“Every today was a tomorrow”: An integral method for indexing the social mediation of preferred futures

The visions we hold of the future, whether they are of utopias or dystopias, are not simply a matter of personal imagination. Our conceptions of the future are mediated to us as much as they are privately created by us. To this point, futures studies have not developed an integrative and broad-based framework for considering the social mediation of futures. Understanding how social mediation impacts on our futures visioning requires an interpretive framework that can cope with the multilayered nature of futures visions, the worldviews that are associated with them and a theory of mediation that can be applied within such a context of ‘depth’. Using theory-building methodology, the current paper attempts this task by describing a theory of social mediation that builds on the integral futures framework. An application of the framework explores the relationship between various scenarios of health care futures, their associated worldviews and the mediational factors that influence our visions of future health care systems.     

Timing feminism, feminising time

This article deals with feminist engagement with the futures studies (and vice versa) and analyses the uneasy relationship that exists between the two. More specifically, it investigates the feminist theorizing of ‘patriarchal time’ and efforts to both decolonise and ‘reconstruct’ time based on feminist epistemological frameworks. Feminism is here understood as a social movement, ideology, theory, philosophy, worldview and a way of life. As such this term overlaps with, yet represents a distinct category from terms such as ‘women’, ‘gender’, ‘femininity’ and ‘women's movements’. Thus, feminism itself is historicized and spatially contextualised as is the notion of non-patriarchal ‘women's/feminist time’ developed by feminists.     

Capitalist accountability and the British Industrial Revolution: The Carron Company, 1759–circa. 1850

The paper argues that accounting historians can help us to understand the origins of the British Industrial Revolution (BIR) by explaining the contribution of accounting to financial success. It re-examines the archive of the Carron Company (hereafter, ‘Carron’) from its formation in 1759 to around 1850 to explore the theory derived from Marx that class conflict, the capitalist mentality, its social relations of production, and accounts, drove the BIR. It shows that, contrary to the currently accepted view that Carron’s early financial accounts were a ‘shambles’, its partners used integrated financial and management accounts based on double entry bookkeeping to impose capitalist accountability on their managers and workers. The paper argues that zealous accounting was critical to Carron’s financial success because accountability for capital drove organisational and technical innovation and it underlay the partners’ early social solidarity. Carron’s partners worked collectively during the company’s difficult formative period up to the 1780s, using accounts to hold the managing partner and his subordinates accountable to them for the circulation of capital and to conduct class war against their workers. From the 1790s, the managing partner exploited a weakness in Carron’s system of corporate governance to understate its profits to demoralise other partners into selling their shares to give him control, which he used to divert a disproportionate share of its accumulating wealth to him and his family. The paper concludes that Carron’s history supports the Marxist theory that accounts played an important role in fuelling the BIR by giving capitalists a technology for controlling production for profit, what Marx called controlling the ‘valorization process’, and for promoting the social cohesion of capital. It calls on accounting historians to test this theory by revisiting the archives of other leading BIR firms, so that we can construct a history of this pivotal shift in the trajectory of world economic development on solid empirical foundations.     

Practising the scenario-axes technique

Studying the future seems a mission impossible, since both the appearance of the future and its underlying dynamics are unknown and unknowable. Nevertheless, the future is being studied by professional futurists. So, professional futurists seem to have found ways to structure ‘the unknown’. The question is, then, how do they do this? Over the years, professional futurists have developed several types of techniques and methods to structure thinking and discussing the future. The scenario-axes technique, which aims to align divergent perspectives on how the future may unfold, is one such structuring device.In the past 2 years, we did ethnographic research at the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research (RPB) and followed professional futurists constructing and applying scenario axes in their scenario projects. Our observations illustrate how the scenario axes are practised by professional futurists and show that the scenario axes do not function as a unifying structure fostering alignment of different perspectives in the way that scenario theorists and practitioners often suggest. Instead, not one, but three different applications and interpretations of functional meaning of the scenario axes co-existed: the scenario axes as a ‘backbone’, as a ‘building scaffold’ and as ‘foundation’.     

Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community?

