Tariffs in a Ricardian Model with a Monopolistically Competitive Sector: the Role of Nontradables

It is shown that for a small open economy the welfare effects of a tariff on the import of the brands of a differentiated good depends crucially on the pattern of trade. The literature has shown that welfare rises when the domestic brands are nontraded. But when the domestic brands are traded, the imposition of a tariff lowers welfare by shifting demand towards the nontraded homogeneous good which causes exit from the differentiated goods industry.     

Welfare‐Worsening Aid Flows To Small Countries: The Role of Nontraded Goods

This paper presents the circumstances under which foreign aid can immiserize a small, tariff‐distorted economy, highlighting the role played by the nontraded sector in generating this outcome. An inflow of aid, provided in the form of an increase in the capital stock, can reduce real income of a small, tariff‐distorted economy if: (i) the inflow results in an increase in the price of the nontraded good and the nontraded good and imports are sufficiently strong complements in demand; or (ii) if the inflow leads to a reduction in the price of the nontraded good and the nontraded good and imports are substitutes in demand, provided the degree of substitutability is not too large.     

INTERNATIONAL FACTOR MOBILITY,NONTRADED GOODS AND TARIFF REFORM*

Within models of traded and nontraded goods, that ignore international factor mobility, the literature on tariff reform has established sufficient conditions under which a policy that reduces (increases) the highest (lowest) tariff to the level of the second highest (lowest) rate, or a policy that moves proportionally all tariffs to a given number improves welfare. The present paper generalizes previous studies by introducing perfect international capital mobility. It demonstrates that if all goods are normal in consumption and the nontraded good markets are locally Walras stable, then a reform policy that reduces (increases) the highest (lowest) tariff to the level of the next highest (lowest) rate improves welfare if (i) the good with the highest (lowest) tariff rate is a net substitute to all other traded goods, and (ii) the nontraded goods are net substitutes to all other goods. Second, a policy reform that moves all tariffs to a given number is always welfare improving.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW WITH TARIFF-RIDDEN AND QUOTA-RESTRICTED IMPORTS*

The welfare effects of foreign capital inflow and changes in the foreign price and tariff rate of a tariff-ridden imported good are considered for a small country for both 3 times 2 and 3 times 3 trade models with a quota-restricted imported good (whose special case is a nontraded good). For the 3 times 2 model, foreign capital inflow does not affect home welfare when there is no tariff on imports, but it harms the home country if a tariff is imposed on the imports to the extent that the tariff-ridden imported good is more capital intensive than the exported good. On the other hand, for the 3 times 3 model the foreign-capital inflow benefits the home country if the tariff rate is below a certain level under the analogous capital-intensity assumptions. The welfare effects of changes in the foreign price of the tariff-ridden good and its tariff rate remain the same for both models.     

Terms of Trade and Welfare for a Developing Economy with an Imperfectly Competitive Sector

The effect of terms of trade on the welfare of a small open economy is analyzed. It exports a homogeneous good and imports some brands of a differentiated good. It also produces some brands of the differentiated good which are not traded. A terms-of-trade deterioration causes resources to move to the nontraded, import-competing sector. The economy's income rises and the price index for the differentiated good falls, resulting in higher welfare. This accords well with the experience of developing economies of East and Southeast Asia.     

Why Free Trade May Hurt Developing Countries

This paper builds a general equilibrium trade model where a country produces two traded goods and one nontraded public consumption good. The government finances the provision of the public good by taxing the incomes of factors of production, and/or by imposing tariffs. Within this framework, the paper (i) shows that a small tariff or an income tax improves the country's welfare if there is an undersupply of public good, and (ii) identifies the circumstances in which an improvement in the country's terms of trade may reduce its welfare, and free trade can be inferior to autarky. A terms of trade improvement, or the movement from autarky to free trade, definitely improves the country's welfare if the government imposes a tariff that leaves the domestic relative price of the imported good unchanged.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,nontraded good and endogenous supply of skilled labour: A theoretical analysis

The paper develops a static four sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labour is endogenously produced by the education sector and is mobile between a traded good sector and a nontraded good sector. Capital is also perfectly mobile among the education sector, skilled labour using traded good sector and the nontraded good sector. However, land and unskilled labour are specific to another traded good sector. We analyse the effects of change in different factor endowments and reduction in tariff rate on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that the effect of a change in different parameters on wage inequality depends on the factor intensity ranking between two skilled labour using sectors and on the relative strength of the marginal effects on demand for and supply of nontraded final good. We also analyse the effects of changes in different parameters on the supply of skilled labour.     

