Empirical evidence on the effects of tax incentives

This paper considers two empirical questions about tax incentives: (i)?are incentives used as tools of tax competition and (ii)?how effective are incentives in attracting investment? To answer these, we prepared a new dataset of tax incentives in over 40 Latin American, Caribbean and African countries for the period 1985–2004. Using spatial econometrics techniques for panel data to answer the first question, we find evidence for strategic interaction in tax holidays, in addition to the well-known competition over the corporate income tax (CIT) rate. We find no robust evidence, however, for competition over investment allowances and tax credits. Using dynamic panel data econometrics to answer the second question, we find evidence that lower CIT rates and longer tax holidays are effective in attracting FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean but not in Africa. None of the tax incentives is effective in boosting gross private fixed capital formation.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

The incentives for tax planning

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements.     

The effects of tax provisions on long-run investment prospects

This paper examines the implications of the tax system on the long-run investment prospects for several classes of securities, including short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity. Combining apparently reasonable assumptions with tax provisions that are similar to those of the prevailing federal system, we indicate that equity may be the only investment medium that promises a positive real, after-tax return to a taxable investor.By modifying selected tax provisions that relate to investment activities, such that the recognition of unrealized appreciation is deferred and the investment itself leads to an immediate deduction, substantially different long-run implications are produced. In particular, under reasonable assumptions all classes of investments (with the possible exception of Treasury bills) appear to promise a positive real, after-tax return     

Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance and the growth of high-powered incentives for managers. A simple model demonstrates the role of feedback effects between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. A novel measure of corporate tax avoidance (the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals) allows for an investigation of the link between tax avoidance and incentive compensation. Increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, in a manner consistent with a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. In addition, this negative effect is driven primarily by firms with relatively weak governance arrangements, confirming a central prediction of the model. These results can help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the undersheltering puzzle, and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.     

The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting investment: panel data evidence from the CFA Franc zone

In this paper we investigate to what extent tax incentives are effective in attracting investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. We test the neo-classical investment theory prediction that tax incentives, by lowering the user cost of capital, raise investment. Next to tax incentives, we also estimate the impact on investment of other investment climate variables that are under direct control of the government, such as the transparency and complexity of the tax system, and the legal protection of foreign investors. In developing countries these variables might be as important as or even more important than the tax variables themselves.     

R&D tax incentives: a reappraisal

This paper examines R&D tax incentives in oligopolistic markets. We characterize the conditions under which tax incentives reach the socially desirable level of firm-financed R&D spending. The outcome of the market depends not only on the level of technological spillover in the industry but also on the degree of strategic interaction between the firms. One major result emerges from the model: The socially desirable level of R&D investment is not necessarily reached by subsidizing R&D. When the technological spillover is sufficiently low, the government might want to tax R&D investments, and this result does not necessarily arise because firms are overinvesting in R&D. There are also cases in which an R&D tax is desirable even though firms are underinvesting in R&D compared with the first-best optimum. In practice, this theoretical finding calls for a lower sales tax combined with an R&D subsidy in oligopolistic industries with high technological spillovers, and a lower sales tax combined with an R&D tax in oligopolistic industries with low technological spillovers.     

Measuring tax incentives for R&;D

A methodology for measuring the user cost of intangible R&D capital is developed. In contrast to the way in which the Hall–Jorgenson–King–Fullerton (HJKF) approach to measuring the user cost of capital, and the related notion of the effective marginal tax rate on capital, is typically applied to intangible R&D capital, the methodology takes explicit account of the microeconomic foundations of R&D in order to aggregate the user costs of the various inputs used in the production of R&D. Illustrative calculations are presented for Canadian provinces which show that relative to the methodology developed here, the standard approach substantially overstates the tax subsidy offered to intangible R&D capital.      

Managerial risk incentives and investment related agency costs

We assess the impact of compensation based incentives together with monitoring mechanisms on investment related agency costs. The results indicate that well structured compensation based incentives significantly reduce agency costs. Managerial firm based wealth delta has a significant, negative effect on agency costs for firms in all size categories. The significance of managerial firm based wealth vega in reducing agency costs is concentrated in small firms, suggesting that vega exposure is more effective where risk is higher. The significance of cash compensation in reducing agency costs is concentrated in the large firms. This result implies that higher cash compensation reduces agency costs by allowing risk-averse managers the opportunity to diversify outside the firm.     

