Do managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts?: Evidence from Australia

This paper examines whether managers manage earnings to ‘just meet or beat’ analyst forecasts in Australia. Previous Australian studies on benchmark-beating have focused on loss avoidance and small earnings increases as benchmarks [Coulton, J., Taylor, S., & Taylor, S. (2005). Is ‘benchmark beating’ by Australian firms evidence of earnings management? Accounting and Finance, 45, 553-576; Holland, D., & Ramsay, A. (2003). Do Australian companies manage earnings to meet simple earnings benchmarks? Accounting and Finance, 43, 41-62]. This paper extends this earlier research on benchmark-beating in Australia by incorporating analyst forecast as an important benchmark. Using three different models of unexpected accruals as proxies for earnings management, this study did not find any significant difference between the mean and median unexpected accruals of the “‘just meet or beat” group as against the “just miss” group. Furthermore, for a long period of time (1997-2002), the proportion of Australian firms ‘just meeting or beating’ analyst forecasts benchmark increased, although such increase was not statistically significant.     

Futurist networks: cases of epistemic community?

This article analyses the concept of epistemic community focusing the attention on two aspects, which contribute to define this ‘actor’: knowledge and capacity of acting under the conditions of uncertainty. The link between these two issues and the ‘nature of future studies’ is considered and the possibility of considering some organisations and institutions as future epistemic communities is explored. The case of the World Futures Studies Federation is examined in detail.In 1992, Peter Haas defined an ‘epistemic community’ as follows: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; shared notions of validity—that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and a common policy enterprise—that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” [1].In ancient Greek, the term ‘episteme’ has a meaning which belongs to the philosophical sphere; ‘community’ is a concept which comes from the religious tradition and, more recently, has been the objective of sociological studies. Epistemic community links the two terms to indicate a ‘new’ and in some aspects, atypical political actor. At etymological level we already have a first sort of indication with respect to what is meant: politics as a synthesis of religion (faith), sociology (the decisions taken by policy makers have consequences on the whole society) and philosophy (intended as Weltanschaung). The German term Weltanschaung means the idea, concept or the ‘vision’ of the world and life. It is the way in which an individual or a social group considers the position of the human being in the world and the attitudes and actions they develop on the basis of a particular vision of the cosmos.In addition to this formal definition, Haas identifies other characteristics: “members of an epistemic community share inter-subjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge” [1].This definition could be analysed in several ways with particular attention to one or more of the indicated criteria. We could assume that the expression ‘possible policy actions and desired outcomes’ is to be understood as the ‘long term implications, expected, possible, probable and desired’ of a decision taken or that which will be taken, and this would already represent a linkage between the policy, the futures studies and an epistemic community; moreover, usually ‘the policy choices concern consequences, which can only be partially anticipated’ [2]. This gives rise ‘to the desire for information, which is not so much based on purely technical knowledge but rather information, which is the product of human interpretation’ [1]. Epistemic communities, national or trans-national, are one possible provider of such information.At this stage, and considering only this aspect of the whole definition, we could argue that a network of experts active in the field of future studies would represent the perfect portrait of what we are looking for: a multi-person actor able to ‘anticipate’, using knowledge, various backgrounds and expertise. To anticipate, in this context, might be specified as to understand or comprehend global and local changes. In general, futurists work within the framework of complexity and uncertainty, try to re-define problems in broader context and attempt to comprehend ‘change’ using knowledge.An example could be helpful: the change we are experiencing in Eastern European countries appears as multi-dimensional: in less than 15 years those countries have moved from a

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socialist economy (closed and planned), to a

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‘Western economy’ (the so-called market economy), to a

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technological one as a consequence of globalisation and, lastly,

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to the learning economy.

