高耗能产品循环经济价值流评价模型构建与应用研究

高耗能产品是我国工业的基础性产品,是推进工业循环经济战略的重点和关键。产品循环经济系统运行的根本目的是要实现其价值流的增值。高耗能产品的价值流是高耗能企业以及高耗能产业循环经济发展的微观分析,具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。探讨了产品价值流模型,构建了高耗能产品的价值流评价指标体系。以某高耗能产品为例,运用价值流及其评价模型分析了该产品生产流程实现的循环经济综合绩效。结果表明,高耗能产品的价值流评价指标体系可以有效反映其价值增值状况,具有一定的实用性,可以为研究高耗能企业或产业的循环经济综合绩效提供一种微观分析模型和手段。     

高耗能行业结构调整和能效提高对我国CO_2排放峰值的影响——基于STIRPAT模型的实证分析

调整高耗能行业的结构,提高高耗能行业的能源利用效率是我国实现低碳经济的重要路径之一,但这是一个渐进的过程,文章围绕如何设计这一过程展开研究。首先构建了我国CO2排放量与人口因素、人均不变价格GDP、高耗能行业结构、高耗能行业能效和第三产业结构之间的STIRPAT关系模型,通过对1980~2012年期间的数据模拟得到长期均衡发展关系模型,最后通过设定不同的情景研究高耗能行业结构和能效变化对我国CO2排放峰值的影响。研究结果显示,相对于第三产业结构、人口因素和人均不变价格GDP而言,我国高耗能行业结构和能效对CO2排放量的影响更大,我国在未来是有可能通过调整高耗能行业结构和提高高耗能能效在2030年达到CO2峰值。同时,情景模拟的结果还显示,降低高耗能行业结构和提高高耗能行业能效对于我国CO2峰值出现时间的影响作用相差不大,但加快降低我国高耗能行业的经济比重更有助于我国减少CO2排放水平。     

中国对外贸易竞争力分析与调整思路

随着经济全球化的发展 ,贸易结构优化和提高对外贸易竞争力对于各国经济发展日趋重要。本文分析了改革开放以来我国对外贸易结构和产品国际竞争力的变动状况 ,指出我国对外贸易目前存在的问题 ,并提出了优化贸易结构、提高对外贸易竞争力的调整思路。     

FDI对我国电子信息产品制造业国际竞争力影响研究

基于FDI对我国电子信息产品制造业生产要素、需求状况、相关产业状况和竞争状况产生影响的理论分析,获得八个解释变量;选取显示性比较优势为被解释变量;利用1998至2008各年统计数据,实证分析FDI对我国电子信息产品制造业国际竞争力的影响。结果表明：内资研发投入、内资的产业集中度、外资资本投入、国内对电子信息产品制造业需求量、我国半导体硅单晶生产额、外资企业销售量占产业销售总量这六个变量显著影响我国该行业国际竞争力,内资资本密集度和外资人力资本强度没有通过显著性检验。     

基于信息流防控系统的高耗能产品循环经济协同效应提升

以提升高耗能产品循环经济协同效应为目标,探讨了高耗能产品循环经济信息流防控系统的概念,构建了相应的模型,并分析了其运行机理。以某高耗能产品为例,运用高耗能产品循环经济信息流防控系统模型构建了"三高"协同防控系统,深入分析了该产品通过生产流程改进所能实现和提升的循环经济协同效应,并给出了具体的提升路径。结果表明,高耗能产品循环经济信息流防控系统能有效提升产品循环经济协同效应,产生预防和协同控制产品物耗、能耗和污染排放的综合效益。     

基于DEA模型的新常态下中国区域高耗能行业生态效率研究

文章从行业生态系统和生态效率等理论出发,结合新常态下生态经济发展的需要,分析我国高耗能行业的主要特征及发展状况。在综合考虑技术创新、产能过剩等因素的基础上,构建包含能源、经济、环境状况的指标体系,收集整理出我国各个省市的相关数据,并运用DEA-Malmquist模型对我国高耗能行业的生态效率进行测算,同时对区域各省份及东部、中部、西部的实证结果进行分析,对于省际间高耗能产业生态效率的差异寻找原因。最后针对实证研究结果,给出我国高耗能行业发展的对策。     

