Aid Disaggregation and the Public Sector in Aid-Recipient Economies: Some Evidence from Cote D'Ivoire

The present paper examines the impact of different aid types, namely project aid, program aid, technical assistance, and food aid on the fiscal sector of the aid‐recipient economy by using time‐series data for Côte d’Ivoire over the period 1975–99. Our empirical results show that when a single value (or aggregated) for aid is used, foreign aid is fully consumed in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. However, results obtained under the assumption of aid heterogeneity clearly suggest that the government responds differently according to the nature of the aid inflows. Our approach tries to illuminate the response of the aid‐recipient government to different categories of foreign aid inflows and the empirical findings clearly demonstrate the importance of the aid disaggregation approach for delving deeper into aid effectiveness issues.     

Need,Merit, or Self‐Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?

Previous studies of aid allocation have concluded that foreign aid is allocated not only according to development needs but also according to donor self‐interest. We revisit this topic and allow for donor‐ as well as recipient‐specific effects in our analysis. In addition to comments on the statistical significance of our results we assess the relative economic importance of recipient need, merit, and donor self‐interest. Our results indicate that all bilateral donors allocate aid according to their self‐interest and recipient need. However, most bilateral donors seem to place little importance on recipient merit. Less than 1% of the variance of aid is accounted for by merit, ceteris paribus. The UK and Japan are exceptions: they allocate more aid to countries with higher growth, higher democracy scores, and fewer human rights abuses.     

Donor ideology and types of foreign aid

We examine how donor government ideology influences the composition of foreign aid flows. We use data for 23 OECD countries over the period 1960–2009 and distinguish between multilateral and bilateral aid, grants and loans, recipient characteristics such as income and political institutions, tied and untied aid, and aid by sector. The results show that leftist governments increased the growth of bilateral grant aid, and more specifically grant aid to least developed and lower middle-income countries. Our findings confirm partisan politics hypotheses because grants are closely analogous to domestic social welfare transfer payments, and poverty and inequality are of greatest concern for less developed recipient countries.     

Darlings and Orphans: Interactions across Donors in International Aid

We examine how the bilateral aid flows from an individual donor to a recipient depend on the aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral donors to that recipient. Thereby, we assess to what extent issues including donor coordination, free‐riding, selectivity, specialization, and common donor interests drive bilateral aid allocations. We find that others’ bilateral flows lead to a significant increase in aid flows from a particular donor, but primarily within a given year. The effects are particularly pronounced for large donors and so‐called “darling” recipients. Overall, the results suggest that herding is a dominant feature of aid inter‐relationships.     

Are Aid Flows Excessive or Insufficient? Estimating the Growth Impact of Aid in Threshold Regressions

Existing empirical studies and policy reports provide ambiguous results on the growth effect of foreign aid flows in the recipient countries. The present paper examines whether there exists an aid threshold that determines the growth impact of foreign aid. We use a threshold regression methodology to estimate growth specifications and the associated aid thresholds in a sample of 42 aid recipients covering the period 1970–2000. Our findings indicate that there is a threshold level of aid, above which the growth impact of aid becomes positive.     

The Trojan-Horse Principle in Development Assistance: A Reading of Uganda's Experience with Aid

The World Bank recommends “ideas, not money” as a guiding principle to donors for dealing with badly governed countries. This paper challenges that principle on the basis of a study of the evolution in Uganda of pro‐growth policies in the early to mid 1990s and pro‐poor policies in the late 1990s. The analysis of Uganda’s experience with aid is accommodated within the theoretical framework of a principal–agent conditionality game, in which policy objectives of the recipient (the agent) evolve over time. The key finding of the paper is that the apparent conditionality failure of the period 1987–91 has paved the way for later reform. Financial aid given during this period suspended the necessity of reforms and bought donor proximity to recipient policy deliberations, as a result of both of which the policy learning could take place that led to later successful reform measures.     

Aid, Growth and Democracy

To the extent that aid is justified by the benefits to the recipient, rather than to the donor, it might be reasonably judged on two criteria: growth and poverty-alleviation. We study the first of these criteria. We find that the long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the degree of political and civil liberties in the recipient country. Aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with an institutionalized check on governmental power; that is, in more democratic countries. The data suggest, however, that if this is not the case, aid will be used to satisfy the government's own non-productive goals. We also find that aid on average is not channeled to more democratic countries, even though there are large cross-country differences between major donors.     

Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?

This paper examines the welfare effects of the exclusivity of foreign aid taking consideration of donor countries' strategic and self-interested economic motivations. Based on an oligopolistic model with strategic interactions between firms and governments providing foreign aid, we demonstrate that a higher exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of tied aid, increases the equilibrium amount of aid and the social welfare of the recipient country when the foreign aid policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion between donor countries. However, when donor countries coordinate aid policies to maximize joint-welfare including recipient country's welfare, the lower exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of untied aid, will increase the equilibrium amount of aid and the global social welfare. The results implicate that when a credible enforcement mechanism for the cooperative regime for foreign aid is not available, tied aid is welfare dominant policy for both donor and recipient countries than untied aid.     

Foreign aid and economic growth: The role of flexible labor supply

This paper examines the link between foreign aid, economic growth, and welfare in a small open economy. External transfers impinge on the recipient's macroeconomic performance by affecting resource allocation decisions and relative prices. The endogeneity of the labor–leisure choice plays a crucial role in the propagation of foreign aid shocks. The efficacy of foreign aid also depends on externalities associated with the public good that it helps finance. The impact of tied and untied aid on the recipient government's intertemporal fiscal balance is examined. Finally, the transitional adjustment to a foreign aid shock is shown to be sensitive to the elasticity of substitution in production and the relative importance of the labor–leisure choice in utility.     

Can cross–border pollution reduce pollution?

We develop a two–country model of foreign aid and cross–border pollution resulting from production activities in the recipient country. There is both private and public abatement of pollution, the latter being financed through emissions tax revenue and foreign aid. We characterize a Nash equilibrium in which the donor country chooses the amount of aid and the recipient chooses the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement and the emission tax rate. At this equilibrium, an increase in the donor’s perceived rate of cross–border pollution reduces emission levels. JEL Classification: Q28, F35, H41 Est–ce que la pollution trans–frontière peut réduire le niveau de pollution? Les auteurs développent un modèle à deux pays d’aide à l’étranger et de pollution trans–frontière résultant d’activités de production dans le pays qui reçoit l’aide. Il existe des efforts privés et publics pour réduire la pollution, ces derniers étant financés par les rentrées fiscales d’une taxe sur la pollution et par l’aide étrangère. On définit un équilibre à la Nash pour lequel le pays donateur choisit le montant de l’aide, et le pays récipiendaire choisit la fraction de l’aide étrangère qu’il allouera à la lutte à la pollution ainsi que le taux de taxation sur la pollution. A cet équilibre, un accroissement dans le taux de pollution trans–frontière perçu par le donataire réduit le taux de pollution.     

Migration,Foreign Aid and the Welfare State

Aspects related to the links between international migration, foreign aid and the welfare state are highlighted in this paper. Migration is modeled as a costly movement from an aid‐recipient developing country with low income and no welfare state, towards a rich donor, developed country with a well‐developed welfare state. Within this model, it is found, among other things, that the best response of the developed donor country is to increase aid as the co‐financing rate by the recipient country increases. When the immigration cost decreases, e.g. as a result of greater economic integration between the two countries, it is beneficial for the donor country to increase aid and the recipient country to increase the co‐financing rate.     

Aid,institutions and economic growth in sub‐Saharan Africa: Heterogeneous donors and heterogeneous responses

This study contributes to the aid‐effectiveness debate using panel data from 43 sub‐Saharan African countries over the period 1980–2013. Its novelty lies in assessing the intermediary role of institutions and the importance of recipient and donor heterogeneity. The long‐run growth effect of (aggregate) aid from “traditional” donors is robustly non‐positive, and the indirect effect is negative. Disaggregation reveals donor heterogeneity. Chinese aid outperforms aggregate aid from traditional donors with respect to growth; however, it has a negative institutional effect. Recipient heterogeneity is largely a short‐run phenomenon, with only a few countries showing some deviations from shared long‐run parameter sets. Comparing donor behavior suggests that the future of aid would benefit more from focusing on quality – particularly, specialization and donor alignment.     

Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Business‐cycle Fluctuations*

This paper investigates business‐cycle effects for a country’s foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows. Ordinary least squares and panel regressions show that volatility in economic growth has a negative and significant impact on FDI outflows. Furthermore, we find different types of shocks have asymmetric impacts on FDI outflows. In other words, fluctuations of the same magnitude in a boom and a recession have different effects on FDI outflows. This relationship is more evident in OECD countries. We also include exchange rate volatility, lagged business‐cycle measure, and control for potential endogeneity problems as robustness checks. Our findings are robust across different specifications.     