This article analyses the concept of epistemic community focusing the attention on two aspects, which contribute to define this ‘actor’: knowledge and capacity of acting under the conditions of uncertainty. The link between these two issues and the ‘nature of future studies’ is considered and the possibility of considering some organisations and institutions as future epistemic communities is explored. The case of the World Futures Studies Federation is examined in detail.In 1992, Peter Haas defined an ‘epistemic community’ as follows: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; shared notions of validity—that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and a common policy enterprise—that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” [1].In ancient Greek, the term ‘episteme’ has a meaning which belongs to the philosophical sphere; ‘community’ is a concept which comes from the religious tradition and, more recently, has been the objective of sociological studies. Epistemic community links the two terms to indicate a ‘new’ and in some aspects, atypical political actor. At etymological level we already have a first sort of indication with respect to what is meant: politics as a synthesis of religion (faith), sociology (the decisions taken by policy makers have consequences on the whole society) and philosophy (intended as Weltanschaung). The German term Weltanschaung means the idea, concept or the ‘vision’ of the world and life. It is the way in which an individual or a social group considers the position of the human being in the world and the attitudes and actions they develop on the basis of a particular vision of the cosmos.In addition to this formal definition, Haas identifies other characteristics: “members of an epistemic community share inter-subjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge” [1].This definition could be analysed in several ways with particular attention to one or more of the indicated criteria. We could assume that the expression ‘possible policy actions and desired outcomes’ is to be understood as the ‘long term implications, expected, possible, probable and desired’ of a decision taken or that which will be taken, and this would already represent a linkage between the policy, the futures studies and an epistemic community; moreover, usually ‘the policy choices concern consequences, which can only be partially anticipated’ [2]. This gives rise ‘to the desire for information, which is not so much based on purely technical knowledge but rather information, which is the product of human interpretation’ [1]. Epistemic communities, national or trans-national, are one possible provider of such information.At this stage, and considering only this aspect of the whole definition, we could argue that a network of experts active in the field of future studies would represent the perfect portrait of what we are looking for: a multi-person actor able to ‘anticipate’, using knowledge, various backgrounds and expertise. To anticipate, in this context, might be specified as to understand or comprehend global and local changes. In general, futurists work within the framework of complexity and uncertainty, try to re-define problems in broader context and attempt to comprehend ‘change’ using knowledge.An example could be helpful: the change we are experiencing in Eastern European countries appears as multi-dimensional: in less than 15 years those countries have moved from a

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socialist economy (closed and planned), to a

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‘Western economy’ (the so-called market economy), to a

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technological one as a consequence of globalisation and, lastly,

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to the learning economy.