水平型产业内贸易——中国外贸发展新取向

从产业内贸易理论、跨国公司直接投资所产生的产业内贸易和发达国家的发展历程来看，水平型产业内贸易是增强一国外贸竞争力的有效途径。目前我国产业内贸易水平不高，并且以垂直型产业内贸易为主。这种状况不利于我国外贸和经济的进一步发展。我国应以水平型产业内贸易为发展取向，通过扩大企业规模、提高引资质量和大力发展差异产品来提高我国外贸的竞争力。     

产业关联视角下的碳关税征收对我国产业经济的影响

最终需求的生产诱发系数和依存度系数揭示,我国高耗能产业部门生产对出口依赖程度较高;碳关税征收在减少高耗能产品出口的同时,由于其产业影响力较大,会对其它产业部门的生产产生较大的波及。高耗能产业部门的感应度系数表明,当各个部门的最终需求变化时,其生产将受到较大的影响。碳关税对高耗能产品的征收最终会通过产业间的关联波及各个产业部门,进而全面影响我国产业经济的发展。     

偏离份额法下我国高耗能产业转移的环境效应研究

以高耗能产业为研究对象,运用偏离份额法分析我国31个省份2006—2015年高耗能产业转移的时空特征,并在Stata 12.0中运用面板数据模型对导致不同区域高耗能产业环境污染排放差异的驱动因素进行数据回归,分析高耗能产业转移对环境污染排放的影响。结果表明:我国高耗能产业呈现出由东部向中西部地区转移的演变趋势,而污染转移和高耗能产业转移的特征基本一致,逐步由东部向中西部地区转移;西部地区环境污染排放是我国高耗能产业污染排放的主体;相对净变化量NRC、竞争力转移增量DIF与环境污染排放呈正相关关系,结构转移增量STR与环境污染排放呈负相关关系。除了受产业转移的影响,高耗能产业的环境污染排放还和经济水平、科技水平显著正相关,和环境管制强度显著负相关。     

论产品结构调整与企业核心竞争力

企业产品结构调整是企业保持创新特征并赢得竞争优势、获得持续发展的关键。本文通过对产品结构调整的基本理论和研究状况以及企业核心竞争力理论的研究,指出在我国社会主义市场经济的不断推进和工业化进程地不断加速的环境中实施基于企业核心竞争力的产品结构调整必要性。     

差别电价效应及影响因素的系统动力学分析

差别电价政策作为价格杠杆直接调控经济,在实施中受较多因素的影响。本文建立了差别电价政策的系统动力学模型,对影响差别电价政策效果的因素进行了分析。研究结果表明,在其他因素不变的前提下,当高耗能企业的单位电耗降低时,企业为获取较多利润会增加生产量,从而使用电量提高;当高耗能企业产品的市场价格提高时,企业较少考虑差别电价,会提高实际生产量,差别电价政策的效果弱化;当高耗能企业产品的市场价格减低时,企业会降低实际生产量,差别电价政策的效果很明显。     

Implementing Steady State Efficiency in Overlapping Generations Economies with Environmental Externalities

We consider in this paper overlapping generations economies with pollution resulting from both consumption and production. The competitive equilibrium steady state is compared to the optimal steady state from the social planner's viewpoint. We show that the dynamical inefficiency of a competitive equilibrium steady state with capital–labor ratio exceeding the golden rule ratio still holds. Moreover, the range of dynamically efficient steady state capital ratios increases with the effectiveness of the environment maintenance technology, and decreases for more polluting production technologies. We characterize some tax and transfer policies that decentralize as a competitive equilibrium outcome the transition to the social planner's steady state.     

