Bias in Federal Reserve inflation forecasts: Is the Federal Reserve irrational or just cautious?

Inflation forecasts of the Federal Reserve seem to have systematically under-predicted inflation from the fourth quarter of 1968 until Volcker's appointment as Chairman, and to systematically over-predict it afterwards until the second quarter of 1998. Furthermore, under quadratic loss, commercial forecasts seem to have information not contained in those forecasts. To investigate the cause of this apparent irrationality, this paper recovers the loss function implied by Federal Reserve's inflation forecasts. The results suggest that the cost of having inflation above an implicit time-varying target was larger than the cost of having inflation below it for the period since Volcker, and that the opposite was true for the pre-Volcker era. Once these asymmetries are taken into account, the Federal Reserve's inflation forecasts are found to be rational.     

Federal reserve policy viewed through a money supply lens

Federal Reserve nonborrowed reserve supply systematically responded to changes in inflation and in the output gap over the period 1969-2000. While the feedback from output gap is always negative, the response of money supply to changes in inflation varies considerably across time. Nonborrowed reserves decreased with inflation in the post-1979 period and increased in the pre-1979 period. Applying a standard macro-model, the estimated reaction functions are shown to ensure equilibrium determinacy. Viewed through the money supply lens, Federal Reserve policy substantially changed over time, but has never allowed for endogenous fluctuations, which contrasts conclusions drawn from federal funds rate analyses.     

How to Weigh Unemployment Relative to Inflation in Monetary Policy?

The monetary policy mandate for the Federal Reserve and of the Riksbank are essentially the same and boil down to stabilizing inflation around the inflation target and employment or unemployment around a long‐run sustainable rate. The relative weight on stabilizing unemployment or employment versus stabilizing inflation may be close to one. A positive unemployment‐gap forecast normally calls for a positive inflation‐gap forecast.     

A Phillips Curve with Anchored Expectations and Short‐Term Unemployment

This paper examines the behavior of U.S. core inflation, as measured by the weighted median of industry price changes. We find that core inflation since 1985 is well‐explained by an expectations‐augmented Phillips curve in which expected inflation is measured with professional forecasts and labor‐market slack is captured by the short‐term unemployment rate. We also find that expected inflation was backward‐looking until the late 1990s, but then became strongly anchored at the Federal Reserve's target. This shift in expectations changed the relationship between inflation and unemployment from an accelerationist Phillips curve to a level‐level Phillips curve. Our specification explains why high unemployment during the Great Recession did not reduce inflation greatly: partly because inflation expectations were anchored, and partly because short‐term unemployment rose less sharply than total unemployment.     

Estimating Monetary Policy Rules When Nominal Interest Rates Are Stuck at Zero

Did the Federal Reserve's response to economic fundamentals change with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis? Estimation of a monetary policy rule to answer this question faces a censoring problem since the interest rate target has been set at the zero lower bound since late 2008. Surveys by forecasters allow us to sidestep the problem and to use conventional regressions and break tests. We find that, in the opinion of forecasters, the Fed's inflation response has decreased and the unemployment response has increased, which suggests that the Federal Reserve's commitment to stable inflation has become weaker in the eyes of the professional forecasters.     

Monetary Policy in a Low‐Inflation Environment: Developing a State‐Contingent Price‐Level Target

A number of academic studies find that either price‐level targeting or temporary above‐average inflation are nearly optimal policies to address a liquidity trap crisis. Still, central bankers and the public generally question whether even a temporarily higher inflation rate could be beneficial in addressing a liquidity trap or could be consistent with price stability over the longer term. At the same time, however, the Federal Reserve's projections for high unemployment and low inflation do not seem to be consistent with the best monetary policies to address the Fed's dual mandate responsibilities. Accordingly, it is useful to seriously discuss these potentially beneficial alternative policies.     

Can central banks’ monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented) Taylor rule or by a nonlinear rule?

The original Taylor rule establishes a simple linear relation between the interest rate, inflation and the output gap. An important extension to this rule is the assumption of a forward-looking behaviour of central banks. Now they are assumed to target expected inflation and output gap instead of current values of these variables. Using a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function, this paper analyses whether central banks’ monetary policy can indeed be described by a linear Taylor rule or, instead, by a nonlinear rule. It also analyses whether that rule can be augmented with a financial conditions index containing information from some asset prices and financial variables. The results indicate that the monetary behaviour of the European Central Bank and Bank of England is best described by a nonlinear rule, but the behaviour of the Federal Reserve of the United States can be well described by a linear Taylor rule. Our evidence also suggests that only the European Central Bank is reacting to financial conditions.     

Nowcasting U.S. Headline and Core Inflation

Forecasting future inflation and nowcasting contemporaneous inflation are difficult. We propose a new and parsimonious model for nowcasting headline and core inflation in the U.S. consumer price index and price index for personal consumption expenditures that relies on relatively few variables. The model's nowcasting accuracy improves as information accumulates over a month or quarter, outperforming statistical benchmarks. In real‐time comparisons, the model's headline inflation nowcasts substantially outperform those from the Blue Chip consensus and the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Across all four inflation measures, the model's nowcasting accuracy is comparable to that of the Federal Reserve Board's Greenbook.     

Out of Bounds: Do SPF Respondents Have Anchored Inflation Expectations?