The first step (socialist economy), recalls other sectors in which the ‘ideas’ were closed and planned. The society was divided into classes and the dominant concept was ‘war’. In this context, every single action was intended as a possibility to demonstrate the points of strength of a system: sports, culture and economy were part of the battle and the vision of the future was mostly influenced by the possibility to destroy or to be destroyed. Examples of these considerations could be seen in the choice made by the USA government in its participation at Olympic Games in Moscow (1980), the USSR’s answer in 1984 (Los Angeles Olympic Games) and the proliferation of nuclear holocaust movies such as The Day After. These ideas were strongly present amongst the people of the Eastern countries, but after 1989, things changed and ‘gradually’ the new paradigms based on ‘Western values’ and, for a few, Western lifestyles, emerged. Probably these changes caused shocks in the local societies, shocks that have had consequences also in the way these societies now see their futures. The third step, the shift to a technological economy, has been faster and wider, thanks largely to the new communication technologies and the Internet. In understanding and developing alternative futures for Eastern Europe, futurists have to take account of the fact that all the three economies exist side by side—Eastern Europe does not represent one or the other economies, it is a complex mix of all the three economies. This complexity is further augmented by the fact that Eastern European societies have not had enough time to understand their present in order to be able to desire possible, alternative futures. Further, economic competitiveness is now based more and more on the capacity to develop and apply knowledge [3]. Thus, futures of Eastern Europe are a function of its capacity to develop relevant new forms of knowledge. Futurists cannot afford to ignore this connection between the knowledge and alternative futures.Thus, the concept of epistemic community and the theory of ‘knowledge economy’ have a great deal in common. If we consider that the so-called ‘decision-makers’ are (in democratic countries) elected by the people, we can argue that that section of the people able to disseminate consciousness of problems, possible solutions and long term implications, posses a form of power. Without engaging with this power, we cannot shape viable and meaningful futures.Are there any trans-national networks of expert where it is possible to identify these characteristics of an ‘embryonic’ epistemic community? In some respect this could be the case of the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), or of the Washington-based World Future Society (WFS) or, at regional level, of the Namur-based euroProspective or the Finland Futures Research Centre, where we have structured networks of the experts coming with different experiences, from different backgrounds, a common interest (to analyse the society from different perspective, but all future oriented), a shared task (to disseminate the use of futures studies not only as a tool but also as a way of thinking) and diversity in knowledge, which is what keeps them together. Moreover, for most of the members, the idea of knowledge economy is already their reality and the capacity to understand trends, possible (or even better) probable futures is the aim of their professional activities.If we briefly consider those organisations, we could assume that they already posses some aspects related to the concept of epistemic community: the WFS for example “strives to serve as a neutral clearinghouse for ideas about the future, membership is open and the Society includes 30,000 people in more than 80 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Members come from all walks of life, they include sociologists, scientists, and educators” [4]. If the WFS’s main strength is in trans-national partnership and different backgrounds of its members, the regional experience that euroProspective is carrying out is mostly based on the construction of a European network of experts. The inter-exchange of ideas and a common ‘mission’ are the two elements, which could let us consider this organisation as futures epistemic communities. Another example, at national/regional level, is the one provided by the Finland Futures Research Centre; the link with epistemic community is offered by the activity and the nature of some projects of this institution such as ‘sustainable energy development in developing countries’, ‘Russian energy and global climate’, ‘collisions of nature and culture in transport policy’, ‘professional delphiscan, an expert system’ [5]—all of these projects or tools (delphiscan is a software) are aimed at producing a relationship between political power and future and knowledge power.There are several reasons why we cannot consider the WFSF by itself as an epistemic community. Perhaps the most important is that it does not have a direct link with the political power; neither does the Federation seek any kind of influence on public authorities or on the decision-making process. But in as much as the Federation is concerned with managing change, it could be considered as an actor able to help people and the institutions understand the on-going processes of change. In the coming years, it will probably be forced to become an epistemic community as it will be necessary to ‘represent and clarify the relation between knowledge management, ICT usage and experts in futures studies as mediators between the complexity of political decision and the tendency of institutions to became advanced learning organisation’ [6] and [7].We also need to study the role the futures studies can play in clarifying those ‘shadow zones’ between the political power and the complexity of the decision-making processes. In this respect, it has to be underlined that the demand for the expert advice is a common phenomenon in policy-making processes, at local, national and international level. All this processes have a concrete objective, which would offer the possibility to exploit the added value of a ‘federation intended as a sort of epistemic community’: the credibility of the futures studies and, consequentially, the credibility of the experts active in this field, depends on this. The debate and the progress of these considerations should be developed in a multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary way with respect to several subjects and research areas, but this is only a logical consequence of the ‘nature and the different backgrounds’ already represented in the Federation.A theme (which emerged during the conference held in Brasov), which allows us to identify a relationship between an epistemic community and the social needs is globalisation. While globalisation is difficult to pin down, it is quite evident that we are living through a phase of transition. But as futurists and a potential epistemic community, our goal ought to be to develop an understanding of, and perspectives on, post-globalisation societies. This suggests that we need to identify the relationships between an epistemic community, the futures studies and the organisations active in this field such as WFSF and euroProspective.The analytical tools offered by the concept of epistemic community seem appropriate under the current prevailing conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. Understanding uncertainty and bringing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge to analyse difficult problems and propose future solutions are the two fundamental characteristics of futurists. The constitution of a network of experts coming from different backgrounds is already a reality inside the Federation but, at the moment, there is no linkage with the traditional and democratic forms of power. To become an active epistemic community, the WFSF has to realise its potential and develop these much needed linkages.     

