Anticipated fiscal policy and adaptive learning

The impact of anticipated policy changes when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations is considered. Agents are assumed to combine limited structural knowledge with a standard adaptive learning rule. These issues are analyzed using two well-known set-ups, an endowment economy and the Ramsey model. In our scenario there are important deviations from both rational expectations and purely adaptive learning. The approach could be applied to other frameworks.     

Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective

The recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules. This paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple, micro-founded models in which the policy authority uses a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Unlike previous analyses, the model economy is not linearized about a steady state—instead, a global perspective is adopted. Globally, the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities. These include a second, low inflation ‘liquidity trap’ steady state, periodic equilibria, and sunspot equilibria. The main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning, even when the policy rule obeys the Taylor principle. The stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast-based. An important finding is that backward-looking Taylor-type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority.     

Are inflation expectations rational?

Several recent papers report evidence of an apparent statistical bias in inflation expectations and interpret these findings as overturning the rational expectations hypothesis. In this paper, we investigate the validity of such an interpretation. We present a computational dynamic general equilibrium model capable of generating aggregate behavior similar to the data along several dimensions. By construction, model agents form “rational” expectations. We run a standard regression on equilibrium realizations of inflation and inflation expectations over sample periods corresponding to those tests performed on actual data and find evidence of an apparent bias in inflation expectations. Our experiments suggest that this incorrect inference is largely the product of a small sample problem, exacerbated by short-run learning dynamics in response to infrequent shifts in monetary policy regimes.     

Adaptive expectations, underparameterization and the Lucas critique

A striking implication of the replacement of adaptive expectations by rational expectations was the “Lucas critique,” which showed that expectation parameters, and endogenous variable dynamics, depend on policy parameters. We consider this issue from the vantage point of bounded rationality, where for transparency we model bounded rationality by means of simple adaptive expectations. We show that for a range of processes, monetary policy remains subject to the Lucas critique. However, there are also regimes in which the expectation parameter is locally invariant and the Lucas critique does not apply.     

Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous and Misspecified Expectations

In the recent literature on monetary policy and learning, it has been suggested that private sector's expectations should play a role in the policy rule implemented by the central bank, as they could improve the ability of the policymaker to stabilize the economy. Private sector's expectations, in these studies, are often taken to be homogeneous and rational, at least in the limit of a learning process. In this paper, instead, we consider the case in which private agents are heterogeneous in their expectations formation mechanisms and hold heterogeneous expectations in equilibrium. We investigate the impact of this heterogeneity in expectations on central bank's policy implementation and on the ensuing economic outcomes, and the general result that emerges is that the central bank should disregard inaccurate private sector expectations and solely base its policy on the accurate ones.     

Inflation Targeting,Recursive Inattentiveness,and Heterogeneous Beliefs

We consider a monetary authority that provides an explicit inflation target in order to align expectations with the policy objective. However, biased perceptions of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. We allow agents to revise expectations over time and we model their recursive choice among prediction strategies as an optimization problem under rational inattention. We then investigate whether a simple policy rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that determinacy under rational expectations may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, monetary policy should be fine‐tuned to correct agents' biased beliefs.     

Using a long-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument

Using a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint. An alternative strategy is to use a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument. We find when Taylor-type policy rules are used by the central bank to set the long rate in a standard New Keynesian model, indeterminacy—that is, multiple rational expectations equilibria—may often result. However, a policy rule with a long-rate policy instrument that responds in a “forward-looking” fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy.     

异质性通胀预期对通货膨胀形成机制的动态影响-基于混合新凯恩斯菲利普斯曲线的实证分析

通过对异质性通胀预期与实际通货膨胀动态关系的实证研究,证实了不同微观经济主体的预期都会对实际通货膨胀产生影响,并且适应性预期所占比例远远大于理性预期.更进一步,适应性预期与理性预期对实际通货膨胀的影响力不同,理性预期对实际通货膨胀的即期影响力大于适应性预期,但是影响的持久性却小于理性预期.所以央行在调控通货膨胀的时候,应关注微观经济体的通胀预期异质性,适时引导各种异质性预期,从而锚定微观经济体的预期,使得货币政策能够顺利实施.     

The learning cost of interest rate reversals

Many central banks in many time periods have sought to avoid interest rate reversals, but at present there is no good explanation of this phenomenon. Our analysis identifies a new learning cost associated with reversing the interest rate. In a standard monetary model with forward-looking expectations, data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty, a policy that frequently reverses the interest rate makes learning the key parameters of the model more difficult. Optimal monetary policy internalises this learning cost and therefore has a lower number of interest rate reversals.     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Optimal Monetary Policy,and the Merit of Policy Inertia

The design and analysis of optimal monetary policy is usually guided by the paradigm of homogeneous rational expectations. Instead, we examine the dynamic consequences of design and implementation strategies, when the actual economy features expectational heterogeneity. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations. Consequently, the central bank's ability to achieve price stability under heterogeneous expectations depends on its objective and implementation strategy. An expectations‐based reaction function, which appropriately conditions on private sector expectations, performs exceptionally well. However, once the objective introduces policy inertia, popular strategies have similar determinacy properties, but they are less operational. This finding calls for new implementation strategies under interest rate stabilization.     