Since the Federal Open Market Committee announced a 2% inflation target in 2012, the median long-run inflation forecast of professional forecasters has been near target. We show, however, that most individual forecasters' long-run inflation expectations fluctuate substantially, with sizeable departures from target. We propose a new “bounds anchoring” indicator based on deviations of individuals' long-run forecasts from target. This indicator sheds new light on gradual changes in expectations since the 2012 announcement. We find that bounds anchoring gradually strengthened in the years following the target announcement, but that this trend has recently started to reverse.     

Has the Economy Become More Predictable? Changes in Greenbook Forecast Accuracy

Several researchers have recently documented large reductions in economic volatility. But a more important question may be whether the economy has become more predictable. Using forecasts from the Federal Reserve Greenbooks, I find that inflation and output have become more predictable, though the results for output are somewhat mixed. The reductions in unpredictability (if any) are significantly smaller than reductions in volatility. Associated with this, the predictable component of fluctuations in output and inflation has virtually disappeared.     

Monetary Policy and the Lost Decade: Lessons from Japan

I investigate how monetary policy can avoid a deflationary slump when policy rates are near zero by studying interest rate policy during Japan's “Lost Decade.” Estimation results suggest that the Bank of Japan's interest rate policy fits a conventional reaction function with an inflation target near 1%. The disapointing economic performance thus seems primarily due to adverse economic shocks rather than extraordinary policy errors. Also, counterfactual policy simulations suggest that simply raising the inflation target would not have substantially improved performance. However, price‐level targeting or combining a higher inflation target with an aggressive output response would have achieved superior stabilization results.     

Using private forecasts to estimate the effects of monetary policy

I develop a methodology that uses the forecasts of market participants and of policy makers to estimate the effects of monetary policy on output and inflation. My approach has advantages over the standard practice of fitting a vector autoregression to the data. I apply my methodology to data on output, interest rates and prices. I find that, even using the Federal Reserve Board's Greenbook forecasts to control for the policy maker's information set, prices rise initially in response to a monetary contraction. This finding undermines the standard justification for including an index of commodity prices in VARs.     

Accounting for a Shift in Term Structure Behavior with No-Arbitrage and Macro-Finance Models

This paper examines a shift in the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates in the United States during the mid-1980s. We document this shift using standard interest rate regressions and using dynamic, affine, no-arbitrage models estimated for the pre- and post-shift subsamples. The term structure shift largely appears to be the result of changes in the pricing of risk associated with a "level" factor. Using a macro-finance model, we suggest a link between this shift in term structure behavior and changes in the dynamics and risk pricing of the Federal Reserve's inflation target as perceived by investors.     

The “price puzzle” reconsidered

A large literature has employed structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models to investigate the empirical effects of U.S. monetary policy. Many of these models regularly produce a “price puzzle”—a rise in the aggregate price level in response to a contractionary innovation to monetary policy—unless commodity prices are included. Conventional wisdom maintains that commodity prices resolve the price puzzle because they contain information that helps the Federal Reserve forecast inflation. I examine a number of plausible alternative indicator variables and find little correlation between an ability to forecast inflation and an ability to resolve the price puzzle. Additionally, a sub-sample investigation reveals that evidence of a price puzzle is associated primarily with the 1959-1979 sample period, and that most indicators—including commodity prices—cannot resolve the puzzle over this period.     

Moderate Inflation and the Deflation–Depression Link

Recent research has concluded that the historical evidence only provides weak support for the contention that deflation episodes are harmful to economic growth. In this paper, we revisit this relationship by allowing for inflation and growth to have a nonlinear specification dependent on inflation levels. In particular, we allow for the possibility that high inflation is negatively correlated with growth, while a positive relationship exists over the range of negative to moderate inflation. Our results confirm a positive relationship between inflation and growth at moderate inflation levels, and support the contention that the relationship between inflation and growth is nonlinear over the entire sample range.     

How much inflation is necessary to grease the wheels?

Tobin's proposition that inflation “greases” the wheels of the labor market is studied using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs. The simulated method of moments is used to estimate the nonlinear model based on its second-order approximation. Optimal inflation is determined by a benevolent government that maximizes the households’ welfare. Econometric results indicate that nominal wages are downwardly rigid and that the optimal level of grease inflation for the U.S. economy is about 0.35% per year, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.04% to 0.87%.     

FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations

We explore empirically the theoretical prediction that public information acts as a focal point in the context of the U.S. monetary policy. We aim at establishing whether the publication of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) inflation forecasts affects the cross‐sectional dispersion of private inflation expectations. Our main finding is that publishing FOMC inflation forecasts has a negative effect on the cross‐sectional dispersion of private current‐year inflation forecasts. This effect is found to be robust to another survey data set and to various macroeconomic controls. Moreover, we find that the dispersion of private inflation forecasts is not affected by the dispersion of views among FOMC members.     

The Taylor Rule and “Opportunistic” Monetary Policy

We investigate the possibility that the Taylor rule should be formulated as a threshold process such that the Federal Reserve acts more aggressively in some circumstances than in others. It seems reasonable that the Federal Reserve would act more aggressively when inflation is high than when it is low. Similarly, it might be expected that the Federal Reserve responds more to a negative than a positive output gap. Although these specifications receive some empirical support, we find that a modified threshold model that is consistent with “opportunistic” monetary policy makes significant progress toward explaining Federal Reserve behavior.