Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse

Could anarchy be good for Somalia's development? If state predation goes unchecked government may not only fail to add to social welfare, but can actually reduce welfare below its level under statelessness. Such was the case with Somalia's government, which did more harm to its citizens than good. The government's collapse and subsequent emergence of statelessness opened the opportunity for Somali progress. This paper investigates the impact of anarchy on Somali development. The data suggest that while the state of this development remains low, on nearly all of 18 key indicators that allow pre- and post-stateless welfare comparisons, Somalis are better off under anarchy than they were under government. Renewed vibrancy in critical sectors of Somalia's economy and public goods in the absence of a predatory state are responsible for this improvement. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 689–710.     

Providing global public goods under uncertainty

We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease participation. In that case, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare.     

论种类偏向型进口刺激政策

本文基于贸易品种类增长的福利内涵,提出一个全新的概念:"种类偏向型进口刺激政策",即刺激进口的政策重点应该是增加进口产品的种类,而不是单纯地扩大现有进口产品的规模。实施种类偏向型进口刺激政策,通过进口产品种类的增加来扩大进口规模,不仅能从根本上缓解外部失衡问题,更为重要的是,种类偏向型进口刺激政策将能充分发挥进口对于改善国内消费者福利、促进制造业生产率进步以及改善贸易条件的政策功能,使进口由"为出口而进口"的扭曲状态向常态回归。     

Political Cycles: Issue Ownership and the Opposition Advantage

In modern democracies, common wisdom suggests that political parties alternate in power due to voters' disappointment. The aim of this paper is to show that parties' turnover may be due to voters' "satisfaction." Our model is built on two main assumptions: Parties "own" different issues, and investments in the provision of public goods create a linkage between successive elections. We show that no party can maintain itself in power forever when the median voter is moderate enough. This result holds when the parties' main objective is to win the election and is compatible with a large range of candidates subobjectives that may change from one election to the next. We also provide some novel welfare implications. Whereas rent-seeker candidates always dominate reelection-concerned candidates in one public good models, rent-seeker candidates may be welfare improving compared with reelection-concerned candidates.     

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TOURISM, EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE: THE CASE OF HONG KONG

Abstract.  The present paper uses a dynamic open-economy model with wage indexation to examine the impact of tourism on employment and welfare. Both short-run and long-run situations are analysed. It is well known that tourism converts non-traded goods into tradable goods. An increase in the demand for a non-traded good raises its relative price, which results in an expansion of the non-traded sector at the expense of the traded goods sector. This output shift raises labour employment in the short run. However, in the long run, the higher relative price leads to higher wages, resulting in a negative impact on labour employment. If the output effect is dominant, the expansion in tourism raises employment and welfare. However, under realistic conditions tourism may lower both labour employment and welfare due to rising costs. These results are demonstrated by simulating a dynamic model for the case of Hong Kong.     

Price Premiums for Eco-friendly Commodities: Are ‘Green’ Markets the Best Way to Protect Endangered Ecosystems?

‘Green’ markets represent a means through which public goods can be privately provided. A green product is an impure public good consisting of a private good (e.g., rain forest honey) bundled with a jointly produced public good (e.g., biodiversity protection). In the context of ecosystem protection, popular green commodities include eco-tourism excursions, coffee grown under forest canopies (‘shade-grown’), tagua nuts for buttons and ornaments, rainforest nuts and oils for cosmetic products, and rain forest honey. We examine the dynamic efficiency of eco-friendly price premiums in achieving ecosystem protection and rural welfare goals by contrasting the use of price premiums to the use of payments that are tied directly to ecosystem protection. We demonstrate analytically and empirically that direct payments are likely to be more efficient as a conservation policy instrument. Depending on the available funds, the direct payments may be better or worse than green price premiums in achieving rural welfare objectives. If direct payments are not feasible for social or political reasons, we demonstrate analytically and empirically that the price premium approach is likely to be more effective at achieving conservation and development objectives than the currently more popular policy of subsidizing capital acquisition in eco-friendly commercial activities.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

