Capital structure in South Korea: a quantile regression approach

Knowledge of how South Korean firms choose their capital structures has particular value due to the country's specific corporate structure and the role of leverage in the evolution of its financial crisis of 1997 and recovery. Using a large panel for the years 1992–2001, we investigate the evolution and determinants of Korean firms' capital structure and focus on differences between firms in different quantiles of the debt–capital distribution. Conditional quantile regressions show that while variables associated with standard models of asymmetric information costs are significant throughout the distribution, there are considerable differences, including differences in sign, in their impact on firms with different degrees of leverage. Those observed nonlinearities in the determinants of capital structure are consistent with a model of capital structure that includes both costs resulting from asymmetric information and an upper bound on the debt–capital ratio.     

Local Government Debt and Firm Leverage: Evidence from China

China's local government debt financing has been expanded aggressively to support infrastructure investment, especially since the enactment of four‐trillion‐yuan stimulus plan to stimulate the economy post global financial crisis. At the same time, the rapid increase of firm‐level leverage ratio of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and the decline of leverage ratio of non‐SOEs jointly deteriorated China's credit misallocation problem. In this study, we empirically test the effect of local government debton firm leverage in China. We find that an expansion of local government debt significantly crowded out the leverage of non‐SOEs, while crowded in that of SOEs. Moreover, the effect differed across industries and sectors.     

Not Leverage but Change in Leverage Matters for Firms’ Future Growth: Evidence from Turkey's Top 1000

In the financial literature it is generally assumed that a firm's financial leverage is a good measure (proxy) of the firm's access to financing. In this study, it is argued that it is not the firm's debt (leverage), but the change in leverage that more accurately mirrors the firm's true likelihood to have access to external sources of financing. Applying a firm-type analysis and panel data techniques to data on the top 1000 private industrial companies of Turkey for the period 1997–2012, it is shown that it is the change in leverage ratio, not the level of leverage ratio itself that matters for the future firm growth, controlling for profitability, leverage and firm size.     

Determinants of Leverage in Slovenian Blue-Chip Firms and Stock Performance Following Substantial Debt Increases

Hypotheses concerning capital structures are some of the most frequently tested in the financial literature. Authors usually discuss different incentives for the use of leverage. Their views can be broadly classified in two main groups. The proponents of the first argue that leverage increases the cash flow available to investors. With the use of debt a firm gains because it uses a cheaper component of capital and since it pays less tax thanks to advantageous debt tax shields. On the other hand, the proponents of the second group stress the importance of minimising transaction costs, and information asymmetry. They point to a pecking order of finance sources. In this article, I explain the most frequently stated drivers that provide incentives for the more extensive use of debt with a focus on an emerging market environment and test whether they are relevant to Slovenian blue-chip firms that emerged from the transition of the last decade.

The second part introduces the owners' point of view. I test whether raised debt levels in fact improve the long-term return to the stockholders of Slovenian firms. This should be expected because of the institution-led capital structure conservatism that firms practised in the past. Three methods are employed to test the relationship between increased levels of debt and long-term stock return. All of them offer a similar conclusion that the expected long-term performance of firms which significantly increased their leverage is no better than the long-term performance of firms that did not. The results are useful for other emerging capital markets in Europe where firms and investors faced similar circumstances tied to their socialist past and transition process.     

The effects of China’s split-share reform on firms’ capital structure choice

China’s split-share structure reform in 2005–2006 mitigates agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and thus may bring substantial changes to corporate financing behaviour. This article examines the impact of that reform on the capital structure decisions of firms by applying a variety of trade-off and pecking-order models. Using data from 1176 non-financial Chinese listed firms during the period 2000–2012, we present empirical evidence indicating that equity tracks the financing deficit better than debt in Chinese firms, a finding which is not consistent with pecking-order theory. This phenomenon is more prominent after 2006 as share reform increases trading activity in the secondary stock market and improves the transparency of financial markets. In addition, Chinese firms have an optimal leverage ratio and they adjust below-target leverage ratios faster than above-target leverage ratios after the implementation of share structure reform, although they make symmetric adjustments towards the target leverage ratio before 2007. Finally, recent share reform has prompted Chinese firms to more quickly address the divergence of actual leverage ratios from long-term target levels, but has slowed their response to short-term target leverage divergence.     

Optimal contract theory with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper incorporates managers' time-inconsistent preferences into the classical DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) contract model to study corresponding impacts on the optimal contract, corporate financial policies, and the optimal capital structure. The extended model shows that the impatience of the time-inconsistent agent has positive effects on the optimal payout decision which is opposite to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and consequently provides a guideline to tailor the contract between investors and the agent. It also shows in the optimal capital structure, the total debt capacity shrinks with the degree of the agent's time inconsistency, and the long-term one shrinks more. In addition, our model predicts that the agent's time inconsistency not only imposes significant limits on the use of long-term debt but also has great effects on firms' capital structures. Thus our finding can potentially explain observed cross-sectional differences in firms' capital structures.     

