Euro Stories: The Irish Experience of Currency Change

This paper presents an overview of an interview study carried out in the Republic of Ireland approximately 1 year after the introduction of the euro in January 2002 and also compares the Irish experience to that of the other initial Eurozone countries. The new currency seems to have been rather more positively received in Ireland than elsewhere. Irish adults had a generally more positive attitude towards the new currency and seemed to have adapted to it rather well. Nevertheless, they shared some common experiences and problems with citizens of other countries, such as the perception that the introduction of the euro raised inflation more than it actually did, confusion of notes and coins and the use of coping strategies involving price conversion to the former currency. The implications of the Irish experience for policy are discussed.     

The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure at the Heart of EU Economic Governance Reform

While the euro officially came into being in 1999, it was the introduction of euro notes and coins 20 years ago in January 2002 that made the common currency a tangible reality for European citizens. The circle of member states has since grown from 11 to 19, and a growing section of the population no longer has any personal experience with a “national” currency, yet the debate on the legal and institutional framework underpinning the common currency has never gone away.

     

The “Euro Illusion”: Illusion or Fact?

The changeover to the euro elicited an upsurge of research on the effects of the new currency on consumers’ conversion strategies, price estimates, price evaluations, choices, and purchases. This research includes longitudinal surveys, interviews, and controlled experiments, both natural and in the laboratory. The present article starts with an overview of this research after which it more specifically focuses on research showing an influence of the nominal value, as expressed in different currencies, on price evaluations and consumer choice. For most countries, the transition to the euro led to a lower nominal value currency. A bias known as the “euro illusion” has been documented such that the subjective value of money is influenced in the direction of the nominal value (i.e., in most countries prices and salaries seem smaller when expressed in euros than in the old domestic currency). Although the term was coined in connection with the euro changeover, the nominal representation of a currency has been shown to influence the subjective value of money in unfamiliar currencies other than the euro. Thus, tourists travelling abroad may frequently be subject to such an illusion. Different mechanisms have been proposed to account for the euro illusion. One is the numerosity heuristic and another the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic in conjunction with biased conversion strategies. The size of the euro illusion is influenced by trade-offs between accuracy and effort. Consistent with this hypothesis, task importance, time constraints, familiarity with the conversion strategy, complexity of the conversion strategy, mood, and attitude towards the country or the currency all influence the size of the euro illusion.     

The Outlook for the Euro Changeover: A Summary and General Analysis

In this paper, the procedures and problems of the changeover to the euro are reviewed. The legal elements involved are discussed as are the psychological aspects. Various practical problems and proposed solutions are described. The possibility of resistance from the consumers in certain segments of the Member State populations is also addressed. One reason for any such resistance might be that for many citizens, the change of currency appears to have little bearing on their everyday concerns.Particular attention is devoted to the scenario for the period 1 January to 1 July 2002, during which coins and notes in euros and national monetary units can be in circulation at the same time.     

The Euro's place in the world monetary system

The European Union is striding ahead on schedule towards European monetary union (EMU). Eleven member states will introduce the euro for book-keeping purposes on 1.1.1999, assigning responsibility for monetary policy to the European System of Central Banks. On 1.1.2002, the euro will also be in circulation as notes and coins, and the participating countries will abandon their national currencies by 30.6.2002 at the latest. But what part will the euro play in the world monetary system? And what conclusions do we need to draw?     

The new EU countries and euro adoption

In the new member states of the EU which have not yet adopted the euro, previous adoption strategies have come under scrutiny. The spillovers and contagion from the global financial crisis revealed a new threat to the countries’ real convergence goal, namely considerable vulnerability to the transmission of financial instability to the real economy. This paper demonstrates the existence of extreme risks for real convergence and argues in favour of a new adoption strategy which does not announce a target date for the currency changeover and which allows for more flexible and countercyclical monetary, fiscal and wage policies.     

Who Can Adjust to the Euro?

