影响纳税人税收遵从决策的因素

税收遵从决策是纳税人行为选择的一个复杂过程,其中起作用的因素很多,除了经济因素,还包括非经济因素。按照经典的逃税模型——A-S模型①所揭示的主要因素是稽查概率和罚款率,除此之外影响纳税人遵从决策的因素还包括:税收遵从成本、税制、纳税人个体特征、对政府的满意程度以及税收文化等。     

Taxpayers' Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A Critique and a New Measure

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non‐compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of ‘tax gaps’ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax non‐compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non‐compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes (such as the ‘VAT gap’) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax‐base‐reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be anticipated from the tax gap estimate.     

Collusive tax evasion and social norms

Although collusive tax evasion by buyers and sellers of commodities and also by employers and employees is widespread all over the world, it has rarely been analyzed in the tax evasion literature. To fill this gap and to compare collusive tax evasion with independent tax evasion, this paper develops a simple noncooperative game-theoretic model and confirms the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper focuses on the effect of social norms and theoretically and empirically demonstrates that the tax compliance norm has a stronger negative effect on the magnitude of collusive tax evasion than on independent tax evasion. The reason for this result is that in a collusive tax evasion game with multiple equilibria social norms affect the range of equilibria and act as an equilibrium selection device, whereas social norms need to be strongly internalized to change the behavior of taxpayers who evade taxes unobservedly.     

Tax compliance under horizontal and vertical equity conditions: An experimental approach

Tax compliance is a complex phenomenon, which requires to be addressed from different perspectives. We report the results of a real-effort experiment aiming at testing the effect of different equity conditions on individual tax compliance levels. We show that equity considerations seem to change individual behaviour only when a vertically unfair tax system is implemented. Also, random effects Tobit estimations show that being audited in the previous period has a negative effect on tax evasion, whereas the level of the fine paid in the previous period positively affects income underreporting. Also, we find that when subjects are in the vertical inequity condition they are significantly more likely to fully evade taxes than in the equity condition, whereas such result cannot be found in the horizontal inequity condition. Finally, we find a standard gender effect showing that female participants are less likely to evade taxes than man and that risk aversion negatively affect tax evasion behaviour.     

An egocentric model of the relations among the opportunity to underreport,social norms,ethical beliefs,and underreporting behavior

A model of the relations among taxpayers’ opportunity, social norms, ethical beliefs, and tax compliance is proposed and tested using structural equation modeling. High opportunity taxpayers, who may personally benefit from evasion, judged evasion as less unethical than low opportunity taxpayers. High and low opportunity taxpayers judged social norms similarly. Further, ethical beliefs partially (fully) mediate the relation between opportunity (social norms) and underreporting. Implications from our study to tax compliance researchers and policy makers are discussed.     

Tax compliance under tax regime changes

We focus on the compliance effects of tax regime changes. According to the economic model of tax evasion, a tax reform should affect compliance through its impact on tax rates and incentives. Our findings demonstrate the importance of at least two further effects not covered by the traditional model: First, ceteris paribus reform losers tend to evade more taxes after the reform. Second, a reform from a proportionate to a progressive system decreases compliance compared to a switch in the reverse direction. However, the level of compliance is generally higher under the progressive than under the proportionate regime.     

新个人所得税法对扣纳双方的影响及应对——基于扣缴人义务及纳税人行为视角

新个人所得税法在实践中的运行效果取决于征纳双方在税收征管过程中的耦合作用.一方面,作为联系税务机关与纳税人的中介与桥梁,扣缴人在个税预扣预缴及汇算清缴方面发挥着重要作用;另一方面,税制结构变化与缴税申报模式转变对纳税人影响深远.在新个人所得税下,扣缴人的扣缴清缴合规、沟通保密及判定审查等义务均有不同程度的增加、拓展或提...     

When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information,Peer Effects and Tax Compliance

In this paper, we suggest that individuals’ tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their ‘neighbours’, or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one's neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this ‘neighbour’ information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information.     

Societal trust and corporate tax avoidance

Using an international sample of firms from 25 countries and a country-level index for societal trust, we document that societal trust is negatively associated with tax avoidance, even after controlling for other institutional determinants, such as home country legal institutions and tax system characteristics. We explore the effects of two country-level institutional characteristics—strength of legal institutions and capital market pressure—on the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance. We find that the relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced when the legal institutions in a country are stronger and is more pronounced when the capital market pressure is stronger. Finally, we examine the relation between societal trust and tax evasion, an extreme and illegal form of tax avoidance. We show that societal trust is negatively related to tax evasion and the negative relation is less pronounced when legal institutions are stronger.     

