Cash policy and the bank-firm relationship

Bank health affects a firm's cash holding - a healthy bank can result in either more (because of the influential bank power) or less (because of precautionary motive) firm-level cash holding. Motivated by the contrasting views in the existing literature, this paper investigates whether bank policy determines firm-level cash policy. Using Japanese firm-level data over 2000–2014, we find that the difference in bank health effects stems from the firm's investment status. We find that healthy banks induce growing firms to hold more cash while declining firms hold more cash when borrowing from unhealthy banks. Furthermore, we find that banks with more liquidity also induce their growing borrowers to have more cash. Our results are robust to the endogeneity of bank selection. Our study indicates that bank-firm relationship can serve as an advance-signalling device for a firm's shareholder-wealth-maximizing investments and contributes to the literature that explains the cash holding puzzle.     

Screening and Signaling in Communication*

In this paper, we analyze a model of repeated strategic communication between a sender and a receiver. The sender has private information on a policy‐relevant variable but does not know the receiver's motives. Together with the desire of the sender to please the receiver and the desire of the receiver to be pleased, the two‐sided incomplete information creates an interesting communication problem in which players can choose to use information strategically. We analyze various modes of communication, which allow for information transmission, and we compare them in terms of both the quality of the policy implemented and the welfare of the players.     

HOW ASSET IRREVERSIBILITY INFLUENCES THE INVESTMENT‐UNCERTAINTY RELATIONSHIP

This paper examines how uncertainty affects firms' investments for varying degrees of asset irreversibility (i.e., the wedge between purchase price and liquidation value of an asset). To identify more or less irreversible capital goods, we exploit unique survey data on German manufacturing firms over the sample period 2004 to 2012 in which managers provide information on investments' purpose (capacity expansion, replacement, restructuring, rationalization, and other). Our results indicate that only investments into the most irreversible capital goods (capacity expansion) will decrease if uncertainty rises. We also find support for other channels, such as the financial friction or the market power channel, to explain the investment‐uncertainty relationship.     

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy‐efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step‐level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff‐superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom‐up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.     

Boosting tourism's contribution to growth and development: Analysis of the evidence

The tourism sector's contribution to economic development depends upon complex and dynamic socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional factors. Policymakers require objective evidence to base decisions on which public policies or investments to pursue. In this paper we develop an economy‐wide approach to assessing public investments in tourism. The approach is powerful in that it considers all inter‐sectoral linkages that are critical for tourism‐sector analysis. This framework is linked to a microsimulation module that enables estimation of household‐level and destination‐specific impacts and the distribution of benefits. To illustrate the framework and the insights it can generate, we apply it to a public investment in Belize's Cayo District. Our findings show that the overall level of economic activity increases while an appreciation of the real regional exchange rate results in slower growth in traditional nontourism exports. Greater availability of capital and labor to meet increased demand would reduce this effect. The investment results in a reduction in the poverty headcount on the order of 0.7 percentage points, though there is a small increase in inequality that is a function of the skill requirements of the new positions created as a result of the investment.     

COMPENSATION FOR QUALITY DIFFERENCE IN A SEARCH MODEL OF MONEY*

We study an economy in which there is always double coincidence of wants, agents have perfect information about qualities of goods, and there are no transaction costs. The hold‐up problem arises because efforts invested in improving quality prior to search may not be compensated in the market. Situations in which barter fails to motivate quality improvement are identified. With money, however, the extra effort in quality improvement will be compensated when high‐quality good producers trade with agents holding both the low‐quality good and money. Injection of money can induce almost all agents to produce the high‐quality good.     

A NOTE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY AND THE EX ANTE VALUE OF INFORMATION

This paper examines the ex ante value of information in the property rights model where the possibility exists that an investing agent can be provided with relevant information before investments are undertaken. When contracts are incomplete, from an ex ante perspective, informing the investing agent does not necessarily increase the expected surplus resulting from a relationship between two economic agents. The paper highlights the fact that the second‐best nature of the problem that arises from contractual incompleteness can ensure this.     

