Marketising the commons in Africa: the case of Ghana

The recent surge in the marketisation of the commons in Africa – especially of water bodies – warrants careful political economic analysis. Three questions remain intractable: (1) Were there markets in the beginning? If so, how have they transformed and if not, how did markets arise and transform over the years? (2) what are the outcomes of such markets for people, their livelihoods, and their environment? And (3) how to interpret the outcomes of water markets and whether water should be commodified at all. For new institutional economists, water markets have arisen because of the inferior nature of Indigenous or customary systems which are incapable of offering precisely what water markets offer Africa: economic and ecological fortunes. Using an institutional political economy approach and drawing on experiences in Ghana, the paper investigates the social history of marketisation of the commons and probes the effects of marketisation in terms of absolute, relative, and differential/congruent outcomes as well as the opportunity cost of the current water property rights regime. The empirical evidence shows that markets have been socially created through imposed and directed policies. Some jobs have been created through investment, but such employment is not unique to marketisation and private investment. Indeed, the private model of property rights has worsened the distribution of water resources not only within different property relations in Africa but also between diverse property relations. Water markets have been responsible for much displacement and trouble not only for communities but also nature. Overall, there is no necessary congruence between the promises made by new institutional economists and how communities experience water markets. Tighter regulations for the use of inland and transboundary water sources might temporarily halt the displacement of communities sparked by marketisation of the commons, but only one fundamental change can guarantee community well-being: to regard the access to and community control of water as constitutionally sanctioned human rights and as res communis.     

Housing privatization in Romania

Over the past three decades, Romanian housing rights changed from a strictly managed public stock to one governed by individual decision‐making. And while it is typical that widespread private ownership provides a basis for a well‐functioning housing market, in Romania this has not been the case. Indeed, rather than creating a market that spontaneously allocates resources efficiently, housing privatization in Romania has created exclusion rights, thus creating an Anti‐commons problem. This problem can have effects similar to those of the tragedy of the Commons in which those who share a common good overuse it. In the Anti‐commons, in contrast, if too many owners have the right to exclude others from use of a resource, the resource is underused. In both cases, the rights allocation wastes resources.     

Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons

The continuing budget deficits and accumulating public debt that commonly plagues western democracies reflects a clash between two rationalities regarding human governance: one of private property and its conventions and one of common property and its procedural framework. Democratic budgeting creates a form of fiscal commons whose governance is subject to the tragic outcomes depicted by Garret Hardin (in Science 162:1243?C1248, 1968). To be sure, tragedy can be avoided as Elinor Ostrom (1990) explains, but only to the extent that the fiscal commons is governed in a manner consonant with Antonio De Viti de Marco??s (1936) model of the cooperative state. While the tragedy of the commons that results from this tectonic clash is an inherent feature of democratic political economy, that tragedy can nonetheless be limited through reasserting the conventions and institutions of a constitution of liberty.     

Public Sector Science And The Strategy Of The Commons

We model the conditions under which incumbent firms may purposefully create an intellectual property (IP) commons such that no firm has the incentive to invest in new product development, despite the potential profitability of a public sector invention. The strategy of spoiling incentives to innovate by eliminating exclusive IP rights—the strategy of the commons—is motivated by a fear of cannibalization and supported by a credible threat. We show how the degree of potential cannibalization is related to this market failure and characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the strategy of the commons is played.     

