UK Auditor Concentration: A Descriptive Note

This note describes supplier concentration in the UK market for audit services. It extends previous research, which has focused on listed markets, by examining auditor concentration ratios across all corporate (quoted, unquoted plc and private) sub-markets. Individual and combined Big Six supplier concentration (CR6) ratios are calculated with reference to the number of clients audited, corporate size and disclosed audit fees. Compared with previous studies, the analysis is based on a larger number (171,799) of corporate audits, and indicates that, inter alia, corporate size (across different sub-markets) is a key determinant of supplier concentration. However, variations are reported in relation to individual auditors, auditee size and corporate sub-sectors. Other key findings are that the CR6 ratio in the quoted market has continued to rise in recent years, from 72.3% in 1991 (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994) to 78.4% in 1994/95, and that the Big Six currently audit a substantial proportion (58.2%) of companies in the UK middle market, which they appear to be targeting, as the large auditee sub-sector becomes saturated, to increase market share.     

Explaining Variability in External Audit Fees

This study examines the effect of several factors on the level of external audit fees using a multiple regression model. Audit fee data were provided by 95 US publicly held companies for the years 1983 to 1985. Variables measuring client industry membership and auditor involvement in the security registration process were proxies for client regulatory aspects. These variables were significant and provide support for the hypothesis that scale economies and/or specialization effects accrue to audit firms in dealing with the regulatory complexities faced by clients. Variables measuring auditee size and complexity, auditee/auditor loss sharing risk, and audit firm size were also significant in explaining variability in external audit fees.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES: SOME EMPIRICAL MODELS

This paper proposes a model of audit fee determination based upon size and other characteristics of the auditee and the auditor, and upon whether there has been a recent change of auditor (which might lead to a low-balling effect). A novel feature of the model is that auditee size is measured in two dimensions, sales and assets, and is allowed to have a quadratic relationship with audit fee. The model was estimated for a sample of large listed UK companies for the years 1981 to 1988. The results support the low-balling hypothesis and also provide insights into the distinctive role of the Big 8 firms in the audit market.     

The Effect of Corporate Status on External Audit Fees: Evidence From the UK

Abstract:  This paper simultaneously examines, for the first time, the determinants of external audit fees of UK companies drawn from the quoted sector (Main Market, the Alternative Investment Market and Ofex), and the unquoted sector (public and private limited companies). The paper also provides new evidence on the effects of corporate failure and the persistence of the big four and mid-tier auditor premiums across the public and private corporate sectors. After controlling for firm size, audit risk and complexity, we find that quoted and unquoted public limited companies have significantly higher audit fees than their private limited counterparts. Our estimates imply that relative premiums for market/corporate form are as follows: Main Market over AIM, 6.8%; AIM over Ofex, 19.5%; Ofex over unquoted plc, 15.5%; and unquoted plc over private, 16.7%. However, despite indications in prior US research to the contrary, we find no evidence that insolvent firms that failed were charged higher audit fees in the year preceding failure. A positive relationship is also found between audit and consultancy fees – a result that persists using an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity.     

Perceived auditor independence and audit firm fees

Regulations requiring the disclosure of fees paid to an auditor for audit and non-audit services (NAS) respond to concerns that such payments are potentially detrimental to auditors' actual or perceived independence. Although empirical studies have failed to produce unequivocal evidence of detrimental effects on auditor independence, the actions of regulators, audit firms and companies are consistent with the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair perceived levels of auditor independence.

Using a sample of UK companies over a six year period to March 2006, we study perceived impairment of auditor independence by examining the relationship between levels of total relative fees (combined audit and NAS fees payable by a company to its auditor as a proportion of the audit firm's UK income) and market value. This paper's methodological innovation is its use of a valuation framework in this setting. A further contribution lies in dropping the assumption of linearity found in most prior empirical studies. We provide evidence that shareholders perceive a threat to auditor independence only at high total relative fee levels. At lower levels, total relative fees are positively related to company value. These results suggest that disclosure of NAS and audit fees are of relevance to investors, as is information about auditor income. Our results support the view that regulation by reference to the threshold at which total relative fees are perceived negatively is more consistent with investor preferences than prohibition of the supply of NAS by auditors to their audit clients.     