Aid and the Delegated Fight Against Terrorism

A positive empirical relationship is found between the level of foreign aid received by a country and the number of terrorist attacks originating from it. A simple model is used to explain it, where the donor delegates some actions against terrorism to the aid‐recipient government. Aid is endogenous in an econometric equation explaining participation in terrorist events, as expected from the model, and an attacks‐supply curve in which aid has a negative impact is presented at the end.     

Foreign Aid under Quantitative Restrictions: Welfare Effects and International Factor Mobility

Using a two‐country, general‐equilibrium model of international trade, this paper incorporates pre‐existing quantitative trade restrictions and international factor mobility into the transfer problem analysis. The effects of foreign aid on the welfare of both the donor and recipient nations are identified under each form of quantitative trade restriction: quotas and voluntary export restraints (VERs). In doing so, this paper identifies conditions under which international transfers are strictly Pareto‐improving (i.e. increase global welfare). A central result of this analysis is the direct welfare effect of a transfer received by a nation with quota‐constrained (VER‐constrained) imports is enhanced (may be enhanced) by a worsening of the recipient’s terms of trade.     

Remittances and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid

We argue that donors could improve the effectiveness of foreign aid by pursuing complementary and coherent non‐aid policies. In particular, we hypothesize that aid has stronger growth effects if recipients receive more aid from donors who allow for (temporary) worker mobility and (more permanent) migration. We focus on overall remittances paid by the donor countries to proxy for worker mobility and migration. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that higher remittances paid by donor countries strengthen the growth effects of foreign aid.     

Need,Merit and Politics in Multilateral Aid Allocation: A District‐level Analysis of World Bank Projects in India

We assess the targeting of foreign aid within recipient countries by employing Poisson estimations on the determinants of the World Bank's allocation of project aid at the district level in India. The evidence of needs‐based location choices is very weak as long as the poverty orientation of overall commitments is taken as the yardstick. It is only for some sectors that we find stronger indications of needs‐based allocation when combining sector‐specific commitments with corresponding measures of need. The evidence for a merit‐based allocation of World Bank aid is even weaker. We typically do not find evidence that aid allocation is affected by political patronage at the state or district level. However, the World Bank prefers districts where foreign direct investors may benefit from projects related to infrastructure.     

Foreign aid and governance in Africa

This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the debate on foreign aid and to verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data from 52 African countries for the period 1996–2010. An endogeneity robust instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares empirical strategy is employed. The findings reveal that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice and accountability) governance. While, these findings are broadly in accordance with Moyo and Collier on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank position on political governance nor the Asongu stance on the aid-corruption nexus in a debate with Okada and Samreth. The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence the election and replacement of political leaders in Africa may have insignificant results. It is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid and that economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political governance in recipient countries.     

Cost-effectiveness of foreign aid programs in the baltics

After the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Western world has given considerable aid to the fledgling democracies. In this paper we draw a summary from Baltic experience in the fields of educational programs, scientific and environmental programs, and commercial projects in banking, taxation, and energy. We analyze the motivation and identify different possible effects of foreign aid. We signal possible inefficiencies arising from the lack of coordination of foreign aid, deal with possible waste as being a form of loss in cost-effectiveness, and address the policies followed by aid-providing agencies. Finally, we suggest ways that can help to achieve cost-effectiveness by assisting the donor and recipient in maximizing benefits gained and possibly reducing costs.     

Foreign investments in real estate,economic growth and property prices: evidence from OECD countries

The last two decades have witnessed a growth in foreign direct investments (FDI) in the real estate sector in most of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries. It is argued that FDI in the real estate sector may improve economic growth in recipient economies. On the other hand, property prices have increased considerably in OECD countries in recent years and some argue that FDI in real estate is one of the driving forces of high property prices in these countries. The purpose of this study is to analyze the interrelationship between FDI in the real estate sector, economic growth, and property prices while controlling for interest rate and inflation. We use observations from a set of OECD countries for the period between 1995 and 2008. The dynamic interrelationship is analyzed by applying a panel cointegration technique. Our empirical results show that FDI in real estate do not cause property price appreciations and also do not contribute to economic growth in OECD countries in the short run and the long run.