On‐Market Share Buy‐Backs: ASX Disclosure Requirements and Compliance

Our paper investigates the compliance of Australian listed firms with the ASX disclosure rules for on‐market share buy‐backs. We find that firm compliance is reasonable for initial buy‐back announcements, but poor for final buy‐back notices. In the latter instance, the disclosure in the appropriate ASX notice is provided in only 53% of cases. Of significant concern is the even lower degree of final notice compliance (42%) for buy‐backs tagged as having ‘unlimited’ duration. Across our total sample of 807 buy‐backs, an alternative form of disclosure of buy‐back completion is provided in 25% of cases, and no proper notification of either the initial announcement or the completion of the buy‐back is provided in 12% of cases. In order to improve buy‐back transparency, some legislative reform of the ASX rules is suggested including: discontinuing ‘unlimited duration’ buy‐backs, restricting buy‐back periods to a maximum of twelve months (after which a new buy‐back process must be initiated), avoiding multiple simultaneous buy‐backs, removing the requirement of daily buy‐back notices in favour of more meaningful quarterly or monthly reports, and requiring greater disclosure in relation to foreign buy‐backs.     

An experimental analysis of tax avoidance policies

Policies to reduce aggressive tax avoidance are increasingly being implemented or discussed in many countries around the world. Tax authorities hope that such policies will generate new tax revenue by increasing overall tax compliance. We present an experimental design to investigate the effect of a stylized anti-avoidance tax policy on tax compliance behavior. We highlight that anti-avoidance tax policies that reduce tax avoidance can also induce an increase in tax evasion (“substitution effect”), which limits the additional tax revenue these policies will generate. We show that the degree of substitution depends crucially on behavioral factors such as tax morale. Policymakers therefore also need to consider behavioral features while designing such policies and estimating their potential effects.     

Tax morale and public spending inefficiency

Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon and encouraging tax compliance is an important and debated policy issue. Many studies have shown that tax cheating has to be attributed to a considerable extent to the tax morale of taxpayers. The aim of the present paper is to shed light on the relationship between the taxpayer and the public sector; specifically, we investigate whether public spending inefficiency shapes individual tax morale. Combining data from Italian municipalities’ balance sheets with individual data from a properly designed survey on tax morale, we find that the attitude towards paying taxes is better when resources are spent more efficiently. This evidence seems not to be driven by some confounding factor at the municipality level or by spatial sorting of citizens and proves robust to accounting for alternative measures of both inefficiency and tax morale. We also find that the negative effect of inefficiency is larger if the level of public spending is lower and/or the degree of fiscal autonomy is higher.     

Tax reform, the informal economy, and bank financing of capital formation

This paper develops a model that relates businesses’ entry into the underground economy to tax rates and the need to access the banking system. The model uses a dynamic approach in which both firms and banks optimize and in which the benefits to a firm of accessing the banking system are endogenous. A firm compares the return to capital with the marginal tax rate on capital income and uses the difference to determine how much of the tax to pay. At the same time, banks use a firm’s capital tax payments, combined with the capital tax rate to obtain an estimate of the firm’s minimum capital value. If the firm pays at least some taxes then it will have access to the banking system, which will allow it to finance investment. If the firm pays no taxes, then it cannot access the banks and cannot invest. We compare the equilibria resulting from tax compliance and tax evasion. We calibrate the model to a highly stylized version of the Russian economy, and analyze the effect of potential tax changes on the underground economy. We compute a dynamic equilibrium for our model, and note that it tracks the path of certain macroeconomic variables of the Russian economy (GDP, budget and trade balances, price level and interest rate) with some accuracy for the years 2001–2008. We are unable to track the underground economy, as this data is unobservable. We then carry out a series of counterfactual simulations, first asking if non-capital intensive firms have an incentive to evade taxes under existing value added tax rates. We find that they do, and that the incentive would have been greatly reduced if the value added tax rate had been selectively reduced for the non-capital intensive sectors. We then ask what the effect would be if the corporate tax rate were raised on capital intensive sectors. The simulations indicate that the capital intensive sectors would not increase their entry into the underground economy.     

Punishing in the public interest: Exploratory Canadian evidence pertaining to convictions and incarcerations for tax offences

Although naming and shaming is a deterrence strategy used by tax authorities, ostensibly to increase tax compliance, the contents of tax conviction notices in which taxpayers are named and shamed have not been investigated in empirical research. To this end, this study uses a sample of 2,570 taxpayers convicted of tax offences by the Canadian tax authority over a ten-year period (2006 through 2015) to identify key characteristics of convictions and incarcerations for tax crimes, and to understand how key conviction characteristics are associated with incarceration. Over this period, findings show that 55% of tax convictions in Canada relate to failure to file tax returns, and that 14% of convicted individuals are incarcerated for an average of 17 months. The mean unreported income per convicted taxpayer is $89,978, the mean unremitted excise tax per convicted taxpayer is $15,330, and the mean fine amount per convicted taxpayer is $48,201. Males are more likely to be convicted of a tax crime than females. Further, professionals are far more likely to be incarcerated than non-professionals. Results also indicate that underreporting related to excise tax as a form of tax evasion is more likely to result in harsher sentencing than underreporting related to income tax. Lastly, we observe a downward trend in convictions and incarceration over the 10-year span, such that the total convictions and incarcerations at the end of the sample period are roughly one-third of the convictions at the beginning. Implications for public policy are discussed.     