Anticipating the future: ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ as unrealized promise?

This article analyses visions of the future articulated by proponents of ‘biotechnology for the poor’, those who claim that an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture is critical to alleviating poverty in developing countries. Specifically, we analyse how such ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents represent a future with or without transgenic crops. Such representations include visions of a beckoning (promising) future, where much is to be gained from an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture, and an onrushing (threatening) future, where much will be lost if the technology is not embraced. The article shows that claims about a beckoning or onrushing future by ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents are based upon unexamined or problematic assumptions about the poor and poverty. As such, poverty becomes merely a moral backdrop against which visions of a future are articulated. Furthermore, ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings do not engage in dialogue with alternative voices in articulating their perspectives on the future, losing a key opportunity to democratize debate about this crucial issue. We conclude by considering the policy consequences (in regulatory and institutional terms) of ‘biotechnology for the poor’ depictions of the future, particularly for the global South where such consequences will be felt.     

Beyond the boundaries of AsiaPacific area studies

The peculiarly American study of the ‘non-Western’ world—going under the rubric of interdisciplinary ‘area studies’—is in crisis. Its origins date back to the postwar and Cold War period and may be best understood as a political and policy-driven scholarly endeavor that flourished in the 1960s, 1970s and well into the 1980s. There have been many critiques from both within and outside the field. This article discusses the impacts of major globalizing trends on the field as well as new directions for the future. It focuses on the ‘Moving Cultures’ project of the School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies at the University of Hawai'i¹ that was part of a larger Ford Foundation's initiative to revitalize area studies. This ongoing project utilizes computer-based and other interactive technologies to link students and classrooms across the Pacific divide as part of a pedagogy intending to decolonize area studies. The promises and perils of technology as a beacon for the future of area studies is critically assessed.     

Has science ever been normal? On the need and impossibility of a sustainability science

In this article, I develop a constructive critique of ‘post-normal science’ by challenging the underlying conception of ‘normal science’. Invoking Bruno Latour's constructivist approach, I change focus from a representationalist understanding to a practice-inspired account of science in which the composition of a matter of fact necessarily implies a politically significant differentiation between internalities and externalities. Contending that science has never been normal in that it has always already been political, I further elaborate on this political dimension by connecting Latour's concepts of matters of fact and matters of concern with Rudolf Boehm's distinction between logical and topical truth. Whereas logical truth is a measure of the validity of matters of fact, topical truth is a measure of the relevance and adequacy of scientific knowledge regarding a particular matter of concern. This allows me to argue that any attempt to install a new ‘post-normal science’ with a higher topical truth vis-à-vis sustainability issues neglects the irreducible political moment situated at the point of determining who and what we should be concerned about. Finally, I draw on the notion of ‘forms of life’ to suggest a ‘politics of the imaginable’ that takes socio-material practices as primary matters of a concern for sustainability.     