This study estimates potential exchange rate variation among 26 European countries during 1992–1998, as a proxy for the potential magnitude of adjustment they face to euro‐block membership, using the instrumental variable (IV) method, applying least squares cross‐section regression analysis based on optimal currency area theory. A currency union among Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia is found to entail a relatively light burden of adjustment for its members. The current membership of other countries in the euro‐block is potentially very demanding on their societies in the long term. This study also compares currency boards and independent central banks as alternative monetary frameworks for disinflation policies. Based on a pooled time‐series, cross‐section dataset of the same countries and years currency boards are found to be more effective in reducing inflation in all countries except Belgium. Balancing EMU's credibility gains against its adjustment costs, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain seem like unstable members of the euro‐block. For all new EU member states except the Czech Republic, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia the advice is to stay out of the euro‐block until their economies are liberalised and flexible enough to withstand major adjustments, and their societal interest groups supportive enough of these adjustments.     

From dollarisation to euroisation

In the past the dollar has been so dominant as an international currency that the term ‘dollarisation’ has become a synonym for currency substitution, i.e. the voluntary use of a foreign currency instead of the respective country's own legal tender. This article addresses the question as to whether the euro may be expected to partly replace the US currency in this function, focusing on the former's use as a substitution currency in countries on the periphery of the euro zone. Some policy conclusions are drawn for both the ‘euroised’ economies and Euroland.     

The Socio-Political Dimensions of the Currency: Implications for the Transition to the Euro

In the first section of this paper, the author demonstrates the crucial significance of anchoring symbolically a currency in the representation of a social whole, not least when practical and technical problems bound up with the creation of a new unit of account and the associated means of payment have to be addressed. In the second section of the paper, on the basis of this analysis, a number of practical implications for the transition to the euro are drawn. The analysis starts with the irreducible political and social dimensions of money related to its traditional public functions. The differentiation of modern societies gives to national currencies a regulatory role in insuring the social bond, as the same currency must be accepted in the public economy as well as in the private one. A series of conditions of legitimacy and confidence in the currency can then be drawn from its participation in the social regulation. To achieve legitimacy, every currency must on the one hand be an instrument that can provide the necessary credit for the development of production and trade and allow people to pay their debts to the public authorities, but it must also serve as a symbol of political belonging to a community. This last dimension of the currency is very often overlooked precisely because it is taken for granted. It is these political and symbolic dimensions of money which the transition to the euro now puts squarely on the centre stage.     

The Impact of the Euro Changeover on Between-Currency Conversions

The present paper reviews available data about between-currency conversion strategies. Specifically, it compares conversion-strategy repertoires and execution before the euro changeover and 5.5 years thereafter. The data illuminate what between-currency conversion strategies people use, how they execute and select among them, why some strategies are favoured over other strategies, how long after the euro changeover people need to do conversions. These findings have important consequences for understanding how consumer behaviour may be facilitated by improving between-currency conversions, a key component for a successful currency changeover. This work was supported by grant from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (Grant # 06-2-235061).     

Interaction effects of mood induction and nominal representation of price on consumer choice

The transition to the euro in several European countries causes consumers to make mistakes in economic transactions. One mistake referred to as the “euro illusion” is the tendency to evaluate prices on the basis of their nominal representation, thus overestimating or underestimating how expensive products are. Investigating effects of the euro illusion on consumer choice as well as moderating effects of mood, three laboratory experiments were conducted employing convenience samples of students. In Experiment 1 a bias toward the nominal representation was demonstrated when participants chose an unfamiliar (fictitious) large-unit currency (small numbers) for paying the price of a consumer product but chose an unfamiliar small-unit currency (large numbers) for obtaining a salary. The bias was larger for participants who were induced to feel positive and deactivated (calm and relaxed) than for participants who were induced to feel negative and activated (anxious and jittery). The difference in frequencies of choice of currency were replicated in Experiment 2. No effects were, however, found of natural mood assessed by self-report ratings. In Experiment 3 choices of more expensive consumer products with additional features were more frequent when the prices were expressed in the large-unit currency than when expressed in the small-unit currency. Neither in this case did self-reported natural mood affect the choices.     

