Fiscal decentralization under free mobility

In this paper it is shown that, under the proper convexity assumption, any efficient allocation of an economy subdivided into locationally separated regions can be sustained by means of fiscal decentralization with profit maximizing local governments. For that to be true, however, a system of intergovernmental grants is needed. Without such grants, fiscal decentralization and Tiebout equilibria are closely related concepts. Since a Tiebout equilibrium generally fails to exist [Bewley (1981)], these grants play an important role not only for redistribution but, in the first place, to make fiscal decentralization a feasible allocation mechanism.     

The politics and economics of decentralization

This paper analyzes a simple general equilibrium model with local public goods subject to exclusion and crowding. In general, no competitive equilibrium exists for such models. However, in this paper we study a four-person example, satisfying assumptions formulated in a paper by McGuire [Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions, J. Political Econ.82, 112–132 (1974)], in which a competitive equilibrium does exist. This example demonstrates that the model is capable of generating realistic implications regarding stratification of jurisdictions, the decision to subdivide or consolidate jurisdictions, reliance on exclusionary zoning, and the use of revenue sharing.     

Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states, we also provide new evidence that points to the existence of a spatial autoregressive component to explaining corruption. We interpret this as consistent with the theoretical findings.     

The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers

In this article, we examine how centralization and decentralization internalize positive spillovers of local public expenditures when a spill-in from foreign spending is not a substitute, but a complement to domestic spending. Specifically, we assume the production of two district-specific public goods out of two complementary district-specific inputs in a taste-symmetric two-district setting. We compare equilibria in non-cooperative decentralization and cooperative centralization for different spillovers, degrees of complementarity and cost-division rules, and control for the effects of strategic delegation and the feasibility of cross subsidies to the input in the foreign district. We find that centralization welfare-dominates decentralization in most institutional settings and for a wide range of parameters. Yet, we also identify conditions for decentralization to welfare-dominate centralization even in our setup where preferences are homogenous. The setup features three structural novelties: Strategic delegation improves provision and welfare in decentralization. In the absence of cross-district transfers, decentralized provision and welfare increase in spillovers. Welfare in centralization is generally non-monotonic in spillovers.     

University planning,decentralization and resource allocation

This paper proposes a system of resource allocation in universities which addresses both the problem of useful simulation of alternatives and efficient substitution of resources. It is the authors' view that the reasons why various university planning models proposed in the last few years have not been found useful in practice is that they take inadequate account of the decentralized nature of decisionmaking within universities. In this regard the three main points of the paper are: (1) university planning models should have flexible aggregation categories which can be determined and re-adjusted by the decisionmaker as he uses it; (2) resource constraints in university planning models should be flexible and negotiable, and negotiation over resources should be part of the analyst's domain of inquiry; (3) planning in universities must take into account the problem of introducing incentives which cause the behavior of individuals within the university to be directed to the needs of the institution's clienteles.     

Implementing organizational change in supply towards decentralization

This paper presents the findings from research in large companies investigating implementation issues faced by chief purchasing officers as their supply organization changed to greater decentralization. Once the decision was made to decentralize, responsibility for implementation was given to the chief purchasing officer (CPO). Firms changing their supply organization to a more decentralized structure faced a number of implementation issues, including the business unit concerns, role of the chief purchasing officer, top management involvement, changes to existing purchasing staff and the involvement of consultants. In the nine changes studied across seven companies, the decentralization process also required the CPO to address a number of simultaneous activities, including cost reduction objectives and implementation of information technology systems. A surprising “purchasing paradox” was also uncovered as top management still expected decentralized supply units to provide additional savings.     

Complementarity,fiscal decentralization and economic growth

Theories of the voluntary provision of public goods and development economics have clarified that complementarity in the production process is a crucial ingredient to understanding how alternative economic environments affect economic performance. This paper examines how the structures of intra- and inter-regional complementarity affect the relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralization. We provide a theory that describes how fiscal decentralization affects economic growth under various structures of regional complementarity. Our empirical analysis, based on a panel data set of the fifty states of the United States over the period of 1992–1997, supports our theoretical specification of the production function. Also, we observe a hump-shaped relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth that is consistent with our theoretical result. Our analysis also shows that the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization conducive to economic growth is higher than the average of the data in some cases, and hence further decentralization is recommended for economic growth. The previous version of the paper was presented at the 59th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (University of Economics in Prague, Prague), the 2003 Fall Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association (Meiji University, Tokyo), the 60th Annual Meeting of the Japanese Institute of Public Finance (Kansai University, Osaka), and in seminars at Yokohama National University and the University of California, Irvine. The authors acknowledge the comments and discussions by people including Timothy Goodspeed, Kiyoshi Mitsui, Motohiro Sato, Etsuro Shioji, Tsunao Okumura, and Craig Parsons. We are also grateful for the comments by the Editor (Amihai Glazer) and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies. Nishimura acknowledges the financial support from JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) Postdoctoral Fellowships for Research Abroad.     