The hegemony of the physical sciences: an exploration in complexity thinking

Traditionally the natural sciences, particularly physics, have been regarded as the Gatekeepers of Truth. As such the legitimacy of others forms of knowledge have been called into question, particularly those methods that characterise the ‘softer’ sciences, and even the arts. This paper begins with an extended discussion concerning the main features of a complex system, and the nature of the boundaries that emerge within such systems. Subsequent to this discussion, and by assuming that the Universe at some level can be well-described as a complex system, the paper explores the notion of ontology, or existence, from a complex systems perspective. It is argued that none of the traditional objects of science, or any objects from any discipline, formal or not, can be said to be real in any absolute sense although a substantial realism may be temporarily associated with them. The limitations of the natural sciences is discussed as well as the deep connection between the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ sciences. As a result of this complex systems analysis, an evolutionary philosophy referred to as quasi-‘critical pluralism’ is outlined, which is more sensitive to the demands of complexity than contemporary reductionistic approaches.     

Participation in environmental spatial planning: Structuring-scenario to manage knowledge in action

Participatory planning experiences highlight the crucial role of cognitions produced, shared and used throughout participatory processes. The construction of spatial plans is more and more intended as a socio/political activity producing highly cognitive visions able to guide collective action and make a common good of it.In accordance with the view that a relevant portion of such knowledge is revealed only through action, the paper proposes the idea of structuring-scenarios as open entities able to structure action and, consequently, to bridge participatory knowledge to the impetuous practice of action.The paper first presents and discusses the role of structuring-scenarios in the work carried out while developing an environmental plan for the delta area of the Po River in Italy. Then it reflects on the main features of content and structure of such scenarios. Finally, the paper analyses the ‘structuring properties’ of these scenarios and their role in structuring action.     

Determinants of futures-oriented environmental policies: A multi-country analysis

This research explores the validity of several hypotheses concerning the future-orientedness of countries. Nine hypotheses that relate futures-orientedness to characteristics of countries are presented. Several of these hypotheses represent ‘conventional wisdom’ about the differences between developed and developing countries and their respective values and political systems. As an example, it can be argued that conventional wisdom holds that more democratic countries will be more futures-oriented. The number of international environmental agreements signed by a country and the number of provisions related to AGENDA21 being implemented by a country were used as proxies for measures of futures-orientedness. Almost 30 independent variables drawn from a variety of secondary sources were used in two multiple regression models to investigate the hypotheses. The results do not support several pieces of conventional wisdom. Specifically, the results suggest that there is: a negative relationship between democracy and futures-orientedness; no relationship between the level of development and futures-orientedness; and a negative relationship exists between wealth and life expectancy and futures-orientedness. These results call into question a view that more democratic, developed, and rich countries are more concerned about the future than their ‘less developed’ counterparts. The results did indicate that countries with more environmental problems tend to be more futures-oriented as are countries that may be experiencing population pressures. Countries with more land tend to be less futures-oriented. More work is needed to better understand the relationships between culture and governmental decision-making structures on futures-orientedness. Future research should also focus on constructing better measures of futures-orientedness.     

Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power

We show that political geography has a pervasive effect on the cross-section of stock returns. We collect election results over a 40-year period and use a political alignment index (PAI) of each state's leading politicians with the ruling (presidential) party to proxy for local firms’ proximity to political power. Firms whose headquarters are located in high PAI states outperform those located in low PAI states, both in terms of raw returns, and on a risk-adjusted basis. Overall, although we cannot rule out indirect political connectedness advantages as an explanation of the PAI effect, our results are consistent with the notion that proximity to political power has stock return implications because it reflects firms’ exposure to policy risk.     

Problematizing international business futures through a ‘critical scenario method’