西方金融资本主义下的寄生阶级、债务通缩与大萧条——兼评迈克尔·赫德森的金融资本主义批判理论

金融资本生成于产业资本、商业资本和银行资本的垄断融合。在支配生产、流通和信用的基础上,金融资本通过定价权、金融投机、地租寻租、支配国债、滥用货币发行权等途径而建立一套寄生性的积累机制。随着金融资本对生产关系的全面支配,金融资本的寄生性积累也越来越系统化、自主化,造成的社会危机也越来越不容易从外部加以克服,但同时,金融资本内部自我否定的逻辑却表现得越来越强烈。金融资本的寄生性积累导致债务膨胀和产业萎缩相互加强的危机,即债务通缩危机。新自由主义量化宽松的反通缩政策,在一定程度上避免了旧版大萧条,却导致了更难以解决的新版大萧条。美国学者赫德森把对金融资本寄生性积累的批判纳入到从古典政治经学到马克思主义政治经济学的传统中,从金融资本的寄生性积累探讨西方经济、政治危机的根源,虽然其金融资本批判理论还因缺乏辩证逻辑而有一定的缺点,但是该理论基本的理论方向是值得肯定的。     

Regulation,renegotiation and capital structure: theory and evidence from Latin American transport concessions

We examine the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. We develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. We test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992–2011. For each concession we have data on the regulatory regime, annual financial performance and contract renegotiations. We begin by demonstrating that, although pervasive, contract renegotiations do not fundamentally alter the regulatory regime. Importantly, firms are not systematically able to renegotiate when in financial difficulty, implying that price cap contracts remain high-powered in practice. We use this result for our main empirical work, where we find broad support for our theoretical predictions: when the cost of debt increases, firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage.     

Household debt and spending during the financial crisis: Evidence from Danish micro data

We use data for nearly 500,000 Danish households to study the relationship between household leverage prior to the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the development in spending over the course of the crisis. We find a strong negative correlation between pre-crisis leverage and the change in spending during the crisis. This reflects that highly levered households spent a larger share of their income than their less-levered peers prior to the crisis, resulting in larger increases in debt in these years. Once we condition on the size of the pre-crisis change in debt, a high level of debt is no longer associated with a larger spending decline. Our results suggest that the larger decline in spending among high-leverage households is the result of a spending normalization pattern that is also found in other years, rather than a causal effect of high debt levels suppressing household spending during the crisis.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

Cyclical behavior of the financial stability of eurozone commercial banks

In light of the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, we investigate the cyclical behavior of the financial stability of banks of the Eurozone, using an unbalanced dynamic panel of 722 commercial banks covering the period 1999–2013, and the generalized method of moments system. We find a negative relationship between business cycle and bank risk-taking, indicating that financial stability is procyclical. In addition, the study shows that lending activity increases risk-taking while rising capital requirements boost financial stability. Moreover, our findings suggest positive co-movements between the business cycle and lending, compared to bank's capital, whereby the procyclicality of lending and bank capital have negative effects on the financial stability of commercial banks in the Eurozone. We notice then that the cyclical behavior of commercial banks, in terms of capital requirements and lending activities, depends on their size. Therefore, lending and capital of smaller banks are procyclical while lending and capital of larger banks are countercyclical. Finally, we find the Troika institutions’ bailouts programs significantly impacted banking stability in the Eurozone.     

Corporate financial soundness and its impact on firm performance: implications for corporate debt restructuring in Slovenia

This article studies the extent of corporate leverage and range of excessive debt of Slovenian firms during the recent financial crisis. Half of all firms (of those with some non-zero debt and at least one employee) are found to face an unsustainable debt-to-EBITDA leverage ratio beyond 4, accounting for almost 80% of total outstanding debt. Moreover, a good quarter of all firms experience debt-to-EBITDA ratios exceeding 10 and hold almost half of total aggregate net debt. We then examine how this financial distress affects firm performance in terms of productivity, employment, exports, investment and survival. We find that, while less important during the good times (pre-recession period), lack of firms’ financial soundness during the period of financial distress becomes a critical factor constraining firm performance. The extent of financial leverage and ability to service the outstanding debt are shown to inhibit firms’ productivity growth as well as the dynamics of exports, employment and investment. Micro and small firms are found to suffer relatively more than larger firms from high leverage in terms of export and employment performance during the recession period.     

Financial crises,debt overhang,and firm growth in transition economies

ABSTRACT

We examine the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 on the relationship between capital structure, investments, and performance for Eastern European companies. While the existing literature documents how firms’ investments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds and to debt holdings, we further investigate whether this investment sensitivity also translates in different levels of performance, and document that capital structure indeed has both a direct and an indirect effect, mediated by the capital expenditure channel. We show that firms with higher financial flexibility experience higher investments and returns on capital. Over-levered firms instead suffer from a debt overhang condition, forcing them to curb investments, and consequently experiencing lower performance. Overall, we provide evidence on the importance of capital structure and financial flexibility on investments and performance, showing the real consequences of the debt overhang condition on firm value creation. Firms should therefore aim at maintaining adequate financial flexibility in order to be able to pursue future profitable investment opportunities, and avoid the under-investment problem arising from a debt overhang situation.     

