Supporting team citizenship: The influence of team social resources on team‐level affiliation‐oriented and challenge‐oriented behaviour

Using a conservation of resources theoretical framework, we connect within‐team social resources with team‐level citizenship behaviours. In a sample of 385 employees situated in 70 teams from China, we confirm that team social support and team psychological safety interact to influence both affiliation‐oriented (AOCB) and challenge‐oriented (COCB) citizenship. Specifically, the two social resources substitute for one another, such that “either” team social support “or” psychological safety may be sufficient to increase AOCB. We find a consistent yet more complex pattern for COCB. Furthermore, drawing on the team prosocial motivation literature, we uncover team effort as a mediator to the effects of both social resources on AOCB. Our findings suggest that managers may enhance team citizenship by promoting team‐level social resources (social support and psychological safety), and they may only need to focus their energies on one of these resources, as exerting effort towards both may be redundant and inefficient.     

NCAA basketball: when does recruiting talent translate into wins for power conferences?

NCAA men’s basketball teams are spending an increasing amount of money on recruiting expenditures in an effort to win more games. We examine the recruiting quality of both freshmen and returning players to determine the impact of recruiting on a power conference team’s success. In particular, we identify the point at which players of different recruiting quality begin to contribute to a team’s success and estimate the impact of returning players by year and position. We find that elite freshmen guards are the only position that immediately impacts a team’s success, while forwards and centers need one or more seasons to develop into a player that generates wins for his team. We conclude by noting how these results may inform coaches regarding the makeup of talent and positions on their roster.     

Recruitment,Training, and Career Concerns

We examine training and recruitment policies in a two‐period model that nests two forms of production, “routine” work where ability and effort are substitutes and “creative” work where they are complements. Alternative ways of improving average ability have opposite implications for agents' career concerns. Although teaching to the top (training complementary to ability) or identifying star performers increases agents' career concerns, teaching to the bottom has the opposite effect. The paper also makes more general comments relating to models of reputation.     

Optimizing the allocation of funds of an NFL team under the salary cap

Every NFL team faces the complex decision of having to choose how to allocate salaries to each position while being limited by the salary cap. This paper uses regression strategies to identify which positions are worthy of greater investment, under the assumption that players are paid in an efficient market. Using a combination of univariate regression models, we identify that it is worth investing in elite players at the quarterback, guard, defensive line, and linebacker positions. In addition, through a separate set of regression models we also consider the possibility that markets are not actually efficient. We determine that the optimal way to take advantage of inefficiency is through the draft, in order to find players who can provide significant win contributions early in their careers while they are being paid on relatively low rookie contracts.     

An experimental test of behavior under team production

This study reports experiments that examine behavior under team production and a piece rate. In the experiments, participants complete a forecasting task and are rewarded based on the accuracy of their forecasts. In the piece‐rate condition, participants are paid based on their own performance, whereas the team‐production condition rewards participants based on the average performance of the team. Overall, there is no statistically significant difference in performance between the conditions. However, this result masks important differences in the behavior of men and women across the conditions. Men in the team‐production condition increase their performance relative to men in the piece‐rate condition. However, this gap in male performances across conditions diminishes over the course of the experiment. In contrast, women in the team‐production condition show significantly lower performance than the women in the piece rate. As a consequence of these differences, men in the team‐production condition show significantly better performance than women in the team‐production condition. We also find evidence that men show stronger performance when they are in teams with a larger variation in skill level. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Career mentoring in context: A multilevel study on differentiated career mentoring and career mentoring climate

This study explores how supervisor career mentoring contributes to contemporary organizational career development, which strives to foster employees' promotability while strengthening their intention to stay. Specifically, we focus on the implications of career mentoring in team contexts. Applying a multilevel framework, we distinguish between individual‐level differentiated mentoring (i.e., an employee's mentoring perceptions as compared to those of other team members) and group‐level career mentoring climate (i.e., the average perception across all group members). In a workplace setting, we collected data from vocational job starters (N ranged from 230 to 290) and their company supervisors (N ranged from 56 to 68). We find that career mentoring climate positively relates to promotability, more so than differentiated career mentoring. Both career mentoring climate and differentiated career mentoring are positively related to the intention to stay. At the individual level, this relationship is mediated by job satisfaction. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of differentiated and group‐level mentoring.     

Blending service provider–client project teams to achieve client trust: Implications for project team trust,cohesion, and performance

The objective of the present research is to examine the effectiveness of “teaming with the client,” using blended service provider–client teams as an organizational strategy for achieving effective co‐production engagements. The results show that having a blended team creates a more trusting relationship between the project manager and client. The client's trust results in greater team trust, team cohesion, and team performance. However, the research also demonstrates an important limitation to the use of blended teams. In blended teams, when the client does not trust the project manager, significant problems arise for the team itself as compared to non‐blended teams.     

Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment

This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential superadditivity—an option open to a group of players is to partition into smaller groups and realize the worths of these groups and (b) small group effectiveness (SGE)—almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by cooperation only within members of some partition of players into relatively small groups. Another condition, small group negligibility (SGN), is introduced and shown to be equivalent to SGE. SGN dictates that small groups of players cannot have significant effects on average (i.e., per capita) payoffs of large populations; thus, SGN is a analogue, for games with a finite player set, of the condition built into models with a continuum of player that sets of measure zero can be ignored. SGE implies per capita boundedness (PCB), that the supremum of average or per capita payoffs is uniformly bounded above. Further characterization of SGE in terms of its relationship to PCB is provided. It is known that if SGE does not hold, then approximate cores of many-player games may be empty. Examples are developed to show that if SGE does not hold and if there are players of “scarce types” (in other works, players with scarce attributes) then even if there is only a finite number of types of players and approximate cores are non-empty, symmetry may be lost; moreover, even players of abundant types may be treated asymmetrically by the core.     

BEHAVIOR IN GROUP CONTESTS: A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team‐incentives within firms, and rent‐seeking. In order to succeed, members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending effort. However, since effort is costly, each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members. Contest theory predicts that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size, sharing rule, group impact function, contest success function, and heterogeneity of players. We review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions. Most studies find significant over‐expenditure of effort relative to the theory and significant heterogeneity of behavior within and between groups. Also, most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory (with the exception of the “group size paradox”). Finally, studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within‐group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de‐escalate and potentially eliminate between‐group conflict.     

Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games

We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing “poorest” by “poorer” allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, we show that the egalitarian solution is characterized by constrained welfare egalitarianism and either bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler or, together with individual rationality, by bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell.     

The power of personality at work: Core self‐evaluations and earnings in the United Kingdom

Organisations are increasingly taking an interest in personality as certain traits purportedly predict desirable attitudes and behaviours. We examine the relationship between one increasingly popular construct—core self‐evaluations (CSEs)—and earnings. We argue that if high levels of CSEs really are valuable traits, then high CSE individuals should be observed to earn more than those with moderate or low levels of CSEs. Using the nationally representative British Household Panel Survey, we find little evidence that individuals with very high CSEs earn more than those with only moderate levels. However, we do find the existence of a pay penalty for individuals very low in CSEs. Similar patterns emerge for the Big Five model of traits. Although the exact mechanisms remain unclear, our findings imply that organisations should play a greater role in the career development of employees scoring lowly in “desirable” traits—especially in a context of increasing career fluidity.     

A SURVEY OF THE HOLD‐UP PROBLEM IN THE EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS LITERATURE

This paper reviews experimental studies on the so‐called “hold‐up problem.” Common features in the experimental design and results are summarized. Most experimental studies show evidence of the hold‐up problem, but to an extent less severe than what standard self‐interest model predicts. Hold‐up occurs at the individual level, but exhibits a less severe pattern than theoretically predicted at the aggregate level. A positive correlation is found between the investment stage decisions and subsequent bargaining behavior. Social preferences largely influence the results in hold‐up games. Remedies that enhance the effect of social preferences can effectively alleviate the hold‐up problem. These laboratory findings are also relevant to real‐life hold‐up situations, but differences in the specific institution and environment may require more variations in the experimental design.     

Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities

A rather general class of strategic games is described where the coalitional improvements are acyclic and hence strong Nash equilibria exist: The players derive their utilities from the use of certain facilities; all players using a facility extract the same amount of local utility therefrom, which amount depends both on the set of users and on their actions, and is decreasing in the set of users; the ultimate utility of each player is the minimum of the local utilities at all relevant facilities. Two important subclasses are “games with structured utilities,” basic properties of which were discovered in 1970s and 1980s, and “bottleneck congestion games,” which attracted researchers’ attention quite recently. The former games are representative in the sense that every game from the whole class is isomorphic to one of them. The necessity of the minimum aggregation for the existence of strong Nash equilibria, actually, just Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, in all games of this type is established.     

Thanks for the memories: baseball veterans' end-of-career salaries

It is well-established that a baseball player's salary is based on his performance, experience, star status, bargaining power, mobility and his team's ability to pay. This paper focuses on veteran players who are on the brink of retirement and on the determinants of their salaries. It is found that a veteran's end-of-career peak salary depends upon how his career performance, that his most recent performance is irrelevant unless he has spent his entire career with one team, and that the average veteran's salary peaks after 9 years in the Majors. A corollary inference is that general managers recognize and reward player performance over the long haul in comparison with others who have played at that player's principal position, and with a nod to how history will evaluate that player. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are non‐binding contracts really not worth the paper?