论社会进步的标准

社会进步主要基于公共生活演进的自然逻辑,而非应然的价值观和典章制度。如同"城池"是"社会文明"的最初门槛,社会的先进与落后主要反映在当今大都市的治理体系中。放弃而今流行的各种"两分"标准,着眼于国家在生存竞争中的兴衰,作者以两个前提下的三大标尺去解释和衡量社会形态的先进与落后。两个前提是:先进基础设施的密集程度和国防的强大程度。三大标尺是:维护公共财产及其使用秩序的程度,精算公权使用成本与收益的程度,以及劳动者再生产的社会化/均等化程度。可用三个要素证伪上述理论:能否粘合精英与平民,给较大规模的国家提供较强内聚力;能否对国外群体产生较强吸引力;能否为技术与知识的创造和普及提供较优越的环境。     

Why (not) cooperate? A cognitive model of farmers’ intention to join producer groups in Romania

After the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania, collective farms were replaced by a large number of small-scale private farms. Although cooperation seems to be a favourable choice for these smallholders, it did not develop as perhaps expected. This article explores the factors that determine the formation of the intention of Romanian vegetable farmers to join marketing cooperatives in the form of so called producer groups. Our theoretical framework refers to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour, which we model with a structural equation model. We identified as main intention drivers the expectation for better prices and easier access to capital. Perceived family support is another significant factor. The level of distrust is high. Although our trust variable is not significant as a predictor of the intention to cooperate in the model, we find qualitative indications that trust plays a role when the intention is translated into actual behaviour.     

International Integration, Risk and the Welfare State

How does international integration affect the welfare state? Does it call for a leaner or an expanded welfare state? International integration may affect the distortions caused by welfare state activities but also the risks motivating social insurance mechanisms. This paper addresses these potentially counteracting effects in a fully specified intertemporal two–country stochastic endowment model, focusing on the implications when product market integration reduces trade frictions across national product markets. It is shown that lower trade frictions may increase the marginal costs of public funds, which gives an argument for reducing (steady–state) public consumption. However, tighter integration of product markets unambiguously leads to more variability in private consumption, and this gives a case for expanding the social insurance provided via state–contingent public sector activities (automatic stabilizers). JEL classification: E30; F10; H11     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

Inside the Crystal Ball of Finance: Understanding Financial Economists' Attitudes to Market and Society

Market economists are thought to wield tremendous power—not only over financial markets but over governments that stray from the ‘market way’. Still, there is mystery about what economists think, and how they form their judgements. This article reports results from a survey of over 50 financial market economists from leading financial institutions in Australia conducted in December 2003 and January 2004. It provides insight into the opinions of economists who impact on markets and policy, especially through media commentary. The article identifies their economic and social views, comparing them with the Australian public. We then examine how professional views of economists differ from their personal views. Differences in professional and private views—especially over the role of government and labour markets—are an opportunity to ponder how judgements are formed and used. We offer tentative answers to the question: do these professionals—highly paid for their opinions—occasionally self‐censor?     

Private takings

This paper examines the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling, Kelo v. City of New London (2005). Kelo can be interpreted as supporting eminent domain as a means of transferring property rights from one set of private agents—landowners—to another private agent—a developer. Under voluntary exchange, where the developer sequentially acquires property rights from landowners via bargaining, a holdout problem arises. Eminent domain gives all of the bargaining power to the developer and, as a result, eliminates the holdout problem. This is the benefit of Kelo. However, landowners lose all their bargaining power and, as a result, their property investments become more inefficient. This is the cost of Kelo. A policy of eminent domain increases social welfare compared to voluntary sequential exchange only when the holdout problem is severe, and this occurs only if the developer has very little bargaining power. We propose an alternative government policy that eliminates the holdout problem but does not affect the bargaining power of the various parties. This alternative policy strictly dominates a policy of eminent domain, which implies that eminent domain is an inefficient way to transfer property rights between private agents.     

OPTIMAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS IN A FEDERATION: A SIMPLE, UNIFIED FRAMEWORK

In a federation with n≥ 2 regions the relative optimality of five regimes – autarky, centralization, unregulated devolution, regulated devolution and direct democracy – is examined. Public policy consists of redistribution and regional public good provision. Regional incomes are uncertain and correlated. Estimates of the usefulness of regional public goods are uncertain and the federal government's estimates are noisier relative to those of regional governments. The optimality of each regime is influenced by four margins – regional insurance, coarseness of federal information, internalization of spillovers and raiding the commons. Regulated devolution is the only regime that is capable of producing the constrained first best level of public goods. Federal insurance under direct democracy can be inadequate relative to that under a utilitarian federal government. An increase in the number of regions allows better risk pooling but also greater opportunities for raiding the commons.     

