Progressive taxation,tax exemption,and corporate liquidation policy

This paper develops a real options model of a firm that operates in continuous time with an infinite horizon. The firm receives stochastic profit flows that are subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. The firm possesses an option to liquidate its operation, which is optimally exercised when the firm's profit flow reaches an endogenously determined threshold level (the liquidation trigger) from above. We show that the firm's liquidation trigger under progressive taxation increases with either a reduction in the tax exemption threshold or an increase in the corporate income tax rate. Corporate income taxes are thus not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

Progressive taxation and corporate liquidation policies with mean-reverting earnings

This paper develops a real options model of an all-equity financed firm that receives mean-reverting earnings and is subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold such that the firm pays no corporate income taxes should its earnings be less than this threshold. The firm possesses a perpetual option to liquidate its operation for a deterministic salvage value at any time. We show that the firm optimally exercises the liquidation option at the first instant when its earnings reach an endogenously determined threshold (the liquidation trigger) from above. Using numerical analysis, we show that the liquidation trigger is higher or lower than the exogenously given tax exemption threshold, depending on whether the tax exemption is below or above a unique critical level, respectively. We further show that the liquidation trigger is strictly decreasing for all tax exemption thresholds less than the critical level, and can be hump-shaped for all tax exemption thresholds greater than the critical level, especially when the salvage value is small. Corporate income taxes as such are not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

Progressive Taxation, Tax Exemption, and Irreversible Investment under Uncertainty

We analyze the impact of progressive taxation on irreversible investment under uncertainty. We show that if tax exemption is lower than sunk cost, higher tax rate will decelerate optimal investment by increasing the optimal investment threshold, while if tax exemption exceeds sunk cost, three different regimes arise. For “small” volatilities the optimal investment threshold is a positive function of volatility, but independent of tax rate. For “medium” volatilities it is independent of both tax rate and volatility. Finally, for “high” volatilities the optimal investment threshold depends positively on volatility, but negatively on tax rate so that we have “tax paradox”.     

The effects of irreversibility on the timing and intensity of lumpy investment

This paper examines how changes in irreversibility of investment affect the timing and intensity of lumpy investment. We develop a continuous-time model wherein a firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring a partially reversible investment cost at that instant. The amount of the investment cost is directly related to the intensity of investment that is endogenously chosen by the firm at the instant when the investment option is exercised. We show that higher irreversibility of investment induces the firm to raise its optimal investment trigger, thereby deferring the undertaking of the project. Furthermore, we show that changes in irreversibility of investment have no impact on the firm's optimal investment intensity due to two opposing effects that exactly offset each other. Finally, we show that higher irreversibility of investment reduces the value of the investment option and, therefore, makes the firm less valuable.     

THE EFFECTS OF ABANDONMENT OPTIONS ON INVESTMENT TIMING AND INTENSITY

This paper examines how the presence of an abandonment option affects the timing and intensity of a firm’s investment. We develop a continuous‐time model wherein a firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring an investment cost at that instant. The amount of the investment cost is directly related to the intensity of investment that is endogenously chosen by the firm at the investment instant. The project generates a stream of stochastic revenue flows with a concomitant stream of constant cost flows, both of which increase with the investment intensity. We show that allowing the firm to make an irreversible decision to abandon the project does not affect the firm’s optimal investment intensity if the investment cost is totally reversible. Otherwise, the option to abandon the project induces the firm to choose a lower level of investment intensity. Furthermore, we show that the presence of the abandonment option pushes down the firm’s optimal investment trigger, thereby hastening the undertaking of the project.     

A macroeconometric analysis of the effects of taxation on financing and real investment in equipment in Canada

This paper analyses the impact of taxation on corporate financing and corporate investment in machinery and equipment in Canada. A coherent macroeconometric model of the firm's real and financial decision process is theoretically developed and empirically tested on Canadian data. Estimates of the impact of taxation in general and of the 1987 Canadian government's White Paper in particular, are analysed. The estimates suggest that income taxation has a negative but relatively small impact on equipment investment in Canada, and that models that ignore the link between the real and financial decisions overestimate the impact of taxation on real investment. With respect to tax reform, the White Paper reduces the incentive to save and invest in equity capital, and is expected to decrease real capital investment in the long run.     

Present bias and corporate tax policies

Two major forms of corporate tax policies are dividend and profits taxes. Based on conventional corporate theory, these tax policies distort the firm's investment decisions and decrease firm value. However, this paper shows that under hyperbolically discounted preferences, dividend taxation is capable of boosting firm investment in a value‐enhancing way. The hyperbolically discounted present value can be interpreted as reflecting irrational myopic preferences or, as we demonstrate, reduced‐form implications of corporate agency issues. Both cases result in an underinvestment problem for the firm, but the firm valuation criteria differ. The optimal taxation issue is discussed under a Cobb–Douglas production function setting.     

Profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry

Abstract This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization.     

Irreversibility,mean reversion,and investment timing

This paper examines the effect of irreversibility on investment under mean reversion. We develop a continuous-time model wherein a risk-neutral firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring a fixed investment cost at that instant. The project, once undertaken, generates a stream of cash flows that are governed by a mean-reverting stochastic process. The firm is then allowed to liquidate its project at any time to partially recover the fixed investment cost. The recovery rate of the fixed investment cost inversely gauges the degree of irreversibility of investment. Using a real options approach, we derive an analytical solution to the value of the firm that is analogous with an American compound option. We show that greater irreversibility of investment induces the firm to raise its investment trigger, thereby deferring the undertaking of the project. We further show that greater irreversibility of investment has a detrimental effect that makes the firm less valuable.     