We experimentally investigate behavior in sequential one‐shot transactions which are governed by non‐binding contracts. In a second, incomplete information treatment, contracts are binding for some players. While according to traditional game‐theoretical analysis no trade is expected in the first treatment, full trade should result in the latter. However, we find that trade is even higher in the non‐binding contract treatment. On the one hand, non‐binding contracts—although they are cheap talk—do guide behavior, especially at the beginning of a business relationship, while reciprocal reactions prevail later on. On the other hand, in the treatment with binding contracts cooperative behavior appears to be crowded out. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Heterogeneous worker ability and team-based production: Evidence from major league baseball, 1920–2009

A detailed longitudinal dataset is assembled containing annual performance and biographical data for every player over the entire history of professional major league baseball. The data are then aggregated to the team level for the period 1920–2009 in order to test whether teams built on a more even distribution of observed talent perform better than those teams with a mixture of highly able and less able players. The dependent variable used in the regressions is the percentage of games a team wins each season. We find that conditioning on average player ability, dispersion of both batting and pitching talent displays an optimal degree of inequality, in that teams with too high or too low a spread in player ability perform worse than teams with a more balanced distribution of offensive and defensive talent. These findings have potentially important applications both inside and outside the sporting world.     

Tom L. Johnson and Cleveland Traction Wars, 1901–1909

Tom L. Johnson made his mark on politics far from Capitol Hill, in the gritty world of turn‐of‐the‐century Cleveland, Ohio. Barely 30 years old and at the height of a successful career as an inventor, steel manufacturer, and street railway monopolist, Tom Loftin Johnson experienced a change of heart. After discovering the ideas of Henry George, Johnson became a lifelong advocate of the single tax, which he used to guide his new career in politics. In 1901, Cleveland voters elected Johnson to the first of his four terms as mayor of the industrial city of 400,000 people. During his eight‐year reign as chief executive, Cleveland took over essential services such as garbage collection, street cleaning, and lighting from private enterprise. Johnson helped humanize the city's correctional system by replacing the old workhouse with a network of farm colonies designed to rehabilitate wayward youths and adults convicted of petty crimes. Largely as a result of Johnson's efforts, Cleveland won constitutional home rule, a lower streetcar fare, the referendum, and higher taxes on the corporations that amassed giant fortunes through perpetual public franchise grants. For a short time, while he was still mayor, Cleveland owned and operated its own streetcar company, a rarity in early 20^th‐century America. All of these accomplishments made Johnson something of a hero to progressive reformers. The muckraker Lincoln Steffens famously called Johnson “the best Mayor of the best‐governed city in the United States.”     

Reason,Intuition, and Time

We study the influence of reason and intuition on decision‐making over time. Facing a sequence of similar problems, agents can either decide rationally according to expected utility theory or intuitively according to case‐based decision theory. Rational decisions are more precise but create higher costs, though these costs may decrease over time. We find that intuition will outperform reason in the long run if individuals are sufficiently ambitious. Moreover, intuitive decisions are prevalent in the early and late stages of a learning process, whereas reason governs decisions in intermediate stages. Examples range from playing behavior in games like chess to professional decisions during a manager's career. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of performance appraisals in motivating employees

Workers' rewards and career perspectives often depend on how their supervisors perceive their performance. However, evaluating a worker's performance is often difficult. We develop a model in which a worker is uncertain about his own performance and about his supervisor's ability to assess him. The supervisor gives the worker a performance appraisal aiming to affect both the worker's self‐perception and his own credibility in assessing the performance. We examine how performance appraisals affect the worker's future performance. Our model's predictions are consistent with empirical findings. Supervisors give, on average, “too” positive appraisals, and both positive and negative feedback can (de)motivate workers.     

Modelling employment durations of NHL head coaches: turnover and post‐succession performance

Match‐level National Hockey League (NHL) data are used to identify factors likely to trigger the departure of a team's coach, and to measure the short‐term impact on subsequent match results. There is a statistically significant link between individual match results and the job departure hazard for up to 15 games prior to the point of departure. The hazard depends on the team's current standing within its conference relative to a pre‐season forecast, recent performance in the Stanley Cup, the coach's age and previous employment with his present team as a player. After controlling for a mean‐reversion effect, teams that changed their coach within‐season are found to perform worse subsequently than those that did not, but the negative effect is short‐lived. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.