Parameter uncertainty and inflation dynamics in a model with asymmetric central bank preferences

This paper builds on the Lucas' (1973) signal extraction model to study the time-varying effect of uncertainty in the output-inflation trade-off on inflation, using a monetary model with asymmetric central bank preferences whereby deviations of output (relative to target) from above are weighted differently from deviations from below. The model is investigated empirically using data from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). We show that the implication of the uncertainty element is to cause the authority to change its indirect control, output by less (and hence change it direct control, interest rate by less) whenever inflation is below or above the target, in line with Brainard's attenuation principle. We also find that SARB's asymmetric output stabilization explains inflation movements significantly, and that the monetary authority seems to be more averse to business cycle recessions than expansions, hence more keen to avoid recessions than expansions. Overall, a more transparent and committed monetary policy practice that would reduce uncertainty over the output-inflation trade-off would be helpful for economic stability.     

A Note on Inflation Targeting

The authors present a pedagogical graphical exposition to illustrate the stabilizing effect of price target zones. Based on a textbook AD-AS apparatus, they find that authorities' commitment to defend a price target zone will affect the public's inflation expectations and, in turn, reduce actual inflation. They also find that, when the economy experiences supply shocks, the announcement that the monetary authorities intend to defend a price target zone will reduce the variability of domestic prices but raise the variability of domestic output relative to a free-price regime. However, when the economy experiences demand shocks, a price target zone tends to lower the variability of both domestic prices and out-put relative to a free-price regime.     

Asymmetric monetary policy and the effective lower bound

We use the canonical New Keynesian model to study optimal discretionary policy when the nominal interest rate is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB). We show that policymakers who seek to minimize a (symmetric) quadratic loss function involving deviations of inflation and output from targets will achieve an average inflation rate below target due to the contractionary effects associated with hitting the ELB. We also characterize optimal discretionary policy for policymakers who view output losses as asymmetric: they place weight on the output gap when output is below potential but place little or no weight on the gap when output is above potential. In comparison to optimal policy using the symmetric loss function, the average inflation rate is higher and closer to the central banks target. Moreover, in response to contractionary demand shocks that push the nominal interest rate to the effective lower bound, policymakers with an asymmetric loss function adopt a policy rate path that remains at the ELB longer but eventually rises more quickly than the path adopted by a policymaker with a symmetric loss function.     

Asymmetric monetary policy rules in Australia

In this study, the hypothesis that the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) implements an asymmetric monetary policy rule is tested. We estimate both linear and asymmetric monetary policy reaction functions for the period before inflation targeting was adopted, for the period when inflation targeting was explicitly adopted and for the full sample period. The results of the linear monetary policy rules are consistent with the estimates reported from other studies that estimate linear monetary policy rules for Australia. On the other hand, the results of estimating the asymmetric monetary policy rules for the pre-inflation targeting period shows that the RBA had reacted symmetrically, suggesting that it had acted with the same aggressiveness towards both inflation and output gaps of the same magnitude, over both phases of the business cycle. However, for the inflation targeting period, the results show that the RBA had reacted asymmetrically in its policy response to the inflation gap, output gap or both. A similar result is found for the full sample period. This asymmetric response supports the view that a non-linear monetary policy rule emanated from asymmetric preferences, rather than from the existence of a non-linear Phillips curve.     

Asymmetric monetary policy rules for the euro area and the US

We analyse the implications of asymmetric monetary policy rules by estimating Markov-switching DSGE models for the euro area (EA) and the US. The estimations show that until mid-2014 the ECB’s response to inflation was more forceful when inflation was above than below the central bank’s aim. Since then, the ECB’s policy can be characterised as symmetric, and we quantify the macroeconomic implications of this policy change. We uncover asymmetries also in the Fed’s policy, which has responded more strongly in times of crisis. We compute optimal simple rules for the EA and the US in an environment with the effective lower bound and a low neutral real rate, and find that it prescribes a stronger response to inflation and the output gap when inflation is below target compared to when it is above target. We document its stabilisation properties had this optimal rule been implemented over the last two decades.     

