Moulin), the Shapley value (by Hart and Mas-Colell), and the prenucleolus (by Orshan). The basic axioms are the same, but three different reduced games can be used to distinguish these three solutions. The main purpose of the paper is to illustrate that besides the definitions of reduced games are different, the axiom converse consistency also plays an important role to distinguish these three solutions.     

中国经济增长的特征、可持续性与潜在增长率估算:一个综述

在本文通过对中国经济增长的表现特征、可持续性和潜在增长率估算三方面的理论综述,进一步论述了中国经济增长的发展脉络,并在此基础上提出研究中国经济增长理论尚需改进的空间.     

A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency

In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core, prekernel, prenucleolus, Shapley value). Our main equivalence theorem claims that a solution satisfies consistency (with respect to an arbitrary reduced game) if and only if the solution satisfies both bilateral consistency and converse consistency (with respect to the same reduced game). The equivalence theorem presumes transitivity of the reduced game technique as well as difference independence on payoff vectors for two-person reduced games.     

Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

The asymptotic shapley value for a simple market game

We consider the game in which b buyers each seek to purchase 1 unit of an indivisible good from s sellers, each of whom has k units to sell. The good is worth 0 to each seller and 1 to each buyer. Using the central limit theorem, and implicitly convergence to tied down Brownian motion, we find a closed form solution for the limiting Shapley value as s and b increase without bound. This asymptotic value depends upon the seller size k, the limiting ratio b/ks of buyers to items for sale, and the limiting ratio of the excess supply relative to the square root of the number of market participants. This work was sponsered in part by NSF Grant DMS-03-01795.     

Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties.     

Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value

We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72.     

Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.     

Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game

We analyse a two-period model of the interbank market, i.e. the market where banks trade liquidity. We assume that banks do not take the interbank interest rate as given, but instead negotiate on interest rates and transaction volumes with each other. The solution concept applied is the Shapley value. We show that there are a multiplicity of average equilibrium interest rates of the first period so that the average interest rate in this period does not convey any information on the expected liquidity situation on the interbank market. As the banks control not only the transaction volumes, but also the interest rates, they can leave the interest rates constant and adjust the transaction volumes when, for example, a liquidity deficit becomes more likely.     

Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well. The authors thank Yukihiko Funaki, Andreu Mas-Colell, David Pérez-Castrillo and Jana Vyrastekova for helpful discussions. We also appreciate the comments from the seminar and conference participants at Keele University, Tilburg University, University of Haifa, University of Warwick, CORE at Louvain-la-Neuve, Catholic University Leuven, Pablo de Olavide University in Seville, University of Vigo, the 2006 Annual Conference of the Israeli Mathematical Union in Neve Ilan, Israel, and the 61st European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Vienna, Austria in 2006. In particular, we are grateful to the associate editor and an anonymous referee. Their valuable comments and constructive suggestions contributed to a significant improvement of the paper. Wettstein acknowledges the financial support of the Pinchas Sapir Center for Development in Tel Aviv University.     

城镇内部行业收入差距成因的实证研究

运用2012年中国劳动力动态调查微观数据,结合Heckman样本选择方法,估计垄断行业和竞争行业的收入方程,结果发现,垄断对行业收入的影响远大于性别、教育、工作经验等个人特征。运用Shapley值分解方法,考察各因素对我国城镇内部行业工资差距的贡献,结果发现,人力资本因素对行业收入差距的贡献最大。分行业看,人力资本因素能够解释垄断行业收入差距的一半左右,管理岗位对竞争行业收入差距的贡献最大,性别因素对竞争行业收入差距的贡献高出垄断行业两倍,非农户口在解释垄断行业收入差距时的贡献要远大于竞争行业。因此,缩小我国行业收入差距,亟需打破行业垄断壁垒,提高劳动者的受教育水平,减轻劳动者地区间流动障碍。     

供应链企业协同创新利益分配策略——基于夏普利值法改进模型

在借鉴大量文献的基础上,提出了综合考虑创新资源投入、创新创造收益和创新承担风险的夏普利值法改进模型,用于解决供应链企业协同创新利益分配合理化问题。将该模型用于研究一个由单个供应商、制造商和销售商组成的三级供应链协同创新联盟的利益分配问题,经仿真计算验证了模型的有效性和适用性。     

Cost sharing with multiple technologies

We study cost sharing problems where gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of scale are eliminated in order to study this effect. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he should not get any part of the gain from cooperation. With properties of linearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to manipulate the individual demands of its members.     

MRO线上销售联盟及收益分配问题研究

以制造企业、网络平台和中间商作为工业品线上销售模式的构成主体,对其不同组合形成的三类销售联盟：单方联盟、两方联盟和三方联盟进行分析描述。运用Shapley值法及考虑实际收益权重的改进方法计算MRO线上销售联盟的收益分配问题。研究结果表明,三方联盟的附加收益大于等于任意两方联盟附加收益之和的一半,即可保证三方联盟中各方收益都达到最大值;任意两方联盟的附加收益增加都会使得第三方成员的边际收益减少。且基于实际责任、风险、成本及损失权益四个综合因素的变权计算方法,可使得线上销售联盟成员之间的收益分配更加公平合理,更加有利于工业品领域线上销售发展。     

我国劳动力市场上工资收入差距的决定因素——基于夏普里值过程的回归方程分解

文章运用中国综合社会调查2006年数据,基于夏普里值过程的回归分解方法,对我国劳动力市场上工资收入差距的决定因素进行了系统的实证研究。研究发现,教育人力资本是导致工资收入差距的最重要因素,其对不平等程度的贡献达到了37．47％;地区、性别和行业因素仅次于教育,成为导致工资收入分配不平等的重要因素;职业类型、单位所有制和社会关系是控制工资收入差距不容忽视的因素;而单位规模、户籍和工作经验对不平等程度的贡献则几乎可以忽略不计。另外,工资收入差距的决定因素在东部和中西部地区存在巨大差异。     

Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division.     

公司控制权、资本流动性与并购绩效*——基于交互视角的中国上市公司股权收购的研究

现有文献分别考察了公司内部治理机制和外部资本市场对并购绩效的影响,甚少考虑外部资本市场与内部治理特征内生性的影响,这会使研究结论产生偏差。本文将上述两者结合起来,在交互的视角下,首先运用夏普里（Shapley）值分解法分析了控制权与流动性各自对并购绩效的贡献,进一步分析了控制权与流动性之间的相互影响,并设计了分位数分组回归模型,研究在流动性调整下控制权的并购绩效效应。本文研究表明,流动性对公司控制权的并购绩效产生了比较明显的调整,货币市场流动性高时控制权并购绩效低;股票市场流动性高时控制权并购绩效显著;而个股流动性对控制权的并购绩效调整不明显。