The first step (socialist economy), recalls other sectors in which the ‘ideas’ were closed and planned. The society was divided into classes and the dominant concept was ‘war’. In this context, every single action was intended as a possibility to demonstrate the points of strength of a system: sports, culture and economy were part of the battle and the vision of the future was mostly influenced by the possibility to destroy or to be destroyed. Examples of these considerations could be seen in the choice made by the USA government in its participation at Olympic Games in Moscow (1980), the USSR’s answer in 1984 (Los Angeles Olympic Games) and the proliferation of nuclear holocaust movies such as The Day After. These ideas were strongly present amongst the people of the Eastern countries, but after 1989, things changed and ‘gradually’ the new paradigms based on ‘Western values’ and, for a few, Western lifestyles, emerged. Probably these changes caused shocks in the local societies, shocks that have had consequences also in the way these societies now see their futures. The third step, the shift to a technological economy, has been faster and wider, thanks largely to the new communication technologies and the Internet. In understanding and developing alternative futures for Eastern Europe, futurists have to take account of the fact that all the three economies exist side by side—Eastern Europe does not represent one or the other economies, it is a complex mix of all the three economies. This complexity is further augmented by the fact that Eastern European societies have not had enough time to understand their present in order to be able to desire possible, alternative futures. Further, economic competitiveness is now based more and more on the capacity to develop and apply knowledge [3]. Thus, futures of Eastern Europe are a function of its capacity to develop relevant new forms of knowledge. Futurists cannot afford to ignore this connection between the knowledge and alternative futures.Thus, the concept of epistemic community and the theory of ‘knowledge economy’ have a great deal in common. If we consider that the so-called ‘decision-makers’ are (in democratic countries) elected by the people, we can argue that that section of the people able to disseminate consciousness of problems, possible solutions and long term implications, posses a form of power. Without engaging with this power, we cannot shape viable and meaningful futures.Are there any trans-national networks of expert where it is possible to identify these characteristics of an ‘embryonic’ epistemic community? In some respect this could be the case of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), or of the Washington-based World Future Society (WFS) or, at regional level, of the Namur-based euroProspective or the Finland Futures Research Centre, where we have structured networks of the experts coming with different experiences, from different backgrounds, a common interest (to analyse the society from different perspective, but all future oriented), a shared task (to disseminate the use of futures studies not only as a tool but also as a way of thinking) and diversity in knowledge, which is what keeps them together. Moreover, for most of the members, the idea of knowledge economy is already their reality and the capacity to understand trends, possible (or even better) probable futures is the aim of their professional activities.If we briefly consider those organisations, we could assume that they already posses some aspects related to the concept of epistemic community: the WFS for example “strives to serve as a neutral clearinghouse for ideas about the future, membership is open and the Society includes 30,000 people in more than 80 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Members come from all walks of life, they include sociologists, scientists, and educators” [4]. If the WFS’s main strength is in trans-national partnership and different backgrounds of its members, the regional experience that euroProspective is carrying out is mostly based on the construction of a European network of experts. The inter-exchange of ideas and a common ‘mission’ are the two elements, which could let us consider this organisation as futures epistemic communities. Another example, at national/regional level, is the one provided by the Finland Futures Research Centre; the link with epistemic community is offered by the activity and the nature of some projects of this institution such as ‘sustainable energy development in developing countries’, ‘Russian energy and global climate’, ‘collisions of nature and culture in transport policy’, ‘professional delphiscan, an expert system’ [5]—all of these projects or tools (delphiscan is a software) are aimed at producing a relationship between political power and future and knowledge power.There are several reasons why we cannot consider the WFSF by itself as an epistemic community. Perhaps the most important is that it does not have a direct link with the political power; neither does the Federation seek any kind of influence on public authorities or on the decision-making process. But in as much as the Federation is concerned with managing change, it could be considered as an actor able to help people and the institutions understand the on-going processes of change. In the coming years, it will probably be forced to become an epistemic community as it will be necessary to ‘represent and clarify the relation between knowledge management, ICT usage and experts in futures studies as mediators between the complexity of political decision and the tendency of institutions to became advanced learning organisation’ [6] and [7].We also need to study the role the futures studies can play in clarifying those ‘shadow zones’ between the political power and the complexity of the decision-making processes. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the demand for the expert advice is a common phenomenon in policy-making processes, at local, national and international level. All this processes have a concrete objective, which would offer the possibility to exploit the added value of a ‘federation intended as a sort of epistemic community’: the credibility of the futures studies and, consequentially, the credibility of the experts active in this field, depends on this. The debate and the progress of these considerations should be developed in a multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary way with respect to several subjects and research areas, but this is only a logical consequence of the ‘nature and the different backgrounds’ already represented in the Federation.A theme (which emerged during the conference held in Brasov), which allows us to identify a relationship between an epistemic community and the social needs is globalisation. While globalisation is difficult to pin down, it is quite evident that we are living through a phase of transition. But as futurists and a potential epistemic community, our goal ought to be to develop an understanding of, and perspectives on, post-globalisation societies. This suggests that we need to identify the relationships between an epistemic community, the futures studies and the organisations active in this field such as WFSF and euroProspective.The analytical tools offered by the concept of epistemic community seem appropriate under the current prevailing conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. Understanding uncertainty and bringing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge to analyse difficult problems and propose future solutions are the two fundamental characteristics of futurists. The constitution of a network of experts coming from different backgrounds is already a reality inside the Federation but, at the moment, there is no linkage with the traditional and democratic forms of power. To become an active epistemic community, the WFSF has to realise its potential and develop these much needed linkages.     

Future Search as ‘real-time’ action research

This paper explores essential links between the brief planning meeting that we call ‘future search’ and the action research tradition of pioneer social psychologist Kurt Lewin. The two practices, based on common values, employ different procedures. Unlike action research, future search involves stakeholders in collecting and organizing their own data, and deciding what to do, all in a single meeting. Unlike scenario planning, future search leads people to create the future they most desire without assessing the probability of attaining it, We work on the assumption that people who put their energy into what they want are more likely to have it. We think of future search as an intersection of three levels of social change practice: (1) a meeting design based on four key principles to be described; (2) a theory and philosophy of facilitating that might be characterized as ‘doing less so that participants can do more;’ (3) a whole system change strategy requiring no special training, systems theory or vocabulary. This article highlights the first level, showing how principles grounded in the Lewinian tradition are translated into a meeting design that stimulates ongoing cooperative action.     

