Price Discovery for Segmented US-Listed Chinese Stocks: Location or Market Quality?

Abstract:  This study extends the cross-listing literature by examining how, and to what extent, the trading of cross-listed China-backed ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange contributes to information flows and price discovery for the corresponding stocks traded in China's A-share market. We find that the cross-listed US prices and Chinese prices are not cointegrated in the long-run and the home market plays a far more important role in both price discovery and volatility spillover than does the US market. The home bias hypothesis still holds for the segmented Chinese A-share market and the location where price discovery actually originates is the essential factor in the process of international information transmission.     

The Impact of Incentives and Communication Costs on Information Production and Use: Evidence from Bank Lending

In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes more strongly related to loan prices and outcomes. Our results highlight how incentives and communication costs affect information production and use.     

Information Aggregation via Contracting

When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk-taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting-based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well-known rational expectations equilibrium models.     

Costly Information Acquisition,Social Networks,and Asset Prices: Experimental Evidence

We design an experiment to study the implications of information networks for incentives to acquire costly information, market liquidity, investors' earnings, and asset price characteristics in a financial market. Social communication crowds out information production as a result of an agent's temptation to free ride on the signals purchased by her neighbors. Although information exchange among traders increases trading volume, improves liquidity, and enhances the ability of asset prices to reflect the available information in the market, it fails to improve price informativeness. Net earnings and social welfare are higher with information sharing due to reduced acquisition of costly signals.     

Inclusionary Housing Policies,Stigma Effects and Strategic Production Decisions

Inclusionary housing policies enacted by municipal governments rely on a combination of legal mandates and economic incentives to encourage residential real estate developers to include affordable units in otherwise market-rate projects. These regulations provide a means of stimulating the production of mixed-income housing at a minimal cost to the public sector, but have been hypothesized to slow development and put upward pressure on housing prices. The results of the theoretical models presented in this paper suggest that inclusionary housing policies need not increase housing prices in all situations. However, any observed impact on housing prices may be mitigated by density effects and stigma effects that decrease demand for market-rate units. The results additionally suggest real estate developers are likely to respond to inclusionary housing policies by strategically altering production decisions.     

An empirical analysis of the incentives to engage in costly information acquisition: The case of risk arbitrage

In order for security prices to be informationally efficient, incentives must exist for traders to engage in costly information acquisition. This paper provides empirical evidence on this proposition. We observe that risk arbitrageurs (i.e., market participants who trade in securities of firms that are involved in mergers, tender offers, and voluntary liquidations) are able to generate private information regarding the success or failure of corporate reorganizations. Moreover, risk arbitrageurs earn substantial returns on their trading activities. These results suggest that security prices are sufficiently noisy to create incentives for costly information acquisition.     

Regulating securities analysts

We examine the effects of regulations designed to address the potential conflict of interest that arises when sell-side analyst research is not independent of investment banking. We focus on two types of regulation: (1) internal barriers between equity research and investment banking that restrict communication; and (2) disclosure requirements relating to analyst compensation. We find that information barriers can increase research effort and improve report quality by limiting an investment bank's ability to distort its analyst's incentives. However, this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower the quality of reports if an investment bank benefits directly from research activity. Disclosure requirements, on the other hand, unambiguously lead to more informative prices and a higher report quality relative to either information barriers or no regulation.     

Efficiency and Stock Performance in European Banking

Abstract:   Recent competitive pressures have progressively driven banks to strategically focus on generating returns to shareholders. Therefore, the investigation of the determinants of bank performance and their relationship with share prices has become increasingly important. This paper extends the literature on market‐based accounting to examine the relationship between stock prices and efficiency. Specifically, it investigates if changes in stock performance can be explained by changes in operating efficiency, derived by parametric and non‐parametric methods. Results seem to suggest that changes in efficiency are reflected in changes in stock prices and that stocks of cost efficient banks tend to outperform their inefficient counterparts.     

Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?

In a capitalist economy, prices serve to equilibrate supply and demand for goods and services, continually changing to reallocate resources to their most efficient uses. However, secondary stock market prices, often viewed as the most “informationally efficient” prices in the economy, have no direct role in the allocation of equity capital since managers have discretion in determining the level of investment. What is the link between stock price informational efficiency and economic efficiency? We present a model of the stock market in which: (i) managers have discretion in making investments and must be given the right incentives; and (ii) stock market traders may have important information that managers do not have about the value of prospective investment opportunities. In equilibrium, information in stock prices will guide investment decisions because managers will be compensated based on informative stock prices in the future. The stock market indirectly guides investment by transferring two kinds of information: information about investment opportunities and information about managers' past decisions. However, because this role is only indirect, the link between price efficiency and economic efficiency is tenuous. We show that stock price efficiency is not sufficient for economic efficiency by showing that the model may have another equilibrium in which prices are strong-form efficient, but investment decisions are suboptimal. We also suggest that stock market efficiency is not necessary for investment efficiency by considering a banking system that can serve as an alternative institution for the efficient allocation of investment resources.     

The effects of a modest incentive on information overload in an investment analysis task

This paper investigates the effects of performance based monetary incentives on cue usage within the information overload paradigm. Participants suggested appropriate stock prices for hypothetical companies based on either six or nine non-correlated information cues. The presence of monetary incentives motivated increased response times compared to participants who did not receive incentives. This in turn resulted in higher levels of information usage than has been observed in previous studies. The results support the view that information processing capacity imposes a limit on the amount of information processed per unit of time rather than on the amount of information that can be processed in total.     