Sequential mergers and competition policy under partial privatisation

We examine optimal merger and privatisation policies in a partially privatised oligopoly with differentiated goods. We first show that under the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, sequential mergers either emerge completely or do not emerge at all. Given this outcome, we derive the following policy implications. First, the level of social welfare can be U‐shaped with respect to the number of merged firm pairs. That is, given that there are some mergers that have already taken place, further mergers may actually lead to welfare improvement. However, these welfare‐improving mergers may not be privately profitable, implying that merger‐friendly policies are appropriate. Second, policymakers can halt privatisation in order to diminish the private incentive for further sequential (welfare‐deteriorating) mergers and improve welfare. Third, full nationalisation is never optimal unless the goods are homogeneous or independent. Our results are applicable to the Japanese life insurance industry and the partial privatisation of Japan Post Insurance.     

A New Approach to Random Utility Modeling using the Dirichlet Multinomial Distribution

In this paper we introduce a new econometricapproach to analyzing recreational site choicedata, the Dirichlet multinomial model. Thismodel, which nests the standard conditionalmultinomial logit model, can accommodateover-dispersed data and may provide moreefficient estimators of coefficients andconsequent welfare measures than the standardconditional logit model, which is so widelyused in the Random Utility Model approach torecreation demand. We illustrate thisDirichlet approach using a data set of rockclimbers in Scotland, and study the impacts onper-trip consumers surplus of alternativemanagement strategies for popular rock climbingsites. Results show that the Dirichletmultinomial approach produces coefficient andwelfare estimates having smaller samplingvariability in this case. We also compareclassical welfare measures with their posteriorequivalents, which allow for welfare changes tobe dis-aggregated.     

Multiproduct Firms and Environmental Policy Coordination

The literature that analyzes the coordination of environmental taxes by governments considers that firms produce a single good at a single plant. However, in practice firms tend to produce several goods at various production plants (multiproduct firms). These firms may organize themselves in a centralized or decentralized fashion for purposes of decision-making: This affects their output and pollution levels. This paper sets out to analyze the coordination of environmental taxes considering multiproduct firms. We find that the organizational structure chosen by the owners of the firms depends on whether or not governments coordinate with one another in setting taxes, and on whether the goods produced are substitutes or complements. Social welfare is greater if a supranational authority sets taxes in all countries. In this case, joint welfare is never lower if the authority is constrained to set the same tax in all countries.     

Stepping Stones for Biological Invasion: A Bioeconomic Model of Transferable Risk

We investigate three sources of bias in valuation methods for ecosystem risk: failure to consider substitution possibilities between goods, failure to consider nonseparability of ecosystem services with market goods, and failure to consider substitution possibilities between ecosystems. The first two biases are known in the literature, and we offer insight on the size of the bias for a specific example. Our work on spatially transferable risk is novel. We develop the concept and show how it may undermine typical invasion prevention strategies. We find three key results. First, partial equilibrium estimates of welfare loss are significantly overestimated relative to general equilibrium estimates. If ecosystem services and market goods are substitutes the partial equilibrium bias is greater than if they are compliments. Second, well-intended policies do not necessarily reduce overall risk; risk reduction actions can transfer risk to another time or location, or both, which may increase total risk. Third, policies of quotas and inspections have to be extreme to improve welfare, with inspections having advantages over quotas.     

On requiring the durable goods monopolist to sell

Requiring a monopolist to sell its output (rather than renting it) my lead to beneficial output adjustments or harmful quality adjustments. In a durable goods model, we show that requiring sales decreases welfare in only a small fraction of cases, but it strictly increases welfare in a majority of cases.     