This paper proposes the need for change in how managers in international business (IB) determine organisational objectives and what criteria they use in addressing complex problems. We propose a move from a largely firm-centric focus; on profit maximization and shareholder value; to a broader societal and environmental view. We see the educational context as the locus for initiating such a shift. However, we see obstacles within the canon of mainstream IB textbooks, with their focus on exposition of normative models of managerial action, illustrated by case studies of successful multinational enterprises (MNEs). Whilst we acknowledge their incorporation of critical issues, we view the lack of substantive critical reflection on the wider implications of IB activity as underpinned by an implicit assumption of the ‘good’ of IB. We posit that the normative structure of mainstream texts militates against students understanding the full range of possible futures for IB practice, and against developing the capability to cope with situations of uncertainty and ambiguity. Seeking to promote a critical pedagogy that accommodates consideration of both mainstream approaches and critical responses to these, we propose one approach to teaching and learning about IB futures that is based upon development of what we term ‘critical scenario method’. This offers a basis for active investigation of complex problems in the ‘real’ world from a range of perspectives, beyond that of profit maximization. We provide a worked, case example of our new method and demonstrate how it will enhance perceptions/understandings of involved and affected actors’ interests and their likely (re)actions as a particular scenario unfolds. The theoretical grounding for this approach is based upon contemporary social science interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of phronēsis, or ‘practical wisdom’.     

Timing feminism, feminising time

This article deals with feminist engagement with the futures studies (and vice versa) and analyses the uneasy relationship that exists between the two. More specifically, it investigates the feminist theorizing of ‘patriarchal time’ and efforts to both decolonise and ‘reconstruct’ time based on feminist epistemological frameworks. Feminism is here understood as a social movement, ideology, theory, philosophy, worldview and a way of life. As such this term overlaps with, yet represents a distinct category from terms such as ‘women’, ‘gender’, ‘femininity’ and ‘women's movements’. Thus, feminism itself is historicized and spatially contextualised as is the notion of non-patriarchal ‘women's/feminist time’ developed by feminists.     

Locating audit expectations gap within a cultural context: The case of Saudi Arabia

This paper offers an insight into the types of ‘audit expectations gap’ that exist within a cultural context. Specifically, it investigates if the business and social environment affect the perceptions of audit performance of users and auditors. Using a combination of mail questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, the study reveals the existence of a ‘performance gap’ with respect to the roles specified in the statutory pronouncements and those that can reasonably be expected of auditors in Saudi Arabia. The results further indicate the ‘performance gap’ arises from four factors in the environment within which auditing is practiced: licensing policy, recruitment process, the political and legal structure, and dominant societal values. Interview results reveal the influence of institutional and cultural settings on the audit expectations gap and indicate that the inclusion of Islamic principles in auditing standards and the code of ethics would help reduce the expectations gap that exists in Saudi Arabia.     

Future Search as ‘real-time’ action research

This paper explores essential links between the brief planning meeting that we call ‘future search’ and the action research tradition of pioneer social psychologist Kurt Lewin. The two practices, based on common values, employ different procedures. Unlike action research, future search involves stakeholders in collecting and organizing their own data, and deciding what to do, all in a single meeting. Unlike scenario planning, future search leads people to create the future they most desire without assessing the probability of attaining it, We work on the assumption that people who put their energy into what they want are more likely to have it. We think of future search as an intersection of three levels of social change practice: (1) a meeting design based on four key principles to be described; (2) a theory and philosophy of facilitating that might be characterized as ‘doing less so that participants can do more;’ (3) a whole system change strategy requiring no special training, systems theory or vocabulary. This article highlights the first level, showing how principles grounded in the Lewinian tradition are translated into a meeting design that stimulates ongoing cooperative action.     

The office: The weakness of numbers and the production of non-authority

It often seems to be taken for granted that numbers produce effects and that practices of accounting enhance authority. This also goes for accounting and the environment. This paper shares this belief and argues that practices of accounting have been a crucial technology for taking nature or ‘the environment’ into account in the post-war era. Nevertheless, the ‘constitutive turn’ in the studies of accounting should not tempt us to leave unexplored the limitation of accounting practices and the inabilities to govern by numbers. With a point of departure in a pollution control agency, the paper explores the making of a non-authoritative office. It points to the emergence of what is labelled ‘accounting intimacy’ rather than the exertion of government at a distance. The paper also points to the ways in which the agency, rather than building a separate and distinct authority, came to reproduce the actor subjected to being governed, i.e., the polluting factory, within its own office. The author argues that this can be related to the investment in a shared ‘technical interest’ and the belief that the right (emission) number in itself would be sufficient to move the factory. The paper then explores the conditions for which numbers nevertheless came to have effects. The argument is that this should be seen as inextricably linked to the emergence of an ‘interesting object’, i.e., ‘the environment’ and an environmental interest, within the office. Thus, we need to pay attention to the formation of interests, and as accounting scholars turn to ‘the environment’, the latter should not be taken for granted.     

