Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting

Extraction from a common pool resource (CPR), such as a fishery, can lead to socially inefficient and undesirable outcomes as a result of appropriation problems. Through regulation of the CPR, users may achieve a more profitable and socially efficient outcome. Feeny et al. (Land Econ 72(2):187–205, 1996) delve into some of the assumptions made by traditional CPR models and how use of those assumptions provides an incomplete framework to guide fishery policy. In the theoretical models we develop, we relax two of those assumptions: CPR users are homogeneous and are unable to create, or influence, management of the resource. We note a case where regulation of the individual user can induce others to harvest more, and relate this to the slippage effect concept. Regarding resource sustainability, we document situations where incentives exist for CPR users to lobby for tighter regulations and thus increase profits by limiting the tragedy of the commons influence.     

Cost Reduction,Licensing and Incentive to Innovate: A Note

In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R&D for process innovations. Competition to innovate is usually modelled as a two stage game. In the first stage of the game both firms simultaneously reduces their production costs. In the second stage the firms compete la Stackelberg and it is possible to prove that the profits of one of the two firms (and total profits) might decrease in a range of parameters. Then we consider the possibility of technology transfer from the leader that has the most productive technology to the follower under licensing by means of a fixed fee and of a royalty. It is possible to prove that under licensing total profits will increase in some range of parameters above mentioned in comparison to the pre-innovation case.     

The Welfare and Resouce Allocation Implications of the U.S.Dairy Quotas

This paper examine the welfare and resource allocation implications of the U.S. dairy quotas. A computable general equilibrium model detailing five dairy sectors and nine aggregate sectors is calibrated to a 1989 benchmark of the U.S economy. The model is used to simulate the removal of the U.S.dairy quotas both the with and without a first-best subsidy to maintain a dairy farm output objective. Welfare, production, trade, and employment results are provided. The welfare cost of the U.S dairy quotas ranges from $0.7 to $1.0 billion. The first-best subsidy ranges from $2.0 to $2.3 billion or approximately $1.4 million per full-time equivalent job maintained in the dairy farm sector [F13, Q17]     

扶持我国出口导向企业实施RRC战略的理论依据

文章探讨本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业实施提高竞争对手成本(RRC)战略的投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业RRC投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业RRC投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。由于RRC战略较之掠夺性定价温和且更易实施,这一政策对于保持我国出口稳定增长具有一定积极意义。     

Networks of common property resources

A tragedy of commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from each source they are connected to. We show that the network structure matters. The exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Next we characterize the efficient levels of extractions by users and outflows from sources. We provide a graph decomposition which divides the network into regions according to the availability of sources. Then the efficiency problem can be solved region by region.     

Fishing Technology and Optimal Distribution of Harvest Rates

This paper examines the problem of the optimal management of a joint-ownership fishing exploitation, where agents use different fishing gears. We consider a model in which the fishing activity may affect resource growth, not only through the harvest function but also through the natural growth rate of the resource. This allows us to capture the fact that some fishing gears alter the natural growth rate of the resource. We find that when the natural growth of the resource is altered by the fishing technology, the optimal stock is not independent of how harvest quotas are distribute among the agents. As a result, a fishing policy that firstly determines the optimum stock and, secondly, decides how to distribute the harvest among the different agents, will not be efficient. We also analyze the joint determination of optimal stock and harvest quotas and show that positive harvest quotas will only be optimal when countries are characterized by certain asymmetries.     

提高我国科技经费使用效益的创新政策研究

政府、依托单位和课题组围绕科技经费进行的博弈,主要体现在课题预算、管理费、人员费、课题决算、课题结余经费5个方面。根据市场机制和博弈论,提出了应从全面实施全额成本核算制的资助方式、同一课题唯一渠道制、增设依托单位的科研一般管理费用政策、适度提高人员费支出比例、开发与政策配套的管理工具、建设专业化科技经费管理队伍、注意政策间的相互配套7个方面进一步完善我国现行科技经费管理政策的建议。     

Time and uncertainty in resource dilemmas: equilibrium solutions and experimental results

Most common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas share two features: they evolve over time and they are managed under environmental uncertainties. We propose a stylized dynamic model that integrates these two dimensions. A distinguishing feature of our model is that the duration of the game is determined endogenously by the users’ collective decisions. In the proposed model, if the resource stock level below which the irreversible event occurs is known in advance, then the optimal resource use coincides with a unique symmetric equilibrium that guarantees survival of the resource. As the uncertainty about the threshold level increases, resource use increases if users adopt decision strategies that quickly deplete the resource stock, but decreases if they adopt path strategies guaranteeing that the unknown threshold level is never exceeded. We show that under relatively high uncertainty about resource size, CPR users frequently implement decision strategies that terminate the game immediately. When this uncertainty is reduced, they maintain a positive resource level for longer durations.     

Information,optimality and pollution control

A mechanism that provides for the efficient production of public goods suggested recently by Groves-Ledyard is reinterpreted as an efficient emissions' rights market scheme. A generalization of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism which Suchanek has shown to comprise an efficient emissions' quotas scheme is restated and then converted into an efficient emissions' charges scheme. The relationship between these schemes yields the standard duality of optimal emissions' charges and optimal emissions' quotas. This duality result is not as strong as one might believe. As an illustration, two emissions' charges schemes are presented each of which generates the charges dual to the optimal quotas given by the specified optimal emissions' quotas government but which are inefficient in general.     

Quota-Induced Cycles

We present a new framework to compare the dynamic effect of tariffs and quotas in the presence of oligopoly. Suppose that the domestic and the foreign firm play a quantity-setting game over time in a perfectly stationary economy. A Markov-perfect equilibrium has the foreign firm exporting at the constant rate under a tariff. In contrast, under the quota the rate of exports changes monotonically over the course of each year, causing seasonal fluctuations in domestic production. Quota-induced cycles can make dynamic market segmentation possible and raise profits for both the firms above what they earn under the equal-import tariff.     

