Do they come back again? Job search,labour market segmentation and state dependence as explanations of repeat unemployment

This study investigates the causes of recurrent unemployment. Using data from the Austrian unemployment register we test the explanatory power of three different approaches which appear in the literature: job search theory, labour market segmentation and state dependence. Whereas job search theory does not seem to be able to explain anything, labour market segmentation does. However, the most powerful determinant of the risk of unemployment repetition is past unemployment history. This micro finding is not inconsistent with theories explaining the persistent high level of unemployment rates.This research was supported by the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung under the project Dynamik der Arbeitslosigkeit und Beschäftigung. Special thanks for valuable comments go to M. Riese, V. Steiner, J. Stern and two anonymous referees.     

Demographic variables in demand systems: The case for generality

This paper provides evidence in favour of greater generality in the demographic demand literature. We propose two demographic demand procedures. One extends the Gorman model by allowing non additive interaction between overheads and Barten scaling. The other extends Price Scaling, by allowing the equivalence scale to vary with utility, and offers a test of Equivalence Scale Exactness (ESE). The rejection of ESE is robust to the assumed demand functional forms (RNLPS, QAIDS), to items chosen, and the estimation method (MLE, GMM). The results show that published cell averages yield well determined estimates of the demographic generalisation parameters.This paper was written during my visit to the UBC in Vancouver, Canada in 1992/93. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful remarks on an earlier version. The disclaimer applies.     

From “tax state” to “debt state”

The paper is motivated by Joseph A. Schumpeter's The Crisis of the Tax State. It inquires whether the buildup of government debt in peacetimeprosperity is a threat to the stability, existence or creation of viable tax states. The paper begins by setting out Schumpeter's conception of the tax state and the nature of recent political-economic events which have reinvigorated the concept. Next the paper sets out some simple debt dynamics and sketches a debt-induced business cycle arising from heavy reliance on debt finance in peacetimeprosperity. Finally, the paper assesses threats to the tax state in light of recent work on path dependence and positive feedback. An attempt is made to throw some light on whether the plethora of new, and often small, states spawned by the demise of communism can be viable tax states.Essay on Government, the Tax State and Economic Dynamics submitted to the Third Schumpeter Prize Competition.     

Perturbations of Matrices: A theorem on the perron vector and its applications to input-output models

This is a much revised version of my paper The Effects of Errors in Matrices on the Perron Vector: An Application to Input-Output Models, which was presented at the 1987 European Meeting of the Econometric Society, held in Copenhagen. I would like to thank Gerard Sierksma and Albert E. Steenge for valuable discussions and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Buying and selling behavior in stochastic environments with backstop markets

The author acknowledges a research grant from the research program Private Forestry and helpful comments from two anonymous referees, Mats Bergman, and Runar Brännlund, Department of Economics, University of Umeå.     

Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a simple (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in fitting complexity. In some environments, bidding may become mutually destructive. Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a threshold problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate.     

Vertical and Horizontal Trust Networks in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Third Reich

In a seminal contribution to the literature on bureaucracy, Breton and Wintrobe (The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organization. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1982) develop a model wherein subordinates and superiors in a bureaucratic structure trade with each other to advance the objectives of the superiors. The success of such an organizational arrangement (for superiors) is based upon the development of vertical trust networks in a way that facilitates the promise of informal payments by superiors in return for informal services provided by their subordinates. Breton and Wintrobe [Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986) 905] also provide a theoretical application of their model by describing the Nazi bureaucracy as a conglomeration of competing agencies that zealously carried out the Final Solution to the Jewish question. As an extension, this note develops two compelling empirical examples of vertical and horizontal trust networks within the Nazi regime: Einsatzgruppen As (Special Action Detachments) attempt to liquidate all Lithuanian Jews after the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler.JEL Classification: D23, D73.     

On designing economic agents that behave like human agents

This paper explores the idea of constructing theoretical economic agents that behave like actual human agents and using them in neoclassical economic models. It does this in a repeated-choice setting by postulating artificial agents who use a learning algorithm calibrated against human learning data from psychological experiments. The resulting calibrated algorithm appears to replicate human learning behavior to a high degree and reproduces several stylized facts of learning. It can therefore be used to replace the idealized, perfectly rational agents in appropriate neoclassical models with calibrated agents that represent actual human behavior. The paper discusses the possibilities of using the algorithm to represent human learning in normal-form stage games and in more general neoclassical models in economics. It explores the likelihood of convergence to long-run optimality and to Nash behavior, and the characteristic learning time implicit in human adaptation in the economy.     