中国财政分权与地方基础设施供给的实证分析

在我国,自上而下的政绩考核机制激励着地方追求短期经济增长,导致其在基础设施投资上拥有很高的热情。文章实证分析了该结论,并用模型论证经济增长、城市化和财政分权等因素是导致地方基本建设支出增长的主要原因。     

中国财政分权与地方基础设施供给的实证分析

在我国,自上而下的政绩考核机制激励着地方追求短期经济增长,导致其在基础设施投资上拥有很高的热情。文章实证分析了该结论,并用模型论证经济增长、城市化和财政分权等因素是导致地方基本建设支出增长的主要原因。     

Population decentralization within metropolitan areas: 1970-1980

Using a data set that maintains geographic and fiscal continuity over time and across a sample of major U.S. metropolitan areas, the authors identify factors of economic and population decentralization that affected central city areas between 1970 and 1980. The problems of annexation are resolved by estimating population changes for central cities and suburban areas with constant 1980 boundaries, and by calculating fiscal variables from overlapping jurisdictions by city area as opposed to municipal city government only. "The empirical investigation supports the view that demographic and housing stock variables seem to have had a greater impact on decentralization than central city-suburban fiscal differences."     

财政分权体制下地区产业结构调整的对策

我国经济发展进入阶段以来,产业结构调整升级已经逐步成为提质增效的重要抓手。财政分权改革在赋予各级地方政府更多自主决策权的同时,极易形成政府和官员主导型经济。为避免地方政府和官员的产业投资决策过度偏离中央政府的政策意图,破除产业结构调整升级的阻碍,可行之策是改进现行政绩考核体系、规范政府行为、实施区域差别性产业政策。     

从空间扩展到网络治理:城市分散化趋势探析

以城市空间分散作为研究基点,对城市经济和行政活动进行分析,论证了当前城市成长中的分散化趋势,为当前我国城市发展及管理研究提供了有益借鉴.     

Structural instability of the core

Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let w(n,q)= 2q-n+1 and let W be a smooth ‘policy space’ of dimension w. Let U(W)^N be the space of all smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is shown that there exists an ‘instability dimension’ w^*(σ) with 2w^*(σ)w(n,q) such that:

1. (i) if ww^*(σ), and W has no boundary, then the core of σ is empty for a dense set of profiles in U(W)^N (i.e., almost always),

2. (ii) if ww^*(σ)+1, and W has a boundary, then the core of σ is empty, almost always,

3. (iii) if ww^*(σ)+1 then the cycle set is dense in W, almost always,

4. (iv) if ww^*(σ)+2 then the cycle set is also path connected, almost always.

The method of proof is first of all to show that if a point belongs to the core, then certain generalized symmetry conditions in terms of ‘pivotal’ coalitions of size 2q−n must be satisfied. Secondly, it is shown that these symmetry conditions can almost never be satisfied when either W has empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q) or when W has non-empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q)+1.     

Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries

This paper studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency (PSE). We first use a theoretical framework that illustrates the two opposing forces that shape a non-monotonic effect of fiscal decentralization on PSE. Subsequently, we carry out an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries, between 1970 and 2000. A country-level dataset is used to measure PSE in delivering education and health services and the new indices are regressed on well-established decentralization measures. Irrespective of whether PSE concerns education or health services, an inverted U-shaped relationship has been identified between government efficiency in providing these services and fiscal decentralization. This relationship is robust across several different specifications and estimation methods.     

The Europeanization of manufacturing and the decentralization of bargaining: multinational management strategies in the European automobile industry

Employee turnover remains to be one of the biggest human resource problems facing the Indian international call center industry. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive study of how the attitudes of call center employees toward different aspects of their work affect their intention to leave. Our specific contribution to the literature is in understanding the heterogeneity among employees and how this affects meaningful inference in studying employees' intention to leave. To achieve this goal, we compare and contrast between traditional ordinary least squares regression models that have been used in the extant literature with latent class analysis. Latent class analysis suggests the presence of three distinct groups of employees, thus confirming the heterogeneity present in the data. The three groups can be represented as the two polar groups, one keen on staying and the other keen on leaving, and a significantly large third group of employees who are unsure. We also find that the impact of different attitudes vary between groups in terms of both economic significance (magnitude of coefficients), and statistical significance. This study throws important light on the research on turnover and has significant research and practical implications.     

Entrepreneurial size,complexity and decentralization of decision-making in the use of temporary help workers in Spain

Using data from a postal survey of Spanish firms, the present work, as its main objective, tries to evaluate the effect of entrepreneurial size, degree of decentralization in decision-making and vertical complexity on the use of temporary help workers. As complementary objectives, it also seeks to confirm the effect of entrepreneurial size on elements of the organizational structure, such as decentralization in decision-making, and on vertical complexity. To respond to the hypotheses, a LISRE model has been used. The results show that entrepreneurial size and degree of decentralization positively affect the frequency with which companies use temporary help workers. In contrast, vertical complexity negatively affects the use of this type of worker. On the other hand, it is confirmed that entrepreneurial size positively affects decentralization in decision-making and vertical complexity.     

基于核心技术竞争力的高新技术企业竞争优势构建

核心竞争力是企业持续竞争优势的源泉,高新技术企业的特点决定了核心技术竞争力是高新技术企业核心竞争力的关键。文章在分析高新技术企业和核心技术竞争力内涵的基础上,从如何培育核心技术竞争力和如何保持核心技术竞争力两个方面探讨了高新技术企业竞争优势的构建。