Jointness in production and farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services

This paper highlights how farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services (ES) is influenced by whether or not the non-marketed ES are produced jointly with agricultural products. When marketed products and non-marketed ES share some production inputs the production relationships between the two may be complementary, competitive or substitutive. Using a cost minimization framework, it is shown how complementary relationships lead to costless voluntary provision of non-marketed ES (typically the case for ES that are supportive of provisioning ES for marketed farm products). It is also shown how competitive production relationships lead to provision of non-marketed ES at lower cost than when non-marketed ES are direct substitutes for farm products or are produced outside of agriculture. The paper closes by showing how the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment for ES that are complementary/competitive is less than or equal to the minimum WTA for the same ES produced in substitute or independent production relationships.     

Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks

This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a suitably defined recursive equilibrium.     

MARKET ECONOMIES WITH AN ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

I consider a general equilibrium model of a competitive market economy in which production is conducted through an endogenous social division of labor. I represent economic decision makers as “consumer–producers,” who consume as well as produce commodities. In this approach, the emergence of a nontrivial social division of labor is guided by Increasing Returns to Specialization (IRSpec) in production. Under IRSpec, I show existence of competitive equilibria, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, and characterize these equilibria. Markets equilibrate through the adjustment of the social division of labor; the production technologies completely determine the equilibrium prices.     

MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH EFFICIENCY GAPS AND A HECKSCHER‐OHLIN TRADE PATTERN*

We develop a two‐factor, three‐sector model of international trade in which the monopolistically competitive firms are characterized by different fixed production costs. We show that, depending on the pattern of the international distribution of factor endowments, the trade pattern is determined not only by relative factor endowments as suggested by Heckscher and Ohlin, but also by absolute factor endowments via a mechanism of competitive selection in the monopolistically competitive sector.     

我国企业竞争战略的新选择

21世纪企业竞争环境出现了新特点、新问题。对此,传统企业竞争战略理论无法予以解释。如果将企业看作是一个知识集合体,运用企业知识积累的生产性质来分析企业竞争与发展问题,可以较好地解释为什么一个行业中的某些企业不仅在较长时期内稳获超额收益,而且能够使已经存在的竞争优势得以持久化。     

Rational rationing and increasing returns an example

The paper gives an example of an economy where it is rational for a monopolist to control a competitive agent by setting both prices and quantities supplied. There are increasing returns in production, and the competitive agent has a discontinuous offer curve. The monopolist reaches points in the discontinuity by rationing.     

大珠江三角洲的产业升级与国际竞争力

改革开放后,珠江三角洲与港澳地区(统称为大珠江三角洲)利用“前店后厂“的分工协作模式,形成了外向依赖型明显、以轻型加工制造业为主的地区生产体系,成为世界重要的制造业基地,具有较强的国际竞争能力.近年来,这种生产体系在规模不断膨胀的同时,却存在着生产效益低下、产业升级乏力、国际竞争力不强等一系列问题.这主要是因为:该生产体系主要由产品生产环节构成,进行着相对简单的生产活动,缺乏产业创新和自我提升的动力.因此,大珠江三角洲国际竞争力的提升,必须调整和完善地区的生产体系,提高产业的自主创新能力和内生发展能力,推动产业的优化升级,提升产业合作的层次;另外,通过区域基础设施建设与使用方式的改革,构筑高效的分工合作体系,推动区域协调发展.     

A DYNAMIC ENTRY AND PRICE GAME WITH CAPACITY INDIVISIBILITY

Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two‐stage game in which potential entrants choose capacities and next active firms compete in prices. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid and there are economies of scale. In the simplest version of the model with a single production technique, the equilibrium turns out to depend on the ratio between the level of total output at the long‐run competitive equilibrium and the firm's minimum efficient scale: if that ratio is sufficiently large (the market is sufficiently ‘large’), then the competitive price emerges at a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of the capacity and price game; if not, then the firms randomize in prices on the equilibrium path. The role of the market size for the competitive outcome is shown to be even more important if there are several available production techniques.