The “Dorfman Steiner” rule

Conclusion When this research was started, it was guessed that the Dorfman-Steiner rule would lose its relevance in an intertemporal setting. This belief has turned out to be false: along the optimal paths ofp (t) ands (t), and must be equal. The only difference with the Dorfman-Steiner result is that they will be different from unity.The author is chargé de cours at the Faculté Universitaire Catholique de Mons (Belgium). He has greatyl benefited from comments by M. Beuthe and J. J. Lambin.     

Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations

The word coordination has two meanings, and thesemeanings are often conflated. One meaning, associated with ThomasSchelling, is seen in situations like choosing whether to driveon the left or the right; the drivers must coordinate to eachother's behavior. The other meaning, associated with FriedrichHayek, means that a concatenation of activities is arranged soas to produce good results. Along with the Schelling sense ofcoordination comes the notion of convention, such as drivingon the right. Some conventions are consciously designed; othersemerge without design (or are emergent). Along with the Hayeksense of coordination comes the notion of social order. Somesocial orders, such as the skeleton of activities within thefirm or within the hypothetical socialist economy, are consciouslyplanned. Other social orders, such as the catallaxy of the freesociety, function without central planning (or are spontaneous).Distinguishing between the two coordinations (and, in parallelfashion, between convention and social order) clarifies thinkingand resolves some confusions that have arisen in discussionsof coordination and spontaneous order. The key distinctionsare discussed in the context of the thought of, on the one hand,Menger, Schelling, David Lewis, and the recent path-dependencetheorists, and, on the other hand, Smith, Hayek, Polanyi, Coase,and the modern Austrian economists. The paper concludes witha typology that encompasses the several distinctions.     

Innovation,profitability and growth over the business cycle

Recent debates about Industrial Policy are dominated by a concern to make firms more innovative. In order to make progress in assessing the magnitude of the effects of innovation on corporate performance, one needs to know how such effects occur. We have contrasted two views of the effect of innovation—the product view and the process view—and have provided some evidence to suggest that both effects are evident in the data. Although it is clear that individual innovations themselves have a positive effect on profitability and growth, it is equally clear that the process of innovation seems to transform firms in some way that gives rise to what look like generic differences between innovators and non-innovators. As a consequence, the process by which profitability and growth are generated differs noticeably between the two types of firms. Perhaps the clearest of these differences is that innovating firms seem to be much less sensitive to cyclical shocks than non-innovating firms are.We are obliged to the ESRC for support. Some of the work discussed here draws upon joint work with John Van Reenan, and we are obliged to him for his assistance and helpful comments. Jonathan Haskel also provided very helpful comments on an early draft of the paper. We are also obliged to seminar audiences at the University of Ulster, the University of Manchester, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, NERA, UMIST, University College London, the Centre for Economic Performance at the LSE and the Industrial Organization Conference held at Vienna, June 24–26, 1992, for many stimulating observations. However, the usual disclaimer applies.     

The optimal intertemporal decision on industrial production and harvesting a renewable natural resource

This paper grew out of a research project financially supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) in its program Economics of Natural Resources. This support is gratefully acknowledged. I also thank H. Wacker for helpful discussions. I also thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments on an earlier draft.     

On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy

In practice one rarely observes pure forms of dictatorship that lack a council, or pure forms of parliament that lack an executive. Generally government policies emerge from organizations that combine an executive branch of government, the king, with a cabinet or parliamentary branch, the council. This paper provides an explanation for this regularity, and also provides an evolutionary model of the emergence of democracy that does not require a revolution. The analysis demonstrates that the bipolar king and council constitutional template has a number of properties that gives it great practical efficiency as a method of information processing and as a very flexible institutional arrangement for making collective decisions.     