Taking Chances: The Effect that Growing Up on Welfare Has on the Risky Behavior of Young People*

In this paper, we analyze the effect that growing up in a family with a history of welfare receipt has on young people's engagement in a variety of social and health risks. Unique administrative data matched to survey data for 18‐year‐olds and their mothers allow us to evaluate the effect of welfare receipt over the course of a young person's childhood. Much of the apparent link between family welfare history and risk taking disappears once we control for the effects of family structure, mothers’ own risk taking, and mothers’ investments in their children. We find no evidence that growing up on welfare causes young people to engage in risky behavior.     

Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions

A natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions: Firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees, and larger investments translate into higher wages. In particular, when wages are determined by ex post bargaining, the equilibrium is always inefficient: Recognizing that capital-intensive production relations have to pay higher wages, firms reduce their investments. This can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers, but this, in turn, depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms. In contrast to this benchmark, we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers. This efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers. We show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se, but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital-intensive jobs.     

ARE TELEVISION AND VIDEO GAMES REALLY HARMFUL FOR KIDS?

Are watching television (TV) and playing video games really harmful for children's development? By using a unique longitudinal dataset with detailed information on children's development and health, we examined the causal effect of hours of TV watched or of video games played on school‐aged children's problem behavior, orientation to school, and obesity. The results suggested that the answer to the question is yes, but the magnitude of the effect is sufficiently small to be considered as negligible. The results were robust to within‐twin‐fixed effects. (JEL I10, I20)     

Transfer Pricing and Hold-Ups in Supply Chains

Abstract. We reconsider the hold‐up problem under symmetric information when more than two parties form a ‘supply chain’. The parties are assumed to renegotiate bilaterally and sequentially. Potential trade distortions then arise in addition to the usual investment problem. Following Edlin and Reichelstein (1995, 1996), we consider fixed‐quantity contracts. First‐best allocations are shown to be attainable if the parties are able to commit to a ‘forced‐compliance’ regime where a central office monitors the consistency of the bilateral renegotiations.     

Moore's Law and the Semiconductor Industry: A Vintage Model*

In this paper we develop a vintage model to gain a better understanding of the semiconductor industry and its role in recent U.S. productivity gains. Unlike previous work, in our model the observed price declines of individual chips are driven by the introduction of better vintages rather than by learning economies. Dominated chips, nonetheless, continue to be produced, for a time, due to sunk investments in chip‐specific production equipment. The model lends partial support to Jorgenson's hypothesis that an exogenous increase in Moore's Law could have generated the more rapid price declines, and faster productivity growth, seen after 1995.     

Tullock's Puzzle in Pay‐and‐Play Lobbying

We explain Tullock's puzzle of small payments from special interests to policy‐makers by the hold‐up problem between the two parties. We construct a simple lobbying environment where an uninformed policy‐maker is a price‐setter who sells access to two opposed and privately informed lobbyists. The key equilibrium property is “the curse of the ex ante favored lobbyist”; the lobbyist proposing a project with the higher expected public value ends up worse off than the lobbyist proposing a project with the lower expected public value. In the absence of contribution caps, the ex ante favored lobbyist strategically devalues her project, and the resulting competitive devaluations destroy private values, revenues, as well as correlated public values. Ex ante, the policy‐maker benefits from a binding contribution cap protects the ex ante favored lobbyist, eliminates competitive devaluations, and thus remedies the hold‐up problem.     

Information technology investment strategies: a review and synthesis of the literature

In spite of high importance of information technology (IT) investments, managers do not have sufficient guidelines to formulate IT investment strategy of a firm. In this paper, we review the literature to determine the factors that influence the IT investment strategy. The concept of IT investment strategy so far considered two domains: intensity and proactiveness; we enhance this concept by adding the domain of investment focus. Through this review, we made an attempt to answer three strategic questions related to IT investments: (i) level of investment that a firm should make in IT, that is, investment intensity; (ii) areas of firm where these investments should be more focused, that is, investment focus; and (iii) timing of investment, that is, whether to be an early mover in adopting IT or whether to invest relatively late compared to competitors.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF HOLD‐UP PROBLEM AND NON‐EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE CONTRACT

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model that examines the emergence of non‐exclusive franchise contracts in the presence of the franchisor hold‐up problem. Our model of an endogenous franchising network underscores the trade‐off between the cost associated with specifying and enforcing the contractual terms and the cost associated with broadening the relationships with multiple franchisors. We show that when the contracting cost relative to the relational cost is high and when the economies of specialization is low, a non‐exclusive franchise contract is an optimal contractual arrangement to mitigate franchisor opportunism.     