Internationalization of currencies: The case of the US dollar and its challenger euro

This article examines the benefits and costs to the United States of having the US dollar used as an international currency and explains the factors underlying the dollar's use internationally. The main benefit for the United States is that it derives seigniorage from the dollar's international use while the main cost is that there is less scope for controlling domestic monetary conditions. There are three prerequisites for the international use of a currency: (1) confidence in the political stability of the issuing country; (2) deep, broad, and open financial markets in the issuing country; and (3) a large share of world exports on the part of the issuing country. The implications of the euro for the dollar's leading international position are discussed. Data are presented showing that the dollar is the world's leading international currency.     

Multinational cash management and conglomerate discounts in the euro zone

We discuss the impact of liberalisation, deregulation and the introduction of a single currency on cash management within multinationals in the euro zone. The developments in the euro zone reduce financial market imperfections in transferring cash and diminish the need for separate local cash holdings. This facilitates the centralisation of cash management and headquarters’ financial control. Increased financial power of multinational headquarters, moreover, offers opportunities for disintermediation. By exploiting these options multinationals in the euro zone can start to reap additional benefits of internal financing and conglomerate discounts of euro zone multinationals may diminish.     

Can the Euro Survive?

One of the fascinating aspects of the European debt crisis has been the resilience of the euro. For much of 2011, the euro was a key reserve currency, oblivious to the chaos ravaging European economies. Now, however, the gravity of the crisis is finally dragging down the euro. As the Euro zone debt crisis enters its third uncertain year, the question about whether the euro can survive rises. This paper argues that the euro can survive given policymakers still have in hand various tools. These tools include creating exit rules, implementing new stabilisation rules and instruments, adopting new fiscal policy, introducing conditional Eurobonds, using inflation differentials and providing more independence to the European Central Bank.     

The franc zone of West and Central Africa

In the francophone countries of West and Central Africa a currency system has long been in place which was originally based on the French franc and is now based on the euro. A look at how this system has operated over the years may highlight some useful experiences for the countries on the eastern and southern periphery of the euro area that are now considering pegging their national currencies to the euro and could help to clarify the opportunities and risks arising for both these countries and the present participants of European Monetary Union.     

Examining the Return–Volatility Relation for Foreign Exchange: Evidence from the Euro VIX

We compare the return–volatility relation for the euro currency to the equivalent relation for the equity market, examining the sign, symmetry, and strength of the relation. We employ the euro‐currency exchange‐traded fund (FXE) and its associated option implied volatility index (the EVZ), whereas previous studies only employ equities and/or realized volatility. The equity studies find a negative asymmetric return–volatility relation for implied volatility, with a strong relation when large market movements occur. We find that the euro return–volatility relation can possess either a positive or negative sign, is asymmetric, and has a weaker relation. Thus, the sign and strength of the euro relation differs from the equivalent equity relation. Our quantile regressions show that both the positive and negative contemporaneous returns of the euro result in increased volatility in the extreme quantiles of the conditional distribution, with the contemporaneous effect showing a stronger relation when the euro depreciates. We also find that the volume of the euro‐currency ETF options affects the return–volatility relation for the euro ETF. Overall, the results here expand the concept originally restricted to equities, with the surprising results that the return‐implied volatility relation is weaker and the asymmetric return sometimes is positive for the euro currency. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 34:74–92, 2014     

Intraday price‐reversal patterns in the currency futures market: The impact of the introduction of GLOBEX and the euro