Alternative Modelle und Hypothesen der Konsum- und Sparentscheidung(1)

Summary For the analysis of the allocation of personal disposable income to the different consumption goods and savings, an indirect-addilog-expenditure-system (IAES) has been constructed. Compared to the linear-expenditure-system (LES) the IAES to far more flexible and is not based upon the idea of minimum-consumption- or minimum-saving-quotas. On the other hand, marginal income shares are not fixed parameters. The IAES allows the derivation of a systematic savings- and consumption-function and supplies consistent income elasticities. But it will be shown that consistent demand systems are only restrictively able to consider all major determinants of the decision-problem consumption or saving. The derived system does not only neglect the effects of wealth on consumption and savings but also the results of real income fluctuations due to the business cycle. Also phenomena like unemployment and uncertainties regarding estimates of the future or inflation are neglected. With the help of an adjustment-procedure a part of these disadvantages has been eliminated. The adjustment with regard to the entire private consumption and savings supplied income elasticities which lead to an almost constant consumption- and savings-share in the period under investigation.     

Economics as mechanism: The mind as machine in Hayek's sensory order

InThe Sensory Order, Friedrich A. Hayek describes the human mind as an apparatus of classification that evolves through experience and that reaches decisions by modeling the alternative courses of action that are available to it. Hayek's mechanistic conception of mind argues aginst the possibility of central planning and against the cogency of any rule that denigrates subjective decision making by employers or other economic agents. As implied by Gödel's proof, no brain, human or mechanical, can ever be sufficiently complex to explain itself. There will therefore always be certain knowledge and rules that cannot be articulated to the satisfaction of a central planner or tribunal.     

Individual Decision Making in a Negative Externality Experiment

The experimental treatments analysed in this paper are simple in that there is a unique Nash equilibrium resulting in each player having a dominant strategy. However, the data show quite clearly that subjects do not always choose this strategy. In fact, when this dominant strategy is not a focal outcome it does not even describe the average decision adequately. It is shown that average individual decisions are best described by a decision error model based on a censored distribution as opposed to the truncated regression model which is typically used in similar studies. Moreover it is shown that in the treatments where the dominant strategy is not focal dynamics are important with average subject decisions initially corresponding to the focal outcome and then adjusting towards the Nash prediction. Overall, 66.7% of subjects are consistent with Payoff Maximization, 27.8% are consistent with an alternate preference maximization and 5.6% are random.     

Power,luck and the right index

Summary We have pointed out the theoretical drawbacks of the traditional indices for measuring a priori voting power inasmuch as they are implied in considering the coalition value a private good. This criticism caused us to view the coalition outcome as a public good. From this aspect and additional considerations with respect to power, luck, and decisiveness, we obtained a story describing the characteristics of an adequate measure of a priori voting power. These characteristics were found to be fulfilled by an index presented by Holler (1978). Through the above analysis this index has received its theoretical justification. An independent view of this index was then provided by means of an axiomatic characterization. This characterization makes possible abstract comparison of the index with previously established private good indices.While we have restricted our attention to simple games, the index presented can be generalized to provide a value on games in characteristic function form. We leave this topic for future conideration.     

Real exchange rates and target interest rates in a simple VAR model

This paper proposes a simple vector autoregressions (VAR) model with (real) output and exchange rate shocks on interest rates. Rather than assuming non-recursive identification schemes, we test the identifying assumption of the error term decompositions. Applying the model to quarterly data on major currencies against the U.S. dollar (USD) from 1974 to 1997, interest rate shocks explain - after 3 years - 16% of Canadian dollar/USD (CAD) real exchange rate variations and less than 2% for the mark/USD and yen/USD. Positive innovations of interest rates bring about (transitory) CAD real appreciations in differences and (permanent) appreciations in levels. Canadian real output is more explained by domestic interest rate shocks (19%) than Germanys (5%) or Japans (0.2%). Canada is smaller than the other economies and CAD has been shown to suffer from fear of floating. Our findings support the proposition that domestic shocks dominate output variance under fixed exchange rates. They are also consistent with structural interpretations of the VAR.     

Is Technological Progress Pareto-Improving for a World with Global Public Goods?

This paper investigates the welfare effects of unilateral or multilateral technological progress in a world with global public goods. We focus on the consumption relation between the private and the public good, and then show that technological progress may beself-centered (benefit oneself but harm others), self-sacrificing (harm oneself but benefit others), or self-defeating (harm all) if two goods are substitutable. In addition, any type of technological progress improves every countrys welfare if the private and the public good are close complements.