中央银行前瞻性指引的理论、实效考察及对我国的启示

本文对前瞻性指引的理论基础及主要国家央行的实践进行梳理总结,对前瞻性指引的有效性、存在的不足及实施前瞻性指引的前提条件进行了分析,指出目前我国应当首先加快推进以利率市场化、建立价格调控为主的货币政策操作框架,为前瞻性指引发挥管理预期作用,成为货币政策工具补充提供基础和前提条件。同时,也应当加强对前瞻性指引的理论研究和实证效果的收集整理,为未来作为货币政策工具的选择提供充足的理论和实践准备。     

Perfecting the Market's Knowledge of Monetary Policy

The rational expectations revolution made clear that a complete macro model requires a specification of the government's economic policy. We argue that monetary policy should be conducted in such a way that the market can predict policy actions. An implication of market success in predicting policy actions is that interest rates move ahead of the policy actions, and such a timing relationship may appear to some as the central bank following the market instead of leading it. Another implication of the market predicting policy actions is that nominal interest rate changes provide no useful information to the central bank about the strength of aggregate demand or inflationary expectations. Finally, failure of the market to predict policy actions reflects a problem that needs to be addressed.We explore the theoretical implications of a monetary policy that is completely specified and perfectly understood by the market. We construct a bare-bones model to illustrate the key concepts. Finally, we conduct an empirical investigation of these issues, especially in the context of monetary policy since 1988, when the establishment of the federal funds future market made available well-defined market information on expectations about Fed policy actions. We find that when the intended funds rate is changed, interest rates over the maturity spectrum respond to news measured by changes in the one-month-ahead funds futures yield but do not respond to the anticipated component of the change in the intended funds rate.     

Inflationary finance of budget deficits as an automatic stabilizer

A rational expectations model is presented to generalize McCallum and Whitaker's (1979) model. The model demonstrates the effectiveness and stability of the full-employment budget deficit and of inflationary finance used to finance this deficit as automatic stabilizers in the determination of current income under rational expectations. Within the same model the problem of optimal dynamic stochastic monetary policy is also briefly explored.     

Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence

Monetary DGSE models under rational expectations typically require large degrees of features as habit formation in consumption and inflation indexation to match the inertia of macroeconomic variables.This paper presents an estimated model that departs from rational expectations and nests learning by economic agents, habits, and indexation. Bayesian methods facilitate the joint estimation of the learning gain coefficient together with the ‘deep’ parameters of the economy.The empirical results show that when learning replaces rational expectations, the estimated degrees of habits and indexation drop closer to zero, suggesting that persistence arises in the model economy mainly from expectations and learning.     

Monetary–Fiscal Policy Interactions under Implementable Monetary Policy Rules

This paper examines the implications of forward- and backward-looking monetary policy rules in an environment with monetary–fiscal interactions. We find that the unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is always non-Ricardian under simple implementable monetary policy rules.     

Using Survey Data of Inflation Expectations in the Estimation of Learning and Rational Expectations Models

Does survey data contain useful information for estimating macroeconomic models? We address this question by using survey data of inflation expectations to estimate the New Keynesian model by Smets and Wouters ( 2007 ) and compare its performance under rational expectations and adaptive learning. The survey information serves as an additional moment restriction and helps us to determine the learning agents' forecasting model for inflation. Adaptive learning fares similarly to rational expectations in fitting macro data, but clearly outperforms rational expectations in fitting macro and survey data simultaneously. In other words, survey data contain additional information that is not present in the macro data alone.     

The Value of Interest Rate Stabilization Policies When Agents Are Learning

We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in the "New Keynesian" model where monetary policy is optimally derived and interest rate stabilization is added to the central bank's traditional objectives of inflation and output stabilization. We consider both the case where the central bank lacks a commitment technology and the case of full commitment. We show that for both cases, optimal policy rules yield rational expectations equilibria that are E-stable for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. These findings stand in contrast to Evans and Honkapohja's findings for optimal monetary policy rules in environments where interest rate stabilization is not a central bank objective.     

Rational expectations forecasts from nonrational models

This paper puts forward a method of policy simulation with an existing macroeconometric model under the maintained assumption that individuals form their expectations rationally. This new simulation technique grows out of Lucas' criticism that standard econometric policy evaluation permits policy rules to change but doesn't allow expectations mechanisms to respond as economic theory predicts they will. The technique is applied to versions of the St. Louis Federal Reserve model and the Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn (FMP) model to simulate the effects of different constant money growth policies. The results of these simulations indicate that the problem identified by Lucas may be of great quantitative importance in the econometric analysis of policy alternatives.     

Adaptive learning, forecast-based instrument rules and monetary policy

This paper argues that recently popular forecast-based instrument rules for monetary policy may fail to stabilize economic fluctuations. In a New Keynesian model of output gap and inflation determination in which private agents face multi-period decision problems, but have non-rational expectations and learn over time, if the monetary authority adopts a forecast-based instrument rule and responds to observed private forecasts then this class of policies frequently induce divergent learning dynamics. A central bank that correctly understands private behavior can mitigate such instability by responding to the determinants of private forecasts. This suggests gathering information on the determinants of expectations to be useful.     

A ‘rational’ explanation for ‘irrational’ forecasts of inflation

This paper analyzes professionals' forecasts of nominal income and the inflation rate. The analysis indicates that both monetary and fiscal policy data was used efficiently to forecast income, but the monetary policy data was not used efficiently to forecast the inflation rate. Further analysis suggests that the apparent inefficient use of the monetary data results from the non-stationary money-inflation relationship predicted by rational expectations models. These models then provide an explanation for the inconsistent conclusions regarding the income forecasts and the inflation rate forecasts.