The Effect of Terrorist Incidents on Capital Flows

Previous work has shown that terrorism has significant negative impact on countries' economies. We explore this relationship in more detail. Using an unbalanced panel of more than 160 countries for up to 25 years and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) we show a decrease in foreign direct investment (FDI) as a consequence of terrorism. We also find evidence that FDI flows are more sensitive to terrorism than either portfolio investments or external debt flows. Finally, we test the hypothesis that terrorism has negative spill‐over effects on FDI flows into neighboring countries and find evidence that cultural, but not geographical, closeness matters.     

Flexible mandates for investment in new technology

Environmental regulators often seek to promote forefront technology for new investments; however, technology mandates are suspected of raising cost and delaying investment. We examine investment choices under an inflexible (traditional) emissions rate performance standard for new sources. We compare the inflexible standard with a flexible one that imposes an alternative compliance payment (surcharge) for emissions in excess of the standard. A third policy allows the surcharge revenue to fund later retrofits. Analytical results indicate that increasing flexibility leads to earlier introduction of new technology, lower aggregate emissions and higher profits. We test this using multi-stage stochastic optimization for introduction of carbon capture and storage, with uncertain future natural gas and emissions allowance prices. Under perfect foresight, the analytical predictions hold. With uncertainty these predictions hold most often, but we find exceptions. In some cases investments are delayed to enable the decision maker to discover additional information.     

Private Information in the BBV Model of Public Goods

To analyze the private provision of a public good in the presence of private information, we explore the connections between two frameworks: the binary public good model with threshold uncertainty and the standard continuous model à la Bergstrom et al. Linearity of best responses in others' contributions is key to matching the two frameworks. We identify all utility functions that display this linearity, and we provide conditions ensuring that the minimal properties that Bergstrom et al. require for utilities are satisfied. Using techniques developed in the threshold uncertainty framework, we show existence and uniqueness of the Bayes‐Nash equilibrium—thus generalizing existing results—and we analyze its comparative statics properties. In particular, under the reasonable assumption that agents' income is stochastic and private information, we complement the full‐information crowding‐out and redistribution results of Bergstrom et al. If the government taxes agents' income proportionally and redistributes (expected) revenues lump sum, equilibrium public good provision can increase or decrease, even if the set of contributors is unchanged. Similarly, we show that crowding‐out can be one‐for‐one, less than one‐for‐one, or more than one‐for‐one. Finally, we extend our results to a multidimensional framework in which agents' unit costs of contributions are also private information.     

GOVERNANCE OF PRODUCTION CO‐OPERATIVES IN RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE

Many Soviet kolkhozy and sovkhozy were transformed into agricultural production co‐operatives, because the farm workers would have had large transaction costs in any other type of organization. These co‐operatives still hold a strong market position. This study explores the hypothesis that this market strength could be due to low governance costs, obtained through strong manager power. As managers want the co‐operative to survive, they make limited investments in the co‐operative and pay low wages. The members, however, do not consider this to be problematic. They appreciate the community within the village, their private plots of land and the co‐operative's services. Hence the existence of the co‐operatives is not threatened.     

Corporate Taxation and Productivity Catch‐Up: Evidence from European Firms

In this paper, we explore whether higher corporate tax rates, because they lower the after‐tax returns to productivity‐enhancing investments, reduce the speed with which small firms converge to the productivity frontier. Using data for 11 European countries, we find evidence that their productivity catch‐up is slower when the statutory corporate tax rates are higher. In contrast, we find that large firms are instead affected by effective marginal rates. Using the reduced‐form model of productivity convergence of Griffith et al . (2009, Journal of Regional Science 49 , 689–720), our results are robust to a host of robustness checks and a natural experiment that exploits the 2001 German tax reforms.