Productivity Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Two-Country Model

In this paper, we examine the effects of foreign productivity shocks on monetary policy in a symmetric open economy. Our two-country model incorporates the New Keynesian features of price stickiness and monopolistic competition based on the cost channel of Ravenna and Walsh (2006). In particular, in response to asymmetric productivity shocks, firms in one country achieve a more efficient level of production than those in another economy. Because the terms of trade are directly affected by changes in both economies’ output levels, international trade creates a transmission channel for inflation dynamics in which a deflationary spiral in foreign producer prices reduces domestic output. When there is a decline in economic activity, the monetary authority should react to this adverse situation by lowering the key interest rate. The impulse response function from the model shows that a productivity shock can cause a real depreciation of the exchange rate when economies are closely integrated through international trade.     

Asymmetric effects in the Polish monetary policy rule

In this paper we investigate whether the reaction function of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) is asymmetric according to the level of inflation gap and the level of output gap. Moreover, we test whether these asymmetries might possibly stem from nonlinearities in the Phillips curve. Threshold models are applied and two cases of unknown and known threshold values are investigated. Our results show that the Polish central bank responds more strongly to the level inflation when the level of inflation is relatively high. We find very weak evidence that the level of inflation reacts more strongly to the output gap when the output gap is relatively high. Thus, the asymmetries in the monetary policy rule seem to indicate asymmetric preferences of the central bank.     

Optimal monetary policy revisited: does considering US real-time data change things?

The primary goal of this article is to investigate whether properly modelling real-time data and optimal real-time decision-making of a monetary planner provides new insights into monetary policy behaviour and outcomes. This article extends a variant of the asymmetric preference model suggested by Ruge-Murcia to investigate the use of real-time data available to policymakers when making their decisions and revised data which more accurately measure economic performance, but is only available much later. In our extended model, the central banker targets a weighted average of revised and real-time inflation together with a weighted average of revised and real-time output. Moreover, we allow for an asymmetric central bank response to real-time data depending on whether the unemployment rate is high or low. Our model identifies several new potential sources of inflation bias due to data revisions. Our empirical results suggest that the Federal Reserve Bank focuses on targeting revised inflation during low unemployment periods, but it weighs heavily real-time inflation during high unemployment periods. The inflation bias due to data revisions is comparable in magnitude to the bias from asymmetric central banker preferences with the bias being somewhat larger during high unemployment.     

The opportunistic approach to monetary policy and financial market conditions

We test the concept of the opportunistic approach to monetary policy in South Africa post-2000 inflation targeting regime. The article contributes to the current debate on central banks having additional objectives over and above inflation and output by incorporating a measure of financial conditions in the modelling framework. Our findings support the two features of the opportunistic approach. First, we find that the models that include an intermediate target that reflects the recent history of inflation rather than simple inflation target improve the fit of the models. Second, the data supports the view that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) behaves with some degree of nonresponsiveness when inflation is within the zone of discretion but react aggressively otherwise. Recursive estimates from our preferred model reveal that overall there has been a subdued reaction to inflation, output and financial conditions amidst the increased economic uncertainty of the 2007–2009 financial crisis.     

成本冲击与价格粘性的非对称性——来自中国微观制造业企业的证据

本文在状态依存模型框架内,估计了中国制造业企业价格粘性的非对称性和异质性。结果显示制造业产品的价格粘性具有非对称的特征,同时企业的"异质性"也影响了产品的价格粘性。根据价格粘性理论,存在价格粘性时,货币是"非中性"的,通过调整货币数量能够影响短期内的产出。然而,由于价格粘性的非对称性,在通货膨胀时期,央行为了抑制通胀而采取的紧缩性货币政策将更多地表现为产出减少,而非价格水平下降;相反,为提高产出而实行的扩张性货币政策将更多地表现为价格水平上升,而非产出水平提高。只有通货紧缩时期,价格粘性的非对称性出现反转,扩张性货币政策在短期内才更有效。     

MONETARY POLICY REGIME SWITCHES AND MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS*

This article considers the determinacy and distributional consequences of regime switching in monetary policy. Although switching in the inflation target does not affect determinacy, switches in the inflation response can cause indeterminacy. Satisfying the Taylor principle period by period is neither necessary nor sufficient for determinacy when inflation responses switch; indeterminacy can arise if monetary policy responds too aggressively to inflation in the active regime. Inflation target switches primarily impact the level of inflation, whereas inflation response switches primarily impact the volatility. Expecting an inflation target switch has minor effects on volatility, whereas expecting an inflation response switch raises volatility more substantially.     