The vision phenomenon: Towards a theoretical underpinning of visions of the future and the process of envisioning

Visions of the future and the method of envisioning are common approaches for making claims about and for the future. On the one hand, we can have our own vision, and we also expect certain people (mostly leaders) to have vision. On the other hand, most futures practitioners confirm that a (shared) vision is needed for successful action, and the active development of vision is therefore to be encouraged. However, theory development has been limited and many authors do not go beyond the confirmation that it is important to have or develop (a) vision, mostly in relation to a specific desire for action. Vision appears to be much more a phenomenon (in its original sense as ‘appearance’) than a theory. Hence, what we should expect from a vision theory is a deeper understanding of what vision is, what the added value of the process of visioning could be, and how we have to appreciate and assess (explicit) vision statements. In this contribution, we propose a basic theoretical framework in order to move towards the underpinning of ‘visionary’ approaches.     

Cognitive representations of the future: Survey results

This paper reports the results of a web-based survey concerning how people think about the future. Five hundred and seventy-two people from 24 countries completed the survey. The results indicate that when the respondents hear the word ‘future’, they think about a point in time 15 years into the future, on average, with a median response of 10 years. Respondents think less about the future than the present. On the other hand, they tend to worry more about the future than the present. Respondents’ ability to imagine the future goes ‘dark’ around 15-20 years into the future. Most of the respondents are optimistic about the near term, but become more pessimistic about the longer term. Respondents believe that humankind is not acting very responsibly with respect to a whole host of environmental and social issues but is acting responsibly with respect to technology. Almost half of the respondents would not wish to have been born in the future. Most of the other respondents would have preferred to have been born 50-500 years into the future. Approximately 45% of the sample believes that humankind will become extinct. The data suggest that Christians are more optimistic and less worried about the future and do not believe that we will become extinct. Males worry less but also think more about the future. There is a strong correlation between thinking about the future, clearly imagining the future, and being optimistic about the future. It is concluded that individuals have diverse and rich conceptions about the future but that they think less about the future than futurists might hope. Individuals’ considerations of the future are highly influenced by their identities and worldviews. Future research should focus on better unraveling these relationships and on understanding their implications for futures-oriented policy making.     

Scenario building for Metropolitan Tunis

Application of interactive and collaborative approach for futures studies provides a challenge even in countries that enjoy a considerable amount of personal freedom. What happens when such an approach is applied to countries where the political, social and cultural situation is different? This paper presents the case study of Metropolitan Tunis where a modified version of ‘future workshop’ was applied. This method, that enjoined the stakeholders to use their imagination and fantasy in an interactive way, proved quite successful.     

Knowledge, limits and boundaries

In this paper the underlying concern is the problem of knowledge. How do we understand the world, what is ‘scientific’ knowledge, and to what extent is this knowledge limited by the fact that the world in which we live is complex? The problems associated with the status of our knowledge of the world have been central to philosophy all along. Here I will focus on the way in which the acknowledgement of complexity transforms some of the traditional conceptions of (especially scientific) knowledge. I will also examine the notions of boundaries and limits, arguing that these notions are not problems we have to get out of the way, but that they are inevitable as soon as we start talking of ‘knowledge’.     

What future for Middle Eastern studies?

Middle Eastern Studies (MES) has increasingly come under attack in recent years. The critics have included the more politically oriented (as with Martin Kramer who reproached Middle Eastern scholars for failing to serve US interests) as well as generalists in various social science disciplines (who have criticised MES for having produced ‘theory-free’ work thereby failing to serve the cause of building cumulative social scientific knowledge). Middle Eastern scholars have responded to such criticism by seeking to point to various contributions MES has made over the years. These debates between Middle Eastern scholars and their critics have revealed three alternative future courses for MES: (1) going back to its roots in ‘Oriental Studies’ (as called for by Martin Kramer in Ivory Towers on Sand); (2) establishing itself firmly in the discipline-oriented social sciences (as called for by the avatars of methodology in the Social Sciences); (3) building upon the pioneering works of those Middle Eastern scholars who have sought to theorise from Middle Eastern experiences thereby contributing both to MES and the disciplines. Pointing to how the sides to these debates differ radically in terms of their understanding of ‘theory’, the article will suggest that the future of MES would be shaped depending upon which understanding of ‘theory’ comes to prevail.     