Pricing and Management of Recreational Activities Which Use Natural Resources

This paper analyses the economic efficiency ofmanagement regimes for the recreational use of anatural resource. Management must determine the useand development of the natural resource. Thefirst-best policy uses price to offset theexternalities of crowding and deterioration. This iscontrasted with two second-best polices which do notuse pricing: unrestricted access and quotas. Acondition under which a relaxation of quota levelincreases efficiency is derived. Under iso-elasticfunctional forms quotas are less efficient thanunrestricted access.     

First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities

This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free-riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two-part per-unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first-best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first-best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first-best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.     

Regulation of a Spatial Externality: Refuges versus Tax for Managing Pest Resistance

We examine regulations for managing pest resistance to pesticide varieties in a temporally and spatially explicit framework. We compare the performance of the EPA’s mandatory refuges and a tax (or subsidy) on the pesticide variety under several biological assumptions on pest mobility and the heterogeneity of farmers’ pest vulnerability. We find that only the tax (or subsidy) restores efficiency if pest mobility is perfect within the area. If pest mobility is imperfect and when farmers face identical pest vulnerability, only the refuge might restore efficiency. With simulations we illustrate that complex outcomes may arise for intermediate levels of pest mobility and farmers’ heterogeneity. Our results shed light on the choice of regulatory instruments for common-pool resource regulations where spatial localization matters.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

The Role of Central Government in Tax Competition Between Heterogenous Regions

This paper analyzes the role of central government in a Nash tax competition between two heterogenous regions, which differ in their endowments of two production factors. Regional governments use a source-based unit tax on mobile capital to finance their public service expenditures. The central government employs excise subsidies and lump-sum taxes to induce the two regions to efficient resource allocations. We answer to the question that whether the central government can induce an efficient equilibrium, and investigate the effects of endowments difference on the optimum subsidy rates. We find that there exists a unique tax rate under which the efficiency is achieved. We identify the set of endowment allocations for which the subsidy rate to one region is higher (or lower) than the subsidy rate to the rival. The large poor region receives a higher subsidy than the small rich region, but the subsidy to the small poor region may be higher or lower than that to the large rich region. [H2]     

Strategic interaction in undeveloped credit markets

This paper studies the strategic interaction between informal and formal lenders in undeveloped credit markets. In a model with adverse selection, loan seniority, market power, and differences in the cost of lending, it is shown that under general conditions a co-funding equilibrium will be a Nash outcome of the game. We demonstrate that a collateral requirement in connection with formal loans always generates a new co-funding equilibrium in which both lenders earn higher profits. A government subsidy to the formal lender may have the opposite effect. We relate our results to existing empirical evidence and the emerging discussion of how to best ensure financial viability and outreach of microfinance institutions.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.     

INEFFICIENT LOCK‐IN AND SUBSIDY COMPETITION*

This article studies a subsidy game among two asymmetric regions in a new trade model. Capital can freely move among regions, but capital rewards are repatriated to the region of residence. The activity of the modern sector is associated with positive spillovers. We study subsidy competition, starting from an equilibrium where the industry core is inefficiently locked in to the smaller region. When regions weigh workers’ and capitalists’ welfare equally, subsidy competition results in a relocation of industry to the larger region, restoring an efficient allocation. When workers’ welfare is weighted more heavily, the smaller (core) region may pay subsidies that are high enough to prevent a relocation of industry.     

Private information,Coasian bargaining,and the second welfare theorem

Most of the debate about Coasian bargaining in the presence of externalities relates to the First Welfare Theorem: is the outcome under bargaining efficient? This debate has involved the definition and importance of transaction costs, the significance of private information, and the effect of entry. There has been little analysis of how Coasian bargaining relates to the Second Welfare Theorem: even if the bargaining outcome is efficient, does the process limit the set of Pareto optimal allocations which can be achieved?We consider a model in which individuals utilize a common resource and may affect each other's output. The individuals differ in their productivities or tastes and this information is private to each of them. The government can manage the common resource and use nonlinear taxes to correct for the externality or it can turn the common resource over to a private owner who can charge individuals to utilize it with a nonlinear fee schedule. The government and the owner have the same information about tastes and productivities of the individuals. Except for the private information, there are no bargaining or administrative costs for collecting the taxes or fees. Whether there is public or private ownership, the government desires to redistribute, but it faces self-selection constraints.We show that the outcome of Coasian bargaining is constrained Pareto efficient. That is, given the information constraints, no Pareto improvement is possible. However, private ownership may limit what Pareto optimal allocations the government can achieve. The private owner in seeking to maximize profits always proposes contracts which counteract the government's attempts to redistribute across individuals with different characteristics. Under public management, any Pareto optimum can be sustained. In this context, private ownership, while not inefficient, does limit the government's ability to redistribute.     

不同权重下政府补贴对供应链的影响

在考虑政府对制造商和消费者的补贴权重的情况下,基于博弈理论建立了制造商和零售商的决策模型,分析了不同权重下政府补贴对消费者、企业决策及其绩效的影响。数理模型推导和算例分析的结果表明:政府只对消费者补贴将导致企业提高价格,政府只对制造商补贴将导致企业降低价格;随着政府补贴的增加,消费者的实际支出价格减少,需求量、制造商利润和零售商利润均增加;政府补贴权重不同,企业决策也不同;政府补贴政策的实施对于消费者、企业和政府都是有利的;政府和企业更倾向于政府对制造商补贴,而消费者更希望政府对消费者补贴。