The optimal neglect of inflation: An alternative interpretation of UK monetary policy during the “Great Moderation”

This paper argues that UK monetary policymakers did not respond to the inflation rate during most of the “Great Moderation” that ran from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. We derive a generalisation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in which inflation is a non-linear function of the output gap and show that the optimal response of the policy rule to inflation depends on the slope of the Phillips curve; if this is flat, manipulation of aggregate demand through monetary policy does not affect inflation and so policymakers cannot affect inflation. We estimate the monetary policy rules implied by a variety of alternative Phillips curves; our preferred model is based on a Phillips curve that is flat when output is close to equilibrium. We find that policy rates do not respond to inflation when the output gap is small, a situation that characterised most of the “Great Moderation” period.     

Federal reserve monetary policy and the non-linearity of the Taylor rule

We propose and estimate a generalized Taylor rule for the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) to find out how the Fed funds rate is sensitive to changes in inflation and output gap variables in the post war period. We find that Fed's monetary policy has only reacted significantly to changes in inflation when they were between approximately 6.5–8.5%. However, the policy stance change on these changes was relatively small. The findings suggest that the US Fed has been too averse to change from its current monetary policy stance, and that it has not reacted noticeably to changes in the US economic activity, as measured by the output gap. The generalized functional form for the monetary policy rule suggests that similar non-linearity exists in the directional change of the Fed rate.     

An explanation for the price puzzle: Asymmetric information and expectation dynamics

Using theoretical and empirical analyses, this paper shows that the expectation dynamics induced by information asymmetry between the Central Bank (CB) and the public can cause the price puzzle. The signalling and learning dynamics between the CB and a representative private-sector agent under asymmetric information is investigated. Inflation positively reacts to contractionary monetary policy because the change in the interest rate is perceived as a signal of the CB’s private information about higher future inflation and output by the public. The empirical section of the paper validates this theoretical argument using a VAR specification about the US economy. Besides providing an explanation for the price puzzle, the results of this paper has practical implications about transparency and monetary policy. The theoretical and empirical findings indicate that asymmetric information causes significant frictions in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. These frictions induce short-run undesired effects like increase in expected inflation and actual inflation as a response to contractionary monetary policy which is identified as “the price puzzle”.     

"机会主义"策略及其在中国货币政策中的运用

本文融合"机会主义"货币政策时变中间目标和阈值效应的特征,提出了含时变产出中间目标的"机会主义"货币政策规则,并利用时变阈值的"泰勒规则"从通胀和产出两方面对我国货币政策规则进行了考察.研究表明,我国利率的调节同时兼顾了经济增长和物价稳定,且调节程度依赖于通胀、产出与其中间目标的偏离程度,表现出"机会主义"货币政策策略的特征.利率对经济增长与其中间目标较小的偏离([-1.478,1.522])就会作出反应,而对通货膨胀与其中间目标较大的偏离([-2.55,2.15])才会作出反应.在我国"十二五"期间,为了实现促进经济平稳较快发展和保持物价总水平基本稳定的总体目标,我国货币政策应该采取更加灵活成熟的"机会主义"策略,调整对通货膨胀调节的力度和敏感度,同时应增强经济可能遭受负面冲击的预期,努力实现"控通胀稳增长"的目标.     

Optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with endogenous growth

We study optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian (NK) model with endogenous growth and knowledge spillovers external to each firm. We find that, in contrast with the standard NK model, the Ramsey dynamics implies deviation from full inflation targeting in response to technology and government spending shocks, while the optimal operational rule is backward looking and responds to inflation and output deviations from their long-run levels.     

THE COMPLEX RESPONSE OF MONETARY POLICY TO THE EXCHANGE RATE

We estimate a flexible non‐linear monetary policy rule for the United Kingdom to examine the response of policymakers to the real exchange rate. We have three main findings. First, policymakers respond to real exchange rate misalignment rather than to the real exchange rate itself. Second, policymakers ignore small deviations of the exchange rate; they only respond to real exchange under‐valuations of more than 4% and over‐valuations of more than 5%. Third, the response of policymakers to inflation is smaller when the exchange rate is over‐valued and larger when it is under‐valued. None of these responses is allowed for in the widely used linear Taylor‐type rules, suggesting that monetary policy is better analysed using a more sophisticated model, such as the one suggested in this paper.     

Monetary Policy Delegation and Transparency of Policy Targets: A Positive Analysis

Abstract. We show that, in a two‐stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society's endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution.