Does land registration and certification boost farm productivity? Evidence from Ethiopia

According to economic theory, tenure security is an important determinant of agricultural investment and productivity. Land titling has been at the center stage of development efforts of many African countries to boost tenure security. We investigate the productivity impacts of the Ethiopian land registration and certification program, employing propensity score matching method in an effort to create a credible counterfactual. Consistent with theory, we find land registration and certification has robust positive effects on farm productivity. More tentatively, we identify the assurance effect as one probable channel for impact. Households with land certificates are more likely to adopt soil‐fertility management strategies on their plots than households without certificates.     

Small U.S. dairy farms: can they compete?

The U.S. dairy industry is undergoing rapid structural change, evolving from a structure including many small farmers in the Upper Midwest and Northeast to one that includes very large farms in new production regions. Small farms are struggling to retain competitiveness via improved management and low‐input systems. Using data from USDA's Agricultural Resource Management Survey, we determine the extent of U.S. conventional and pasture‐based milk production during 2003–2007, and estimate net returns, scale efficiency, and technical efficiency associated with the systems across different operation sizes. We compare the financial performance of small conventional and pasture‐based producers with one another and with large‐scale producers. A stochastic production frontier is used to analyze performance over the period for conventional and pasture technologies identified using a binomial logit model. Large conventional farms generally outperformed smaller farms using most economic measures—technical efficiency, various profitability measures, and returns to scale.     

To reallocate or not: Reconsidering the dilemma in China's agricultural land tenure policy

In China, rural land is collectively owned at the village level. Village officials usually have the power to reallocate land property across families on an ongoing basis due to demographic changes in the village. Realizing that frequent land reallocation and abusive land requisition will undermine economic productivity as well as social stability, the “Rural Land Contract Law” passed in 2002 explicitly reads that farmland tenure security must be maintained for at least 30 years since the last nationwide reallocation in 1998. The frequency and magnitude of land reallocation in Chinese villages have decreased as a result. However, failure to allocate land to the newly increased population often induced conflicts among village members if the security of land tenure for 30 years was strictly implemented. Administrative land reallocations then still continued in some villages to accommodate demographic changes in these places. Based on an almost nationally representative rural dataset collected in 119 villages of 6 provinces across China in 2008, this paper lays out some stylized facts about the administrative land reallocation after 1998. By analyzing the opinions of over 2200 farmers on the central policy of maintaining farmland tenure security, we are able to rationalize why some farmers support the policy while others oppose it. This analysis helps us to better understand the dilemma between efficiency and equity embedded in the current agricultural land system in China. It is further shown that social conflicts among village members may easily arise either due to administrative land reallocation or due to lack of it. We argue that this dilemma cannot be resolved effectively without coordinated reforms in household registration system which can help hundreds of millions of Chinese rural migrant workers to permanently settle in cities and release their farmland to those who stay in the countryside.     

Sharecropping efficiency in Ethiopia: threats of eviction and kinship

We tested a theoretical model with the Marshallian inefficiency (H1) and threat of eviction (H2) hypotheses having opposite effects on land productivity on sharecropped plots. The model also assumes that kinship contracts may eliminate or reduce the Marshallian inefficiency (H3) and threat of eviction (H4) effects on land productivity. Our empirical findings were consistent with H2 and H4 being true. We found higher land productivity on sharecropped plots than on share tenants' own plots and higher land productivity on sharecropped plots of nonkin than of kin tenants. The nature of the data allowed controlling for unobservable household characteristics through household fixed effects and for observable plot characteristics. Analyses with and without plot characteristics revealed that these findings were stronger with plot characteristics than without them. Based on the plausible assumption that observable plot characteristics are positively correlated with unobservable plot characteristics this strengthens our conclusion. The results are also supported by first-order stochastic dominance analysis. Sharecropped plots' output value distribution unambiguously dominated the output value distribution from share tenants' own plots. Nonkin sharecropped plots' output value distribution also first-order stochastically dominated the output value distribution from kin sharecrop plots.