A productivity analysis of Central and Eastern European banking taking into account risk decomposition and environmental variables

This paper develops a Luenberger productivity index that is applied to a technology where desirable and undesirable outputs are jointly produced and are possibly negative. The components of this Luenberger productivity index - the efficiency change and the components of the technological shift - are then decomposed into factors determined by the technology, adjusted and then for ‘risk and environment’, ‘risk management’ and ‘environmental effects’. The method is applied to Central and Eastern European banks operating during 1998-2003 utilising three alternative input/output methodologies (intermediation, production and profit/revenue). Additionally, the comparative analysis of the sensitivity of the productivity indices in the choice of the methodologies is undertaken using statistical and kernel density tests. It is found that the main driver of productivity change in Central and Eastern European banks is technological improvement. That is, in the beginning of the analysed period, the results hinged on the banks ability to capitalise on advanced technology and successfully take into account ‘risk and environmental’ factors. Whereas, in later periods, one of the most important factors of technological improvement/decline was ‘risk management’. Finally, the tests employed confirm previous findings, such as Pasiouras (2008)in this journal, that different input/output methodologies produce statistically different productivity results. Finally, we find that external factors, such as ‘risk in the economy’ and banking production, and a ‘corruption perception’ affect the productivity of banks.     

Risk-premia,carry-trade dynamics,and economic value of currency speculation

In this paper, we derive the dynamics and assess the economic value of currency speculation by formalizing the concept of a trader inaction range. We show that exchange rate returns comprise a time-varying risk-premium and that uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds in a speculative sense. The often-cited ‘forward bias puzzle’ originates from the omission of the risk-premium in standard UIP tests. Consistent with its popularity among market professionals, the carry-trade strategy can be rationalized as it systematically collects risk-premia, however, the economic value generated by bilateral carry-trades is limited.     

The happy story of small business financing

We examine two data sets, one from the UK (n = 15,750) and one from the US (n = 3239), to show that SME financial behaviour demonstrates substantial financial contentment, or ‘happiness’. We find fewer than 10% of the UK firms seek significant growth and only 1.32% of US firms list a shortage of capital other than working capital as a problem. Financial performance indicators (growth, return on assets, profit margin) were not found to be determinants of SME financing activities, as might be expected in a ‘rational’ risk–return environment. Younger and less educated SME owners more actively use external financing – even though more education reduces the fear of loan denial – while older and more educated (‘wiser’) SME owners are found to be being less likely to seek or use external financing. The contentment hypothesis for SME financing also extends to high-growth firms in that we show that they participate more in the loan markets than low-growth firms. By way of contrast to the finance gap hypothesis, the contentment hypothesis observes the importance of social networks (connections) [for finance] and confirms the ‘connections – happiness’ linkage in the literature on happiness while doubting the theoretical suitability of Jensen and Meckling [Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.] base-case analysis for SMEs.     

Constitutional concepts within the process of European integration

In order to come to an understanding concerning the questions surrounding the drafting of a European constitution, one must differentiate the three different meanings of the word ‘constitution’ by virtue of the very nature of its beginnings. The concept of a constitution in the organisational sense is the first possible way to understand the term. As such, ‘Constitution'is synonymous with the organizational founding statute of any association or collective. Separate from this is a second possible context of the term, which refers to the legal meaning of the word. Here, the expression is understood as the highest legal norm of an autonomous legal order, its first and highest law. Within both of these meanings, one can speak of a ‘European Constitution’. A third, political way of understanding the term refers to the concept of the constitution as an ordering idea, which a specific place to the internal and external independent political unity combines and which orders from the outside inward. In other words, with this is concerned the question, why exactly this specific space within these specific limits to the independent political unity should be combined/bound. The introduction of such an order upon which can be founded, why exactly this concrete space in the specific limits as independent unity should be constituted, is still not today found for Europe.