PERSPECTIVE: Ten Years Of Experience Teaching A Multi‐Disciplinary Product Development Course⋆⋆

Integrated Design for Marketability and Manufacturing (IDMM at Stanford) is an Integrated Product Development course (IPD at Michigan) that is distinguished by hands‐on manufacture of customer‐ready prototypes executed by cross‐disciplinary teams of students (MBAs and graduate Engineering and Design students) in a simulated economic competition against benchmark products and against each other. The course design is such that teams can succeed only by performing well in each of the marketing, manufacturing, engineering, and design dimensions. Student failure modes include adopting the wrong product strategy, failure to execute a sound strategy of producing a product that meets market needs, failure to drive costs down, poor product positioning and/or communication, poor forecasting and inventory management, and poor team dynamics. Instructors adopting this course model will face challenges that derive from its definitively cross‐functional nature. The course involves faculty from Business, Engineering, and Design in a world where teaching load, compensation and infrastructural support is most often tallied on a unit‐specific basis. The course requires faculty with broad interests in a world in which narrow academic depth is often more highly valued. Other challenges the course presents include maintaining a sense of fairness in the final product competition, so that students can move beyond the anger of a potential failure to learn from their experience. Also, in its current manifestations on the Stanford and Michigan campuses the course requires expensive general‐purpose machine tools and instruction for students to build fully functional (customer‐ready) product prototypes. We provide our current resolutions to these challenges, and the rewards for making the effort. In the end, the course's survivability can be traced to the benefits it provides to all stakeholders: students, faculty, and administrators. These benefits include a course that integrates disciplines in a way that students believe will increase their integrative skills and marketability, a course that faculty can embrace as a vehicle for their own development in teaching and research, and that administrators find sufficiently novel and engaging to attract the attention of outside constituencies and the press. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.     

Integrated Market-Immersion Approach To Teaching New Product Development In Technologically-Oriented Teams

This article presents a market immersion methodology for teaching NPD in technologically-oriented teams. This methodology was developed during the early 1990s at the Lally School of Management and Technology of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Since then, it has been successfully utilized to train in excess of one hundred MBA-level student teams. The NPD course is taught by a 5-member cross-functional team of faculty with backgrounds in marketing, manufacturing operations, and accounting. The course is modeled on Cooper's stage gate process, and the course is designed to provide a combination of classroom and apprenticeship experiences. The 6-credit, year-long course requires students to work in self-directed teams of approximately 5 to 6 members. Each student team chooses its own industry or technology domain in which to concentrate its efforts, and students undertake intensive market and field research in order to assess any existing market opportunities. Once a specific target market and market need have been identified, students are then required to design a product and an organization to meet that need. In specific, students must produce a detailed marketing, manufacturing, operations, advertising, distribution, and financial plan that can bring their product to market. During the process, students create multiple potential product designs, build mock-ups of their products, and field test the mock-ups. At every phase of the course, the teams are continuously immersed in real customer markets. As a result, teams must struggle to incorporate new market information and learning into their project in a consistent and holistic manner. The following article presents the curriculum content and tools, lessons learned, and student reactions to this original pedagogical approach to teaching NPD. Due to the length of the course, particular attention is paid to the teaming issues that naturally arise when teams work together on long-run projects. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.     

Sustainable Product and Market Development for Subsistence Marketplaces: Creating Educational Initiatives in Radically Different Contexts*

Developing products and business processes to serve subsistence marketplaces (or the roughly 4 billion poor around the world referred to as the bottom of the pyramid) is a significant challenge for businesses. Despite the importance of subsistence marketplaces, most product development educational curricula have been focused on relatively resource‐rich and literate consumers and markets. We teach an innovative year‐long product development course which includes an international immersion experience and which covers a broad spectrum of learning from understanding poverty, to consumer behavior, to product development and engineering design specifically for subsistence consumers. This unique course represents a pioneering effort to focus attention and create knowledge about product development, marketing, management, and engineering practices for subsistence marketplaces. Our two‐semester course sequence for graduate‐level students in a variety of business and engineering disciplines and industrial design combines in‐class pedagogy with experiential learning and results in useful and marketable product concepts and prototypes. Working on projects with multinational companies or startups, students identify an opportunity of general need, conduct field market research to better understand subsistence consumer needs and contexts through an international immersion experience, develop a product concept, convert the concept to a workable prototype, and develop a manufacturing plan, marketing strategy, and overall business plan for the product. Overlaying the content found in a typical new product development lab course we develop a contextual understanding of subsistence marketplaces, setting the stage for new product development. A central aspect of the learning experience is travel to subsistence markets for actual immersion in the context and to conduct market research. Our course is at the confluence of two of the most important issues facing humanity, subsistence and sustainability. Lessons learned here can also be extended to other radically different contexts, such as future scenarios involving severe energy shortages or climate change consequences. Such educational initiatives provide challenging learning experiences in preparing students for the unique demands of the 21st century.     

Perspective: The Innovation Dilemma: How to Innovate When the Market Is Mature

Most companies have ambitious growth goals. The trouble is there are only so many sources of market growth. Markets in many countries and industries are mature and increasingly commoditized; achieving growth in market share is expensive; and acquisitions often do not work. For most companies, product development means line extensions, improvements, and product modifications, and only serves to maintain market share. Markets aren't growing, so firms increasingly compete for a piece of a shrinking pie by introducing one insignificant new product after another. The launch of a truly differentiated new product in mature markets is rare these days. As a result, development portfolios have become decidedly less innovative since the mid‐1990s, and R&D productivity is down. The answer is bold innovation—breakthrough products, services and solutions that create growth engines for the future. This means larger‐scope and more systems‐oriented solutions and service packages. Examples such as Apple's iPod are often cited. (Note that Apple did not invent the MP3 player, nor was this opportunity in a blue ocean; in fact there were 43 competitors when Apple launched!) What Apple did succeed in was in identifying an attractive strategic arena (MP3s) where it could leverage its strengths to its advantage and then to develop a solution that solved users’ problems. The result—an easy‐to‐use, easy‐to‐download MP3 system, which also happened to be “cool.” Our benchmarking studies reveal that five vectors must be in place to undertake this type of innovation to yield bolder and more imaginative development projects. First, develop a bold innovation strategy that focuses your business on the right strategic arenas that promise to be engines of real growth. Most businesses focus their efforts in the wrong areas—on flat markets, mature technologies, and tired product categories. Break out of this box towards more promising strategic arenas with extreme opportunities. Next, foster a climate and culture that promotes bolder innovation. Leadership is vital to success. If senior management does not have the appetite for these big concepts, then all your efforts and systems will fail. Senior management plays a vital role here in promoting an innovative climate in your business. Next, create “big ideas” for integrated product‐service solutions. The best methods for generating breakthrough new product ideas are identified in this paper. Then drive these “big concepts” to market quickly via a systematic and disciplined idea‐to‐launch system designed for major innovation initiatives. Just because these projects are imaginative and bold is no reason to throw discipline out the window. In fact, quite the reverse is true. Finally build a solid business case and focus on the winners. Most innovation teams don't get the facts, and consequently build weak business cases; the result is that many worthwhile innovations don't get the support they need to be commercialized. It's essential to do the front‐end homework, and so build a compelling business case. Then make the right investment decisions—evaluating “big concepts” for development when little information is available. Note that financial models don't work well when it comes to evaluating major innovations, because the data are often wrong. But other methods can be used to make these tough go/kill decisions. Illustrations and examples are provided from many industries and companies to show how to implement these five vectors.     