On the optimality of funding and hiring/firing according to stochastic demand: The role of growth and shutdown options

We examine the firm's investment and hiring/firing policy under stochastic demand with potential reversibility. We evaluate in particular the values of both investment and hiring/firing growth and shutdown options not only for the standard Cobb–Douglas production function but also when taking account of the natural upper bound on the output due to the demand level. For this latter purpose, we use results about average of options provided in Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007). As a by-product, we extend the approach of Tserlukevich (2008) by introducing the employment level to analyze in particular the optimality of the financial structure and leverage. Our approach allows us to get a quasi-explicit solution of the optimal firm's value that can be deeply analyzed. Such results can potentially explain the interest for flexible contractual arrangements with capital and labor firm's structure.     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

One crisis,two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems

This article explores the link between the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the different government interventions aimed at rescuing financial institutions on the significant increase of the costs of public debts as measured by the interest rate spreads with respect to Germany. We show evidence on the existence of a statistically significant link between the two crises embodied by capital injections and government guarantees. More specifically, the two types of government interventions have a negative impact on the cost of the sovereign debts under study. This empirical result can explain why the sovereign debt crisis immediately followed the subprime crisis.     

The impact of government debt on the long-run natural real interest rate – a quantitative evaluation

Persistently low natural real interest rates are a problem for monetary policy and financial stability. I analyse to what extent a permanent increase in government debt that is financed by higher taxes could raise the long-run natural real interest rate. As a measurement tool, I use an incomplete markets model with capital and government bonds. Increasing the public debt/GDP ratio by one percentage point raises the real interest rate by between 0.4 and 1.5 basis points, depending on the degree of inequality generated by the model and the tax instrument used to balance the government’s budget constraint. I also show that the interest rate effect of a change in public debt/GDP predicted by the model is significantly smaller than its empirical counterpart for the US, due to the fact that the model understates the empirical fraction of households that are constrained in their consumption decision.     

Internalizing the Social Costs of a Small Number of Powerful,Overindebted Firms

Extraordinary debt-to-capital ratios (leverage) and the compression of markets to very few, large companies (concentration) are economic risk factors. They have contributed to vast social costs during the current economic crisis in the USA and in Europe. This theoretical study internalizes these social costs via two market-based policy instruments for the first time in a real-economy Dixit–Stiglitz framework: a tax on firms' debt capital use and a subsidy for market entrants. It helps understand the complex real-economic mechanisms that these policy instruments cause, it derives intuitive rules of thumb for setting the tax rate and the subsidy level so that they elevate welfare, and it suggests ways to practically implement the policies.     

A barrier option framework for rescue package designs and bank default risks

Rescue packages adopted to stabilize the banking system are generally divided into three categories: government purchases of distressed assets, government guaranteed debt issuance programs, and direct equity capital injections. Countries afflicted by the recent financial crisis launched general programs in one or two, and even in three different categories. In this paper, we examine that the design of a government rescue package for a distressed bank depends on the expected reduction of the default risk in the bank's equity returns. We find that the bank's default risk is negatively related to distressed loan purchases, and to capital injections, but positively related to guaranteed debt issuance. We also find that the rescue package including all three categories is not guaranteed to increase stability for the rescued bank. Specifically, the combination of distressed loan purchases and capital injections is superior to the package of the three categories in addition to the solo instrument. This suggests that an effective design of a government rescue package for the financial services industry largely depends on its targets.     

Mean reverting financial leverage: theory and evidence from Pakistan

Grounding concepts of the two competing theories of capital structure (trade-off theory, pecking order theory) are quite opposite to each other. Trade-off theory claims that there is an optimal (target) capital structure and firms try to achieve that optimal (target) point. Whereas pecking order theory argues that there is no optimal (target) capital structure but the firms follow a specific pattern of financing. Using the two competing theoretic frameworks, this study applies Fisher-type panel unit root test to an unbalanced panel data of 13 115 firm-year observations of nonfinancial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan spread over 38 years (1973–2010). Overall panel test results, for short-term, long-term, as well as total leverage support trade-off financing behaviour while individual firm results do not. Individual firm results show that only 16% of the firms have short-term target, 25% of the firms have long-term target and 12% of the firms have total target leverage ratio. Further, industry results explain that most of the industries do have target leverage ratios and classification of data into profitable and lossmaking firm-year observations explains that profitable firms clearly follow trade-off financing behaviour while the results for lossmaking firms do not support trade-off financing behaviour. Our study indicates that it is important for the government to ensure policies to develop well-balanced financial markets and to improve accountability systems.