The impact of directors’ and officers’ insurance on audit pricing: Evidence from UK companies

This paper examines the impact of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance on audit pricing in a large sample of UK companies. The existence of D&O insurance is expected to exert a dual impact on auditors’ pricing decisions. The presence of an additional source of funds to satisfy stakeholder claims in the event of audit client failure suggests that audit fees in insured companies should be lower. Alternatively, recent research has identified a positive link between the presence of D&O insurance and a number of characteristics traditionally associated with more expensive audits. The main objective of this study is to ascertain which of these influences pre-dominates. Analysing a sample of 753 UK listed companies in the early 1990s, when companies were obliged to disclose the presence of D&O insurance, this study shows that D&O insurance is associated with higher audit fees. It also confirms that insured companies are larger, more complex and present a greater audit risk (using a range of measures) than uninsured companies. Further analysis suggests that the impact of D&O insurance on audit fees may be influenced by company size, auditor size, and the extent of non-executive presence on the company's board.     

Determinants of audit fees in Bangladesh

This paper reports the results of an analysis of the determinants of audit fees of both financial and non-financial companies in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi audit services market is unusual in that there is no direct involvement of international audit firms in it. The results of the regressions show that the size of the auditee has the greatest influence on audit fees. Whilst there was no international Big Six grouping, it was possible to construct a group of Bangladeshi audit firms which commanded a price premium, based on their size and whether they had a link with an international firm of auditors. Financial services companies were found to have higher audit fees relative to non-financial companies. Subsidiaries of multi-national holding companies also had higher audit fees. The surprising result was that auditees which employed at least one qualified accountant had higher audit fees.     

The Impact of Managing Director Changes and Financial Distress on Audit Qualification and Auditor Switching

Abstract:   This study examines the interactive effects of change in managing director/chief executive officer (MD) and financial distress together with five control variables (type of audit firm; audit fees; gearing; time; and company size) on first, audit opinion and secondly on auditor switching. Based on a sample of 297 UK listed companies between 1987 and 2001, we find that companies that are financially distressed and change their MD are most likely to receive a qualified audit report, ceteris paribus . In addition, we find evidence of both familiarity and intimidation threats and that the probability of a switch increases with the severity of qualification.     

The Audit Report under Going Concern Uncertainties: An Empirical Analysis

This study explores the value of the audit report in the context of the going concern qualification (GCQ) decision along the joint dimensions of auditor competence and independence. Likelihood of company failure, auditor switch rates, the self-fulfilling prophecy argument and audit firm size are analysed as variables potentially affecting the value of the audit report in a GCQ situation. This study focuses on the outcomes of such decisions: the presence or absence of a GCQ, for a large sample of UK quoted companies over the decade 1977–86. Our results suggest that, unless the likelihood of failure is very high, the probability of a GCQ is very low. We find some evidence in support of an association between the presence of a GCQ and auditor switching but no support for the self-fulfilling prophecy argument. In addition, smaller UK audit firms do not appear to exhibit lower GCQ rates than do large firms. There is some evidence that the issues of auditor competence and independence may be a cause for concern in this context in the UK.     

Regulating the Market for Audit Services: A Game Theoretic Approach

We apply game theory to model how alternative mandatory audit firm rotation regimes can affect the strategic interaction between auditee and auditor firms, and analyze potential consequences on detection risk and impairment of auditor scepticism. The major results suggest that: (1) relative to an initial state with no rotation requirement but high probability for impaired auditor scepticism, imposing either short-term or long-term mandatory audit firm rotation will remove the threat to auditor scepticism and lead to higher audit fees and lower detection risk; (2) relative to long-term mandatory audit firm rotation, imposing a short-term rotation will lead to lower audit fees and higher detection risk, resulting from greater informational frictions. We further find that imposing supplementary regulatory instruments, such as increased regulatory scrutiny of the auditee and/or auditor, can be used to lower the detection risk and increase audit quality. We discuss implications of these findings for empirical research.     