Communication Flows in International Product Innovation Teams

Recently, we have witnessed a strong growth in the internationalization of many firms' product development activities. However, the lack of attention devoted by scientific research to the management of international innovation contrasts sharply with the importance attached to it as a cornerstone of international business success. Although several empirical studies and normative theories have specified the communication requirements in innovation teams, an empirically based insight is definitely needed on the communication requirements and requirements that prevail in the complex context of international innovation teams, in which the participants are located in different company units, countries, and cultures. This article addresses the following research question: viewing international innovation as an interfunctional activity, what are the communication requirements an international innovation team is facing, and what are the communication capabilities (interface mechanisms) that may be adopted to initiate, develop, and launch the new product effectively and efficiently? An extensive case study research project was designed to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework. Over a two year time period, the research team has investigated selected innovation projects in four European multinational corporations. The analysis of the case study data suggests five requirements that determine the effectiveness and efficiency of communication in international product development teams: network transparency, knowledge codification, knowledge credibility, communication cost, secrecy. To cope with these communication requirements, organizations may create firm level capabilities (parallel structures, cross‐functional and inter‐unit climate, communication infrastructure, goal congruence) and team level capabilities (core team, team leadership, formalization, procedural justice). The evidence from the in‐depth case study research indicates that these mechanisms provide a parsimonious and powerful approach to address the communication requirements in international product innovation teams. After the information processing framework proposed by Tushman and Nadler [124], the adoption of these mechanisms is expected to improve innovation effectiveness. This holds important consequences for the management of international product innovation projects. First, the innovating firm must balance centralization and decentralization, employ formal as well as informal strategies, and integrate ad‐hoc and permanent strategies. Second, it highlights the critical role of the project leader. Given the fact that companies often select the most available person, rather than the best person for the job, the allocation of light weight project leaders may create heavyweight problems in international teams. Third, following the argument in favor of procedural justice, the absence of involvement may severely hinder cross‐functional commitment to international innovation projects. Fourth, the innovating firm must also actively manage the communication flows with external parties. Failure to do so may result in flawed specifications, and a limited understanding about product design and market strategies.     

First Things First

Although successful new product development practices often require joint efforts of professionals from various departments, all too often these professionals are trained as specialists with little exposure to other functional viewpoints. Colin Clipson describes the results of an educational initiative designed to bring together selected technical, business and design students enrolled in classes at The University of Michigan. Members of various student teams quickly ascertained a need to overcome language and cultural barriers in order to develop product recommendations for sponsoring firms. The results of this educational experiment have implications for current educational programs as long as improved innovation management is seen as a desirable social goal.     

Innovative versus incremental new business services: Different keys for achieving success

In companies where new product development plays an important strategic role, managers necessarily contend with a portfolio of projects that range from high technology, new‐to‐the‐world, innovations to relatively simple improvements, adaptations, line extensions, or imitations of competitive offerings. Recent studies indicate that achieving successful outcomes for projects that differ radically in terms of innovativeness requires that firms adjust their NPD practices in line with the type of new product project they are developing. Based on a large‐scale survey of managers knowledgeable about new product development in their firm, this study focuses on new business‐to‐business service projects in an attempt to gain insights about the influence of product innovativeness on the factors that are linked to new service success and failure. The research results indicate that there are a small number of “global” success factors which appear to govern the outcome of new service ventures, regardless of their degree of newness. These include: ensuring an excellent customer/need fit, involving expert front line personnel in creating the new service and in helping customers appreciate its distinctiveness and benefits, and implementing a formal and planned launch program for the new service offering. Several other factors, however, were found to play a more distinctive role in the outcome of new service ventures, depending on how really new or innovative the new service was. For low innovativeness new business services, the results suggest that managers can enhance performance by: leveraging the firm's unique competencies, experiences and reputation through the introduction of new services that have a strong corporate fit; installing a formal “stage‐gate” new service development system, particularly at the front‐end and during the design stage of the development process; and ensuring that efforts to differentiate services from competitive or past offerings do not lead to high cost or unnecessarily complex service offerings. For new‐to‐the‐world business services, the primary distinguishing feature impacting performance is the corporate culture of the firm: one that encourages entrepreneurship and creativity, and that actively involves senior managers in the role of visionary and mentor for new service development. In addition, good market potential and marketing tactics that offset the intangibility of “really new” service concepts appear to have a positive performance effect.     

Designing Visual Recognition for the Brand*

The present paper examines how companies strategically employ design to create visual recognition of their brands' core values. To address this question, an explorative in‐depth case study was carried out concerning the strategic design efforts of two companies: Nokia (mobile phones) and Volvo (passenger cars). It was found that these two companies fostered design philosophies that lay out which approach to design and which design features are expressive of the core brand values. The communication of value through design was modeled as a process of semantic transformation. This process specifies how meaning is created by design in a three‐way relation among design features, brand values, and the interpretation by a potential customer. By analyzing the design effort of Nokia and Volvo with the help of this model, it is shown that control over the process of semantic transformation enabled managers in both companies to make strategic decisions over the type, strength, and generality of the relation between design features and brand values. Another result is that the embodiment of brand values in a design can be strategically organized around lead products. Such products serve as reference points for what the brand stands for and can be used as such during subsequent new product development (NPD) projects for other products in the brand portfolio. The design philosophy of Nokia was found to depart from that of Volvo. Nokia had a bigger product portfolio and served more market segments. It therefore had to apply its design features more flexibly over its product portfolio, and in many of its designs the relation between design features and brand values was more implicit. Six key drivers for the differences between the two companies were derived from the data. Two external drivers were identified that relate to the product category, and four internal drivers were found to stem from the companies' past and present brand management strategies. These drivers show that the design of visual recognition for the brand depends on the particular circumstances of the company and that it is tightly connected to strategic decision making on branding. These results are relevant for brand, product, and design managers, because they provide two good examples of companies that have organized their design efforts in such a way that they communicate the core values of their brands. Other companies can learn from these examples by considering why these two companies acted as they did and how their communication goals of product design were aligned to those of brand management.     

The dynamics of multicultural NPD teams in virtual environments

Changes in the business environment, responses of companies to these changes and the available information and communication technologies (ICT) pose a number of challenges to present and future product developers, as well as to educational institutions. An appropriate response to these challenges is to create a solid basis for strategies to combat stronger competition, since existing educational programs have provided this only to a small extent. Several European universities provided this basis with the development of an international design course European Global Product Realization (EGPR). The main objective of the EGPR course is to provide a stimulating working environment for students, where they can conquer the design competences needed for their future professional practice. The main focus is put on multidisciplinary, multinational and multicultural teams, using virtual technological developments in solving a new product development (NPD) problem at a global level. This paper studies how the growth of the course internationally affects the design process carried out. A survey was carried out among the students of the past four courses and the analysis shows that the cultural background of the students has significant effect on their perception of the courses’ processes. This is a novel challenge that the developers of the course need to face in order to provide the highest level of knowledge possible to the students.     

Market Learning and Radical Innovation: A Cross Case Comparison of Eight Radical Innovation Projects

Does customer input play the same key role in every successful new-product development (NPD) project? For incremental NPD projects, market information keeps the project team focused on customer wants and needs. Well-documented methods exist for obtaining and using market information throughout the stages of an incremental NPD project. However, the role of market learning seems less apparent if the NPD project involves a really new product—that is, a radical innovation that creates a line of business that is new not only for the firm but also for the marketplace. In all likelihood, customers will not be able to describe their requirements for a product that opens up entirely new markets and applications. To provide insight into the role that market learning plays in NPD projects involving really new products, Gina Colarelli O'Connor describes findings from case studies of eight radical innovation projects. Participants in the study come from member companies of the Industrial Research Institute, a consortium of large company R&D managers. With a focus on exploring how market learning for radical innovations differs from that of incremental NPD projects, the case studies examine the following issues: the nature and the timing of market-related inquiry; market learning methods and processes; and the scope of responsibility for market learning, and confidence in the results. Observations from the case studies suggest that the market-related questions that are asked during a radical innovation project differ by stage of development, and they differ from the questions that project teams typically ask during an incremental NPD effort. For example, assessments of market potential, size, and growth were not at issue during the early stages of the projects in this study. Such issues came into play after the innovations were proven to work under controlled conditions and attention turned to finding applications for the technology. For several projects in the study, internal data and informal networks of people throughout relevant business units provide the means for learning about the hurdles the innovation faces and about markets that are unfamiliar to the development group. The projects in this study employ various techniques for reducing market uncertainty, including offering the product to the most familiar market and using a strategic ally who is familiar with the market to act as an intermediary between the project team and the marketplace.     