Integrating futures studies with organizational development: Design options for the scenario project ‘RWS2020’

Most futures studies are not used by managers and strategists and do not influence the direction of organizational development. Although the contribution of future studies to management is in theory all but self-evident, the practice in organizations is that futures knowledge is hardly used, or at most, is used selectively and strategically (‘politically’). This article acknowledges that gap and claims that it is a fundamental divide between to very different domains. However, out of that re-conceptualization of the relation between futures studies and management, a new direction for an integrated praxis arises. In an empirical case study, we show that by means of an intelligent process-design and professional balancing of several key-dilemmas, futures studies can be connected to management processes and organizational development. The future can be brought back into the everyday practice of management. However, in order to do so, the futures field needs to set aside some of its methodological claims and move towards the field of strategic management. Not because futurists need to abandon their specific knowledge and expertise, but to make the most of it.     

Participation in budgeting: A critical anthropological approach

Accounting researchers adopting structural and post-structural interpretive approaches have long criticized mainstream assumptions about the enduring economic aspects of accounting systems, highlighting their roles in reflecting and shaping social realities that are contradictory, diverse, and changing. The paper aims to develop this critique by inquiring empirically and philosophically into the roles that constructing participation in budgeting might play in enhancing ‘ontological plurality’, that is, supporting actors’ perspectives, abilities and concerns which are generally excluded by structuring action to maximize private profits. It defines and elaborates a critical anthropological approach using Marx’s notion of ‘social praxis’ and Latour’s idea of ‘modes of existence’ to highlight the theoretical contribution of anthropologists exploring beyond traditional divides over social agency through studies of grassroots participative responses to contemporary socio-economic crises. Drawing on ethnographic data collected through a multiple site case study of eight worker cooperatives in Argentina, the paper analyses how reciprocal relations between the actors’ levels of agency in wider associative actions, and their degrees of participation in budgeting, caused gradual expansions in ontological plurality, moving the actors beyond their particular tensions and broader structural conflicts. Exploring the notion of ‘ontological movements’, the paper develops a continuum of participation and ontological pluralism in budgeting, which it argues contributes to the structural and post-structural interpretive accounting literatures through historical, constructive, and participative components.     

The Namesake: Futures; futures studies; futurology; futuristic; foresight—What's in a name?

The term we used to describe the study of alternative futures is important. Disciplines and discourses do not emerge from a vacuum but have a history and a cultural context; and their names can hide as much as they reveal. This paper examines such terms as ‘futurology’ and ‘foresight’, and argues that to emphasise plurality and diversity the study of the future is best served by the moniker ‘futures studies’. It suggests that remembering the history of futures discourse is necessary to resolve the crisis of identity and meaning, and frequent fruitless reinvention, of the field. Finally, it presents Sardar's four laws of futures studies: futures studies are wicked (they deal largely with complex, interconnected problems), MAD (emphasise Mutually Assured Diversity), sceptical (question dominant axioms and assumptions) and futureless (bear fruit largely in the present).     

Reading history: comment on Chenoweth and Feitelson

While Chenoweth and Feitelson have done a service to the futures community by comparing the Global 2000 Report with The Resourceful Earth-two important books of the late 1970s/early 1980s—their comparison is flawed in three dimensions: (1) they treat the books as though they were intended to be accurate predictions of the future. Their intention, instead, was to influence public policy in certain, often contrasting, directions; (2) by using in 2000 the same data sources the two books used in the 1970s (rather than better data sources available now, but not then), the authors' comparative conclusions are often flawed; and (3) in spite of this, their own conclusions often do not seem to follow from the comparative data they present: using only the data the two authors present, The Resourceful Earth does not appear to have been more ‘accurate’ in ‘predicting’ the year 2000 than was the Global 2000 report.     

Future of Turkey-EU relations: a civilisational discourse

Should or can Turkey join the European Union (EU)? This paper argues that there are three alternative scenarios of the EU decision to grant membership to Turkey: ‘privileged relationship offer,’ ‘wait and see attitude,’ and ‘start of full membership negotiations.’ It then gauges each alternative path, and argues that the most likely scenario is a decision to start the negotiations, followed by the scenario of ‘wait and see.’ The EU decision will be conditioned by its future vision of global governance and the role foreseen for Turkey inside, outside or at the margin of it. The paper concludes that the EU decision will have significant implications for the future of relations between Europe and Turkey on the one hand, and Europe and the Islamic world on the other.     