This article assesses the intraday price‐reversal patterns of seven major currency futures contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange over 1988–2003 after 1‐day returns and opening gaps. Significant intraday price‐reversal patterns are observed in five of the seven currency futures contracts, following large price changes. Additional tests are conducted in three subperiods (1988–1992, 1993–1998, and 1999–2003) to examine the impact of the introduction of electronic trading on GLOBEX in 1992 (to assess how a near 24‐hour trading session might impact the next‐day opening and closing futures prices) and the introduction of the euro in 1999 (to assess its impact on price predictability in other futures markets). It is found that the introduction of the GLOBEX in 1992 significantly reduced pricing errors in currency futures in the second subperiod, making the currency futures markets fairly efficient. However, the introduction of the new currency, the euro, and the disappearance of several European currencies in 1999, resulted in significant price patterns (mostly reversals and some persistence) in most of the currency futures, indicating inefficiencies in the third subperiod. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:1089–1130, 2006     

Die aktuelle Kritik an der makroökonomischen Geldtheorie

There is no universal agreement on what money actually is. Money is created and used by the modern bank system, which can be split into the central bank, the commercial banks and the remaining sector of households, companies and states. The article focuses on bank deposits, which are created by commercial banks themselves. Bank deposits count as money in a modern economy such as Germany, where the bulk of money held by the public is in the form of deposits with banks. The other part is currency — bank notes and coins. Not accessible to the public (with some exceptions) are central bank reserves held by commercial banks with the central bank. There are two main problems which are currently being discussed by the Deutsche Bundesbank and by some more or less academic authors. First, what kind of relationship exists between base money (currency and reserves) and bank deposits? This relationship plays a crucial role in controlling and steering inflation and investment. Second, are banks lending the savings of their customers to other customers? This relationship is a cornerstone of the money multiplier theory. The answers to these two questions are not as trivial as they seem to be. Textbooks are of no help because they are the targets of the criticism made by central bank authors.     

Austritt einzelner Länder aus der Währungsunion: ein Szenario

The exit of a member state from the eurozone is often depicted as a catastrophic event that would lead to uncontrollable havoc in the financial markets. In this contribution, an alternative scenario is developed based on a consensual understanding. It describes a multi-year transition period during which all member states’ payments were automatically realised on the basis of a basket consisting of the euro and the new currency. In the remaining eurozone countries, the relative weight of the euro would increase over time, while it would decrease in the exit state. The hope is that the possibility of a smooth exit path would increase the bargaining power to change the governance rules of the eurozone.     

The arrival of the Euro and its implications for Asia

The third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) commenced on January 1, 1999 with the launch of the European single currency, the euro. The first round of participants comprises 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) nations, dubbed “Euroland.” The potential implications of EMU for Asia are immense. The euro's emergence as an international currency and its impact on Asia can be assessed in 3 different domains: (1) as a medium of exchange for Europe's trade with Asia; (2) as a store of value in stocks and bonds in world capital markets; and (3) as part of official foreign exchange reserves of Asian central banks. Our analysis suggests that there is potential for the euro to play a bigger role in EU-Asia trade links, which will be underpinned by the collective importance of Euroland as a much-enlarged trading and investment partner for Asia. However, in the short term at least, Asian equity markets are unlikely to benefit from significant inflows of capital from the EU as the former have been decimated by the region's financial crisis. As for Asian bond markets, rapid deterioration of sovereign ratings of countries in the region over the past 12 months would make it difficult for Asian companies to raise funds through euro-denominated debt instruments. As for official foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of Asian reserves is currently held in US dollar assets. Judging from Asian trade and debt figures, it seems unlikely that the euro would challenge the US dollar as a reserve currency any time in the near future. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the euro's introduction could make it easier for Asian central banks to diversify their reserves from the greenback to the euro. The internationalization of the euro is likely to happen only gradually, whether in terms of international trade denomination and settlement, denominating international financial assets, or as a reserve currency. Since the magnitude of shock that the single European currency would bring to the international monetary system is still unknown, only very tentative conclusions for the impact on Asian countries can be drawn at this point in time.