Network externality and incentive to invest in network security

Breaches of network security can result in substantial losses for businesses. A game theory-based model is developed to investigate in the short run how network externality influences the optimal strategy of competing online firms producing homogenous services to invest in NS. A firm's self-protect rate and survival probability against NS security incidents differ depending on its related investment decisions. The incentive of a firm to invest in NS is derived, and the impact of the survival probability and the effect of the number of firms investing in NS on a firm's incentive to invest in NS are also analyzed. Policy implications drawn from the study are provided at the end the work.     

TAXING FOREIGN PROFITS WITH INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*

A large part of border crossing investment takes the form of international mergers and acquisitions. In this article, we ask how optimal repatriation tax systems look like in a world where investment involves a change of ownership, instead of a reallocation of real capital. We find that the standard results of international taxation do not carry over to the case of international mergers and acquisitions. The deduction system is no longer optimal from a national perspective and the foreign tax credit system fails to ensure global optimality. The tax exemption system is optimal if ownership advantage is a public good within the multinational firm. However, the cross‐border cash‐flow tax system dominates the exemption system in terms of optimality properties.     

Tax policy, venture capital, and entrepreneurship

The paper studies the effects of tax policy on venture capital activity. Entrepreneurs pursue a single high risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide funds, covering investment cost plus an upfront payment, in exchange for a share in the firm. The contract must include incentives to enlist full effort of entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists also assist with valuable business advice to enhance survival chances. The paper develops a general equilibrium framework with a traditional and an entrepreneurial sector and investigates the effects of taxes on the equilibrium level of managerial advice, entrepreneurship and welfare. It considers differential wage and capital income taxes, a comprehensive income tax, progressive taxation as well as investment and output subsidies to the entrepreneurial sector.     

Tax Progression and Human Capital in Imperfect Labour Markets

Recent contributions to the theory of taxation argue that tax progression raises welfare and employment in the presence of labour market imperfections. This literature takes the endowment of workers with human capital as given. The present paper analyses the effects of tax progression in a model with endogenous human capital formation. We show that the effect of tax progression on human capital investment depends on the deductibility of the cost of human capital formation. With full deductibility, tax progression raises employment and welfare. With incomplete deductibility, in contrast, the effect of tax progression on employment and welfare may be negative.     

Domestic R&D,Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare

This paper provides a new rationale to examine the two‐way relationship between domestic research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as their impacts on domestic welfare. Our analysis is based on the strategic interaction in cost‐reducing investment decisions between domestic firms and a foreign firm, which is different from the common factors that are discussed in the literature such as spillovers and technology sourcing. Our results are as follows. We show that domestic R&D investment may either increase or decrease the foreign firm's FDI incentives. Further, depending on the marginal cost of domestic firms, domestic R&D incentives can always increase regardless of the effects of domestic R&D investment on the foreign firm's FDI decision. Finally, we find that domestic welfare improves under domestic cost reduction if the slope of the marginal cost of domestic R&D investment is sufficiently small.     

Real option analysis for effects of emission permit banking on investment under abatement cost uncertainty

The present paper analyzes the investment effects of emission trading scheme (ETS) when emission permits are bankable and there is technological uncertainty with regard to the abatement cost. A real option model is employed to accommodate irreversibility of investment and cost uncertainty. In the absence of abatement cost uncertainty, a bankable ETS reduces a firm's incentive for environmental investment, because the firm can utilize the banked permits for future compliance which act as substitutes for abatement investment. However, when cost uncertainty is prevalent, investment may reduce the opportunity cost of irreversible investment under the banking system, thereby increasing a firm's investment incentive. The condition is derived under which a bankable ETS provides higher investment incentives than a non-bankable ETS does.     

Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies under Tax‐Rate Uncertainty

Abstract. In this paper, we apply a real‐option model to study the effects of tax‐rate uncertainty on a firm's decision. In doing so, we depart from the relevant literature, which focuses on fully equity‐financed investment projects. By letting a representative firm borrow optimally, we show that debt finance not only encourages investment activities but can also substantially mitigate the effect of tax‐rate uncertainty on investment timing.     

On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly

This paper investigates the neutrality of profit taxation in a mixed oligopoly where one (partially) public firm competes with private firms. We find that the neutrality of a profit tax is robust under a general cost and a general demand function as long as the degree of privatization is endogenously determined. This result is also true when product heterogeneity is considered under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is exogenously given, the profit tax neutrality holds only in the cases where the public firm is fully privatized or fully state-owned; otherwise, the neutrality breaks down.     

Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are Incomplete

The investment of a regulated firm affects the service/good provided on many dimensions. Should an integrated regulator take care of them all? Or is it better to have separate regulators responsible for them? We analyze the effect of the separation of regulatory powers on the regulated firm's ex ante incentive to invest in a “cooperative” innovation. The effects of the innovation are not verifiable and the cost of investing is sunk, hence, there is a problem of hold‐up. We find that when the innovation produces opposite effects the ex ante firm's incentive to invest is larger in the case of separation than in the case of integrated regulation. We also stress the risk of over‐investment that the separation of regulatory powers may induce. We maintain that along with classical incentive regulation—which mainly provides incentives for the firm to be efficient—the separation of regulatory powers may play a role in providing an incentive for cooperative innovations.     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

与生态环境建设相适应的我国财政体制改革

财税制度作为经济的重要调控手段,在我国的生态环境建设中发挥着重要的作用。深化财税体制改革,一方面要增加财政投入,加大财政的支持力度;另一方面,要实施减免税收、差别利率等税收优惠政策,实现财政、税收双管齐下,构建财税联动机制,强化对生态工程和循环型经济项目的支持力度,增强财税对生态建设和循环经济建设的支持和调节功能,这将是未来我国财税在这方面改革的主导方向。