New Product Team Decision Making: Regulatory Focus Effects on Number,Type, and Timing Decisions*

Company executives rely on new product development teams to carry out their directives and make decisions according to management's goals. However, team members bring their own motivational perspectives to strategic decisions. This research examines how individual and leadership motivations influence a dyadic team's new product decisions. Specifically, this article investigates how matching vs. mismatched motivations between team members affect new product number, type, and timing decisions. In addition, this study asks how effective leadership‐provided motivations are in guiding teams' new product decisions. A set of hypotheses is developed using regulatory focus theory, which identifies basic motivational differences in individuals (i.e., promotion vs. prevention focus) and their effects on decision making. The hypotheses examine the effects of regulatory focus match vs. mismatch within teams on the likelihood to introduce new products, the timing of new product introductions, and the types of new products introduced. To test the hypotheses, a controlled, yet realistic product management simulation is employed. A total of 124 undergraduate seniors (83 women and 41 men) at a large public university enrolled in a marketing management capstone course participated in this study for partial course credit. Utilizing two‐person teams engaged in a business simulation ensured an appropriate level of controlled complexity in the decision making task, while allowing the phenomena of interest to be isolated and tested. Results show that when dyads share the same motivational approach (regulatory focus match), leadership‐prescribed goal pursuit strategies are largely ineffective. Only dyads that do not share the same motivational approach to decision making (regulatory focus mismatch) make new product decisions consistent with leadership‐prescribed goal pursuit strategies. For regulatory focus match dyads, the results demonstrate that a promotion focus (when compared to a prevention focus) leads to greater numbers of new products introduced, faster new product introductions, and more novel new product introductions. For new product managers, these results carry important implications. Which new product opportunities to invest in and which to forgo is presumably determined by the strategic direction given to teams by top management. Results suggest that when team members share the same motivational approach, this not only influences new product decisions, but also diminishes or eliminates the influence top management can exert on new product decisions. Such “isolation” from leadership influences does not have to be detrimental. For example, companies that seek to insulate new product development teams from influences from the top, such as is the case in many new venture incubations, would be well served to staff those teams ensuring a promotion focus match.     

Success Factors for Integrating Suppliers into New Product Development

Faster, better, cheaper—these marching orders summarize the challenge facing new product development (NPD). In other words, NPD teams must find the means for speeding time to market while also improving product quality and reducing product costs. Cross-functional teams have proved effective for meeting these challenges, and such teams may extend beyond company boundaries to include key materials suppliers. Effective integration of suppliers into NPD can yield such benefits as reduced cost and improved quality of purchased materials, reduced product development time, and improved access to and application of technology. As Gary Ragatz, Robert Handfield, and Thomas Scannell point out, however, those benefits do not automatically accrue to any NPD team that includes representatives from a supplier's company. In a study of 60 member companies from the Michigan State University Global Procurement and Supply Chain Electronic Benchmarking Network, they explore the management practices and the environmental factors that relate most closely to successful integration of suppliers into the NPD process. The study identifies supplier membership on the NPD project team as the greatest differentiator between most and least successful integration efforts. Although the respondents reported only moderate use of shared education and training, the study cites this management factor as another significant differentiator between most and least successful efforts. Respondents listed direct, cross-functional, intercompany communication as the most widely used technique for integrating suppliers into NPD. To integrate suppliers into NPD, a company must overcome such barriers as resistance to sharing proprietary information, and the not-invented-here syndrome. The results of this study suggest that overcoming such barriers depends on relationship structuring—that is, shared education and training, formal trust development processes, formalized risk/reward sharing agreements, joint agreement on performance measurements, top management commitment from both companies, and confidence in the supplier's capabilities. Overcoming these barriers also depends on assett sharing, including intellectual assets such as customer requirements, technology information, and cross-functional communication; physical assets such as linked information systems, technology, and shared plant and equipment; and human assets such as supplier participation on the project team and co-location of personnel.     

New Product Development Practices and Early‐Stage Firms: Two In‐Depth Case Studies