A model of recommended retail prices

Manufacturers frequently post nonbinding public price recommendations, but neither the rationale for this practice nor its impact on prices is well understood. I develop a model in which recommendations signal a manufacturer's production cost to searching consumers, who then form beliefs about retail prices. Increasing search makes consumers reject offers for the manufacturer's and competitors' products more often, and I show that both consumers and the manufacturer prefer more search when the production cost is low and less search when it is high. With incentives thus aligned, manufacturer recommendations inform consumers via cheap talk, and their removal harms both parties.     

Indexing and Stock Price Efficiency

Indexing has experienced substantial growth over the last two decades because it is an effective way of holding a diversified portfolio while minimizing trading costs and taxes. In this article, we focus on one negative externality of indexing: the effect on the efficiency of stock prices. Based on a sample of large and liquid US stocks, we find that greater indexing leads to less efficient stock prices, as indicated by stronger post‐earnings‐announcement drift and greater deviations of stock prices from the random walk. We conjecture that reduced incentives for information acquisition and arbitrage induced by indexing and passive trading are probably the main causes for degradation in price efficiency.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

Stock Market Valuation of Deferred Tax Assets: Evidence from Internet Firms

Abstract:   We use the provisions of SFAS No. 109 , Accounting for Income Taxes , to examine the extent to which stock prices of Internet firms were associated with expectations of future profitability before versus after the 'market correction' in early 2000. We find that the valuation of deferred tax assets of firms with business models reliant on the level of web site traffic was significantly greater after the market correction. In our view, this evidence is consistent with pre‐correction mispricing.     

Accounting for Joint Ventures and Associates in Canada, UK, and US: Do US Rules Hide Information?

Abstract:   Unlike US GAAP, accounting principles in Canada and the UK require disclosure of disaggregated components of joint ventures and associates. Using comparative analysis of Canadian, UK and US data, this study investigates the potential loss of forecasting and valuation relevant information from aggregating joint venture and associate accounting amounts. Findings show that aggregating joint venture and associate investment numbers, and aggregating joint venture revenues and expenses, each leads to loss of forecasting and valuation relevant information. Thus, current US accounting principles likely mask information that financial statement users could use to predict future earnings and explain share prices.     

Blockholder Trading,Market Efficiency,and Managerial Myopia

This paper analyzes how blockholders can exert governance even if they cannot intervene in a firm's operations. Blockholders have strong incentives to monitor the firm's fundamental value because they can sell their stakes upon negative information. By trading on private information (following the “Wall Street Rule”), they cause prices to reflect fundamental value rather than current earnings. This in turn encourages managers to invest for long‐run growth rather than short‐term profits. Contrary to the view that the U.S.'s liquid markets and transient shareholders exacerbate myopia, I show that they can encourage investment by impounding its effects into prices.     

Discussion of “decentralized capacity management and internal pricing”

Dutta and Reichelstein (2010) study the role of transfer pricing and organizational choice in providing incentives for efficient decisions on the acquisition and subsequent reallocation of capacity within decentralized firms. Their analysis suggests that transfer prices based on the historical cost of capacity facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. They also find that symmetric responsibility center structures are generally better suited for providing efficient investment incentives than hybrid organizations. An important condition for the derivation of the two results is the linearity of the shadow prices of capacity. If shadow prices are nonlinear, transfer prices should be below (above) the historical cost of capacity in order to counteract the managers’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest). Because profit center organizations can use transfer prices for mitigating the inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices, they offer a natural advantage over pure investment center organizations in implementing efficient capacity decisions. Overall, these observations suggest that the curvature of profit functions is an important factor in determining the suitable instruments for decentralized capacity management.     

Effects of Macroeconomic Policies on Sectoral Prices

The effect of macroeconomic policies on the relative pricesof internationally traded and domestic goods has been the subjectof extensive study. Analysis of the way in which these policiesthen affect prices at the sectoral level is complicated by theheterogeneity of sectoral production: even the prices of singleproducts usually are determined by both domestic and tradedcomponents. We present a framework which first traces the influenceof macropolicy on the relative prices of exports, imports, andhome goods. It then accounts for each sector's degree of "tradability,"which is based on the importance of trade in sectoral income,and the influence of macroeconomic policy on sectoral prices.To illustrate the use of this approach, it is applied to a simulationof trade liberalization in Argentina. Our results suggest thateconomywide policies had substantial negative effects on boththe real exchange rate and the incentives to agricultural exports.     

Price Discovery,Causality and Forecasting in the Freight Futures Market

This paper investigates the causal relationship between futures and spot prices in the freight futures market. Being a thinly traded market whose underlying asset is a service, sets it apart from other markets investigated so far in the literature. Causality tests, generalised impulse response analysis and forecasting performance evaluation indicate that futures prices tend to discover new information more rapidly than spot prices. Revisions in the composition of the underlying index to make it more homogeneous, have strengthened the price discovery role of futures prices. The information incorporated in futures prices, when formulated as a VECM, produces more accurate forecasts of spot prices than the VAR, ARIMA and random-walk models, over several steps ahead. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The informational consequences of good and bad mergers

We study the information production dynamics in financial markets in response to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) announcements. We find that acquirers with low levels of pre-announcement stock price informativeness experience a substantial increase in their corresponding post-announcement stock price informativeness in response to positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). We show that this increase is due to the enhanced prospect of deal completion. By contrast, high levels of acquirer pre-announcement stock price informativeness limit traders' incentives to search for, and acquire, new information. We also find that similar dynamics apply to the changes in acquirers' analyst coverage. Emphasizing the important role of information acquisition costs in influencing informed trading, a positive acquirer CAR increases the acquiring firm's post-announcement stock price informativeness in M&As involving public rather than private and subsidiary targets. Overall, we show that M&As have important informational consequences beyond their immediate effects on stock prices.