Protection and commercial policy: Experiments with a general equilibrium econometric model

This paper analyzes the incidence of commercial policy by simulating the effects of an import tariff in the context of a general equilibrium econometric model of the U.S. It is found that in the long run the tariff protection given to importables is mainly at the expense of exportables, rather than the nontraded goods sector. The simulations also provide the general equilibrium responses of a number of other variables to changes in commercial policy, which may be of interest from a policy perspective.     

International migration,remittances and real incomes: effects on the source country

"This article deals with the impact of remittances from emigrants on real incomes for different groups in their country of origin in a two-by-two model with one traded and one nontraded good. It is shown that emigration does not necessarily raise the real income of the emigrants themselves. If the traded good is capital intensive, nonmigrant workers gain and capitalists lose, whereas if it is labor intensive, the outcome depends on what happens to the price of the nontraded good. The result of a rise is that capitalists gain and workers lose, while a fall has the opposite effect."     

Relaxing competition through quality differentiation and price discrimination

In this paper, I compare two-part tariff competition to linear pricing in a vertically differentiated duopoly. Consumers have identical tastes for quality but differ in their preferences for quantity. The main finding is that quality differentiation occurs in equilibrium if and only if two-part tariffs are feasible. Furthermore, two-part tariff competition encourages entry, which in turn increases welfare. Nevertheless, two-part tariff competition decreases consumer surplus compared to linear pricing.     

Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products; and under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power.     

Economic integration and agglomeration in a middle product economy

We examine the interactions between economic integration and employment agglomeration in a neoclassical-growth, middle-product economy. There are two vertically integrated economies, with competitive final good firms operating plants in both regions and monopolistically-competitive intermediate good firms operating each in only one region. Immobile workers are employed with traded middle products to produce the nontraded final good; mobile workers are used with immobile capital to design and produce differentiated intermediate good inputs. While agglomeration and growth need not be positively related, trade need not enhance regional growth nor widen the skilled-unskilled wage gap.     

International capital and nontraded goods in the long run

The present paper develops the comparative static properties of a small open economy which produces both traded goods and nontraded goods, and is a price taker in the international market for productive capital. Assumptions of full employment, competitive markets, and international mobility of productive cap ital input capture a long run horizon. Comparative static results associated with the wage, labor, and the price of the nontraded good are independent of factor intensity, factor substitution, and demand for the nontraded good. A tax on the traded good and a capital subsidy together raise national income and the real wage.     

Revenue-Neutral Environmental Tariff Reform, Growth, and Welfare

This paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of revenue‐neutral tariff reform in a small open endogenous growth model with environmental externalities. As is the case in countries that depend primarily on imported energy, the employment of a foreign intermediate good causes negative environmental externalities in production. This paper shows that substituting a tariff on the foreign intermediate good for a tariff on the foreign consumption good in a revenue‐neutral way raises the growth rate and the welfare, if the environmental externality is sufficiently strong and if the elasticity of substitution between inputs lies within a certain range.     

Quantifying the Impact of Trade on Wages: the Role of Nontraded Goods

This paper uses an applied general‐equilbrium model to decompose the effects of changes in trade‐ and technology‐related variables between 1982 and 1996 in the United States on the wages of skilled and unskilled labor. The results indicate that trade‐related variables (tariff cuts, improvement in the terms of trade, and the increase in the trade deficit) had little impact on the widening wage gap. The major factor behind the rise in the skilled wage relative to the unskilled wage was differential rates of growth in skill‐biased technical change across sectors. The paper also highlights the role that nontraded goods play in explaining the wage gap. Finally, the paper presents estimates of how wages would change if the economy moved to autarky. The results show that expanding trade could actually reduce wage inequality, rather than increase it.     

Traded and Nontraded Goods and Real Wages

The paper explains most, if not all, observations made by the empirical literature regarding the behavior of skilled and unskilled real wages in the United States, especially those since 1980. Generalizing the Stopler–Samuelson theorem, the authors show that the nontraded sector is critical to explaining the effects of changes in the price of traded goods on relative and absolute wages. Factor‐intensities play their role as in the traditional Stolper–Samuelson model, but the output of the nontraded sector matters as well. Specifically, freer trade benefits capital and hurts both the skilled and unskilled labor if the import as well as the nontraded sectors contract. This is a new result to the literature on Stolper–Samuelson issues.     

Trade policy and mixed enterprises

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.     

Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs

We analyze the non‐cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher‐cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower‐cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

Tariff Rate as a Public Good

If domestic firms lobby for protection, the tariff rate is a public good to all domestic firms, whether they engage in lobbying or not. This paper analyzes how the endogenous tariff rate as a public good depends on the group size in two‐stage lobbying models. The result depends not only on whether domestic firms lobby cooperatively or not, but also on whether domestic firms incur indirect lobbying costs or not. This paper shows that if free riding is not very serious and if the number of domestic firms is small compared to the number of foreign firms, entry of a domestic firm is likely to increase the equilibrium tariff rate.