New product development practices (NPD) have been well studied for decades in large, established companies. Implementation of best practices such as predevelopment market planning and cross‐functional teams have been positively correlated with product and project success over a variety of measures. However, for small new ventures, field research into ground‐level adoption of NPD practices is lacking. Because of the risks associated with missteps in new product development and the potential for firm failure, understanding NPD within the new venture context is critical. Through in‐depth case research, this paper investigates two successful physical product‐based early‐stage firms' development processes versus large established firm norms. The research focuses on the start‐up adoption of commonly prescribed management processes to improve NPD, such as cross‐functional teams, use of market planning during innovation development, and the use of structured processes to guide the development team. This research has several theoretical implications. The first finding is that in comparing the innovation processes of these firms to large, established firms, the study found several key differences from the large firm paradigm. These differences in development approach from what is prescribed for large, established firms are driven by necessity from a scarcity of resources. These new firms simply did not have the resources (financial or human) to create multi‐ or cross‐functional teams or organizations in the traditional sense for their first product. Use of virtual resources was pervasive. Founders also played multiple roles concurrently in the organization, as opposed to relying on functional departments so common in large firms. The NPD process used by both firms was informal—much more skeletal than commonly recommended structured processes. The data indicated that these firms put less focus on managing the process and more emphasis on managing their goals (the main driver being getting the first product to market). In addition to little or no written procedures being used, development meetings did not run to specific paper‐based deliverables or defined steps. In terms of market and user insight, these activities were primarily performed inside the core team—using methods that again were distinctive in their approach. What drove a project to completion was relying on team experience or a “learn as you go approach.” Again, the driver for this type of truncated market research approach was a lack of resources and need to increase the project's speed‐to‐market. Both firms in our study were highly successful, from not only an NPD efficiency standpoint but also effectiveness. The second broad finding we draw from this work is that there are lessons to be learned from start‐ups for large, established firms seeking ever‐increasing efficiency. We have found that small empowered teams leading projects substantial in scope can be extremely effective when roles are expanded, decision power is ground‐level, and there is little emphasis on defined processes. This exploratory research highlights the unique aspects of NPD within small early‐stage firms, and highlights areas of further research and management implications for both small new ventures and large established firms seeking to increase NPD efficiency and effectiveness.     

“Squeezing R&D”: A Study of Organizational Slack and Knowledge Creation in NPD,Using the SECI Model

During new product development (NPD), functional areas such as marketing, R&D, and manufacturing work together to understand customer needs, create product concepts, and solve technical issues. NPD is dependent on the creation of new knowledge and the interplay between tacit knowledge (knowledge that is difficult to articulate and codify) and explicit knowledge (knowledge that can be codified and documented). Knowledge creation requires time and resources, and the dichotomy facing senior management is how much spare capacity in NPD teams—so‐called organizational slack—is appropriate. Too much organizational slack and precious development resources will be wasted; but when slack is eliminated, there is a danger that knowledge creation will be severely hindered. There have been very few studies of organizational slack at the project level, and so the aim of our research was to examine the impact of changes in organizational slack on knowledge creation in NPD projects. Six projects were studied at two companies, over a two‐year period. Multiple sources of data were used to determine how changes in organizational slack impacted knowledge creation, which was operationalized using Nonaka's socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization (SECI) model. It was found that the creation of knowledge in NPD projects is susceptible to changes in organizational slack. A significant finding was that every time there were changes in organizational slack, there was always some impact on knowledge creation. Increased slack enabled knowledge creation; but, importantly, the impacts of decreasing organizational slack were often very negative and disrupted the work of NPD teams, particularly at the end of projects. Managers who feel that “squeezing R&D” is important should think again—their action might disrupt knowledge creation and compromise innovation.     

Key Factors Affecting Customer Evaluation of Discontinuous New Products

Common sense, as well as plenty of research, tells us that customer feedback can play an important role in successful product development efforts. By understanding the key factors that affect customers' evaluations of a new product, a project team improves its chances of making the right decisions throughout the design and development effort. However, customers typically lack a useful frame of reference for evaluating discontinuous, or really new products. In all likelihood, the key factors that affect customers' evaluations of radically new products differ from those for incremental innovations. Robert Veryzer describes the results of a study that examines the customer research efforts and findings of seven firms involved in the development of discontinuous new products. This study has the following objectives: gaining insight into the customer research inputs such companies use during the development of discontinuous new products, and exploring the critical factors that influence customers' evaluations of these really new products. The subjects in this study conducted relatively little formal customer research during the early stages of the NPD projects. The methods used for obtaining customer input during the concept generation and exploration stages were primarily qualitative. Although the companies in the study still did not focus consistently on customer issues during the technical development and design stage, the less discontinuous projects did use such traditional quantitative techniques as concept tests, clinics, and experiments during this phase of NPD. Throughout the projects in this study, the real opportunities for obtaining customer input came during the prototype testing and commercialization phases of the NPD projects. Several key factors appeared to influence customer evaluations of the products that were being developed by the NPD teams in this study. Lack of familiarity was manifested in customers' resistance to the new products in the study. Similarly, unfamiliarity with these new products often seemed to lead customers to focus on product attributes that development team members viewed as relatively unimportant. Other factors that affected customer evaluation of the products in this study included customer uncertainty about the benefits and risks associated with the product, customers' ability to understand how the product operates, perceptions of the product's safety, and product aesthetics.     