Seize the Moment: Financial Crisis and the Making of the Finnish Competition State

In this paper we examine how Finnish Governments dismantled the Nordic welfare state paradigm from the 1990s onwards and adopted Schumpeterian ideas of a competitive workfare state. In the early 1990s, Finland went through a financial crisis that was the most severe in OECD countries since the Second World War and came to play a major role in the paradigm change. In the crisis, the Ministry of Finance gained a central role as a consensus-building power broker, and formulated a political strategy of national competitiveness, which was adopted as a rationale of power for consensual governments and has been maintained since. We suggest that financial crises can become formative moments in which new ideas are adopted and policies are reformulated. They can also become moments which provide opportunity to overcome citizen opinion. In Finland, the wide popular and party support for the Nordic welfare model was not reflected in the new paradigm.     

Early adopters of new supermarket products

New goods and expanding product variety are thought to provide enormous welfare gains. New products can influence the pricing of competing products, but often the most important way that new products improve the welfare is through their direct consumption value. The demographic profile of the buyers of new goods suggests those welfare gains are unequally distributed. For supermarket products in the US, expenditures on new goods are disproportionately concentrated among high earners and younger consumers.     

Privatization of state holding corporations

Many countries have privatized part of their state holding corporations in recent years. However, the literature on this issue has analyzed mainly the privatization of uniproduct public firms. We consider a state holding corporation with two plants that may produce complement or substitute goods. Assuming that private firms are more efficient than the state holding corporation we find the following: If the marginal cost of the state corporation is low, it is not privatized either if goods are substitutes or if they are complements. However, if the marginal cost of the state corporation is high the two plants of the state holding corporation are sold to a single private investor if goods are complements, and to different investors if goods are substitutes. If goods are close substitutes and the marginal cost of the state corporation takes an intermediate value only one plant is privatized. We extend the model to consider that firms are equally efficient, that they face quadratic cost functions and that there are n uniplant private firms producing each good. We find two differences with the previous result: The government never privatizes just one plant of the state corporation, and when goods are complements the two plants of the state corporation are sold to different investors if n is high.     

The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation and Welfare Composition of Spending on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections between 1978 and 2006

This study attempts to make a contribution to the field of spending aspects of fiscal policy and their impacts on electoral outcome. Due to varying degrees of financial responsibilities and commitments to provide public goods and services, US state governments serve as a perfectly natural laboratory to test the electoral significance of fiscal policies. We adopt a probit model, with several specifications, to determine significant impacts of fiscal consolidation and increases in welfare spending on US gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 2006. The analyses show that voters are more concerned about the increase in debt than current budget deficits. An increase in welfare spending is negatively associated with reelection. Moreover, the impact of taxation on gubernatorial elections turns out to be insignificant. In particular, findings suggest that the political business cycle model does not hold true in US gubernatorial elections. Expansionary fiscal policy right before the election may not have crucial impacts on the chances of an incumbent winning the election.     

Optimal Pollution Abatement Under ‘Sustainable’ and Other Social Time Preferences

This paper analyses optimal pollution abatement expenditure and the pricing of pollution under alternative social time preferences, including ‘sustainable’ preferences, defined as those that are consistent with two axioms of sustainable development introduced by Chichilnisky (Land Econ 73:467–491, 1997). These axioms state essentially that neither the welfare of present nor future generations ought to be favoured over the other in determining the socially optimal path of economic development. The method is to calibrate a modified Ramsey model of optimal global growth and saving, where pollution is generated by the global output of goods and services. Pollution in turn reduces output. The simulation results illustrate how sensitive the optimal pollution price and abatement expenditure can be over time to assumptions about the social time preference rate. They also show that ‘sustainable’ preferences impose a lower burden on future generations in terms of the pollution price and abatement expenditure. Hence there is a case for governments to make explicit their value judgments about intergenerational welfare, in the context of their notion of sustainable development, when setting target pollution abatement levels and pollution prices over time.     

On the growth and welfare effects of monopolistic distortions

The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap” may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term.