Social imaginaries and Big History: Towards a new planetary consciousness?

A sustainable global future depends on a fundamental shift from the currently dominant national imaginary to a global imaginary. Most of human reasoning is based on prototypes, framings and metaphors that are seldom explicit; although they can be forged, usually they are merely presupposed in everyday reasoning and debates. The background social imaginary offers explanations of how ‘we’ fit together, how things go on between us, the expectations we have of each other and outsiders, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie those expectations. We argue that although the 17th and 18th century scientific and social revolutions generated prototypes, metaphors, framings and related conceptions of time and space that pointed towards a global imaginary, there were deep-seated structural reasons for the ‘nation’ to become, at least temporarily, the central category of human existence and belonging. By the early 21st century, there are already widespread metaphors that envisage the human world as a whole—from the ‘global shopping mall’ or ‘global village’ to the ‘spaceship Earth’. Yet, compared to the rich poetics of national imaginaries, the proposed prototypes, metaphors and framings are often thin. Evoking innovative myths about shared human existence and destiny, Big History helps to articulate the rising global imaginary in terms that motivate transformative and progressive politics in the 21st century.     

The future of western societies: multicultural identity or extreme nationalism?

The Y2K study assumed that ideas about the future among the young generation might tell something about the direction of that future, since it would be increasingly in charge. The respondents in 1967 tended to hope for more equality (classes, genders, nations, races) but were pessimistic in their predictions, though extreme nationalism and xenophobia were not really on the map yet. The article then reviews or presents recent studies on attitudes to various categories of immigrants and forms of integration. Differences relate to the country the study was made in (the Netherlands most positive) and the category of immigrants one asks about :‘asylum seekers’ seen negatively and ‘illegal immigrants’ even more so. The youngest respondents are generally most positive, or least negative; this may indicate that intolerance and racism is again on its way out after a period of growth. The future that may be foreseen on the basis of this lies somewhere between the multiculturalism some hope for and the integration by sheer assimilation that others demand.     

Information society: wireless ICTs’ transformative potential

This paper sets mobile technology and services against the backdrop of existing debates on ‘information’ and ‘post-industrial’ societies. This paper posits the suggestion that mobile technology has the potential to realise the information society aspirations of states in a way that information and communication technologies more generally have failed to do in recent years. Essentially, mobile services and the devices that enable access to them are becoming constitutive of the lives of users both in a work and a social dimension. This essential nature of the technology renders it different from on-line networking that has become a part of normal working environments in the developed world.The paper starts with a discussion on the meaning of the information society and post-industrialism (The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting, Heinemann, London, 1974; The rise of the network society, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002; The wealth of information, Methuen, London, 1983) and considers criticisms (Inf. Commun. Soc. 3(2) (2000) 139; Theories of the information society, Routledge, London, p. 30) that they are unrealised constructs (in part because economies remain defined by manufacturing) and that the advocates’ primary definitions are meaningless. Moreover, in order to address the dangers of exclusion from the benefits of the technology utilisation, the paper considers the concept of ‘social exclusion’ in a bid to challenge policy-makers’ assertions that the information society—wireless or otherwise—can and will bridge the social divide. The paper concludes with a discussion on policy implications for the achievement of inclusivity and openness.     

Governance,tax and folk tales

This paper develops a particular narratological approach to analyse a common category of narratives: individuals’ accounts of their organization’s context and purpose. In two phases of interview research with 45 senior UK accounting professionals (tax officials, tax advisors to, and tax directors of, multinational companies) we focus on a pivotal period in the governance of UK taxation. We advocate analysing what ordinarily could be called ‘real world’ narratives about this context (‘tax tales’) as if they were folk tales. This approach draws on an influential analysis of folk tales by Propp. Our theoretical contribution is to show how features of strong or dominant plots, of the kind that structure folk tales, also help accounting professionals to make sense of this complex governance environment. This helps us understand personal projects of sense making in a context that is technically, legally and morally complex and has implications for governance, for policy, and for accounting as a professional project.