中国独立石油公司海外发展机遇分析

2011年,中国石油公司海外油气上游并购显现新的特点,中资背景的独立石油公司海外油气业务取得突破性进展,已连续成功收购具有一定规模的海外油气上游资产并投入运营.建议中国独立石油公司的海外油气业务发展以适当规模的生产型项目起步,采取谨慎稳妥的投资战略,以边际油田开发项目为重点;关注风险较低的滚动勘探和潜力较大的前缘勘探项目,特别是政治高敏感地区的项目;适度介入以页岩气、页岩油或致密油为主的非常规资源项目.现阶段国内外经济及油气行业环境为中国独立石油公司海外上游业务发展创造了难得的机会,建议中国独立石油公司依靠专业服务团队科学合理地筛选油气项目,与中国国家石油公司在海外油气资产分布上互相补充,在项目运作上互相协同.     

Investigation of Factors Contributing to the Success of Cross-Functional Teams

Although recent empirical research shows that most firms have implemented cross‐functional teams for the majority of the new product development projects undertaken, they are still finding it hard to ensure that these teams are successful in completing the new product development task. In this article, the author first reviews the vast literature on cross‐functional new product development teams to uncover the array of factors that have previously been demonstrated or hypothesized to relate to cross‐functional team success, when measured at the project level. He then analyzes the responses of 112 new product development professionals to determine which factors are more frequently mentioned as leading to project success. In looking at how to achieve successful teams, many factors have been suggested in the literature by a number of different researchers. The author suggests a model of these factors that divides them into three categories that help achieve success. Setting the stage for product development by developing appropriate project goals, empowering the team with the needed decision‐making power, assigning the appropriate human resources, and creating a productive climate should be related to fostering team success. Of these four factors, appropriate project goals is mentioned most often as being associated with success, followed by empowerment. Several specific team behaviors, including cooperation, commitment to the project, ownership of the project, and respect and trust among team members, also have been posited to contribute to team success. Of these, this research finds that cooperation is mentioned most often as being associated with success, followed by commitment and ownership. Finally, a number of researchers have suggested that team leaders, senior managers, and champions provide enabling support to cross‐functional teams in achieving success. Team leadership is the most frequently mentioned enabler, according to these findings, followed by senior management support. The author's results also show that increased use of cross‐functional teams in new product development is related to higher project success. However, achieving cross‐functional team success appears to be more complicated than previously thought. For example, across the set of factors identified in this research, the most frequently mentioned is obtaining the team behavior of cooperation. Setting appropriate project goals, a stage‐setting step that is completed early in the project, follows closely in relative importance. Finally, providing good team leadership as an enabler is the third most frequently mentioned factor in achieving success. This suggests that companies must work in all dimensions to maximize the probability of achieving team success.     

Who Knows What in NPD Teams: Communication Context,Mode, and Task Contingencies

The use of cross‐functional teams in new product development (NPD) benefits firms in many ways. One benefit is the diverse knowledge team members bring to the project, but that benefit can only be appreciated if team members fully utilize and integrate the differentiated expertise of members. As reliance on cross‐functional NPD teams grows, however, firms struggle to exploit the full potential of functionally diverse groups, the biggest obstacle being integrating team members' varied knowledge, expertise, and abilities. Therefore, understanding how information is integrated and used is a primary concern for both practitioners and researchers. Databases and other forms of hard data are methods team members can use to effectively share and integrate knowledge; another method based on social cognition is transactive memory systems (TMS). TMS indicates who will learn what and from whom. The notion is that knowledge is distributed among people in the group, and to make effective use of it, individuals need to know who knows what and who knows who knows what. Grounded in the knowledge‐based theory of the firm, this study investigates the influence of different communication contexts and modes on TMS under different NPD task environments (i.e., exploitation and exploration) in cross‐functional NPD teams. A theoretical model is developed and empirically tested using data collected from 272 ongoing NPD teams of 128 Chinese high‐tech companies. Findings suggest that when teams face tasks defined by exploration, informal communication and face‐to‐face communication are positively associated with TMS, whereas for tasks defined by exploitation, formal communication and computer‐mediated communication are positively related with TMS. Additionally, this study found that TMS is positively related to NPD performance both in terms of project performance and in terms of market performance. Based on these findings, theoretical and managerial implications are drawn regarding resource deployment that encourages the development of effective TMS leading to successful NPD projects.     