Crowdfunding tax incentives in Europe: a comparative analysis

ABSTRACT

Some European countries offer tax incentive schemes to investors and companies in crowdfunding. On one hand, they could be seen as a tool to reduce the system’s dependence on banks and increase the availability of credit for start-ups and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). On the other hand, there is the counterweight of disadvantages that investors may face by investing in crowdfunding (i.e. complex and incomplete laws, and weak protection). This paper is primarily intended as a primer on the use of tax incentives for crowdfunding in Europe. In this study, we first examine the implementation of tax incentive schemes in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium. Then, we analyse and compare the characteristics of such schemes along three dimensions: the incentives structure; the business characteristics; and the type of investor. We find that tax incentive schemes for crowdfunding vary widely in their form and other features of their design. Moreover, the most used forms of tax incentives are those that provide for an up-front tax credit on the amount invested in early-stage ventures. These incentives have an immediate effect on the annual income tax of the investor. A central implication is that the more tax incentive schemes are properly designed and tailored for crowdfunders, the more investors, start-ups and other firms with low liquidity could use crowdfunding as a source of funding.     

Causes,benefits, and risks of business tax incentives

This paper provides an updated overview of tax incentives for business investment. It argues that tax competition is likely to be a major force driving countries’ tax reforms, and discusses tax incentives as a possible response to this. This is complemented by more detailed arguments for and against tax incentives, and by an illustrative analysis of different incentives using effective tax rates. Findings from the empirical literature on tax incentives are also presented. Based on the overview of theoretical and empirical findings, the paper then suggests a matrix of criteria to determine the usefulness of different tax incentives depending on a country’s circumstances.     

Dynamic effects of permanent and temporary tax policies in a q model of investment

This paper incorporates the tax policy analysis of Hall and Jorgenson into a dynamic optimizing model with adjustment costs to develop a q model of investment. This framework is particularly useful for analyzing the dynamic effects on investment of permanent and temporary changes in tax policy. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional intertemporal substitution argument, a temporary investment tax credit need not be nore expansionary than a permanent investment tax credit. The role of depreciation allowances in determining the dynamic response of investment to temporary changes in the tax rate is also investigated.     

Bilateral effective tax rates and foreign direct investment

This paper computes effective (marginal and average) tax rates that account for bilateral aspects of taxation and, therefore, vary across country-pairs and years. These tax rates serve to estimate the impact of corporate taxation on outbound stocks of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) among OECD countries between 1991 and 2002. The findings indicate that outbound FDI is positively related to the parent and host country tax burden and negatively associated with bilateral effective tax rates. Relying only on unilateral (country and time variant) rather than on both unilateral and bilateral (country-pair and time variant) effective tax rates leads to biased estimates of the impact of corporate taxation on FDI.     

Expected economic growth and investment in corporate tax planning

Review of Accounting Studies - This study investigates whether expected economic growth is associated with investment in corporate tax planning. We predict that higher expected economic growth...     

Realism,skill, and incentives: Current and future trends in investment management and investment performance

We review the recent trends in investment management and performance research and highlight the fields expected to develop further in the future. The trend to adapt the classic CAPM and factor models seems likely to continue, with the drive for realistic factors, which best proxy the drivers of investment performance, playing a key role. The search for skill, based on enhanced benchmarks, is also a developing area, with new concepts of identification and verification at the fore. The availability of more qualitative data has allowed corporate finance themes such as agency conflict and incentives to be explored. These are some of the areas where we have seen major developments in recent years and where we expect to see continuing development.     

Host-country governance, tax treaties and US direct investment abroad

We investigate how the quality of the host-country governance and a bilateral US income tax treaty affect the rates of return that US companies require on their foreign direct investment (FDI). Using indexes of corruption and political instability, we find that poor governance causes the companies to require significantly higher rates of return. This lends support to earlier authors who have concluded that poor governance discourages both local investment and inward FDI. After accounting for the quality of host-country governance, however, no evidence could be found that an income tax treaty has any effect on the required rates of return.