Further evidence on the determinants of audit pricing in universities

This study investigates the determinants of audit fees for UK universities, involving an analysis of 451 university-year observations over the period 2007–2010. The study contributes to a fledgling strand of research examining audit pricing in the public sector. In seeking to identify an appropriate model to explain audit fees we interview a number of university auditors and use their insights in conjunction with prior findings from both private and public sector studies of audit pricing. Our findings show that audit fees in UK universities are positively influenced by size, the number of subsidiary companies, the amount of endowments, the level of debtors, being located in England and the use of a London-based auditor. We also find that more research-intensive universities (using a range of measures) and universities with greater operating surpluses pay lower audit fees.     

Auditor Market Share,Product Differentiation and Audit Fees

This study examines the effects of auditor market share and product differentiation on audit fees. Previous studies have attributed the price premium charged by the Big Eight (the Big Six in the present study) to Big Eight product differentiation. However, such a price premium could be partly due to monopoly pricing. In the present study, the Hong Kong audit market provides a unique setting in which a non-Big Six local auditor has a market share comparable to those of the third and fourth largest Big Six firms. This makes it feasible to control for the effects of market share via matching. Also, the wide disparity among the Big Six firms ‘market shares in Hong Kong makes it feasible to test for the effects of market power on audit fees. The results show that, consistent with prior studies, the Big Six audit firms charge higher audit fees than non-Big Six firms in the small auditee, but not the big auditee, market. This suggests that similar economic forces to those other audit markets are also at work in Hong Kong. Despite the Big Six firms’ widely different market shares, there was no price differentiation among them. Yet there was a Big Six price premium over the large local firm with a similar market share to those of two of the Big Six. Together, these results suggest that the Big Six price premium is a result of product differentiation rather than monopoly pricing.     

Government ownership,audit firm size and audit pricing: Evidence from China

The present study provides empirical evidence on the impact of government ownership on audit pricing behaviour based on data from Chinese listed companies between 2001 and 2008. Our findings, having controlled for auditor choice, indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) incur significantly lower audit fees than non-SOEs. The results also reveal a significant interaction between the type of SOE (i.e., owned by central vs. local government) and audit firm size, which also affects audit fees. More specifically, large auditors tend to charge the central-SOEs lower audit fees than local-SOEs (province, city and county), while small auditors charge central-SOEs higher fees than local-SOEs. We explore a political economy rationale from a supply-side perspective in explaining the results.     

The pricing of initial audit engagements by big 4 and leading mid-tier auditors

The recent investigation of the UK audit market by the Competition Commission testifies to perennial regulatory concerns regarding increasing supplier concentration, big 4 dominance of large company audits and the capacity of mid-tier auditors to compete. Against this backdrop, this paper presents new evidence on whether there is competitive pricing for initial audit engagements by big 4 auditors relative to their next four largest mid-tier (mid 4) counterparts for the UK quoted and private corporate sectors. Based on data from FAME for 2007 and 2010, the evidence indicates that larger quoted companies switching between the big 4 benefit from substantial discounts, with smaller discounts attracted by clients switching to the mid 4. Coupled with evidence that fees for both audit and non-audit services recover in subsequent periods, and consistent with the theoretical framework, the paper concludes that big 4 discounting is a competitive outcome aimed at securing future economic rents. New evidence demonstrates that smaller clients switching to big 4 or mid 4 auditors do not benefit from low-balling.     

Audit Labor Usage and Fees under Business Risk Auditing

The adoption of business risk audit (BRA) approaches during the 1990s by several leading audit firms has been the subject of considerable scrutiny and commentary. Under BRA, the auditor responds to the increasing complexity of auditee financial reports by acquiring a deep and comprehensive understanding of the auditee's industry, strategy, business models, and processes—tasks best accomplished by higher-ranked labor—and by employing this understanding to make audit labor allocations. Using proprietary data for 165 audits conducted in 2002, we investigate three propositions about audit labor use under BRA. First, relative to pre-BRA benchmarks for the same auditor, we expect BRA audits to use a greater proportion of higher-ranked labor. Second, we expect engagements with high assessed auditor business risk (ABR), a summary risk assessment that reflects the BRA auditor's rich understanding of the auditee, to be allocated more labor and more higher-ranked labor than pre-BRA benchmarks. Third, at all ranks of labor, we expect a positive association between assessed ABR and levels of labor use. We find empirical evidence consistent with these propositions. We also find that total labor use in our sample is only modestly lower than pre-BRA norms. Analysis of fee data from these engagements suggests that audit fees in 2002 are substantially less than would be expected under pre-BRA benchmarks. After controlling for audit labor use, both total fees and fees per hour increase with assessed ABR for first-year auditees but not for continuing auditees. Overall, our results provide evidence on the impact of the BRA audit regime and speak to the likely impact of BRA on audit effectiveness and efficiency.     