Benchmarking the Firm's Critical Success Factors in New Product Development

Managing new product development (NPD) is, to a great extent, a process of separating the winners from the losers. At the project level, tough go/no-go decisions must be made throughout each development effort to ensure that resources are being allocated appropriately. At the company level, benchmarking is helpful for identifying the critical success factors that set the most successful firms apart from their competitors. This company- or macro-level analysis also has the potential for uncovering success factors that are not readily apparent through examination of specific projects. To improve our understanding of the company-level drivers of NPD success, Robert Cooper and Elko Kleinschmidt describe the results of a multi-firm benchmarking study. They propose that a company's overall new product performance depends on the following elements: the NPD process and the specific activities within this process; the organization of the NPD program; the firm's NPD strategy; the firm's culture and climate for innovation; and senior management commitment to NPD. Given the multidimensional nature of NPD performance, the study involves 10 performance measures of a company's new product program: success rate, percent of sales, profitability relative to spending, technical success rating, sales impact, profit impact, success in meeting sales objectives, success in meeting profit objectives, profitability relative to competitors, and overall success. The 10 performance metrics are reduced to two underlying dimensions: program profitability and program impact. These performance factors become theX-and Y-ax.es of a performance map, a visual summary of the relative performance of the 135 companies responding to the survey. The performance map further breaks down the respondents into four groups: solid performers, high-impact technical winners, low-impact performers, and dogs. Again, the objective of this analysis is to determine what separates the solid performers from the companies in the other groups. The analysis identifies nine constructs that drive performance. In rank order of their impact on performance, the main performance drivers that separate the solid performers from the dogs are: a high-quality new product process; a clear, well-communicated new product strategy for the company; adequate resources for new products; senior management commitment to new products; an entrepreneurial climate for product innovation; senior management accountability; strategic focus and synergy (i.e., new products close to the firm's existing markets and leveraging existing technologies); high-quality development teams; and cross-functional teams.     

New Market Creation for Breakthrough Innovations: Enabling and Constraining Mechanisms

While the technological development associated with breakthrough innovation (BI) is truly challenging, creating markets to stimulate their use may be an even more daunting barrier to successful commercialization. Co‐development partners, distribution channel agents, and ultimate users are all required to adopt new processes and to change behaviors in many cases, and the outcomes are unknown. In this paper, the processes and challenges associated with creating new markets for BIs are explored in a qualitative prospective cross‐case comparison of 12 breakthrough projects under development in 10 large established companies. A number of activities that take place in implicit fashion that create both enabling and constraining mechanisms for BIs are observed. The data suggest, for example, that the earliest application choices that scientists make in the project's development ultimately affect the revenue model, that scientists are unaware of the impact of these decisions, that business model development is a very exploratory process, that criteria used to choose initial market entry points conflict with the expectations of operating units, and that the concept of a killer application can be rather dangerous to the health and well‐being of a BI in its commercial infancy. It is argued that new market creation is the result of managing a specific set of events and activities, which are identified in a grounded theoretic fashion. The companies studied, however, were neither fully aware of nor systematically attentive to these activities. A framework is presented of enabling and constraining mechanisms that teams and organizations impose through the processes and decisions they take in the course of the project's development, and a series of propositions regarding the dynamics of successful new market creation for BIs is offered. The implications of these results are far‐reaching. These results show that market creation for BIs may require as much time and investment as their technical development. We do not find evidence of large established organizations’ awareness of or willingness to make these investments as readily as they invest in technical development. The result is research and development labs at large established firms with stockpiles of potentially game‐changing technologies. To evolve a mature BI commercialization competency, a firm must recognize and address the implications for managerial processes, for personnel recruitment, for setting leaders’ expectations, and for developing appropriate performance metrics for those responsible for market creation that go beyond technical discovery and engineering development. Implications for each are discussed.