Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist

This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered. A third externality – that between firms and inspectors – is the source of the perverse effect; more cheating by firms is good for bribe-taking inspectors and more bribe-taking inspectors are good for cheating firms.     

International tax arbitrage, tax evasion and interest parity conditions

Using a finite-horizon general equilibrium model with uncertainty and money, we characterize situations where tax arbitrage opportunities may arise for international portfolio investors in an economy with heterogeneous capital income taxation when there is some scope to evade taxes on foreign capital income. We derive tax-modified uncovered interest parity conditions and forward rates similar to the no-tax ones, but augmented by tax-induced “risk-premium” terms; covered interest parity conditions remain unaffected by the introduction of capital income taxes, a consequence of our approach of bounding tax-based arbitrage without restricting arbitrage per se.     

Joint tax evasion

Tax evasion analysis typically assumes that evasion involves individual taxpayers responding to some given policies. However, evading taxes could require the collaboration of at least two taxpayers. Detection depends on the costly avoidance activities of both transacting partners. An increase in sanctions leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction in the illegal sector, but it may also increase the incentive for the partners to cooperate in avoiding detection. The total cost of transacting in the illegal sector can fall, and tax evasion may increase. The policy implications of this phenomenon are considered. JEL Classification: H26
L'évasion fiscale collective. Dans les analyses de l'évasion fiscale, on suppose habituellement que le payeur de taxe fait face à un ensemble donné de politiques auxquelles il réagit. Pourtant, dans le cas des transactions marchandes, l'évasion fiscale n'est possible que si plusieurs agents coopèrent ensemble. La probabilité que l'évasion soit détectée dépend alors des efforts que chacun fait pour la cacher. Dans un tel contexte, de plus lourdes sanctions accroissent le coût espéré des transactions illégales, mais peuvent aussi, indirectement, accroître l'incitation pour les partenaires à coopérer pour cacher leur activité illégale. Il en résulte que le coût total des transactions illégales peut diminuer et l'évasion fiscale augmenter. Nous étudions les implications de ce phénomène.     

Timing tax evasion

Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: First, fines increasing in the duration of an evasion spell, implying that the expected costs of evasion increase convexly with the time spent non-reporting, while the benefits increase linearly. Second, different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of tax evasion dynamics.     

Household tax evasion

Household members share public goods and make intra-household transfers. We show how these features of the household interact with the tax evasion decision, and identify the dimensions in which household evasion differs from individual evasion. In the model we present two members of a household choose how much to contribute to a household public good and how much self-employment income to evade. We are interested in how different evasion possibilities interact with the contribution decisions to the household public good and the role of income transfers within the household. We show the household evasion decision differs from the individual decision because it affects the outcome of the household contribution game. When household members are taxed as individuals neutrality applies when choices are not constrained. If the evasion level of one household member is constrained then an income transfer can generate a Pareto improvement. When the household members are jointly taxed there is a couple constraint on strategies and corner solutions can emerge.     

Indeterminacy, underground activities and tax evasion

This paper introduces underground activities and tax evasion into a one-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with aggregate external effects. The model presents a novel mechanism driving the self-fulfilling prophecies, which is characterized by well behaved (downward sloping) labor demand schedules. This mechanism differs from the customary one, and it is complementary to it. Compared to traditional labor market income, the income derived from underground labor activity is subject to a lower expected tax rate when considering both the probability of detection and the evasion penalty. During a belief-driven expansion, the household allocates more time to both traditional and underground labor supply. In equilibrium, this action serves to lower the effective labor tax rate faced by the household, thus providing stimulus to aggregate labor supply so as to make the initial expansion self-fulfilling. The mechanism here is akin to a “regressive tax”; the household's effective tax rate depends negatively on the level of total labor income. We argue that an underground sector, and the associated tax evasion, offer a good economic rationale for a regressive tax rate.     

Merchant internalization and tax evasion

Merchant internalization has been used to explain why merchants may accept high fees to accept card payments. However, merchants seem to be more resistant in some economic activities or countries; in particular, when the shadow economy is sizeable. Cash payments are usually associated with tax evasion, and therefore the analysis of card industry should take it in to consideration. This paper explores the role of tax evasion in the merchant internalization condition; first, considering it as exogenous, and then, as a strategic reason.     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: reply

Saha [Eur. J. Polit. Econ. (2003)] has raised some points about our paper [Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 16 (2000) 75]. We herewith reply to these points.     

Misreporting trade: Tariff evasion,corruption, and auditing standards

Official international trade statistics report commerce between every pair of countries twice: once for the importing country and once for the exporter. In principle, the two values differ only by transport costs, but as has long been recognized, they also differ systematically with product‐level tariffs. We aggregate across products to construct a dataset of annual aggregate bilateral trade, separately for the importer and exporter reports. With these data, we show that the reporting differences also vary systematically with country characteristics aside from tariffs: incomes, auditing standards, corruption, and trade agreements.     

A note on income tax evasion,labor supply,and nonlinear tax schedules

The existing literature on income tax evasion lays claim to two important implications: one is that higher tax rates induce greater income declarations and the other is that increases in gross income induce a fall in the fraction of income declared. The purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of these results with respect to three modifications of the standard model. The first involves relaxing the assumption of linear income tax schedules. The second modification is to consider an alternative form for the penalty function. Thirdly, we consider the consequences of the tax payer making a joint hours of work-income declaration decision.     