Determinants of tax evasion: A cross-country investigation

The purpose of this study is to expand on the work of Riahi-Belkaoiu [Riahi-Belkaoiu, A. (2004). Relationship between tax compliance internationally and selected determinants of tax morale. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 13, 135-143] and systematically investigate, on a cross-country basis, many of the key determinants of tax evasion identified by Jackson and Milliron [Jackson, B. R., & Milliron, V. C. (1986). Tax compliance research: findings, problems and prospects. Journal of Accounting Literature, 5, 125-165]. Based on data for 45 countries, the results of the OLS regression analysis show that non-economic determinants have the strongest impact on tax evasion. Specifically, complexity is the most important determinant of tax evasion. Other important determinants of tax evasion are education, income source, fairness and tax morale. Overall, the regression results indicate that the lower the level of complexity and the higher the level of general education, services income source, fairness and tax morale, the lower is the level of tax evasion across countries. These findings remain robust to a broad range of cross-country control variables, an alternative tax evasion measure and various interactions.     

Capital gains tax,supply‐driven trading and ownership structure: direct evidence of the lock‐in effect

This study investigates the effect of differential capital gains tax rates on investor trading and share prices in a unique market setting that facilitates the resolution of conflicting prior evidence of holding period tax incentives. In particular, we examine whether the concessionary tax treatment of long‐term capital gains increases the supply of shares that qualify for long‐term status, thereby causing downward price pressure. We find evidence of abnormal seller‐initiated trading following the 12‐month anniversary of listing for IPO firms that appreciate in price (‘winners’) and report no such evidence for firms that decline in price (‘losers’). Consistent with the tax concessions being greater for individual than institutional investors, we report that abnormal seller‐initiated trading is mitigated by higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. We also report limited evidence, for winners, of declining share prices upon qualifying for long‐term tax status.     

The effects of International Financial Reporting Standards,auditing and legal enforcement on tax evasion: Evidence from 37 African countries

This study examines the significance of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), audting and legal enforcement on tax evasion for a group of 37 African countries for the period 2008–2017. These countries were subsequently regrouped into subsamples of four clusters. Three-stage least square regression was used for the analysis. The results indicate that there is a negative and significant relationship between IFRS and tax evasion in some clusters (i.e., early IFRS adopters and strong legal enforcers). The other clusters (late IFRS adopters and weak legal enforcers) have a similar sign of coefficient though statistically insignificant. Moreover, evidence suggests that adoption and application of IFRS lead to improved financial reporting quality and lessen tax evasion in some African jurisdictions. Additionally, legal enforcement is found to be statistically significant in relation to tax evasion in two clusters (i.e., early IFRS adopters and strong legal enforcers). Some African countries are slow or ineffective in adopting and implementing IFRS, which by itself cannot improve tax compliance. IFRS can only achieve its objective when there is strong legal enforcement (e.g., control of corruption, rule of law, effective regulatory framework, voice and accountability, strong monitoring, and auditing to promote transparency). More evidently, in contrast to weak legal enforcers, countries with strong legal enforcement have high IFRS compliance, which can strengthen auditing and reporting standards and hence, improve tax compliance.     

Reporting import tariffs (and other taxes)

This paper derives the implications for compliance and fiscal revenues of a tax base that is the product of several factors. For instance, in the case of import tariffs, the tax base is the product of quantity and unit value, both reported to, and during an audit assessed by, the custom authority. Import tariffs are particularly interesting as custom receipts represent an important share of government revenues in many developing countries and there has recently been a surge in empirical studies showing how evasion in this field is a pervasive phenomenon. I show that, with a multiplicative tax base, when the fiscal authority has an imperfect detection technology a greater declaration in one dimension actually increases the fine when evasion in the other dimension is detected. Therefore, there is an additional incentive for the taxpayer to underdeclare and a multiplicative tax base is subject to more evasion, compared to a tax base that can be assessed directly. As a result, fiscal revenues decrease with the dimensionality of the tax base. Also, voluntary compliance and fiscal revenues may be higher when the importer is required to declare only the total value of imports instead of quantity and unit value separately. This paper provides an argument in favour of uniform or specific tariffs and a reason for why a flat tax may improve compliance.     

Tax Havens,Tax Evasion and Tax Information Exchange Agreements in the OECD

Using data on Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), we find a positive relationship between higher tax burden and OECD residents’ tax evasion, especially via tax havens. Contrary to established investor preference for certain country characteristics, we find they are less important to tax evaders who value privacy and want to remain undetected by their home tax authorities. We find very limited evidence that OECD Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAS) reduce tax evasion, controlling for other determinants of overall OECD FPI. Without the US in the OECD sample, tax havens play a lesser role and OECD policies appear to make a marginal impact.     

Fighting Tax Evasion by Discouraging the Use of Cash?

We propose a bargaining model of tax evasion with a seller that offers a price discount to a buyer in exchange for a cash payment without a receipt, which allows tax evasion. We study the effect on evasion and government revenue of two policy instruments: a tax on cash withdrawals (TCW), which imposes a cost on the buyers who pay cash, and a tax rebate conditional on having the receipt. The tax rebate reduces evasion but it is costly if tax evasion is low. The TCW reduces evasion only if it is set at a sufficiently high rate, which must be higher the larger is the mass of cash users. We also show that the implementation of a TCW, which poses several challenges, is easier if the cost of cash hoarding is high.