A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis

The tragedy of the anticommons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their economic or political power for their own purposes without consent of the other players of the economic or political game. I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone countries’ policies toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anticommons in this paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends of public and private finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out programs of the Eurozone countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ competitive and non-cooperative approach to the Greek financial problems. I shall also show that a coordinating agency, say the IMF, can foster the coordinated outcome only under strict informational conditions.     

Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.     

The Next Great Depression II: The Impending Financial Collapse

I seek to put social provisioning into perspective with regard to the financial instability issue in capitalism. My analysis rests on an institutionalist-Minskyian endogenous instability assumption and maintains that monetary/financial stability is a peculiar public good or specific commons since it concerns all of society and its viability in time, not individuals involved in private financial relations. Consequently, the provision of financial stability becomes essentially a matter of public policy and requires the intervention of public power in order to prevent finance from becoming a public “bad.” This result relies on the distinction between private “normal” goods and ambivalent/transversal money (and related financial relations). I point to the necessity of a public organization and tight regulation of finance and financial markets, when standard equilibrium models assume that social optimum and stability can be provided by private self-adjustment and market prices mechanisms.     

The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public‐private mixed health care system, where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors. Voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income, and public policy choices are part of a multi‐dimensional, competitive political equilibrium. We show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence. We also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure.     

Modes of biotechnology assessment in the USA,Japan and Denmark

Since the 1970s technology assessment by public bodies has become generally accepted as necessary. Modes of technology assessment differ from country to country, in terms of degree of institutionalization, acceptance by policy makers and level of public involvement, and these in turn depend on the goals, methods and organizational framework of the particular technology assessment. The varying social and political roles of technology assessment arise out of national political traditions and differing cultural views of technology. This article compares modes of biotechnology assessment in the USA, Japan and Denmark, focusing on the role of public discussion in the policy-making process. By analysing these three different contexts, the article seeks to uncover ways in which the cultural conditioning of technology policy takes place.     

The political economy of legal titling

The libertarian case for legal titling is that formalization of the economic (de facto) rights of those who own land and buildings improves prospects for capitalism and, ultimately, development. Although all rich countries have private property rights, we argue that the success of legal titling depends on a certain kind of state—what we call a property-protecting state—that is often missing in developing countries. We use insights from Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics to clarify the political basis for legal titling to improve land tenure security. Evidence from Afghanistan shows that legal titling has not worked because the country does not have a property-protecting state. We suggest focusing on improving political institutions before investing in legal titling. In the meantime, it makes more sense to register land ownership at the community level, without the state.

     

基于个人利益视角的美国消防服务供给模式分析

公共产品理论认为公共产品与服务应该由政府垄断提供。但是公共选择学派在理论上的创新以及欧美国家私有化改革实践都证明了公共产品私人供给的可能性。19世纪中期美国消防服务供给模式向市政化演进，是私人利益所致，市政化对包括消防员、保险公司和政治家在内的利益集团都有益处。对中国公共产品供给政策的借鉴和启示：引导社会组织参与公共物品的提供；明确划分各级政府事权范围，并以法律形式确定下来；完善政治决策程序，提高政府服务效率。     

Going to market: A comparative study of Russian and Rromanian marketing managers

This study compares the effects of and adjustments to market economy forces on the part of marketing managers in Russia and Romania. Data supporting this comparison and the test of four hypotheses were gathered by personal interviews with Russian and Romanian managers. The findings show that, although marketing managers in both countries were drastically affected by market forces, Romanian managers were able to recognize and respond to market forces better than were Russian managers. The behavior of Romanian marketing managers also depended more on the type of enterprise ownership (state, joint stock, or private) than did the behavior of Russian marketing managers.