Unemployment, tax evasion and the slippery slope framework

The proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ??slippery slope?? framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market in order to study the relation between tax compliance, tax evasion and unemployment. This paper shows that the firm??s decision to evade taxes also depends on trust in tax authorities and affects one of the most important macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate. Also, the model is able to mimic the crucial interaction between trust and power and its effects on tax compliance. The main result is that with the ??right mix?? of policy tools of deterrence, trust in tax authorities is maximised, tax compliance increases and a reduction of tax evasion may decrease unemployment.     

Tax morale and tax evasion reports

The study proposes a new measure of tax morale for Italy based on voluntary tax evasion reports. Using this measure, I detected a positive relationship between tax morale and social capital, political participation, and immigration, but a negative relationship between tax morale and the dissatisfaction with public services and unemployment.     

Local interaction in tax evasion

When individuals underreport their incomes, they take into account their private gains and moral losses, the latter depending on the acquaintances’ previous underreports. We prove that under quite natural assumptions the process globally converges to the symmetric steady state.     

Two comments on tax evasion

A simple theoretical model of tax evasion behaviour is used to analyse whether a large fine (with small probability of detection) is a more powerful deterrent to tax evasion than a high probability of detection (with a small penalty). The effect of a higher tax rate on the amount of tax escaping the tax collector is also examined.     

International capital tax evasion and the foreign tax credit puzzle

In this paper we examine how the presence of international tax evasion affects the choice of a foreign tax credit by a capital exporting region. Since the credit raises the opportunity cost of concealing foreign source income, it can be employed to discourage evasion activity. International tax evasion can thus help to rationalize the adoption of a tax credit in excess of a deduction-equivalent rate. JEL Classification: H21, H26
Evasion fiscale pour le capital international et le problème du crédit d'impôt pour le fardeau fiscal à l'étranger. Ce mémoire examine comment la présence d'évasion fiscale pour le capital international affecte le choix du crédit d'impôt pour le fardeau fiscal à l'étranger par une région qui exporte du capital. Puisque le crédit d'impôt accroît le coût d'opportunité du camouflage de la source étrangère de revenus, c'est une technique qui peut être employée pour décourager l'évasion fiscale. Voilà qui peut expliquer qu'on adopte un crédit d'impôt qui est plus généreux que ce qui constituerait la déduction dans un système où le fardeau fiscal à l'étranger est simplement déduit du revenu imposable.     

A tax discrepancy coefficient resulting from tax evasion or tax expenditures

Tax evasion and tax expenditures introduce discrepancies between taxpayers. In this paper, a tax discrepancy coefficient has been worked out in order to establish, given a constant tax yield, what bigger or smaller amounts taxpayers would have to pay if tax evasion or tax expenditures were completely eliminated. After the definition of the coefficients these are calculated for individual income tax returns in Belgium. Similar coefficients can be established for other types of taxation, such as inheritance tax, corporate income tax or even sales tax (e.g. V.A.T.).     

Wage endogeneity,tax evasion,and optimal nonlinear income taxation

This paper studies the interaction between tax evasion and wage endogeneity within a Mirrleesian optimal tax framework. It characterizes the optimal marginal income tax rates on the skilled and the unskilled workers and the optimal amount of resources to be spent on deterring tax evasion. It shows that tax evasion weakens the incentives for the government to manipulate the marginal tax rates for the purpose of exploiting general equilibrium effects on wages. Moreover, the extent of this depends on the curvature of the evasion cost function. It also argues that marginal income tax rates are likely to be higher when the government attempts to deter evasion.     

Anticorruption reforms,tax evasion,and the role of harassment

We examine the impact of anticorruption reforms on tax evasion when corruption and potentially harassment are endemic among tax auditors. We find that the threat of harassment may counterintuitively boost the impact of such anticorruption reforms on tax evasion and also eliminate corruption. Specifically, a moderate anticorruption policy can discontinuously reduce tax evasion to a level even below that under no corruption. Further strengthening of such policy can nonetheless prove counterproductive and increase tax evasion. On the contrary, in the absence of harassment, a moderate anticorruption reform induces higher tax evasion and sustenance of bribery. In this case, only a large reform can reduce tax evasion and eliminate corruption.     

A note on progression,penalty schemes and tax evasion

This note deals with the question of whether shifting the tax base towards more progression will stimulate or discourage tax evasion, when the tax base is shifted so that either the expected tax revenues of government or the expected utility of taxpayer will remain unchanged. The answer turns out to depend sensitively on the nature of penalty schemes if caught in tax evasion. If the penalty rate is charged on the undeclared income, tax evasion will increase, while if the penalty rate is charged on the evaded tax, tax evasion will decrease when the tax base is shifted towards progression.     

Kleptocracy and tax evasion under resource abundance

Evidence has shown that petroleum wealth is associated with less transparency and at the same time less tax collection. In this paper, we find that the two issues are linked through the citizens’ tax evasion behavior. We develop a model to explain this link and conduct extensive empirical tests of its validity. The explanation is that officials tradeoff greater transparency to improve tax compliance against less transparency to increase gains from corruption. Oil windfalls diminish tax revenue needs, causing officials to optimize on less transparency. Seeing this, citizens optimize on a lower level of tax compliance. At equilibrium, both decline with a positive oil shock. We also study the alternative channel in which tax compliance responds to enforcement. Transparency is found to be the more robust channel. Ignoring citizens’ strategic behavior would lead to predicting suboptimal investment in state capacity for tax enforcement. Using giant oil discoveries data combined with oil price data, we develop a dynamic composite instrument and estimate the model with a dynamic panel system generalized method of moments. We find robust support for our explanation and the model's deep structure for 130+ countries and the 1980–2010 period.