Consequences of adopting an expanded auditor’s report in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has recently required an expanded auditor’s report for large public companies. We investigate whether this requirement is associated with an increase in the decision usefulness of the auditor’s report and whether it has indirect consequences on audit fees and quality. Our analyses cover four years surrounding the changes, including companies that transitioned to the new regime and companies that continued issuing the previous report’s format. We do not find evidence that the regulatory change significantly affected investors’ reaction to the release of auditors’ reports, audit fees, or audit quality. Furthermore, we do not find that variation in the expanded reports’ content has affected these outcomes. Although companies with long reports pay comparatively higher fees, the mere increase in disclosure does not affect audit fees or quality. Collectively, our evidence is consistent with the expanded auditor’s report providing little incremental information to investors.     

Auditor Concentration: A Replication and Extension for the UK Audit Market 1991–1995

This paper examines the issue of auditor concentration in the UK during the period from 1991 to 1995. It shows that in 1995 the Big Six held 75% of the total number of audits and collectively earned 92% of the total audit fees. There was only a small increase in auditor concentration during the five year period, resulting from companies switching from small audit firms to Big Six and newly listed companies choosing a Big Six firm. The paper also examines auditor concentration within industries. Finally, the study assesses the measurement methods most commonly used in auditor concentration studies.     

Income smoothing and audit fees

In this study, we examine the effect of income smoothing on auditors' pricing decisions. Analyzing a sample of 12,823 firm-year observations from U.S. companies in non-regulated industries for the period 2000–2018, we find that income smoothing is negatively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors favorably view smoothed earnings. This result holds when we control for other variables that have been identified as determinants of audit fees in prior literature, including client-specific (e.g., client size, audit complexity, litigation risk, and corporate governance), auditor-specific (e.g., auditor quality, auditor tenure, and auditor expertise), and engagement-specific (e.g., audit opinion, busy season, reporting lag) factors. Our results also hold across (1) alternative smoothing measures (with and without considering the use of accruals to smooth earnings), (2) different sources of income smoothness (innate vs. discretionary components) and (3) various robustness tests. Overall, our evidence supports the notion that auditors perceive income smoothing as signaling rather than opportunistic behavior, and thus charge lower audit fees. To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines income smoothing directly from the perspective of auditors.     

THE IMPACT OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND OWNERSHIP ON AUDIT QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM LARGE UK COMPANIES

This paper examines the impact of board composition and ownership structure on audit quality in the UK prior to the adoption of the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance ([5]). In this study I use audit fees as a proxy for audit quality and seek to investigate whether the proportion of non-executives, the extent of managerial ownership or ownership by large blockholders influences the extent of auditing, and consequently, the audit fee. Utilizing data from a sample of 402 quoted companies I find that the proportion of non-executive directors has a significant positive impact on audit fees. I also find that audit fees are negatively related to the proportion of equity owned by executive directors. I find no evidence that ownership by large blockholders (institutional or otherwise) or CEO/chairman duality has a significant impact on audit fees. Overall, the findings suggest that non-executive directors encourage more intensive audits as a complement to their own monitoring role while the reduction in agency costs expected through significant managerial ownership results in a reduced need for intensive auditing.     

Auditor Selection: What Influences Decisions by Listed Companies?

Major business failures, including Enron and World Com in the United States and Harris Scarfe and HIH in Australia, and related alleged audit failures, have put the choice of auditor on the agenda. The choice of the "right" auditor has economic consequences for an auditee and implications for corporate governance. This paper discusses factors important to explaining auditor choice, including institutional factors (pertaining to the auditee and auditor) and newer emerging criteria as well as networking between directors and auditors. The paper discusses the relevant research and the policy implications for good corporate governance of auditor choice in publicly listed companies.